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Abstract 
This study is broadly concerned with the analysis of ideology in discourse. 
More specifically, it investigates the role modality plays in reflecting underlying 
ideologies as well as ideological inconsistencies in three practical analyses of 
discourse. 
Achieving these objectives is, I argue, dependent on a view of discourse which 
is not only functional but also pragmatic. The functional aspect of this view reflects 
the broad objectives of functional linguistics: i.e. relating linguistic structures to social 
structures. The pragmatic aspect reflects an emphasis on the need not to exclude 'the 
reader' from the process of interpretation. Whereas previous studies have either 
entirely neglected or presented an unsatisfactory account of the reader, the proposed 
functional-pragmatic approach to discourse analysis resolves this issue by allowing a 
systematic variance in interpretation. This is done in the light of a systematic account 
of modality which helps present a realistic and practical consideration of the role of 
the reader in approaching discourse analysis. 
Again, in line with a functional and pragmatic view of discourse, the argument 
put forward in this study is that all 'types' of discourse can be approached in a similar 
manner for critical analysis. Consequently, practical analyses of ideology through 
modality in three instances of discourse: literary texts, political texts and scientific 
texts are presented. The overall aim is to show how a systematic, functional and 
pragmatic analysis of modality is adequate in critically analysing the ideologies 
present in all texts. 
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Introduction 
The motivation behind this project initially arose from personal fascination 
with the power of language and its potential in influencing people at the ideological 
level. By observing the effects language, in all its linguistic manifestations, can have 
on people, whether through journalistic writing, advertising, literature, politics, 
science, etc, it became apparent that not all aspects of the language have the same 
persuasive weight. The broad objectives of this study thus became an attempt to 
investigate how and which aspects of language play more significant roles in 
ideologically manipulating hearers/readers, and ultimately, how these aspects of 
language could be systematically analysed. 
After thorough readings on the notion of ideology, both Marxist and Post-
Marxist, and other related readings on applications of theories of ideology in 
discourse analysis, the need to focus on the linguistic aspect of modality became more 
obvious. It was seen that modality has not only received little consideration at the 
practical level, but that it had also been handled rather unsatisfactorily through the 
process of modal categorisation; i.e. at the theoretical descriptive level. Indeed, 
modality was seen as one indispensable but "sorely neglected interpersonal" aspect of 
meaning (Weber 1992: 22), whose practical potential was relatively unexplored 
despite views like Fowler's (1977) who sees that: 
in real texts and utterances there is no content without modality, no communication of ideas 
except in the framework of interpersonal values and relational language. 
(Fowler 1977: 79) 
The reasons behind the blatant disregard of this apparently highly influential 
aspect of language were not to be underestimated. As Lakoff (1972: 229) points out. 
accounting for modality in English is an extremely complex task since modals are in 
fact "semantically highly irregular and unpredictable". And this explains both the 
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diversity in approaches that have attempted to undertake that task as well as the 
obvious gaps in the available categorisation. 
Following from that, this thesis seeks to investigate the role modality plays in 
reflecting the ideological positions of text producers in discourse. This is done by 
providing a practically applicable approach to critically interpreting ideology in 
discourse through a systematic analysis of modality. In the light of the broad 
objectives of functional linguistics and the multifunctional view of language proposed 
by Halliday (1978, 1985), i.e. analysing the relationship between the linguistic system 
-and social structures, the more specific aim of this thesis is to relate the linguistic 
feature of modality to that central aspect of social structures known as ideology. 
The goals of each chapter in this thesis are thus divided in the following 
manner. In the first chapter, the search for an adequate underlying theoretical and 
practical framework starts by accounting for the difficulties in doing discourse 
analysis in general. Adopting Halliday's (1978, 1985) functional theory of language 
inevitably leads to a systematic review of those necessary constituents of discourse in 
the light of that theory. 
In the second chapter, I intend to argue for the position that all types of 
discourse, even literary discourse, can be approached in the same manner for critical 
analysis. This involves a set of positions concerning the issues of style and stylistics 
as well as to how the notion of 'the reader' can be accounted for in such a view of 
discourse. The objectives of the second chapter are therefore to describe and analyse 
the associations and interactions among a set of traditionally controversial terms: 
literary language and non-literary language, style and stylistics, ideology and 
discourse. The view put forward is that literature does not constitute a special type of 
discourse since it is subject to the same linguistic and social determinants as any other 
type of discourse. Therefore, and in line with the aims of this thesis, if we are to 
approach literary discourse from a critical perspective, then this means that the area of 
focus is no longer the aesthetic features of a text but rather ideological aspects. As 
long as a text (literary or non-literary) addresses ideological concerns, and as long as 
the primary objective of analysing it is to explore the ideological implications of that 
text within a social setting, no approaches which specifically target literary discourse 
as opposed to non-literary discourse can be justified. All this serves as a prerequisite 
for Chapters Five, Six and Seven which involve three analyses of three different 
'types' of discourse: literary discourse, political discourse and scientific discourse. 
Chapter Three then targets the issue of modality by providing a critical review 
of most approaches to categorising modality in the last four decades. The main 
objective behind this review is to arrive at a clear position concerning what constitutes 
modality and how it can be practically accounted for in the light of our functional 
purpose. It mainly focuses on both the diversity of approaches that undertook that task 
as well as the incompleteness of each of them. This is meant to reflect the complexity 
of modality as a notion and the difficulty of accounting for it in a systematic and neat 
manner. 
Based on the advantages and shortcomings of these approaches, the fourth 
chapter proceeds by providing a more appropriate account of modality, which satisfies 
the intended tasks of Chapters Five, Six and Seven by directly relating it to ideology. 
The aim of Chapter Four is to outline a framework which focuses on the two main 
modality systems in the English language (epistemic and deontic) as playing a 
decisive role in indicating the type and degree of involvement a speaker has in the 
content of his/her message, and ultimately, an attitude/position towards the object of 
his/her message. This attitude/position is directly related to the notion of ideology in 
the light of a view of an existing relationship between modality and ideology in 
discourse. Keeping the multifunctional nature of discourse in mind, the proposed 
account of modality which will be used for the analysis of ideology in discourse is 
both systematic and flexible. These are necessary constituents of an approach, one of 
whose objectives is to provide a realistic and practical account of the role of the 
reader through the extended role of context in a variety of texts. In view of the 
underlying functional theoretical basis to the suggested approach, the way modality 
and ideology interact provide a useful and suitable field for examining how the 
ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions of language and meaning interact. 
In Chapter Five, the main objective is to provide a practical examination of 
how modality and ideology interact with specific reference to two literary passages 
from Conrad's Heart of Darkness. The first reason for doing so is to present the first 
of three practical implementations of the theoretical issues discussed by then. The 
second is to show the workability of the approach proposed with what is unanimously 
acknowledged as a work of literature. And finally, the analysis aims at providing a 
reading of what is generally deemed as the ambiguous and/or dualistic ideological 
position of the main narrator in the novel, Marlow. All these are done through a 
pragmatic and systematic analysis of the way modality and ideology functionally 
interact in discourse. 
In Chapter Six, the plan is to examine the different effects of the varying use 
of modality in reflecting the ideologies put forward by two political texts addressing 
the same political issue. After tracing the political backgrounds which the two 
speakers represent, the differences in the frequency, type of modal expressions, and 
degree of strength of these expressions between the two political speeches will be 
analysed and interpreted. This will be done in light of the enveloping ideologies of the 
two political parties, the varying audiences and the differences in the situation for 
each of the USA and the UK. 
Finally, in Chapter Seven, the analyses of the two scientific texts are intended 
to firstly, explore the ideological implications of the traditional and historical view of 
science and scientific discourse as reflecting objectivity and relating to 'the truth'. 
More specifically, and based on Post-Marxist views, the chapter also aims to assess 
the way modality functions and is utilised in scientific discourse and how that relates 
to the ideological claims of the two texts under study. Finally, and in line with the 
view adopted in this thesis, the non-political ideologies of the two texts are 
foregrounded in order to emphasise the existence of ideological struggles in discourse 
which are not always necessarily and exclusively political in that their main objective 
is political hegemony. 
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I Discourse Analysis: A Critical Review 
1.1 The First Obstacle: Defining Discourse 
A researcher in the field of discourse analysis faces quite a number of 
obstacles, the first of which is discouragingly at the onset of any discourse-related 
research: the definition of the term discourse. In the search for an adequate definition 
of the term, several complexities arise. The first of these is, according to Mills (1997), 
an etymological one. Apart from its Latin and Middle English roots, confusion in 
defining discourse has arisen mainly due to a discrepancy between the core meaning 
of the term discours in French (where it is essentially synonymous with 'speech') and 
its more current use in English. Following that, although the English 'discourse' does 
not correspond exactly with its French counterpart, it was confused with the French 
sense of the word for a period of time (Mills 1997: 2-3). Ultimately, this muddle 
affected both writers as well as readers/interpreters of literature on discourse. 
Another source of difficulty in defining discourse is that the use of the same 
term in different contexts has eventually diversified its meaning. As van Dijk (1997d: 
1) points out, 'discourse' can generally be used in reference to "a form of language 
use, public speeches or '" to spoken language or ways of speaking" when making 
reference to, for instance, "the discourse of former President Ronald Reagan" . Yet 
this is only one of its senses. In speaking of "the discourse of neo-liberalism" for 
example, van Dijk (l997d: 2) points out that the term 'discourse' would not refer o n l ~ ~
to "the language use of neo-liberal thinkers or politicians, but also to the ideas or 
philosophies propagated by them". Therefore, different contexts are seen to bring out 
different senses in the meaning of the term which consequently contribute to the 
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difficulty in being precise in its use and definition. How 'discourse' is defined 
depends on the area of meaning the term is seen to cover. 
However, one common factor which underlies both these reasons for the 
fuzziness in the definition of the term is that the researcher's understanding of it 
depends largely on and is motivated by a diversity of underlying disciplines. 
Disciplines such as linguistics, psychology and sociology, for example, which 
naturally have selective and dissimilar interests in discourse, tend to focus on one or 
another area, thus highlighting or undermining some of the different dimensions of 
discourse. Therefore, the dependence of the term 'discourse' on other underlying 
disciplines gives rise to definitions reflecting a variety of perspectives, thus branching 
and shaping these branches of 'discourse' in such a way to suit different objectives. 
Although there are positive outcomes to this diversification, such as how it eventually 
leads to more precise and specified uses of the term, there are less positive 
consequences mainly in that the number of definitions increases. Ultimately, faced 
with the large number and variety of definitions of the term 'discourse' arising from 
the number of dissimilar views and related factors that are considered, the analyst's 
task becomes increasingly complex. Nonetheless, in spite of these difficulties, it is 
crucial to explore the meaning of 'discourse' in order to limit the sense in which it 
will be used in this thesis. 
1.2 The Second Obstacle: The Structure-Function Controversy 
Apart from the problems associated with defining the term 'discourse', the 
second major obstacle facing the discourse analyst is selecting the appropriate 
approach to its analysis. This is a complex task due to a) the large number of available 
approaches springing from b) more than one underlying theoretical linguistic basis. In 
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other words, a prerequisite to selecting the adequate approach to discourse analysis is 
another decision regarding the underlying theoretical basis for it. This is a necessary 
decision since different underlying linguistic theories reflect and emphasise different 
dimensions of discourse and consequently suggest which aspects of discourse should 
be analysed and how. The main point is that the existence of more than one theoretical 
linguistic basis to discourse as well as the diversity in the approaches to its analysis 
does not make the whole project any easier. 
Still, this is not an endless, futile endeavour. According to Schiffrin (1994), 
the numerous existing branches in discourse analysis are not varied to a point where 
they are fundamentally disparate. There are unifying theoretical factors. In her book, 
Approaches to Discourse Analysis, Schiffrin convincingly argues for two main 
underlying theoretical bases to all approaches to discourse analysis. These are the 
structural and the functional views of discourse, which respectively find their roots in 
structural and functional theories of language and linguistics. Therefore, before 
elaborating on the different approaches to discourse (which will be done in section 
1.4), it is crucial to briefly chart the main principles behind the two most influential 
theories of language and linguistics since these constitute the bases and backgrounds 
from which structural and functional approaches to discourse adopt their principles. 
1.2.1 Structural Theories of Language 
The structural and functional theories of language are those respectively 
advocated first by Bloomfield (1933) and then Chomsky (1965) on the one hand, and 
by Firth (1935) and then Halliday (1978) on the other. Starting with the structural 
view, Bloomfield (1933: 22) proclaims the goal of linguistics as that of describing 
regularities in language according to "well-defined p r o c e d u r e s " ~ ~ i.e. mainly based on 
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structural notions like phonology and syntax. A prerequisite to this description is the 
collection of the largest number of actual spoken utterances (a corpus), which would 
originate from "the language of all persons alike" and which would therefore be 
representative of a speech-community (Bloomfield 1933: 22). Taking the language of 
a speech-community as its basis, structuralist linguistics would then try to rearrange 
this "primary data in as economical a way as possible" (Atkinson et al 1989: 32) in 
order to highlight the structured nature of language. This is usually done using a set of 
general rules and abstract principles. 
However, one of the numerous problems encountered by this theory, and 
which led to direct criticisms by behaviourists such as Skinner (1957), was related to 
the manner in which data were collected. Such data usually originated from reports by 
individual subjects of events taking place in their consciousness. This highly 
"introspective" method of data collection was viewed as the primary technique in 
producing the subject-matter of investigation (Atkinson et a11989: 32). Direct 
objection to this method of data collection by Skinner (1957) for instance eventually 
led to the intervention of behaviourist psychology in the process. There, attention was 
drawn away from "introspectionism" as a means for collecting data to collection done 
at the level of the group. However, with this positive step came the view of language 
that emerged in the light of behaviourist psychology: language as behaviour (Mackey 
1978: 6). This meant that the main objective of the structuralist-behaviourist theory 
became the study of the structure of language behaviour and grouping these different 
behavioural patterns into sets with structural headings. Grammatical rules were 
deducible and could be generalised based on linguistic choices made collectively by 
language speakers and not through the intuitions of indi vidual language users. 
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This was the main point contested in Chomskian, transfonnationalist 
linguistics: i.e. the claim that language is considered to be simply a set of behaviours 
which can be easily conditioned and controlled. According to Chomsky (1965: 4), 
linguistic theory should instead be concerned "with discovering a mental reality 
underlying actual behaviour". This reflects Chomsky's view that linguistic theory 
should be essentially mentalistic rather than mechanistic (Mackey 1978: 5). In parallel 
with Saussure's notions of langue and parole, Chomsky (1965: 4) proposed to study 
language competence, where competence refers to "the speaker-hearer's [intrinsic] 
knowledge of his language", rather than perfonnance, which refers to "the actual 
[extrinsic] use of language in concrete situations". Interest in language competence 
then led to the introduction of Chomsky's (1965: 3) "ideal speaker-hearer" who (or 
rather which) is a theoretical construct only present "in a homogeneous speech 
community, who knows its language perfectly, and is unaffected by such 
grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of 
attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge 
of the language in actual perfonnance". The aim of linguistic theory is to produce an 
adequate grammar which "must assign to each of an infinite range of sentences a 
structural description indicating how this sentence is understood by the ideal speaker-
hearer"(Chomsky'1965: 4). This would be a "universal grammar", an underlying 
system of rules which no speaker is aware of or "can become aware of' (Chomsky 
1965: 8). It would also be a "generative grammar": a system of rules, serving as the 
basis for any externalised form of language use (i.e. performance) in that it underlies 
all the surface differences of various languages (Chomsky 1965: 8). 
In short, Chomsky (1965) is only interested in the study of language as a 
feature of the human mind as present in an idealised situation and not in the actual 
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language used by real people in real situations, since any form of deviation from 
"universal grammar" is the result of that language being affected by "irrelevant" 
factors. At the same time, although Chomsky's views appear to be radically variant 
from the earlier structuralists', they are still seen to fall into the structural frame since 
the main differences between the two structuralist views of language relate to whether 
language structures are to be studied as a feature of competence (Chomsky's view) or 
performance (Bloomfield and Skinner's views). 
In the light of the structuralist theories of language, the roots of the structural 
view of discourse can be easily traced. Here discourse is regarded merely as another 
level of structure, as "an organized linguistic unit above the sentence or clause" 
(Stubbs 1983: 1). This is based on the premise that although language might have 
"social and cognitive functions," these functions do not affect the "internal 
organization of language" (Schiffrin 1994: 22-23). As a result, in their emphasis on 
the structured nature of language, a structuralist analysis would focus on "the way the 
different units function in relation to each other" (Schiffrin 1994: 22-23), disregarding 
"the functional relations with the context of which discourse is a part" (van Dijk 1985: 
4). 
1.2.2 Functional Theories of Language 
On the other hand, the more recent functional theory of language as advocated 
by Halliday (1978) presents a completely variant position and starts off from the 
earlier Firthian (1935) view that linguistics should deal with meaning rather than 
structure. According to Firth (1935), "all linguistics [is] the study of meaning and all 
meaning [is] function in a context" (in Firth 1964: 8). As a result, and following Firth, 
Halliday (1985: xxxi) emphasises the interconnection between language structures 
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and language functions and his distance from the earlier mentalistic structuralist 
theory. For instance, Halliday's notion of "meaning potential" is defined in terms of 
culture, not mind, since meaning potential is related to "what speakers can do and can 
mean, not what they know" (de Beaugrande 1991: 225). 
In his book An Introduction to Functional Grammar, Halliday (1985: 10) 
emphasises these points by arguing that "grammatical phenomena" are directly related 
to "features of culture ... in extremely complex and abstract" ways. This view of 
language presented a linguistically innovative position concerning the relationships 
betweenthe three main categories: structure,junction and meaning, thus highlighting 
the social dimensions of language. People, Halliday (1978: 2) explains, "by their 
everyday acts of meaning, ... act out the social structure affirming their own statuses 
and roles and establishing and transmitting the shared systems of values and 
knowledge" [emphasis mine]. What this means is that when language users "actively 
engage in text and talk", they both display and construct their roles and identities (van 
Dijk 1997c: 3), and this gives rise to the view of language as "a form of social 
practice" (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). 
From Halliday's statement above, his view can then be seen as functional in 
different ways and at several levels: i.e. what Halliday refers to as "multifunctional". 
Firstly, in the very act of using language, people necessarily perform functions at the 
basic linguistic communicative level. However, there are other functions performed 
through the use of language such as the "acting out the social structure," and 
"affirming their own statuses ... ". This means that people use language for purposes 
other than only communicating a message at the level of relating signs or sounds to 
agreed-upon notions of meaning (which goes beyond simple 'sense' and 'reference'). 
Instead, they "act out" or display their "statuses", "roles" and ideologies in the 
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process: i.e. they engage in "social interaction". This is another functional level. 
Finally, people not only "act out" these statuses, roles and ideologies, but they also 
establish and transmit them. This functional level hints towards the significance and 
weight given to the interaction between language and society, emphasising the role of 
language in transmitting not only meaning, but also relations between participants in a 
linguistic interaction. 
Each functional level pointed out above reflects one or more of Halliday's 
(1985: 53) three metafunctions which are the three aspects of meaning that are present 
in each clause in each language: the ideational, the interpersonal and the textual 
metafunctions. Ideational meaning according to Halliday (1985: 53) refers to "the 
representation of experience: our experience of the world that lies about us, and also 
inside us, the world of our imagination. It is meaning in the sense of 'content''', the 
initial level of relating signs and sounds to meanings. Interpersonal meaning is 
"meaning as a form of action: the speaker or writer doing something to the listener or 
reader by means of language" (Halliday 1985:53). Here, establishing the language 
users' statuses and roles and transmitting these statuses and roles is evident. Finally, 
textual meaning is "relevance to the context: both the preceding (and following) text, 
and the context of situation" (Halliday 1985: 53). And these different levels of 
meaning are evident in all texts at the same time. 
A simple way for explaining simultaneous presence and interaction amongst 
these three levels of meaning can be done by analogy to three types of maps: 
geographical, political and road maps. There, each type of map highlights different 
yet simultaneously-present features of various countries (Halliday 2001: personal 
communication). The ideational level of meaning can be compared to geographical 
maps which highlight locations, heights, natural phenomena etc. of different 
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countries. This level expresses the field of discourse: i.e. what the discourse is about 
(Halliday and Hasan 1989: 24). The interpersonal level of meaning can be understood 
by analogy with political maps which focus on geo-political borders between nations 
drawing upon the roles and relations between countries. In discourse, this is referred 
to as the tenor of discourse: i.e. who the participants are and what their roles and 
relationships between each other are (Halliday and Hasan 1989: 24). Finally, the 
textual level can be compared to road maps which show the different ways to take in 
order to get from one point to another. This, by analogy, is referred to as the mode of 
discourse: i.e. what part the language is playing in the interactive process (Halliday 
and Hasan 1989: 24). It follows then that just as all of these maps constitute different 
areas and angles of looking at one or another country and are all necessary for a more 
complete knowledge of the country, the field, tenor, and mode of discourse are all 
simultaneously present and necessary to consider in any functional analysis of 
discourse. 
Consequently, within this functional perspective, discourse is necessarily seen 
as "language in use", where language is a "complex cognitive and social 
phenomenon" (Brown and Yule 1983: 1, 271). This view assumes both that language 
has "functions that are external to the linguistic system" and that these functions affect 
"the organization of the linguistic system" (Schiffrin 1994: 22). As a resulr, functional 
approaches are seen to highlight the inseparability of language from the medium in 
which it is used, placing particular (and varying degrees of) emphasis on the 
relationship between language and context. At the same time, an essential feature of 
the functional view is its acknowledgment of the role of structure in discourse. This is 
reflected in the way Halliday equates the textual metafunction with the other two (the 
ideational and interpersonal) in his functional theory. It follows that the initial point of 
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difference between structural and functional approaches is the perspective since in 
functional approaches, it is the context which detennines the status of an utterance 
rather than its syntactic structure. And the difference in perspective ultimately affects 
the objectives and the outcomes of a functional analysis. Yet the central position in 
functional linguistics is that structure and function remain two sides of the same coin. 
To summarise, the main differences between both types of approaches to 
analysing discourse are the following. While structural approaches to the study of 
discourse mainly describe the structured nature of discourse by drawing "attention to 
systematic organizational properties" of texts and providing ways of describing them 
(Fairclough 1992: 15), functional approaches emphasise the functional dimension of 
discourse through "accounting for the linguistic features in the discourse as the means 
employed in what [language users] are doing" (Brown and Yule 1983: 26). 
In line with these differences, the temptation is to draw a definitive dividing 
line between these views of discourse and to ultimately speak of approaches to its 
analysis as either exclusively structural or exclusively functional. Yet this would in no 
way be a representative division since both approaches are more appropriately 
regarded as complementary if viewed as a natural/chronological progression. While 
there are definitive theoretical divisions between structural and functional approaches 
to discourse analysis, discourse could never be viewed except as "language in use" 
since language not in use does not exist except as a theoretical (Chomskyan) 
construct, an inadequate notion from a practical perspective. An important point to 
make is that this theoretical division between the two main schools has had its 
positive effects on the development of both approaches and has been quite 
constructive in that it contributed towards expanding our understanding of the various 
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dimensions of discourse by providing a better descriptive and analytical coverage of 
each of these dimensions. 
In that light, despite the possibility that the two starting points of any analysis 
may be predominantly either structural or functional, Schiffrin (1994), for example, 
convincingly argues for the inseparability of such approaches. She speaks of the 
presence of functional elements in what are considered as the most structural 
approaches to the analysis of discourse and a presence of structural element in the 
most functional ones. She finally demonstrates this by placing the various approaches 
on a continuum with the headings language structures on one end and language 
functions on the other, and showing how each type displays elements of the other. The 
point she makes is this: just as in a study of language one needs to consider the 
connections between language and the world, one cannot simply disregard the 
connection between structure and function in analysing discourse. This last statement 
constitutes a major premise in the analysis of discourse: i.e. the existence of a 
relationship between language and social structures which is paralleled by the 
existence of a relationship between structure and function within the plane of 
meanmg. 
Yet all in all, having to decide on the more appropriate theoretical view of 
language to be adopted in this thesis, the above argument aimed to show that the more 
balanced view is that which does not overlook the interaction between language 
structures, functions and meaning. This is specifically a functional view of language 
and not a structural one. 
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1.2.3 Structure and Function in Discourse 
Trying to be more specific in selecting the relevant approach to the analysis of 
discourse, which would have those broad functional basis mentioned above the , 
discourse analyst has to make decisions concerning: 
1) the type of relationship that exists between structure and function as well 
as the degree of dependence and effect of one on the other, and 
2) what other extralinguistic and contextual factors to include in any analysis. 
From the Hallidayan functional perspective, the relationship that exists 
between structure and function (where function reflects all three metafunctions of 
language discussed above) in discourse cannot be separated from social structures 
within a social context. This is evident in Halliday's (1985: xxxi) assertion that 
"grammatical phenomena" are directly related to "features of culture". Yet the more 
urgent issue to address here concerns the type of relationship between language and 
social structures: i.e. how these affect each other. The starting point in any functional 
approach to discourse analysis is an acknowledgement that the use of language 
structures reveals more than surface meanings of utterances. As Fowler puts it: 
Linguistic expressions 'package' experiences of the world and encode different views of the 
ways objects and events are organized. When we speak or write about something, the words 
we choose, the structure of our sentences, convey an implicit analysis of the topic, an attitude 
to it. These attitudes relate to the way we were brought up with language, and to the purpose 
for which we are using it - these are social, even political factors. 
(Fowler 1986: 33- 4) 
The argument proposed here is the same made by Toolan (1988: 247- 8) who 
explains that both the speaker's lexical choices and the manner in which slhe 
syntactically arranges these choices convey a way or ways of viewing the world and 
an attitude or attitudes towards it. This claim has been taken up in several analyses of 
various syntactic features. For instance, Trew (1979) in his article Theory and 
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Ideology at Work, concentrated on the grammatical feature of voice where the choice 
between active and passive structures in political headlines was seen to reflect 
different degrees of emphasis on different parts of the utterances. Also, Halliday's 
early (1973) analysis of transitivity in Golding's The Inheritors as well as Weber's 
(1992) reference to modality in different works of fiction have again highlighted the 
same point: i.e. that linguistic choices (the textual metafunction) reflect the attitudes 
of a speaker (interpersonal metafunction) as well as affecting the content (ideational 
metafunction) of a message. 
An elaboration of and an extension to this line of reasoning are outlined by 
Fairclough (1989: 29) who further argues that the relationship (between language and 
social structures) is a dialectical, "two-way relationship". He bases his argument on 
Althusser's (1972) view that "social institutions may have diverse 'ideological 
formations'" as well as on Pecheux's (1982) position that "corresponding to different 
ideological formations are different 'discursive' formations". Fairclough then (1988: 
13) devises a combined term of "ideological-discursive formation" which he explains, 
adequately reflects the dialectical nature of the relationship between social structures 
and language. In short, not only is the "discursive event ... shaped by situations, 
institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them" (Fairclough and Wodak 
1997: 258). 
This essentially socio-political view of discourse highlights its "socially 
constitutive" nature since discourse is seen to help "sustain and reproduce the social 
status quo" as well as contributing considerably towards "transforming" it [emphasis 
mine] (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). Hence the suggestion here is that the 
relationship between language use and social structures is that of mutual 
interdependence and partial governing. It is important to note that these statements 
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neither claim that social structures completely determine the use of language nor that 
language use totally determines the shape of social structures. Both are mutually 
interdependent and both partially constitute one another. 
The significance of this argument with respect to the theoretical view of 
discourse adopted is that it both highlights the importance of the interrelationship 
between discourse and social structures and points to its complex nature. At the centre 
of the argument is the effect this has on language users, both as producers and 
receivers especially through the role of ideology. Consequently, in the light of the 
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multifunctional view of language, the importance of accounting for the ideational and 
interpersonal levels is reflected in their respective contribution to the content of 
communication between language users (at the basic linguistic level) as well as to the 
negotiation of the relationship between them as social beings engaged in social 
interaction. Moreover, these contributions are reflected (whether implicitly or 
explicitly) in the form the language is used: i.e. in the choice and arrangement of 
certain linguistic features at the textual level. As Macdonell (1986: 1) puts it, 
"discourse is social. The statement made, the words used and the meanings of the 
words used, depends on where and against what the statement is made". 
Finally, the dialectical nature of the interrelationship between discourse and 
social structures suggests that the notion of ideology is clearly a major factor to 
consider. This is the case since ideology plays a central role in acting at the 
interpersonal level by directly affecting participants and the dynamics of power 
relations between them. Furthermore, the view that the relationship between discourse 
and ideology is an indirect one (Hodge and Kress 1993: 6) makes ideology a more 
effecti ve tool in enhancing "unequal power relations". It is therefore an essential 
constituent of the functional view of discourse. 
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However, before elaborating on the role ideology plays in discourse (as 
viewed from a functional perspective in its relation to the three metafunctions 
discussed above), it is crucial to clarify the term since it too has a certain degree of 
vagueness associated with its use in more than one sense mainly by Marxist and Post-
Marxist thinkers and critics. 
1.3 The Third Obstacle: Confusing Discourse and Ideology 
In her book, Discourse, Mills (1997) addresses this issue of confusion in the 
use of the term 'ideology'. She adopts a more or less Foucauldian view of the 
difference between discourse and ideology and argues for a theory of discourse rather 
than a theory of ideology for the analysis of texts. While ideology carries the 
connotations associated with "a vulgar Marxist model", discourse "because of its lack 
of alliance to a clear political agenda", offers a way of thinking about hegemony 
"without assuming that individuals are necessarily simply passive victims of systems 
of thought" (Mills 1997: 29, 30). She quotes Foucault who writes: 
The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult to use for three reasons. The first is that, 
whether one wants it to be or not, it is always in virtual opposition to something like the truth 
... The second inconvenience is that it refers, necessarily I believe, to something like a 
subject. Thirdly, ideology is in a secondary position in relation to something which must 
function as the infra-structure or economic or material determinant for it. 
(Foucaurt 1979: 36) 
Of course, each of these arguments might be valid depending on the view of ideology 
considered. It is therefore quite crucial to clarify Foucault's reasons by discussing 
each separately. 
The first point that Foucault makes concerning the difficulty in dealing with 
term 'ideology' reflects his criticism of an earlier Marxist view developed mainly in 
the work of Louis Althusser. In his book, Politics and History, Althusser (1972) refers 
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to the term ideology as "false consciousness", arguing that the theorist's position and 
mission is that of "scientific critique". Here Mills rightly echoes Foucault in arguing 
that the only way to apprehend this falseness is from a position of critique standing 
outside the influence of ideology. This, of course, is dismissed as a possibility since 
no one's position "is completely outside the ideas and practices [one] is analyzing" 
(Mills 1997: 33). 
However, Mills only marginally presents other accounts of the other sense in 
which the term 'ideology' can be understood. More recent views of ideology (mainly 
-that of the Critical Linguistics and Post-Marxist theory) are in fact only briefly 
mentioned at the end of her second chapter, without serious elaboration. This is the 
sense referred to by Carter and Nash (1990: 20- 21) "as a socially and politically 
dominant set of values and beliefs which are not 'out there' but are constructed in all 
texts especially in and through language" [my emphasis]. Here, in speaking of a 
"dominant" ideology, indirect reference is made to less dominant and even dominated 
ideologies: i.e. the term "dominant" presupposes some form of struggle to reach the 
status of dominance, and this struggle would in effect be between one and another 
potentially dominant ideology. The "opposition" that Foucault speaks of would 
therefore exist between one and another ideology and not between ideology and the 
truth. 
Of course, this more recent view of ideology appeared as a result of increasing 
criticism concerning the way Althusser first defined and handled the term, and this is 
evident in the progression from Critical Linguistics to Critical Discourse Analysis 
(see section 1.4 for further discussion). In this sense, Foucault's influential arguments 
have helped develop the term into one which is more convincing at the theoretical 
level and relatively less troublesome to implement at the practical level. This view of 
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ideology dismisses the claim of a scientific approach to analyse discourse objectively 
(Fairclough 1989, Simpson 1997) and is especially cautious about defining ideology 
as "false consciousness" (Fowler 1986). Within this more recent view of ideology, 
Foucault's argument and the problems he distinguishes are no longer valid. 
The second point that Foucault (1979: 36) makes is very much related to the 
first. The trouble with ideology referring to a "subject" is that it presents a 
contradictory situation: i.e. a situation where the subject is both the origin of this 
ideology as well as its outcome. This creates a dilemma from a Foucauldian 
perspective since it would be impossible to place the subject, who is already affected 
by an ideology, in a position to expose this "false consciousness". In fact, if the goal 
of an ideological analysis of a text were to bring out "the truth", then this would 
create an internal conflict. Yet again, more recent views of ideology dismiss the 
uncovering of the truth as an achievable goal, and reference to the subject only 
highlights the importance of accounting for different points of view when analysing 
texts. It is assumed that the subject is partly an effect of discursive structures; 
however, the ability of that subject to identify ideologies in a text, to possibly disagree 
with them and to challenge them is not to be undennined either (see section 1.4 for 
further discussion). 
Finally, Foucault's (1979: 36) view of the position of ideology as a secondary 
one to the "economic or material detenninants for it" would also hold in the light of 
Althusser's Marxist reading of ideology but not within later, Post-Marxist views put 
forward by Linguistic Criticism and Critical Discourse Analysis for instance. 
According to these approaches, the relationship between ideology, discourse and the 
socio-economic factors that influence power relations in a society is a two-way 
relationship. Post-Marxist critique, such as the work of Lukacs (1971: 3), argues 
against the traditional view that ideology is situated in the superstructure. Indeed, the 
whole distinction between base and superstructure in Lukacs's reading of Capital is 
placed under scrutiny and retains no validity (1971: 147). Different social groups 
within the same society may produce discourses with opposing ideologies which may, 
in tum, either reproduce existing ideologies or challenge them. Consequently, social 
institutions may either change as a result of an ideological challenge or grow stronger 
if the challenge is suppressed in one way or another. This relationship between 
discourse and social structures is described as a "dialectical" one since both affect one 
.-
another. 
In short, the point argued for here is that in the light of more recent views of 
discourse and ideology, dividing, contrasting or arguing for one or another of these 
two terms is not justified. In a way, ideology as we know it now, and discourse are 
different in that they cannot be compared, or rather contrasted, along the same set of 
criteria. However, being different does not in any way suggest that they are either 
unrelated or that they work in opposition to one another. On the contrary, the more 
recent view of the relationship between discourse and ideology is that of mutual 
interdependence, and even partial governing. CDA and CL (see section 1.4) argue that 
a discursive event can reflect one or more ideologies while at the same time, one 
ideology can be manifested through a variety of different discourses. Yet at the same 
time, the functions of discourse are not limited to a simple expression of ideology, a 
position adequately explained in Halliday's multifunctional view of language. 
In short, placing the two in competition or opposition with each other as Mills 
(1997) does, is not in any way constructive to the field of discourse analysis, 
especially at a stage where the earlier view of ideology is becoming increasingly 
challenged by more recent work. One is therefore led to conclude that while 
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Foucauldian criticisms of the difficulties with the term 'ideology' are justified in the 
light of a Marxist model, they are not in relation to the other sense of using the tenn. 
In Aronowitz's (1988: 146) words, ideology is "an ineluctable feature of social life" 
and therefore, "the reason for the persistence of ambiguity with respect to its meaning 
does not reside in some slipperiness of social thought, but in the dependent nature of 
the concept itself'. This dependent nature is a central feature of ideology within a 
multifunctional view of discourse. 
As a result, my own future reference to ideology coincides with Carter and 
Nash's (1990: 20- 21) definition of the t e r m ~ ~ i.e. "as a socially and politically 
dominant set of values and beliefs which are ... constructed in all texts especially in 
and through language". Here, the socio-political partial determinants of ideology as 
well as the centrality of the linguistic system in the evolution of ideology are 
highlighted. This therefore carries the suggestion that the role ideology plays in 
discourse can potentially be explored and interpreted by functional-linguistic analyses 
which considers the socio-political as well as the linguistic elements of context. 
Moreover, Carter and Nash's (1990: 21) statement that, "the ways in which ideologies 
impregnate a society's modes of thinking, speaking, experiencing and behaving [are] 
a necessary 'condition' for action and belief within a social formation and hence are 
crucial in the construction of personal identity" points out a partly individual (as 
opposed to simply social) dimension to ideology. Ideology is therefore a socio-
individual phenomenon (see Chapter Four for a further discussion). Finally, the view 
that ideology is "a necessary 'condition'" falls in line with the position adopted in this 
thesis that ideology is a necessary constituent of discourse and therefore, there is no 
ideology-free discourse. 
The interdependence of the notions discussed above (discourse, ideology and 
socio-economic-political structures) raises the final obstacle facing the discourse 
analyst. A prerequisite to deciding on the most appropriate functional approach to 
discourse analysis is resolving what I see as the dilemma of selection. In other words 
two main rival forces are: 
1) what should be accounted for in an analysis as opposed to 
2) what can realistically and practically be accounted for. 
Of course, theoretically speaking, the more factors one is capable of taking 
into consideration, the more 'complete' an analysis would be. In fact, this is the view 
proposed by integrationalist approaches to language (Toolan 1996; Harris and Wolf 
1998; Harris 1998) which advocate the first of the two rival forces. Integrationalist 
linguistics raises sound (though slightly outdated) theoretical questions such as the 
"segregationist" division between 'competence' and 'performance', 'langue' and 
'parole'. According to Harris and Wolf (1998: 4), one cannot approach language 
based on these "segregationist" polarities since language simply "cannot be 
decontextualised" in the way suggested by earlier Saussurian and Chomskyan 
linguistics. Rather, language displays a natural integration among all its aspects 
(linguistic and non-linguistic) and should therefore be approached in a way to account 
for this integrationalism: i.e. without presuppositions of pre-existent rules or 
grammars (Harris 1998a: 5-14; Harris 1998c: 15-26). This position is also echoed by 
Toolan (1996) whose integrationalist theory of "total speech" carries the full weight 
of the title. 
Of course, although this might make theoretical sense, the question of how to 
approach linguistic analysis in a practical manner following integrationalist 
suggestions is relatively disregarded. Knowing that it is impossible to approach the 
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whole of the language as is, the very few practical integrationalist analyses of texts 
are a complete disappointment (Harris 1998b: 27-45). These focus more on pointing 
out the shortcomings of earlier 'non-integrationalist' approaches rather than proposing 
their own convincing analyses. In fact, this I argue is the expected outcome of an 
unrealistic, over ambitious Integrational view of language. Attempting to account for 
all variables and factors when analysing discourse runs the risk of losing focus and 
accomplishing very little mainly because one is incapable of accomplishing so much. 
As a result, integrationalism finds itself facing the problem of selection once again. 
On the other hand, looking at what is realistically and practically feasible is 
still quite a complex process. Here, the analyst is placed in a position of an arbitrator 
regarding the selection process and has therefore to decide on a certain hierarchy of 
significance and justify it in the face of inevitable criticisms. In relation to this thesis, 
the two questions which relate to the second of the two views above are: 
1) which linguistic feature is the one considered more significant to approach if 
the objective of the analysis is to examine the underlying, possibly 
inconsistent ideologies in specific instances of language use? 
2) how is that feature best approached and analysed? 
These two questions set up the general frame of the fourth chapter and 
attending to them will be the task of that chapter. However, the central idea here is 
that the hierarchy of selection mentioned above must be based on some criteria which 
make selected linguistic features more appropriate than others, in the light of a 
critical-functional approach. Thus, in attempting to justify the choices made in this 
thesis (both relating to selected approach to discourse analysis as well as to the 
selected linguistic feature), it is crucial to discuss the distinction between non-critical 
and critical approaches to the analysis of discourse. Weighing the advantages and 
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disadvantages of each approach with regards to this general categorisation, one would 
be better equipped in deciding on a more appropriate approach. As a result, a brief 
review of the main objectives and methodologies of both types of approaches follows 
in the next section. 
1.4 Discourse Analysis: Non-Critical versus Critical Approaches 
The first point to make is that the di vision between the two approaches is not 
an absolute one. In fact, a distinction in the 'criticalness' or 'non-criticalness' of 
approaches has arisen mainly as a result of evolution in the views of a certain group of 
discourse analysts who later became known as critical linguists. Hence, this section 
will briefly review a selection of approaches to discourse analysis which fall under 
one or the other category. The main objective is to demonstrate the appropriateness of 
critical approaches to discourse analysis and justify their use in my upcoming 
analyses by contrasting the two. 
1.4.1 Non-Critical Approaches 
One such 'non-critical' approach to discourse analysis is Sinclair and 
Coulthard's (1975). Its starting point is a reaction to previous linguistic tendencies 
which concentrate on analysing the structure of the sentence, i.e. analysis at sentence 
level. Motivated by Firth's (1935) interest in trying to understand "what language 
really is, and how it works," Sinclair and Coulthard's (1975: 4) approach aims at 
analysing "the function of utterances and the structure of discourse" above the level of 
the sentence [emphasis mine]. They attempt to answer questions like: "how are 
successive utterances related; who controls discourse; how does he do it; how, if at 
all, do other participants take control; how do the roles of speaker and listener pass 
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from one participant to another; how are new topics introduced and old ones ended" 
etc. (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975: 4). 
Yet although they aim at analysing "functions" of utterances, their approach is 
not functional in the traditional sense. This is evident in their departure from 
Sinclair's (1966) approach which aimed at examining "the relationship between the 
grammatical structure of an utterance and its function in discourse": i.e. in the sense 
of accounting for the functional realisations of declarative, interrogative, and 
imperative structures of clauses as statements, questions, and commands (Sinclair and 
Coulthard 1975: 2). Thus, Sinclair's (1966) main point of emphasis was his distance 
from the Chomskian (1965) view that had introduced the notion of deep and surface 
structures of clauses in order to explain instances where a declarative sentence 
functions as a question. Sinclair's (1966) answer to that is to account for context. 
At the same time, Sinclair and Coulthard's (1975: 12) functional view is not 
functional in the Hallidayan sense since the Hallidayan view of the ideational, 
interpersonal, and textual functions found in the clause does "not provide [them] with 
a useful starting point". They argue that Halliday's (1970) discussion "is pitched at a 
different level [in that] he is concerned not with the function or meaning of a given 
utterance of a sentence, but rather with the function of the presence and surface 
ordering of elements within a sentence" (12). And finally, they also reject the 
functional dimension of speech-act theory of Boyd and Thome (1969) (see Chapter 
Three for further discussion) and argue that their approach is functional in the sense 
that it concentrates on those functional relationships within the text which are beyond 
the boundaries of the sentence; i.e. whether utterances are "intended to evoke 
responses", for instance, or whether they are "intended to mark a boundary in the 
discourse", etc. (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975: 14). In other words, it is how different 
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levels of discourse function in relation of each other and to the context of the 
utterance. 
Therefore, since their main objective is to find linguistic evidence "for 
discourse units larger than the utterance", Sinclair and Coulthard's (1975: 19-59) 
approach provides a functional descriptive system of discourse using larger units of 
analysis (transactions, exchanges, moves, and acts) which have a hierarchical relation 
between each other just as sentences and clauses, for example, have a structural 
hierarchical relationship between them. Finally, this descriptive system is followed by 
a proposed set of interpretative rules which take into consideration the linguistic form 
of sentences as well as the situational factors. 
Another similar functional approach to discourse analysis is that of 
Conversation Analysis which finds its basis in the view that "language is not merely a 
mode of action, but a means of interaction" (Edmondson 1981: 32). As a result, non-
verbal acts are seen to be as significant as verbal acts "in terms of the development of 
a conversation" (Edmondson 1981: 32). This meant that Conversation Analysis 
emphasised the view that linguistic, extralinguistic and paralinguistic factors are 
equally structurally significant in discourse. Therefore, the role of silence, tum taking 
and sequence of utterances, usually underemphasized in previous approaches, is 
considered in detail (Edmondson 1981: 33-43). Its medium of analysis is mainly 
informal conversation and this helped produce accounts of various aspects of 
conversation like openings and closings, how topics are established, developed and 
changed, etc. 
Moreover, Conversation Analysis developed in the light of ethnomethodology, 
the branch of sociology that deals with the codes and conventions that underlie 
everyday social interactions and activities. The effects of social structures such as age, 
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sex or class categories were a major concern in Conversation Analysis (Goffman 
1983: 2). Yet the main area of interest was more that of describing and understanding 
"how actors deploy the mechanisms of talk-in-interaction to accomplish 
institutionally oriented activities" rather than specifying "the extent to which these 
interactional mechanisms enable the production and reproduction of the varieties of 
social formations found in society" (Zimmerman 1991: 4). 
This led to criticism mainly by Critical Discourse Analysts such as Fairclough 
(1989: 19) who argued that since data are interpreted "on the basis of a shared 
orientation among the participants to a single discourse type", one chief problem with 
such analysis is that the general picture of a harmonious and co-operative 
conversation is given. Of course, this is far from being a realistic picture. 
From the perspectives of critical linguists, the main reason both these 
approaches are considered 'non-critical' is because they lack "a developed social 
orientation" reflected in their failure "to consider how relations of power have shaped 
discourse practices" [emphasis mine] (Fairclough 1989: 15). The centrality of the 
social-functional dimensions to discourse is emphasised in Fairclough's (1995) 
summary of all discourse-related notions which he lists as follows: 





discourse (count noun) 
genre 
order of discourse 
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language use concei ved as social practice. 
instance of language use, analysed as text, 
discursive practice, social practice. 
the written or spoken language produced in a 
discursi ve event. 
the production, distribution and consumption of 
a text. 
the constitution of a text from diverse discourses 
and genres. 
way of signifying experience from a particular 
perspecti ve. 
use of language associated with a particular 
social activity. 
totality of discursive practices of an institution, 
and relations between them. 
(Fairclough 1995: 135) 
As for those approaches (whether functional or structural) which ignore the 
social and ideological dimensions of discourse, these are consequently deemed as 
descriptive in nature, since being analytical, from Fairclough's (1989: 15) perspective, 
involves accounting for the relationship between discourse and issues of power and 
ideology. 
However, although it is true that these approaches mentioned above overlook 
social and ideological factors, their branding as merely descriptive seems rather harsh 
and unfounded. Firstly, the critical/non-critical division adopted by such Critical 
Linguists or Critical Discourse Analysts as Fairclough, Fowler, Kress, Hodge, van 
Dijk, etc. is based on a much specified view of what constitutes criticalness. 
Following this view, an approach is considered critical if, and only if, it accounts for 
the relationship between language, power and ideology: in other words, only if its 
main objective is an "interventionist" one, aiming at "[making] explicit an awareness 
of control in order to resist it critically" (Stockwell 1999: 3). Yet this is an obviously 
narrow view of what a critical analysis entails. Criticalness is based on questioning 
the foundations, methods and results of specific claims by different fields of enquiry. 
Yet the issue of hegemony is only one of several aspects of the interaction between 
language and social structures that can be subject to critical analysis. 
Secondly, the main area emphasised by critical approaches is that where non-
critical approaches failed rather than they succeeded. In other words, they undermine 
how critical these approaches were and are in contrast with previous theories and 
tendencies to, for instance, concentrate on and analyse short and invented sentences as 
opposed to considering the context of an utterance within the larger and more 
authentic medium of discourse. These non-critical approaches are necessary 
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constituents in the evolution of critical linguistic thought. One must also confess that 
such approaches are not merely descriptive since they do more than provide an 
'objective' description of what is present and evident at the surtace structure of a text. 
Mills (1995) makes that point clear by arguing that these approaches do in fact relate 
different levels of structure to others (both micro and macro) as well as relating 
structural patterns to functions of language. This is an important issue since it 
ultimately clears up the possible confusion of mapping structuralist approaches with 
non-critical ones. 
1.4.2 Critical Approaches 
The other side of the division, then, brackets together a large number of 
'critical' approaches to analysing discourse, two of which are discussed in detail since 
they are more appropriate for the upcoming analyses. These are the earlier Linguistic 
Criticism (LC) of Fowler et al. (1979) and Fowler (1986) on the one hand, and the 
more recent Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Fairclough (1989, 1995). The 
division between these two is chiefly due to minor differences in the scope and 
coverage of these approaches rather than major theoretical ones. This becomes more 
obvious when looking closely at each approach where one can detect similarities 
relating to the most fundamental issues. 
At the theoretical level, both approaches share the same linguistic theoretical 
background traceable back to Halliday's (1978; 1985) functional theory, particularly 
the view of language as essentially multifunctional in nature. Moreover, the two 
approaches are influenced by Marxist socio-political thought concerning issues of 
power, ideology, social institutions and the complex relationships among them. They 
do not "simply use linguistics to talk about what is objectively present at the surtace 
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structure of the text", but they see these "objective structures as always having some 
further meaning in a given social context" (Fowler 1995: 14). And in order to carry 
out this interpretive aim, LC and CDA need "a particular kind of grammatical model 
as its basis", namely, the functional model (Fowler 1995: 14) although Fairclough 
(1995) considers Halliday's (1985) functional-systemic grammar as merely 
provisional. 
Both these theoretical inspirations have direct implications on the practical 
side of LC and CDA. On the one hand, the linguistic background is reflected in the 
tools ana methodologies used in text analyses which spring mainly from Hallidayan 
models (such as transitivity analyses). On the other hand, the socio-political influence 
motivates the main objectives of critically analysing discourse: i.e. to examine the 
ways in which ideologies of social and political institutions affect discourse in general 
and how that effect is a dialectical one. 
Consequently, in the light of these theoretical backgrounds, both approaches to 
discourse analysis are branded by Fowler (1996: 3) as "instrumental linguistics", the 
objective of which is to expose ideologies which are "coded implicitly behind overt 
propositions," in order to examine them "in the context of social formation". As van 
Leeuwen (1993: 193) suggests, CDA and CL (Critical Linguistics) "should be 
concerned with ... discourse as the instrument of power and control as well as with 
discourse as the instrument of social construction of reality". The underlying 
presupposition is that words and structures chosen by the language users are 
'motivated' and that they "communicate a cultural semiotic in addition to the literal 
meanings of the words and sentences" (Fairclough 1995: 15). Both '''selection' and 
'transformation' are guided by reference, generally unconscious, to ideas and beliefs" 
(Fowler 1991: 2). 
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Of course, ideologies cannot be simply "read off the linguistic fonns because 
the same fonn has different significances in different contexts" (Fowler 1996: 9). 
However, certain interpretations may be made of constructions that fall into a 
recurrent regularity. Finally, both (CDA and CL) see the ultimate effect of the 
reproduction of governing ideologies in discourse as bringing about what Fairclough 
calls 'naturalization' and what Fowler calls 'habitualization'. These very similar tenns 
mainly focus on how ideology can be hidden in language. This problem is handled in 
the aims of CDA and CL at exposing those less visible aspects of discourse that 
indirectly position people in ways serving the ideological interests of those in power. 
The differences between both approaches, on the other hand, are the 
following. Whereas Fowler's approach to text analysis is mainly linguistic (or 
'textual'), Fairclough's is both 'textual' and 'intertextual' (Fairclough 1995: 188). 
Fowler concentrates predominantly on the 'linguistic' level of text analysis. This 
covers both "the traditional levels of analysis within linguistics (phonology, grammar 
up to the level of the sentence, and vocabulary and semantics)" together with 
"analysis of textual organization above the sentence including intersentential cohesion 
and various aspects of the structure of texts which have been investigated by 
discourse analysts and conversational analysts (including properties of dialogue such 
as organization of tum-taking)" (Fairclough 1995: 188). Fairclough (1995: 188), on 
the other hand, considers it essential to account for the 'intertextual' level of analysis. 
This essentially "shows how texts selectively draw upon orders of discourse- the 
particular configurations of conversationalized practices (genres, discourses, 
narratives, etc.), which are available to text producers and interpreters in particular 
social circumstances". Influenced by Bakhtin (1981), he believes that the concept of 
context should also include "intertextuality as well as sociocultural knowledge" which 
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means that "discourses are always connected to other discourses which were produced 
earlier, as well as those produced synchronically and subsequently" (Fairclough 1995: 
276). This, of course, increases the number of variables to be considered, and 
although serving the purpose of making discourse analysis more accurate, it 
nevertheless makes the task much harder and time consuming. It also paves the way 
for questions concerning the practicability of expanding the scope of analysis to 
account for more variables and where the analyst can draw the limiting line. 
Such issues together with the problems of difficulty, one-sidedness, 
descriptIve and interpretive potential of CDA are raised by Widdowson (1995a, 
1995b, 1996), Fairclough (1996) and Toolan (1997). In their heated debates, 
Widdowson and Toolan question some of the terminology of CDA as well as its 
claims in terms of the interpretive capacity of this approach to discourse analysis. 
While Widdowson is mainly interested in terminological 'contradiction', Toolan 
focuses on how CDA differs from stylistics and how they sometimes work in 
opposition. The main point, however, is an agreed acknowledgement of the 
importance of the direction in which CDA is proceeding and the positive promise of 
further improvements in the analytical abilities of the approach. 
From such debates, therefore, springs the agreement that conforming 
exclusively to one model of text analysis can be dangerously limited. This lack of 
satisfaction with adopting only one or another model for the analysis of discourse (see 
Birch 1989) is acknowledged by critical linguists throughout. Therefore, the tendency 
in future analyses should be directed towards being more selective in adopting a 
combination of models. However, one vital characteristic of any model or any 
combination should be its/their ability to present a systematic analysis of a text 
through utilising a set of linguistic features systematically described (Toolan 1990: 
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28). Another characteristic should be its flexibility. Such a tendency is based on the 
premise that as long as ways of analysing texts can help clarify that view of the 
relationship between discourse and social structures in a relatively neat manner, these 
ways are useful and can therefore be adopted. Such a tendency is pragmatic in nature. 
As Birch (1989: 151) puts it: 
The key to any future success would lie with interdisciplinary approaches to analysis. This 
would mean recognizing the restrictions and constraints of single disciplinary approaches to 
the subject.. .. 
(Birch 1989: 151) 
1.5 Conclusions 
In this first chapter, I have tried to address the difficulties associated with the 
use of the term 'discourse' and with approaches to its analysis. After pointing out the 
reasons for the vagueness associated with defining the term, the next obstacles facing 
a discourse analyst were identified as selecting the appropriate approach to analysing 
discourse with its prerequisite underlying theoretical framework. This led to a 
consideration of the two main theories of language (structural and functional) and a 
discussion of the way each accounted for the relationships between language structure 
and functions. It was seen that structural theories, on the one hand, largely 
undermined the association between language structure and meaning, the effects of 
which were deemed as either "the weak point in language study" (Bloomfield 1933: 
140) or simply "irrelevant" to the theory of linguistics (Chomsky 1965: 3). On the 
other hand, the functional view generally presented a more balanced position of the 
indispensability of structure in any functional theory of language (Halliday 1978, 
1985). Indeed, this balanced functional view of language was seen to be supported by 
numerous approaches to discourse analysis which concluded that, from a practical 
perspective, structure and function do not exist in isolation from one another and that 
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the relationship between the two is that of mutual interdependence (Schiffrin 1994). 
Insisting on isolating language structure and function would inevitably lead to a 
disregarding at least one dimension of meaning since neither can be spoken of 
independently from the other. As Pratt (1987: 52) adequately concludes, "the point is 
not that standard [structuralist] descriptive approaches are altogether wrong, but that 
they are limited in ways they themselves do not acknowledge" [emphasis mine]. 
Consequently, an initial decision was made concerning the appropriateness of 
a broad functional theoretical basis to approaching discourse analysis, a functional 
--basis which is in line with the Hallidayan multifunctional view of language and its 
broad objective of analysing the relationship between the linguistic system and social 
structures. The next step was to decide on those factors that should be accounted for 
in this analysis, and consequently, which practical approach to select. Here, a central 
factor governing the relationship between language and social structures within the 
multifunctional view of language was acknowledged as the notion of ideology. 
Consequently, after clarifying the vagueness associated with the use of the term 
mainly in Marxist and Post-Marxist contexts, ideology was seen as a necessary 
constituent of discourse playing a decisive role in the interaction between the three 
metafunctions of meaning: the ideational, interpersonal and textual. 
Hence, in the light of the broad objectives of a multifunctional view of 
language, i.e. analysing the relationship between the linguistic system and social 
structures, ideology was seen as an indispensable notion to account for in any 
multifunctional analysis of discourse. Discourse and ideology are simply inseparable 
notions especially in the light of critical approaches to discourse analysis which put 
forward a view of discourse as essentially socio-culturally conscious. 
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Subsequently, in attempting to provide an answer to the question, "what is 
discourse?" the following suggestion can be made. Discourse can be regarded as a 
contextually occurring instance of language use which is not determined by the length 
and/or grammaticalness of its component utterance/s, but by the involvement of a 
speaker/writer and a hearer/reader in an act of communication, in a context saturated 
with ideologies resulting from cultural, religious, political, gender-related, etc. 
modalities. Analysing discourse would then involve a consideration of these 
constituents. 
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II Literature, Stylistics and The Reader 
2.1 Introduction 
Given the vagueness associated with the term discourse, the previous chapter 
focused mainly on narrowing down its fundamental constituents and deciding on its 
main characteristics. The conclusion reached was that 'discourse' could be defined as 
a contextually occurring instance of language use; it is not determined by the length 
and grammaticalness of utterance/s, but by the involvement of a speaker/writer and a 
hearer/ reader in an act of communication, in a context saturated with ideologies 
(conflicting or otherwise) emerging from and affected by personal as well as cultural, 
religious, political, gender-related, etc. modalities. Discourse, as an instance of 
language in use, then necessarily reflects the multifunctional dimensions of language 
in general, and this suggests that any approach to its analysis will have to take into 
account both linguistic as well as extra-linguistic features, the latter of which are a 
combination of subjective/personal and intersubjective/cultural factors. 
In the light of this definition, one main proposition put forward in this thesis is 
that all texts as instances of discourse can be approached in essentially the same 
manner for critical analysis. This would specifically include those texts (namely 
literary texts) traditionally viewed as unique and different from all other instances of 
discourse in that they exhibit unique and different 'types' of language. Yet 
considering these types as different would naturally cause problems to an otherwise 
uniform view of discourse, the analysis of which could not then be approached from 
the same angle. Consequently, the aim of this chapter is to revisit and, where relevant, 
redefine a set of traditional notions which do not conform with the view of discourse 
discussed above. These include such notions as literature, literary and non-literary 
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language, style in language and its effects on stylistic analyses, and the positions and 
roles of text producers as well as the reader in interpreting texts. The need to attend to 
these issues springs from their centrality in critical approaches to discourse analysis. 
Handling them rather loosely can run the risk of undermining the feasibility, 
objectives and value of a functional and critical analysis of discourse as defined 
above. 
2.2 Literature as Discourse 
2.2.1 'Literary' and 'Non-Literary' Language 
The unique status associated with literature and literary language is an old 
issue traceable back to the times of the Greeks. Plato distinguished poetry from other 
types of discourse and went to the extreme position of expelling poets from his 
Republic mainly due to the dangerous effects their use of language -literary language 
- can have on people. Yet although numerous and divergent views have evolved since 
then, the distinctiveness of literature and of literary language as a characteristic 
feature has far from faded out. This is a tricky issue which complicates the task of the 
discourse analyst since it creates the need to justify treating literature as discourse: i.e. 
"literature [as] an example of language in use" (Carter 1982: 12) especially when 
literature has traditionally been considered as a special type of discourse displaying a 
distinctive type of language. Treating literature as discourse would then imply that 
literature be regarded merely as an instance of "real communication in [a] real social 
context" (Carter and McCarthy 1994: 135): i.e. "mediating relationships between 
language-users: not only relationships of speech, but also of consciousness, ideology, 
role and class" (Fowler 1981: 80). This would ultimately bring the status of literature 
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to that of everyday discourse, a view historically rejected by literary figures and 
literary critics. 
Adopting a position concerning this issue is, therefore, not a simple 
straightforward decision since dismissing the traditional view of the specialness of 
literature and literary language runs contrary to a set of mainstream historic beliefs 
and positions. As a result, my intention in this section is to test the viability and bases 
for the two: i.e. those which distinguish between literary and non-literary language 
(where the first is considered as not only "special" and "different" from, but also 
superio-;' to, "normal-everyday" language or non-literary language) on the one hand, 
and those which regard literary and non-literary language as essentially the same, on 
the other. These views can be seen to constitute the two boundaries of a continuum. 
At one end of the continuum is Chapman's (1973: 3-13) view which regards 
literature as offering language that is completely different from what may be loosely 
termed "the 'normal' or 'everyday' usage of a speech-community" in that it is 
"special, heightened and prestigious", thus presenting features "peculiar to itself 
which are not found in other areas of expression". More importantly, literature "is the 
work of men who were specially sensitive to the language of their time and who used 
the skill of language to make permanent their vision of life" (Chapman 1973: 5). They 
have managed to do so by manipulating language "to make it contain a unique series 
of experiences and interpretations" (Chapman 1973: 5). For him, literature can be 
defined as "the art that uses language ... as an artistic medium, not simply for 
communication or even expression. It is not spontaneous ... it is considered and 
developed in a way that is impossible for everyday conversation ... " (Chapman 1973: 
7, 13). Rephrased concisely, Chapman's rather vague view (discussed in section 
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2.2.2) distinguishes between literary and non-literary language based on differences 
which are fundamentally structural and marginally functional. 
Another slightly variant and less vague view is that of I akobson (1960) who is, 
to begin with, more specific in his treatment of the issue since he is interested 
exclusively in poetry as a specific form of literature rather than literature in general. 
Although he argues that literature exhibits language which has structurally and 
functionally unique characteristics, the language of literature is, nevertheless, not 
completely different from normal everyday language since it shares common 
functions. His approach is based on a multifunctional view of language which argues 
that there are six basic functions of verbal communication: "emotive", "referential", 
"metalinguial", "conative", "poetic" and "phatic" (Jakobson 1960: 58), and the 
language of literature reflects all these functions. Yet in contrast with Halliday's 
(1978; 1985) view, lakobson's (1960) reference to the multifunctional nature of 
language concerns those more basic functional dimensions of language with their 
corresponding structural manifestations. For instance, the "conative function", 
according to lakobson (1960: 55, 56) is oriented "towards the addressee" and 
therefore "finds its purest grammatical expression in the vocative and imperative 
which ... deviate from other nominal and verbal categories". 
Consequently, Jakobson's (1960: 57) emphasis on the "poetic function" as 
essential to poetry reveals poetry's characteristic feature of focusing "on the message 
for its own sake". This is reflected in what lakobson (1960: 59,60) describes as the 
"well-ordered shape of the message" found mainly at the phonetic level and carried 
on syllabically as forms of internal measurement to ensure "equivalence". Yet while 
the poetic function is not the only function in poetry but is the dominant one, 
lakobson (1960: 59) points out that "measure of sequences is a device which, outside 
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the poetic function, finds no application in language". In fact, this is characteristic 
only of poetry. 
In short, from lakobson's (1960) perspective, what makes poetry different at 
the functional level is its additional and unique function which is not characteristic of 
other types of discourse: the poetic function. Yet interestingly enough, this functional 
definition of poetics is still a largely structuralist one since what he characterises as 
poetry, for instance, is that which exhibits specific measurable structural features like 
the phonetic and syllabic rhyme and rhythm. 
A broader treatment of the notion of multifunctionalism is later taken on by 
Leech (1987: 77) who, following lakobson (1960), argues that literature in general is 
different since it is "that kind of text in which the poetic function is dominant over 
others". Again, he emphasises that while all texts are seen to combine more than one 
function, which may include the poetic function, that which is labelled as literature 
would be the one where the dominant function is the poetic function. In other words, 
it is seen to exist along with other subsidiary ones. However, where Leech differs 
significantly from lakobson is in his lack of emphasis on structure of language. He 
argues that "in functional terms, there is no discontinuity... between everyday 
communication and literature," and this lack of discontinuity is explained not in 
structural terms, but rather by including the hearer or reader as central to the process 
of interpretation. He states that: 
... multiplicity and indeterminacy of meaning are characteristic of both literature and 
conversation; and in both literature and conversation, as readers or hearers, we have to engage 
our minds fully (in terms of background knowledge, intelligence and imagination) to 
reconstruct the addresser's intention as well as we can. 
(Leech 1987: 83) 
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As a result, Leech's (1987: 78) re-evaluation of Jakobson's positions towards 
literature and the quality of "literariness" is entirely dependent on the "evaluation or 
interpretation of the text by readers, by a social or linguistic community". 
Further along the continuum, a fourth view concerning the status of literature 
and literary language is that of Pratt (1981). She argues that from the critic's point of 
view, there is no motivation for viewing literary discourse "as generically distinct 
from other linguistic activities or as exploiting any kind of communicative 
competence other than that which we rely on in non-literary speech situations" (Pratt 
1981: 377). She points out the view that "linguistic deviance" as tolerated by literary 
works is one of the main arguments which are "most often adduced to support the 
poetic language doctrine" (Pratt 1981: 409). This is the case since the function of 
language in literary works is considered as "not primarily communicative" whereas its 
function elsewhere is (Pratt 1981: 409). This, she contests, is not a unique 
characteristic of literary language. This kind of "flouting" is common in everyday 
communication and more importantly, is in itself as communicative as the lack of it. 
In other words, deviance is used for a purpose which is communicative as well as 
effective not only in literary language, but also in everyday-ordinary language. As a 
result, Pratt adopts the position that there are no differences between literary and non-
literary language either on the functional or the structural levels. 
Other writers like Kress (1988), Simpson (1997), and Weber (1992) push the 
argument against a distinction between literary language and other types of discourses 
all the way, taking into account both linguistic and socio-cultural factors. Kress (1988: 
127), for instance, sees that "all texts are subject to the same linguistic and social 
determinations, so-called literary texts no less than so-called non-literary texts". We 
then cannot isolate literary works from the same factors that affect everyday 
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conversation and this would as a result place literary texts under the influence of 
political and cultural pressures just as is the case with non-literary texts. The effect of 
this view of literature is that it changes the traditional (usually historical and/or 
autobiographical) approaches to analysing literary texts into more culturally and 
politically motivated approaches. In Kress's words, it is an attempt "to bring literary 
texts fully into the arena of cultural and political concerns" (1988: 127). 
Simpson (1997: 7) also supports this view. He argues that there are no items of 
modem English vocabulary or grammar that are "inherently and exclusively literary". 
-As a result, we can better understand literary communication only if it is viewed as 
"contiguous with other discourses" (1997: 7). This view is finally echoed by Weber 
(1992: 1) in stating that "there are no linguistically identifiable distinctions between 
literary and non-literary texts ... [since] '" literature is a culturally defined notion", 
2.2.2 Is the Distinction J ustifled ? 
After outlining these views, obvious problems emerge in some, especially the 
earlier ones. For instance, in claiming that the language of literature is "special, 
heightened and prestigious" and that "literature is the work of men who were specially 
sensitive to the language of their time and who used the skill of language to make 
permanent their vision of life" [emphasis mine], Chapman (1973: 5) neither clarifies 
how the language of literature is "heightened" nor does he offer any justification for 
his implication that non-literary discourse is produced by "men" who are not as 
sensitive to the language of their time. The vagueness of these generalisations and the 
absence of a detailed systematic basis for differentiating the two shed doubt on the 
viability of this distinction in the first place. 
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Yet the root of the problem, I argue, lies in the definition of Literature (with a 
capital L), which is constantly presented in a way to suggest that all instances of 
literature constitute one uniform category. Of course, this is not the case as there are 
several degrees of structural (even functional) restrictions and determinants associated 
with different forms of literature, each with their variant bearings on the language. In 
fact, different literary genres can be seen to fall in a continuum of structural rigidity 
where a sonnet, due to its high level of structural restrictions (in terms of the number 
of lines, rhyme, rhythm, etc) would be an instance of one extreme and a novel an 
instance of the other. Following that, while the extreme ends of the continuum present 
a more or less clear categorisation of the genre under study, there are middle-grounds 
cases which according to Pratt (1988) are problematic in their categorisations. As she 
explains, there are "conventions of representation relatively independent of '" genre 
distinctions" (Pratt 1988: 18) which makes the classification of different texts a 
challenging task. 
Following this, if, on the one hand, the definition of literature and the quality 
of 'literariness' depends on those structural restrictions, then the distinction between 
literature and non-literature blurs the further we move along the continuum. This 
would only give rise to another graver problem of having to decide where the main 
dividing line is when attempting to make further sub-genre divisions. While one 
cannot deny the existence of certain structural restrictions characteristic only of some 
instances of literature (such as in a sonnet), the language exhibited in other instances 
(such as in a novel) is almost indistinguishable from other 'non-literary' forms of 
discourse. 
On the other hand, if the quality of 'literariness' depends on how figurative, 
"special, heightened and prestigious" (Chapman 1973: 13) the language of a text is 
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(i.e. in terms of aesthetic functional effects), then this is an essentially subjective 
matter left for the reader and the influence of social, historical and educational 
institutions to decide. In this case, the same text could be considered literary by some 
readers, less literary by others and even non-literary by some others. Again here, one 
faces a potentially more serious impediment: deciding on the degree of 
decorativeness, specialness, etc. language structures have to exhibit in order to fall 
under either category. In both cases, these conclusions contribute only to further 
enhance the difficulty in drawing a separating line and provide no assistance towards 
clarifying the controversy. 
Nonetheless, both views are partly valid, and the situation is not necessarily a 
mutually exclusive one since all of these factors do play some role in deciding on 
what is considered as literature and literary language. As mentioned above, the degree 
of structural restrictions in the language of a text can at one extreme determine its 
status as literary while in many other cases it does not. Moreover, even the labelling 
of a genre as a literary one does partly determine the status of the language it embeds 
as literary language (as revealed in Fish's (1980) classroom experiments) both at the 
production and reception levels. This is evident in genre theories (Swales 1990; Kress 
1985; O'Toole 1988) which argue for an existing association between the overall 
genre which a text conforms with on the one hana, and the language it exhibits or 
even should exhibit as a result of belonging to that genre on the other. As Kress 
(1985: 31) explains, just as a specific genre is seen as the outcome of "meanings, 
fOlms and functions of ... conventionalised occasions of social interactions", the 
genre can also affect structural choice. For instance, history as a genre is seen to 
exhibit a predominance of clauses of causation while scientific writing reflects 
impersonal and factual statements, and this is due to the nature of the requirements of 
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both genres (Kress 1985: 55-57). In short, choice of language is "partly determined by 
the norms of the socially appropriate genre for these functions" (O'Toole 1988: 1). 
Finally, the reader also plays a vital role in this controversy where the quality 
of literariness would be viewed in terms of functional effects of a use of language on a 
reader. This is the point Simpson (1997: 8) supports when arguing that '''literary' is a 
quality conferred upon texts not according to what they are, but according to what 
they do. It is ... afunctional description". Of course, this is too simplistic. There are 
other complications which arise as a result of the need to specify what these effects 
are, who the reader is and how s/he reacts to and is affected by which functional 
dimension of the language used in a text; and a whole section will be devoted to that 
later in this chapter. While for instance, these effects were action-prompting effects in 
Plato's view of poetry (the reason that caused him to dread and expel poets from his 
Republic), in Jakobson's view, these are a combination of effects ranging from giving 
the reader pleasure (aesthetic) to teaching her a lesson (didactic) even to prompting 
her to action (conative). Yet again, the effects referred to by critics like Simpson, 
Kress and Weber are socio-cultural-political ideological ones. These issues will be 
dealt with in a following section of this chapter, but the main point that arises from all 
these arguments is that both traditional as well as more recent views of literature are 
only partly valid. At one extreme, there exist some structural qualities characteristic 
only of specific literary genres and the language exhibited in these genres. At the 
other extreme, literariness can be determined in terms of broad functional effects of a 
use of language on readers. 
In the light of this argument, the view argued for in this thesis is that Literature 
is the result of a long-standing socio-historical institutional, educational tradition, 
which is cUlTently perceived as the standard status quo. This means that Literature is 
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approached by readers as a "complex and opaque" fonn of discourse "because the 
experiences [it] describe[s] and elicit[s] in the reader are considered, necessarily to be 
complex and deep" [emphasis mine] (Birch 1989: 86). Therefore, what makes some 
(and very few) literary genres distinctive fonns of discourse results partially from a 
set of structural restrictions (which are not characteristic of all literary genres), some 
broad functional effects on the reader (which are not exclusive to literature), and most 
importantly because literature is read differently in the first place. 
However, looking at this whole controversy from a critical-functional 
perspective, the need to isolate literary language as a unique category becomes of 
little significance. Unlike traditional approaches, those functions that are of interest 
for a critical analysis of discourse are not aesthetic but ideological ones. In this sense, 
whether a literary text is highly decorative or not is of relatively little importance as 
long as it addresses socio-cultural issues, issues relating to the effects of a use of 
language and the power of language on a reader at the ideological level. Unless those 
aesthetic characteristics of language playa functional role in affecting, for instance, 
the consistency of a writer's ideological positions or the reader's interpretation of 
these positions, there would be no motive or motivation to differentiate between 
literary and non-literary language since both are subject to the same set of 
~ ~
detenninants and can therefore function in similar ways in tenns of ideological effects 
on readers. ~ n d d this is the position adopted in this thesis, that there is no structural or 
functional motivation for isolating literary language as a different type of language 
use. 
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2.3 Style and Stylistics 
The next set of notions directly related to the traditional view of literature and 
literary language are those of style and stylistics. These too do not conform to the 
functional/critical view of discourse discussed above, and therefore, clarifying them 
becomes crucial due to their central role in determining the directions in which the 
analysis of literary texts proceeded. As a result, the following section aims at 
examining the role and value of these notions from the perspective of a functional 
theory of discourse and a critical approach to its analysis. 
2.3.1 Definitions and Role of Style 
Similar to the notion of literary language, the term style was traditionally used 
with positive connotations to describe "written" language as "praiseworthy, skilful or 
elegant" (Chapman 1973: 11). However, the two core senses of style which developed 
subsequently were those viewing it either as "an intimate, individuating index" or as 
"an evaluative index" (Crystal 1969: v). From a practical point of view, this meant the 
following. In the first case, emphasis is laid on those linguistic features considered 
unique to a specific author and characteristic of his/her language. In the second, the 
evaluative, aspect of style is stressed by comparing and contrasting linguistic features 
of different works in order to determine the value and, more importantly, superiority 
of one over another. 
Still, both views have common bases. As Enkvist (1973: 15) explains, in both 
cases style is necessarily seen as some kind of "DEPARTURE" from a set of 
linguistic patterns labelled as a "norm" or the "syntactically neutral or unmarked", an 
"ADDITION" of stylistic traits to expressions deemed as "neutral or styleless, or pre-
stylistic", and/or as "CONNOTATION", whereby linguistic features acquire their 
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value from the "textual and situational environment". However, even at the structural 
level, these common features are quite problematic. For instance, there is a general 
lack of clarity concerning what is considered as the norm (those syntactically neutral 
and unmarked forms) and what traits are therefore considered stylistic. And Enkvist's 
(1973: 15) further distinction between "stylistic choice" and "pragmatic and 
grammatical choice," the latter of which has no stylistic value, only contributes to 
further enhancing this difficulty. This is the case since no clear guidelines to 
determine which choice is stylistic and which is not can be offered. Moreover, such 
bases for distinction as choice and deviance (especially of those unmarked syntactic 
patterns) are not only subjective but also rather non-distinctive since choice for 
instance is characteristic of all language use. In this sense, approaching style on the 
basis of these features would present quite a circular definition. 
Apart from the highly inadequate bases for defining style as a notion, the two 
senses in which style developed are also unsatisfactory. On the one hand, looking at 
style as "an intimate, individuating index" (Crystal 1969: v) presents an extremely 
narrow view of style with highly limited practical value. On the other hand, 
approaching style in terms of "the impressions of the reader" (Enkvist et al. 1964: lO-
11), which characterises a large portion of the second sense of style: i.e. as "an 
evaluative index" (Crystal 1969: v), faces the same obstacles as those discussed under 
literary language arise; namely relating to the identity of what is constantly referred to 
as the reader. The risk of associating the general identity of the reader with the one 
directly responsible for a reading of a specific text is an ever-lurking possibility. 
Moreover, there are always questions concerning the uniformity of those reader-
impressions in the presence of the inevitable element of subjectivity. Finally, the 
difficulty in providing a systematic account of those criteria the reader considers in 
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order to make these judgements concerning which style is better renders the move 
from the theoretical to the more practical arena a very complex one. 
In the aftermath of these drawbacks, approaching the notion of style from a 
critical-functional view of discourse promises a more useful account. Carter and Nash 
(1990: 21) attempt just that by defining style as "a textual phenomenon [which] 
should be studied both in terms of particular linguistic forms in a text and as effects 
generated by those same forms on the consumer (the reader) by the producer of the 
text (the writer)". This falls in line with the above view of discourse, where discourse 
--is a functional and therefore a dynamic process reflecting an interaction between the 
author, the reader, linguistic structures in the text as well as a set of social factors. In 
this process, the author, reader, text and consequently styles are also influenced by 
socio-cultural factors, thus bringing to light an important dimension in the question of 
style: the role of ideology as a crucial determinant in the interplay between structure, 
function and meaning (Kress 1988: 127; Carter and Nash 1990: 21). This finally 
results in a view of style as the product of a use of language which is affected by both 
individual and social factors. Rephrased by Birch and O'Toole (1988: 1), stylistic 
choices are partly determined by the functional and ideological needs of the producer 
of the text and partly by "the norms of the socially appropriate genre for these 
functions" . 
Yet these latest additions to what constitutes style have serious implications. 
While under the first structuralist view, doubt was shed on the viability of 
distinguishing style on the basis of non-distinctive features, in the latter functional 
view, all the bases for isolating style are completely wiped out. If one's style is 
reflected in one's choice of the content and form of a message which is also affected 
by social and individual factors, then this suggests that one's style is indistinguishable 
52 
from one's discourse. The only justification for singling out the notion of style would 
be when accounting for regularities and irregularities in patterns that become 
characteristic of an individual's discourse, and these according to Leech (1987: 48) 
are "purely statistical" matters. At one extreme, i.e. when relating to those recurrent 
and typical patterns in language use, this is what characterises genres. At the other 
extreme, i.e. when discussing only one isolated instance of discourse, then style and 
the language of discourse are identical. As a result, style would be a redundant term 
from a functional view of discourse, and a stylistic analysis would be essentially the 
same as discourse analysis. And this is the position adopted in this thesis, that a 
stylistic analysis which specifically targets literary genres can simply be replaced with 
a critical analysis of discourse which targets all instances of discourse including those 
referred to as literary. 
Yet looking at the way stylistics developed, one is faced with a completely 
different picture to that argued for in this thesis. Historically, the three main 
theoretical branches of stylistics outlined below barely correspond to the functional 
view of discourse and the main objectives of a critical analysis of discourse. It is 
crucial, therefore, to provide a brief description of these approach in order to set the 
bases from which this thesis differs. 
2.3.2 Branches in Stylistic Analysis 
At the theoretical level, there are three main branches of stylistics. The first 
regards it as "that part of linguistics which concentrates on variation in the use of 
language ... with special attention to the most conscious and complex uses of language 
in literature" (Turner 1973: 7). Here stylistics is essentially part of "linguistics" 
(Crystal 1969: 9) which takes the analysis of literary texts as its medium. The second 
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branch is that regarding it as "an extension of practical criticism, enabling the critic to 
sensitise his grasp of detail together with his grasp of structure wholes" (Cluysenaar 
1976: 10). In this sense, stylistic analysis is used as back up to the analysts' intuitions 
about the meaning of texts (Mills 1995: 7). It therefore falls as part of literary 
criticism, where linguistics is used "instrumentally" as a matter of convenience 
because of its practicality in providing some sort of "toolkit" for analysts of literature 
and for students to use when undertaking literary interpretation (Leech and Short 
1981: 13). 
The differences between these two views are summarised by Carter (1986: 8-
12) who labels the first "linguistic stylistics" and the second "literary stylistics". 
"Linguistic stylistics" is described as "the purest form of stylistics" since it uses the 
study of style to derive "a refinement of models for the analysis of language and thus 
contribute to the development of linguistic theory" (Carter 1986: 8). It is therefore 
linguistic in orientation in the sense that the ultimate objective is in the benefit of 
linguistic theory and description, and where literary texts serve as the medium used to 
refine models that are linguistic in essence (Carter 1986: 10). On the other hand, 
"literary stylistics" is that approach to text analysis where the ultimate objective is to 
arrive at a reading of the text under study. As a result, the tendency, argues Carter 
(1986: 12), would be "to draw eclectically on linguistic insights" used to serve "what 
is generally claimed to be fuller interpretation of language effects", and which will in 
tum be more than what is possible without resorting to linguistics. In this sense the 
approach is not linguistic since linguistics is used only as a tool to support the analysis 
of the content of a literary work and is not the aim of the study altogether. 
Finally, the third branch is that which considers stylistics as "a means of 
linking" literary criticism and linguistics (Widdowson 1975: 3). This view attempts to 
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find the middle grounds between both fields of study, and its definition as "the 
analysis of the language of literary texts, usually taking its theoretical models from 
linguistics" (Mills 1995: 4) reveals the presence of elements from both fields. 
, 
Yet moving to the practical level, only the third view of stylistics makes 
practical sense and is reflected in practical analyses since there are serious doubts 
whether Carter's branches of stylistics do exist in their pure forms. In fact, except for 
the analysts' openly declared aims and institutional affiliations, it is difficult to think 
of specific stylistic analyses which have contributed solely and exclusively to one 
field. The findings of "linguistic stylistics" are used by "literary stylistics" in order to 
help interpret texts; and if these findings are non-applicable or irrelevant when 
applied, then there usually is, or should be, a rethinking of the orientations and 
analytical potential of the linguistic model used. Normally, the linguistic model is 
modified in the light of the extent and range of its applicability in more than one 
linguistic medium. The more applicable, the more valuable it is both for the study of 
linguistics and literary criticism. Indeed as O'Toole (1988: 12) explains, the three 
characteristics of a stylistic analysis are: 
1) "[providing] as detailed a description as possible of the transmitted text of 
the work in question" 
2) "inevitably [prompting] and [deepening] the process of interpretation" and 
3) "[testing] the power of the chosen model of linguistic description". 
In short, stylistics is, or should be, a discipline "which genuinely tries to combine both 
approaches [linguistics and literary] to the study of literary texts" (Van Peer 1988: 2). 
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Yet Carter's distinction is not unfounded. There have been approaches to 
stylistic analysis which did attempt to perfonn one or the other task. Their limitations, 
however, are what brought about the third more balanced view. These limitations boil 
down to highly specified contributions to one or the other field of study with no 
account for the social dimension of language, the role of ideology or their functional 
effects on readers. Even when earlier approaches speak of effects on the reader of a 
specific style, the use of the first tenn usually referred to some sort of vague aesthetic 
effect which is essentially a subjective, difficult-to-specify evaluation on the one 
hand, or to meaning (Tompkins 1980: ix) in general. In fact, both these tenns are 
unclarified and unspecified as are many of factors that were considered as part of 
earlier approaches to stylistic analysis. 
This explains the variety of approaches which emphasise different components 
of the text at the expense of others. Firstly, there are those which stress the role of the 
producer of the text in their analyses. As a result, they focus on analysing textual 
features in the light of the personality, background and environment of the generators 
of the text (Enkvist 1973: 14). Other analyses concentrate on the role of the receiver 
in tenns of his/her reactions to the "textual stimuli" generated by the producer of the 
text. This is based on the assumption that analysts would have better access to the 
'stylistic effects of texts through the readers' responses to the text than through trying 
to analyse what is in the mind of the writer and what motivated him/her to writer this 
way (Enkvist 1973: 14). Finally, there is a third group of analysts who pay attention 
only to the text as a structural-syntactic unit with minimal references to the producer 
or the receiver. Their aim, Enkvist (1973: 15) explains, is to "objectify" their 
approach by looking for stylistic clues in the text at the descriptive level. 
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Yet as mentioned above, each of these approaches necessarily faces problems 
of being too narrow and positioned. One must acknowledge the fact that language in a 
text is not merely a medium through which an author "encodes" certain meanings and 
effects that are either "decoded" or not by a reader (Fludernik 1993: 60). There are 
other extra-textual factors and forces (social, individual, political, historical, racial, 
etc.) that are indisputably significant. A more comprehensive analysis of text has to 
take into consideration those elements determining "the meaning of a text in its social 
context" not only in its linguistic context (Mills 1995: 8). This should be done in 
addition to accounting for the role of the reader, author and linguistic make up of the 
text and not as a replacement for it. 
As discussed in Chapter One, the seriousness of this issue (i.e. what factors to 
consider and why) is translated into questioning the underlying criteria used in 
selecting and setting the parameters for a framework whose aim is to provide an 
analysis of a text, literary or non-literary, which is of practical value. Even when the 
main objectives of such an analysis are specified as presenting a reading of underlying 
political, racist, sexist, religious, economic, etc ideologies in a text, questions of 
determining what factors should be accounted for as opposed to what can be 
realistically accounted for are raised. Here, the starting point towards any answer to 
the above question is an agreement concerning the insufficiency of accountinLg for the 
exclusive role of either the producer of the text, the text (as a structural unit) or its 
receiver. Within the functional view of language adopted in this thesis, the position 
argued for is that all these three basic levels need to be considered. The way these are 
considered is another matter, and this will be taken up in the last section of this 
chapter and then again in Chapter Four. However, it is crucial to note that what 
occupies a predominant position in an analysis whose main objectives are examining 
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the functional effects of a specific use of language on a reader is the reader 
her/himself. Even with more recent critical stylistic approaches to literary criticism 
(such as in the work of stylisticians like Carter, Fowler, Mills, Simpson, Toolan, 
Weber, etc.), the role and position of the reader is under-specified in the reading 
process. 
In fact, this branch of stylistic approaches is the only one which falls in line 
with the functional view of language proposed by Halliday. However, while it does 
view the reader as affected by the interaction among the some or all those factors 
-discussed above, it still does not provide a practical way of realistically accounting for 
the role of the reader in a practical analysis of a literary text. Yet this is not the reason 
for not mentioning this branch of stylistics earlier. The reason is the argument made in 
the previous section where I contested the use of the term stylistics to refer to a 
specified version of a critical analysis of discourse which takes Literature as its 
medium. This term, I argued, is derived from the notion of style which is necessarily 
seen as a distinctive feature of language. However, this I argued was a hard position 
to justify whether at the structural or functional levels since an analysis of style 
(which is based on the concept of choice) is essentially the same as analysing 
language in use, i.e. discourse. There is, in other words, no styleless discourse and 
stylistics as a term is therefore an unfortunately misrepresentative one. Consequently, 
before deciding on the parameters of a critical approach to literary/non-literary 
discourse, the notion of the reader needs to be clarified and elaborated on. 
2.4 The Problem of The Reader 
As apparent from the above arguments, central to understanding, defining and 
specifying all those issues of literary and non-literary language, style and approaches 
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to stylistic analysis is the role of the reader. However, questions regarding whether the 
reader referred to is an individual reader or a representative of a certain group or 
community of readers are raised. Also, how that reader is affected by both internal 
and external factors (in the broadest sense) in the process of reading and interpretation 
are essential issues to address. Finally, since any view of the reader is dependent on a 
corresponding view of the relationship between that reader, the writer and the text, a 
clear and specific position regarding the interaction among these three is crucial in 
light of the definition of discourse outlined above. This is precisely what this final 
section will try to achieve; i.e. to examine these issues in the light of those theories 
which regard the reader as central in the process of interpretation. These theories are 
known as Reader-Response Criticism. 
2.4.1 Reader-Response Criticism 
The roots of reader-response criticism are traditionally traceable to Husserl's 
(1960) theory of phenomenology. This philosophy or method of inquiry is based on 
the premise that reality consists of objects and events as they are perceived or 
understood in human consciousness and not of anything independent of human 
consciousness. And this is what, according to Mailloux (1982: 20), different reader-
response approaches share: "the phenomenological assumption that it is impossible to 
separate perceiver from perceived, subject from object". As a result, in their quest to 
locate the meaning of a literary work, it was imperative for reader-response critics to 
place the role of the reader centrally in the equation since meaning is seen to have "no 
effective existence outside of its realization in the mind of a reader" (Tompkins 1980: 
ix). 
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This, naturally, brought about a set of diverse views regarding such traditional 
notions as text and the reader particularly as deviating from Formalists' and New 
Critics'. Most of these views are clearly summarised and presented, more or less 
chronologically, in Tompkins' (1980) account of most approaches to reader-response 
criticism of the time (from the' 50s to the late '70s) and are seen to follow a 'coherent 
progression' from formalism through structuralism and phenomenology to 
psychoanalysis and post-structuralism. Despite the variety of approaches, Tompkins 
finds that the one objective they all share is the specification of meaning. One group 
--
of approaches reflects a more text-based position; another a more reader-centred one. 
While in the first the role of the reader as an individual is, although present, less 
important in determining meaning in the text, the emphasis in the second shifts to the 
process of reading and the reader rather than the object of reading. 
Yet of the different arrangements of approaches to reader-response criticism, 
Steven Mailloux's (1982) presents the most convenient one. According to Mailloux, 
the three main directions in reader-response criticism can be represented in the 
following manner: Holland's (1975) and Bleich's (1978) "psychological" models 
reflecting a "subjective" view of reader-response, Fish's (1970) and Iser's (1974) 
"intersubjective" models, a "phenomenological" view, and Culler's (1975) and Fish's 
(1976) "social" models, a "structuralist" view. Of course, these are only a small 
selection of the numerous approaches, but they nevertheless are representative of the 
three main directions in reader-response criticism up till the late '70s. The different 
positions each branch adopts with respect to the reader and her role in the reading 
process constitute the points of relevance in this argument and are therefore briefly 
outlined below. 
60 
2.4.2 Three Directions in Reader-Response Criticism 
2.4.2.1 Psychological Models 
To begin with, Holland's (1975: 40) mainly subjective or psychoanalytic 
approach claims to take "as its subject-matter, not the text in supposed isolation, '" , 
nor the self in rhapsody, ... , but the transaction between the reader and the text". 
Holland introduces the notion of identity theme, which is in fact an innate unique 
individual characteristic, the unchanging core of an individual's personality. He then 
argues that it is in line with each person's identity theme that interpretation occurs. In 
this sense interpretation becomes an essentially subjective process since differences in 
identity themes influence the reader's defences, expectations,fantasies, and 
transformations (DEFT) in the process of reading. To him, unifonnity of response is 
not possible since individual personality is responsible for all response. It is the 
reader's mind which occupies the centre of textual meaning and unity since 
"interpretation is a function of identity" (Leitch 1995: 41). Of course, Holland's view 
is open to criticism such as Mailloux's (1982: 25) pointing out this theory's inability 
to account for the "phenomenon of similar responses" since meaning becomes "the 
result of '" interpretive synthesis, the transfonnation of fantasy into a unity which the 
reader finds coherent and satisfying". In other words, if different people possess 
different 'identity themes' then how can this theory explain similarity in responses? 
Yet whether this is a crucial issue in Holland's (1975) theory remains 
questionable since his model does open the possibility for the existence of similar 
identity themes which bring about similar interpretations. The more challenging 
criticism is Culler's (1975) indication that what Holland has essentially done is 
"[transfer] the concept of unity from text to person" (Bennett 1997: 38). The 
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seriousness of this criticism, in my opinion, arises from the fact that making this shift 
leaves Holland's theory essentially untestable and therefore unverifiable. In other 
words, the practical usefulness of such a theory would be minimal since the closest 
one can get to identifying the 'identity theme' of another individual would be through 
another interpreter's subconscious 'identity theme'. Although one cannot deny the 
existence of the individual 'personality factor' that plays a role in reading and 
interpretation, taking such a factor into consideration in a practical account of reading 
and interpretation and placing it centrally in this account is a different issue. Another 
common criticism is that Holland's account also exhibits little commitment to 
"historical inquiry, formalist explication, or ideological analysis" and instead gives 
the primary role of shaping and determining the text to the reader (Leitch 1995: 43). 
This adds to the subjective nature of interpretation and response in Holland's model. 
Another 'psychological' and 'subjective' approach to reader-response 
criticism is Bleich's (1978), and in it he emphasises the role of the reader as the 
source of meaning. In his book, Subjective Criticism, he places the reader at the centre 
of the reading process by distinguishing between three levels of reading. The first is 
the "subjective response", the 'symbolization' which is the reader's first reaction to a 
text as first perceived and identified by that reader (Bleich 1978: 98). The second is 
~ ~
the "resymbolization" which occurs after perception and identification, which in tum 
create in the reader "a need, desire, or demand for explanation" (Bleich 1978: 39). In 
other words, the need for explaining the initial reaction to the text is what brings about 
what is "commonly known as interpretation" (Bleich 1978: 67). Finally comes the 
level of 'negotiation' among the members of an interpretive community of those 
individual interpretations. In that, he distinguishes between interpretation and 
response. While response is the initial emotional reaction to a text (a private process), 
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interpretation is the more belated and objectified individual subjective experience (a 
communal process). His aim is to stress the primary emotional response at the 
expense of interpretation seeking to demonstrate "the subjective ground of all 
objective formulation" (Leitch 1995: 45). In his pedagogical orientation, he is more 
interested in what students feel rather than what they think. Therefore his main point 
of emphasis is the primacy given to the individual self as creator of texts, and this 
brings about several criticisms such as Mailloux's (1982) which sheds doubts on the 
ability of Bleich's model in accounting for agreement in negotiation. 
Mailloux (1982: 32) questions Bleich's argument and asks how different 
subjectivities can "participate in a negotiating process" since texts are individually 
constituted. He elaborates by saying that since there could be different versions of 
each negotiator's response statement constituting different versions of the same 
literary text, then "no negotiating process is comprehensible" unless the text is prior to 
individual initiative (Mailloux 1982: 33). Mailloux (1982: 33) concludes by pointing 
out the impossibility of a task whose objective is to account for "interpretive 
agreement after having established the absolute primacy of the indi vidual as 
interpreter". And this seems to be the main point of criticism when it comes to 
'psychological' and 'subjective' approaches. In concentrating on the individual mind 
as the main producer of meaning, and in stripping individuals and individual minds 
from any realistic sense of a social dimension, such accounts inevitably fail to explain 
similarity in response. In this, their contribution to our understanding of the role of the 
reader in the reading process remains less empirical, more theoretical, and therefore 
minimal from a practical perspective. 
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2.4.2.2 Phenomenological Models 
Another direction in reader-response criticism is Fish's (1970) 
'phenomenological' and 'intersubjective' view. In his article Literature in the Reader: 
Affective Stylistics, Fish (1970) regards the text not as "an object, a thing-in-itself, but 
an event, something that happens to, and with the participation of, the reader" (in Fish 
1980: 25). To him, the text becomes alive through the act of reading, in the process of 
reception. Yet since reading happens through time, his proposed method of analysis 
aims at monitoring the temporal flow of sentences which are "structured by 
everything the reader brings with him, by his competences" (Fish 1980: 46). He 
suggests that "it is by taking these into account as they interact with the temporal left-
to-right reception of the verbal string that [one is] able to chart and project the 
developing response" (Fish 1980: 47). 
Yet although the reader seems to lie at the centre of meaning, since "the place 
where sense is made or not made is the reader's mind rather than the printed page," 
(Tompkins 1980: xvii), Fish is in fact interested in the "interaction" between the 
words on the page and "the actively mediating consciousness of the reader-hearer" 
(Leitch 1995: 36). And a major part of this 'interaction' lies in the intentions of the 
author. Fish argues that readers 'react' to words, sentences and texts in one way or 
another because they (i.e. readers) operate "according to the same set of rules that the 
author used to generate them" (Tompkins 1980: xvii). His notion of the 'informed 
reader' represents a reader who is able to understand the text the way the author 
intended it. It follows then that the reader is eventually manipulated by the text which 
is the creation of the author, thus enacting the author's will. Meaning is ultimately 
created in the reader by the author, and this in Leitch's (1995: 38) words, elevates the 
authorial consciousness to a level where it controls "the complications of meanings 
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through the manipulation of linguistic and poetic conventions". In this sense, Fish's 
position presents a conflicting and a partly misleading view which starts off giving the 
impression that the reader lies at the centre of the interpretive activity. However, later 
on, Fish takes meaning back to the author's arena and strips the reader of the power to 
go beyond what was intended by the author. The fact remains that in Fish's approach, 
whether we are looking at the text or at the reader's cognitive process (his reaction to 
text), the same goal is sought: the intended meaning of the author which is concretised 
in the text when it is read. As a result, the possibilities for an intersubjective 
interpretation become more tangible since meaning is not the product of a subjective 
process located in the mind of the reader but in the temporal interaction between the 
reader and the text. Finally, Fish's model is also criticised because it brushes aside 
extrinsic social realities and historical issues (Leitch 1995: 37). 
A similar position is adopted by Wolfgang Iser (1974: 80) in his account of the 
reading process and the position of the reader. According to Iser, a reader actively 
participates in the production of textual meaning in that s/he acts as "co-creator of the 
work by supplying that portion of it which is not written but only implied". From a 
phenomenological viewpoint, the text is concretised when the reader's imagination 
comes into play where different readers "[fill] in the unwritten portions of the text, its 
'gaps' or areas of 'indeterminacy,'" in their own ways (Tompkins 1980: xv). In this 
sense, the act of reading is the text since both constitute one another. Yet there are 
limits as to the type and amount of 'filling in' that can be done. According to Iser, 
these limits are implied by the text, circumscribed by it and traceable to it so that the 
interpretations arrived at are not "mere subjective fabrication[s] of the reader's," but 
are proof of both the text's inexhaustibility as well as its limited intentions (Tompkins 
1980: xv). Therefore, this co-creation gives the reader the authority to fill in only what 
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is implied by the text. In short, the reader's activity is both a fulfilment of what is 
already implicit in the structure of the work as well as a partly subjective process. As 
Iser (1971: 4) explains, while meanings "are the product of a rather difficult 
interaction between the text and reader", the focus is more on the "intersubjective 
nature of the time-flow of reading and the textual perspectives that guide the 
consistency-building and put restrictions on the range of configurative meanings". In 
this sense, Iser's reception theory both refuses "to dissolve the text into the reader's 
subjectivity or the interpretive community's codes and conventions" while at the same 
time promoting "the creativity of the reader" (Leitch 1995: 53). Yet in practice, Iser 
gives primacy to the text which is responsible for constantly readjusting the reader's 
expectations and evaluations and where the response of the reader depends on how 
attentive s/he is to textual cues. And it is this precise point which Sauer (1988: 85) 
contests when he argues that "reception is not at all merely the filling in of spaces left 
open in the text" since "differences, misunderstandings, discontinuities and exploited 
potential will surely remain". In other words, apart from Iser's brushing aside the 
social dimension of reading, the indeterminacy of the text is one major characteristic 
which is always a possibility. 
2.4.2.3 Social Models 
The third direction in reader-response criticism is Culler's (1975) 'social' 
model which has a structuralist basis in that it attempts to account for the reader's 
understanding of literary texts from a linguistic point of view. He speaks of 'literary 
competence' as a set of conventions which "[direct] the reader to pick out certain 
features of the work corresponding to public notions of what constitutes an 
'acceptable' or 'appropriate' interpretation" (Tompkins 1980: xviii). In that, reading is 
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presented as a "highly detennined operation of decoding" mainly directed "by textual 
and cultural constraints" (Leitch 1995: 60). It is a rule-governed process, and it is this 
underlying system of rules, their 'literary competence', that detennines literary 
meaning since readers do not approach a text without preconceptions. In this sense, 
literary meaning is a publicly agreed-upon institutionalised matter. Therefore, the 
organising principles of textual interpretations are located not in the reader, as Iser 
suggests, but "in the institutions that teach readers to read" (Culler 1981: 120). This is 
best summarised by Culler's (1981: 125) statement that "meaning is not an individual 
creation but the result of applying to the text operations and conventions which 
constitute the institution of literature". Yet despite its 'social' branding, Culler's 
approach presents only a narrow view of the social and cultural aspects of reader-
response. It is mainly targeted at pointing out those conventions in reading which 
come in the fonn of an "underlying social and historical system of rules determining 
literature and its interpretation" (Leitch 1995: 60). In that, other ideological aspects, 
for instance, are left completely unmentioned. 
A similar position is adopted by Fish (1976: 167) who substitutes his earlier 
(1970) notion of the "infonned reader" with the concept of "interpretive 
communities". Here he suggests that the interpretive strategies of the readers are those 
constituting the text and thus seeks to account for both "the variety as well as the 
stability of reader responses to the text" (Leitch 1995: 38). This, according to 
Mailloux (1982: 23), signals his shift from a phenomenological emphasis "to a 
structural or even post-structural position", a position which stresses "the underlying 
systems that detennine the production of textual meaning and in which the individual 
reader and the constraining text lose their independent status". His notion of an 
'interpretive community' is made up of "those who share interpretive strategies not 
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for reading (in the conventional sense) but for writing texts, for constituting their 
properties and assigning their intentions" (Fish 1980: 171). These strategies "exist 
prior to the act of reading and therefore determine the shape of what is read rather 
than, ... , the other way round" (Fish 1980: 171). What this means is that 
interpretation is no longer a 'response' to the author's intended meaning but rather the 
outcome of interpretive strategies. The reader is seen to 'negotiate' the text so that 
when a line seems ambiguous, it is the reader (as part of a community of interpreters) 
who has to decide on the meaning in a manner demanded by his/her community's 
interpretive strategies. Yet despite Fish's change in approach, the same criticisms 
concerning his neglect of the social dimension still surround him. Such criticisms 
question the value of Fish's 'interpretive communities' without specific detail 
concerning the 'situation', the 'historical and social configuration', and "what 
political interests are concretely entailed by the very existence of interpretive 
communities" (Said 1983: 26). It is these drawbacks that set the direction in which 
reader-response criticism proceeds in the following years. 
Yet as far as the earlier years of reader-response criticism are concerned, there 
exists a continuum that moves from psychological reading models which emphasise 
unique responses, through phenomenological models which include subjective and 
intersubjective readings, L to the social models that stress shared responses. 
2.4.3 Other Directions in Reader-Response Criticism 
As mentioned earlier, there are several shortcomings to each of these 
approaches. In fact, Tompkins (1980: 201) singles out a set of weaknesses which all 
approaches to reader-response criticism share. For instance, she argues that these 
approaches do not essentially depart from New Criticism as is assumed, and this is 
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reflected in their similar objective; i.e. the location of meaning. Whether meaning is 
located in the text or in the reader is the only concern that divides them. Yet the two 
main issues which seem to have dictated the directions of later criticism are the fact 
that none of the above approaches consider language as an instrument of power, nor 
do they include an adequate account of the social dimension. By adequate I mean an 
account which is systematic, which manifests itself convincingly and realistically in 
the theory and which has practical potential. 
This drawback and the dissatisfaction with the kind of coverage reader-
response criticism made of the issues involved are what prompted at least one of the 
two main directions which reading theories took in the '80s and the early '90s. One of 
them was based on the view of readers as "historically or socially constructed, rather 
than abstract and eternal essences" (Bennett 1995: 4). It emerged from the recognition 
that "readers are different, that no single identity can be demanded of or imposed on 
readers" and that, as a result, "questions of social, economic, gender and ethnic 
differences" are simply unavoidable. In contrast with the conventional view of 
reading as "a solitary affair" constituting an escape from the world, these later 
approaches saw reading as inseparable from political and historical factors in the 
sense that the choice of what to read, where to read, when to read and how to read are 
"determined by social, religious or political restraints" (Bennett 1995: 5). In another 
sense, the emergence of the "resistant reader" foreshadowed the rough path awaiting 
those who do not comply with the demands of those determining reading conventions. 
Following this line of reasoning, reading becomes a struggle, and the reader, in 
constant battle with the text and those external constraints. This view was best 
exemplified in feminist criticism such as Pratt's (1986: 29) who, in adopting the view 
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of the resistant reader, argued for the need to regard reader-response as a "socially and 
ideologically determined process". 
The other direction in reading theory involves what Bennett (1995: 4) calls "a 
problematization of the very concept of 'reading' and 'the reader', a recognition not 
only that readers are different from one another, but that any individual reader is 
multiple, and that any reading is determined by difference". This manifested itself 
mainly in deconstructionist theories which highlight the complexities in approaching 
the notion of 'the reader' rather than help explain or simplify it. 
According to deconstructionist theorists such as Samuel Weber (1987) and 
Jacques Derrida (1992), readers face a dilemma of identification and distance. 
According to Derrida (1992: 74), readers are drawn by the "impulse" of identifying 
themselves with the text while at the same time trying to distance themselves and 
differ in reading. And this is what Weber (1987: 92) refers to in his statement, "if 
[reading] succeeds it fails" since in their attempt to interpret the text as the text 
dictates it, readers are in fact recreating the act of writing and are not really reading. If 
they differ in interpretation, then they miss the intended point and purpose of the text. 
In other words, a deconstructionist view contests both the notion of a single shared 
reading as well as that of several subjective readings. Yet although this can make 
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sense at the theoretical level (that it is not an either-or situation) deconstructionists do 
not seem to take this view in a constructive direction. Another example to 
demonstrate the kind of complication characteristic of deconstructionist theories is 
Derrida's (1992) and Felman's (1977; 1982) positions which raise existential 
questions concerning the notions of the text and the reader. Derrida (1992: 74) starts 
by arguing, for instance, that the reader, by definition, "does not exist" but is merely 
the product of the reading process. But at the same time, the text only comes into 
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existence through the act of reading, remarks Felman (1977: 124): i.e. it does not exist 
prior to the reader. It follows then that the "priority, the originary locus and even the 
temporal primacy of text and reader are uncertain" (Felman 1977: 124). The points 
such arguments are meant to make correspond to the deconstructionists' doubts of the 
communicative ability of reading since "the action by which communication is 
produced - reading - is necessarily inhabited by its ... own resistance" (Bennet 1995: 
11). These views are addressed next. 
2.5 Accounting for The Reader 
In the light of these deconstructionist views regarding the role of the reader in 
the reading process, there exist several reservations pertaining to the theoretical and 
practical contributions of these arguments. Issues like whether or not a text exists in 
isolation of the reader and whether or not the reader brings the text to life seem quite 
pointless if the intention is to analyse these texts for any purpose and only complicate 
the notions of the text and the reader. My point is that our interest in a text is in the 
context of reading and not the text in isolation or the reader in isolation. And in this 
process of reading, both (the text and the reader) exist through the interaction between 
them. 
On top of that is the reality of the reader. The reader is, after all, a real entity 
living in a society, and is affected and partly shaped by both individual and social 
factors. And these constantly changing factors reflect upon the reader who is also 
undergoing constant change and development. This is why it is unrealistic to speak of 
one definitive interpretation. Even the same person changes her mind during the 
temporal flow of the reading process as well as after the reading is done. Therefore, 
while there can be a limit as to the range of possible interpretations which are 
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relatable to the text at the intersubjective level, there can be no one definitive 
interpretation. And this, I believe, is as ambitious an aim as can realistically be 
achievable. The closest one can get to pinning down the possible range of 
interpretation is being categorical about what do not constitute intersubjective 
interpretations. 
As a result, in this extremely complex process of reading and interpretation, 
the reliable constants are in fact identifiable variables. Taking into account the role of 
the reader in discourse analysis is therefore a major difficulty in that it includes 
elements of individual subjectivity, socio-cultural and institutional intersubjectivity 
and textual pseudo-objectivity. And the view that all these factors are present makes 
the linguistic makeup of the text in the light of social constraints equally important. 
The position proposed in this thesis concerning the role of the reader is therefore the 
following. 
In the presence of these already mentioned elements and variables, accounting 
for the role of the reader in the process of interpretation should start by primarily 
acknowledging the need for opening the possibility for variance in interpretation. The 
way this is done is discussed in the analytical framework proposed in Chapter Four, as 
well as the practical applications of this framework in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
While at the one hand, accounting for the variability in reader interpretation reflects < 
the flexibility of the proposed framework, the systematic nature of the proposed 
framework reduces the danger that interpretation might tum into a completely loose 
process without any restraints. All this falls in line with the broad objectives of the 
analysis which are investigating the power of language in its multifunctional nature in 
terms of its effects on the reader at the ideological level. These objectives necessarily 
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project the view of the text as a functional and therefore a dynamic process reflecting 
an interaction among all the constituent elements of discourse. 
All in all then, and in agreement with the objectives of critical-functional 
analyses of discourse, the approach put forward in this thesis will target ideological 
issues in various instances of discourse (both literary and non-literary, both overtly 
and non-overtly ideological). Its basis falls in line with one of the premises set in the 
first chapter: that a critical analysis of discourse should involve a systematic 
utilisation of a relevant set of linguistic tools for that purpose. Consequently, this 
analysis would be based on a systematic approach which is adequate in that it 
manifests itself convincingly and realistically in the theory as well as having practical 
potential. 
Relating this to a more specific linguistic tool, the forthcoming analyses will 
be based on a systematic analysis of modality in discourse in order to provide a 
reading of ideology. And the grounds for selecting modality as the main linguistic 
feature are its direct relationship with ideology and the key role it plays in reflecting 
or obscuring ideology in general. This relationship will be discussed thoroughly in 
Chapter Four, yet mentioning it at this point is only to signal and emphasise the need 
for a systematic description of modality on which a systematic analysis of ideology 
could be based. ~ A n d d this is the upcoming task of the next chapter: presenting the 
different approaches to defining and categorising modality in general so that the most 




This chapter addressed a set of traditional and controversial issues which 
required redefinition in the light of the view of discourse discussed in the previous 
chapter. These related to notions such as literary and non-literary language, style and 
stylistics and the role of the reader in discourse analysis. The conclusions reached 
were mainly concerned with determining where these controversial issues fit in light 
of the objectives of a critical analysis of discourse. Both structural and functional 
bases w.hich set literary language apart as a special type of language were examined 
and scrutinised. It was concluded that each of these bases was only partially valid 
depending on the perspective from which the issue is approached. While structural 
restrictions did at one extreme determine the status of a work as literary (such as in a 
sonnet), these restrictions became less effective the more we move on a continuum of 
literariness. At the same time, while certain literary functions (such as those detailed 
in Jakobson's work) can be characteristic of works of literature, these were not 
exclusi ve to literature. 
Moreover, a similar set of conclusions was reached with respect to the issue of 
style which was traditionally (from a structural perspective) considered as some 
special and positive characteristic of one's use of language. However, whether style 
was seen as an evaluative index or an individuating one, there were serious doubts 
concerning its role as a distinctive feature in language. Even when considered from a 
functional perspective, in terms of its effect on readers, there were still no 
justifications for setting it apart from language use in general. Based on that, the 
different stylistic approaches which aim at analysing style in literature were examined 
and conclusions regarding the inadequacy of most of them were made in light of the 
multifunctional view of discourse presented in the first chapter. 
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Finally, as a prerequisite to deciding on the most appropriate approach to 
analysing discourse, the role of the reader was also examined in considerable detail in 
order to provide an adequate account of that reader which is both theoretically and 
practically workable in the approach. This was done in the light of reader-response 
theories and special emphasis was laid on the need to consider the individual as well 
as the social role of reader in her interaction with the text. This was based on the view 
that while there is a substantial degree of conformity in interpretation, the possibility 
that different readers may vary in interpretation should also be accounted for. This 
was seen possible only through an approach which allows for a consideration of all 
the mentioned variables in a systematic way where modality (the proposed linguistic 
feature to be analysed) is the key feature. 
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III Searching for a Practically Useful Account of Modality 
3.1 Introduction 
Analysing a text from a critical perspective presupposes an interaction 
amongst a large number of factors, and accounting for them is a very delicate process. 
The first two chapters have tried to identify many of these factors and clarify those 
which are problematic as well as those which do not correspond with the view of 
discourse agreed upon. It was concluded that the main challenge to accounting for 
those factors and the interaction among them in the light of the main objectives of a 
critical analysis of discourse would be the potential chaos that might arise out of that. 
This is due to the sheer number of sub-factors that belong to each which adds to the 
complexity of their interaction. It was concluded, therefore, that the only way to 
achieve this goal is through an approach which involves a 'systematic' utilisation of a 
relevant set of linguistic tools (Toolan 1990: 28) for the main purpose of providing a 
systematic reading of ideology in a text. And modality was identified as the linguistic 
tool with obvious potential. 
Consequently, since the aim of the fourth chapter is to highlight the 
importance of modality in text analysis and propose a model for doing so, it is crucial 
first to provide a review of the most relevant studies which have tackled this topic. 
This would set the necessary background serving as a basis from which the overall 
view of modality adopted in this thesis departs and/or on which it is partially based. 
Doing this, the diversity in approaches which have sprung from different theoretical 
views of language will be of primary focus. However, only those more useful 
accounts which correspond more closely to the view adopted in this thesis (both at the 
theoretical and practical levels) are elaborated on in any detail. This narrowing down 
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is determined in the light of the main objective of this chapter: the selection of the 
most appropriate account of modality which is both systematic as well as potentially 
practically useful for the analysis of ideology in discourse. And this usefulness is 
defined in line with the functional view of discourse outlined in the two previous 
chapters. 
Before embarking on this review, one must first point out the complexity 
associated with attempting to identify the main criteria which the different accounts of 
modality rely on. Although there sometimes are more obvious and dominant ones, 
detecting and pinpointing those elements is not that straightforward since they are not 
always openly signalled in the approach itself. In effect, my attempt to classify these 
approaches will be based both on their claims as well as on my own reading and 
evaluation of each. It is, in most cases, a chronologically structured review. 
3.2 Accounting for Modality: Complexities and Diversities 
Throughout the last few decades, several approaches springing from various 
perspectives have tried to define the term 'modality' and provide a systematic account 
of it. These have varied widely due to the fact that the main bases for the diversity in 
categorisations were deeply rooted in and dependent on one or more of theJollowing 
criteria: syntactic, semantic, functional, cognitive, etc. Hence, each approach has 
faced its own difficulties and has produced a more or less narrow and positioned 
account of what modality entails and which expressions should be included under the 
heading of modality. This is, to some extent, justifiable, the reasons behind it being 
related to how vast the topic initially is, the difficulty, degree of ambiguity and 
subjectivity associated with interpreting modal expressions in language, and the 
tendencies to adopt one or another approach based on what is the popular theory of 
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language at the time. This meant that various approaches have targeted the topic of 
modality from different angles and for diverse reasons, having their roots in several 
linguistic backgrounds, and in this sense, "the nature of the goal has come to be 
defined in terms of the means of approach" (Perkins 1983: 1). 
3.2.1 Twaddell's (1960) Restricted Structural Approach 
One of the earlier treatments of modals is Twaddell's (1960), which 
concentrates exclusively on a subset of English verbs: modal auxiliary verbs. The 
criteria on which Twaddell bases his selection are essentially a set of syntactic 
features shared by these modal auxiliaries but not characteristic of other main verbs. 
These unique features are summarised as follows: modal auxiliaries are distinguished 
by their ability to occur: 
1) before 'not' such as in "you must not leave the house" as opposed to other 
main verbs 
2) before the subject for interrogation, as in "may I leave?" 
3) as a substitute for an entire verb phrase as in "John can play the flute but I 
can't" and 
4) as the locus of grammatical stress as in "he must do it" (Twaddell 1960: 18). 
It is these same properties, later referred to by Huddleston (1976: 333) as the "NICE" 
properties, an acronym formed from "negation", "inversion", "code" and "emphatic", 
which became central in all syntactic categorisations of modals. 
Twaddell then makes a further division between modal auxiliaries and those 
he calls "primary auxiliaries" (be, have and do). Again, the distinction between them 
is drawn on syntactic grounds in that unlike "primary auxiliaries", modal auxiliaries 
neither show signs of agreement with the subject as in "* he mays go" nor do they 
have a full past tense (except for 'can' of ability). Finally, the last set of properties 
that distinguish modal auxiliary verbs is distributional. By this Twaddell refers to 
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their inability to co-occur as in "*John may could leave". In short, these three main 
syntactic features characteristic of modal auxiliary verbs clearly and neatly distinguish 
them not only from other full verbs, but also from 'primary auxiliaries', making them 
a category of their own. 
The first point on which Twaddell is criticised (Hermeren 1978; Coates 1983) 
is that his syntactic criteria do not permit him to account for any other expressions of 
modality. This is argued by Huddleston (1976) who explains that the NICE properties 
necessarily create a set of 'marginal' modals such as 'need' and 'dare' which satisfy 
some but not all these properties. Another problem is the presence of some auxiliaries 
such as have and be which satisfy the NICE properties but for which there are no 
semantic grounds to consider as modal. This leads to the next main criticism which is 
the inability for Twaddell's approach to account for the issue of meaning. In fact, this 
approach represents an extremely popular linguistic tendency stressing the view of 
language as a structured system which can be accounted for in a neat systematic 
manner. Of course, this is only possible at the expense of other important issues, such 
as that of meaning in this case, in which Twaddell expresses no interest. This main 
criticism will be a recurrent one in some later approaches to grouping and 
categorising modals. 
3.2.2 Joos's (1964) Restricted Semantic Approach 
A completely different approach is that adopted by Joos (1964). His is a 
complex semantic approach to classifying only eight modal auxiliaries (will, shall, 
call, ma)', must, ought to, dare and need), and these are grouped based on the 
differences in the kinds of semantic oppositions between them. Modals are considered 
to belong to a subgroup in which each modal is "either 'adequate' or 'contingent', and 
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either 'casual' or 'stable'; and each either 'assures' the event or specifies that it is 
'potential'" (Joos 1964: 149). This means that the differences between modals depend 
on which of those characteristics are exhibited by which modals. The reader is then 
invited to visually place the eight modals on the eight comers of "an abstract 
semiological cube" with the six characteristics on the six faces of that cube. Each face 
would then have four modals at its four comers which are listed below: 
Casual modals (WILL, SHALL, CAN, MAY) take that relation from the minimal social 
matrix of events, where the determining factors are the resultant of chance and whim 
operating upon the items that populate the factual world of accepted reality, but the 
Stable modals (MUST, OUHGT TO, DARE, NEED) find that relation in the maximal social 
matrix of events, where the determining factors are eternal and omnipresent: they are the 
community mores. Accordingly, stable modals exclude remote tense. 
Adequate modals (WILL, CAN, MUST, DARE) derive their force from completeness in the 
set of determining factors; but the 
Contingent modals (SHALL, MAY, OUGHT TO, NEED) get their weakness from some 
deficiency in the determining factors. 
Assurance (WILL, SHALL, MUST, OUGHT TO) comes from penalties for failure of the 
specified event to occur; but 
Potentiality (CAN, MAY, DARE, NEED) comes from immunity in case the actor brings the 
event to completion. 
(Joos 1964: 149-150) 
The first observation to make about Joos' classification of modal auxiliary 
verbs relates to his attempt to present a "symmetrical or exceptionless semantic 
arrangement" (Ehrman 1966: 9). This brings out several criticisms doubting the extent 
to which such a categorisation is a representative one when it comes to the numerous 
unaccounted for 'meanings' of modals as well as the unaccounted for modals. For 
instance, as Hermeren (1978: 18) argues, such classification suggests that Joos 
considers each modal to have a 'unitary meaning' which is "independent of the 
various contexts in which the modal occurs". This is echoed by Coates (1983: 9) 
when describing Joos' approach as generally "monosemantic" since it attempts to 
provide a "basic meaning for each modal" thus facing problems of deciding which of 
80 
the meanings constitutes the 'core meaning'. It follows that the definition of each 
modal is both vague and general in order to account for the diversity in the possible 
interpretations of the modal (Hermeren 1978: 18). Consequently, this kind of 
definition of modals is not informative enough and not very useful from a practical 
point of view. 
3.2.3 Palmer's (1965, 1974) Early Structural Approaches 
Palmer's (1965) approach to classifying modals is essentially based on 
syntactic criteria. His initial division between main verbs and auxiliary verbs is not 
based on "such notional categories [as] the expression of futurity, potentiality, 
obligation, etc." but rather on "four clearly statable formal characteristics of the 
auxiliary verbs" (Palmer 1965: 20-21). These are "negation", "inversion", "code" and 
"emphatic affirmation". Echoing Twaddell's (1960) structural account outlined above, 
he also makes further subdivisions within auxiliary verbs between "primary" (be, 
have, do) and "secondary" auxiliaries of which the latter are the modals (Palmer 1965: 
36). Finally, completely disregarding the issue of meaning, he only points out those 
problematic cases which do not fit his categorisation (dare, need, used) without 
attempting to directly address the problem. 
Realising this drawback, only in his later account does Palmer (1974) start to 
take the issue of meaning more seriously, although his main emphasis still lies on 
further detailed and systematic subdivisions of modal auxiliary verbs based on formal 
criteria. At the structural level, his later account (1974: 30-32) includes what he calls 
the "paradigm test" for defining auxiliaries, a test which takes into consideration the 
different positions of verbs (including modals) in a verb phrase as well as restrictions 
on combinations and order of these different verbs. At the semantic level, on the other 
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hand, Palmer (1974: 102) refers to a distinction between "epistemic" and "non-
epistemic" uses of mainly the modals will, may and must, taking into account those 
ambiguities associated with the use of modals in different utterances. 
However, his emphasis still centres on how the semantic notion of "epistemic" 
functions with respect to formal notions such as that of "tense" (Palmer 1974: 103). 
For instance, he suggests that there are three types of modals which are most clearly 
distinguished by their tense marking. These are "discourse-oriented", "subject-
oriented" and "epistemic" (Palmer 1974, 100). Their correspondence with the formal 
feature of tense is the following. With the first, there is no tense marking as in "he 
may not leave"; with the second, the modal may be marked for tense as in "John 
could run 10 miles"; with the third, the full verb may be marked for tense as in "John 
can't have been there yesterday". This is perhaps one major criticism towards 
Palmer's earlier (1965; 1974) approaches although he does admit that these formal 
distinctions are not general enough and points out some exceptions. As Kalojera 
(1982: 5) argues, Palmer always seems to imply that the meaning of modals "is in one 
way or another reflected in their form, and a difference in the meaning of the same 
modal should be accompanied by a difference in the structure of the verb phrase". 
This is also evident in Palmer's suggestion that the difference between the two 
meanings of the modal 'must' (obligation and logical conclusion) is signalled out by 
the fact that only the "logical conclusion" sense can be reflected in the verb phrase 
"must have + past participle" (Kalojera 1982: 5). Again, these are precisely the same 
points queried by Huddleston (1971); the idea of an existing set of "formal 
corollaries" reflecting semantic differences between modals. All in all, these 
criticisms indirectly signal the incompatibility of semantic and syntactic criteria for 
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grouping modal auxiliary verbs, and this too will be a recurrent criticism in some 
future accounts. 
3.2.4 Ehrman's (1966) Corpus-Based Approach 
Ehrman's (1966) approach to the study of modals is the first to be based on a 
corpus. Her starting point is a reaction to Joos' classification of modal auxiliaries and 
a test of whether his classification is a valid one. She argues that J oos' appealing "idea 
of symmetrical or exceptionless semantic arrangements" has distracted researchers in 
a way that they tend to "overlook arrangements which are less tidy but which 
correspond better to present-day usage" (Ehrman 1966: 9). Based on that, her aim is 
to not argue for a well-organised system, but rather to "determine just what each 
modal auxiliary means" (Ehrman 1966: 9). She acknowledges the presence of 
dialectal variations and hopes her 'meanings' would cover most of the variations in 
American standard speech. Yet although her approach is different from preceding 
ones in that it is based on a corpus, she still concentrates only on "that closed set of 
verbs" termed as the "present-day modals": can, could, may, might, will, would, shall, 
should, must, ought to, dare and need (Ehrman 1966: 9). There, she attempts to work 
out three types of meanings: 
1) the 'basic meaning' which is "the most general meaning" of each modal 
auxiliary and which "applies to all its occurrences" 
2) 'overtones' which are derived "from the basic meaning" but "add 
something of their own" [emphasis mine], and 
3) 'use' which is "conditioned by specific sentence elements and features of 
nonsemantic interest". 
(Ehrman 1966: 10) 
However, Ehrman's (1966: 9) 'monosemantic' approach still falls short of her 
goal: determining "just what each modal auxiliary means", and this is evident in her 
findings. For instance, since both 'dare' and 'need' seem to have no "basic meaning" 
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in her account, she concludes that they are "no longer in use as modal auxiliaries" 
(Ehrman 1966: 73). Moreover, the basic meaning of 'may' is considered not as one 
meaning but "a two-dimensional continuum". Other conclusions are made without a 
convincing explanation such as her view that the difference between 'will' and 'shall' 
is merely 'stylistic' (Ehrman 1966: 9). And this is what lead to criticisms such as 
Coates' (1983: 9) who points out the general difficulty and problems associated with 
having to assign a "basic meaning for each modal" (the 'core meaning'). In short, 
although Ehrman's (1966) approach is based on actual uses of modals, her 
interpretations are still highly subjective, and the nature of her restrictive 
'monosemantic' goal (one meaning per modal) makes her findings also quite narrow. 
3.2.5 Boyd and Thorne's (1969) Speech Act Theory-Based Approach 
Boyd and Thome's (1969) approach to describing modality in English 
presents yet another perspective: that based on the notion of speech acts as introduced 
by Austin (1962). Instead of trying to offer a neat classification of modal auxiliary 
verbs in English, they propose an approach to paraphrasing modal auxiliaries in 
English using Speech Act Theory metalanguage. They argue that their account of 
modality presents a more precise interpretation of the meanings of modals in specific 
instances of use. Yet selecting their modals is done on the following bases. As is the 
case in Speech Act Theory, the "illocutionary force" of any verb phrase is seen as 
determined by a set of formal features to be associated with the verb phrase in 
question. These features are "first person", "present tense", "non-progressive aspect" 
and "non-habitual aspect" (Boyd and Thome 1969: 58). Following from that, modal 
auxi liary verbs indicating the 'illocutionary potential' of the sentence are also subject 
to these restrictions, and such restrictions constitute the bases for selection. 
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Yet this is not all that clear. There are several criticisms of their approach. 
Firstly, at the general level, although Boyd and Thome (1969: 59- 60) claim that their 
"interests in [their] paper are almost entirely confined to the semantic level", they rely 
exclusively on grammatical features of distribution in trying to differentiate between 
verbs like 'demand' and 'order', for instance. Secondly, as pointed out by Hermeren 
(1978: 28), when following the above-mentioned criteria, then the past forms of 
auxiliary verbs (such as would) would not be considered modal. Moreover, when 
looking closely at their discussion of the difference between the terms "illocutionary 
potential" and "illocutionary force", there seems to be some confusion in the sense 
that both refer to the same instance of language use in two different places in their 
article (Hermeren 1978: 28). And finally, their choice of examples is not only 
decontextualised, but also selected in such a way "to avoid possible confusion" like 
those which arise "from the existence of considerable dialectal variation" (Boyd and 
Thome 1969: 62). This, in conclusion, does not only present a very restrictive view of 
modality in general, but also an unrealistic one since it is precisely these variations in 
using the same modals in English which reflect their semantic richness. Again, such 
an account is less useful at the practical level. 
3.2.6 Halliday's (1970) Functional Approach 
Halliday's (1970: 324) approach to defining and categorising modals is 
essentially functional in orientation because, as he argues, "in order to explain the 
structure of language we need to consider its use". And this is precisely what he does 
in his classification and differentiation between modality and modulation which he 
further supports by emphasising grammatical differences between the two groups 
(Halliday 1970: 339). According to Halliday (1970: 349), modality is "the speaker's 
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assessment of probability and predictability", the first of which is seen to cover two 
other notions: "possibility" and "certainty". The difference between "probability" on 
the one hand and "possibility" and "certainty" on the other is that while the first is 
described as "uncommitted", the second two are "committed" (Halliday 1970: 347). 
Moreover, since modality is referred to as "a form of participation by the 
speaker in the speech event", and since it is through modality that "the speaker 
associates with the thesis an indication of its status and validity in his own 
judgement", thus "intruding" and taking up a position (Halliday 1970: 335), modality 
-is placed as part of the interpersonal function. This is the case since it expresses "a 
role relationship between the speaker and hearer" in the sense that "the speaker is 
taking upon himself a particular communicati ve role" through which he determines 
both his own role as well as the hearer's in relation to each other (Halliday 1970: 
325). 
As for modulation, Halliday (1970: 335) does not consider it as "a form of 
participation by the speaker in the speech event". It is not the "speaker's comments" 
since it forms "part of the content of the clause, expressing conditions on the process 
referred to" (Halliday 1970: 338). Under modulation, the speaker is not seen to 
intrude or take up a position, and therefore modulation lies under the ideational 
. function of language which is mainly concerned with expressing "a content, relatable 
to the speaker's experience of the real world" (Halliday 1970: 325). It is concerned 
with notions such as 'ability', 'inclination', 'permission', 'obligation' and 
'compulsion' (Halliday 1970: 340). 
Despite the fact that Halliday (1970) presents a much more inclusive and 
functionally sensitive categorisation of modality in its wider sense, a couple of 
shortcomings are worth pointing out. Firstly, although Halliday includes both "verbal" 
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and "non-verbal" fonns of modality, his "verbal" forms are restricted to modal 
auxiliary verbs. He does not mention or include other verbal but non-auxiliary 
modals. This is mainly due to a set of syntactic restrictions which he places on verbal 
modals and which are only fulfilled by modal auxiliary verbs (Halliday 1970: 330). In 
this sense, it seems that/unction becomes secondary to structure. 
Secondly, in differentiating between the interpersonal and ideational functions 
of language, Halliday (1970) seems to suggest that the first is primarily participants-
oriented while the latter is primarily content-oriented. He then places modality under 
the first and modulation under the second. Although Halliday (1970: 349-350) later 
attempts to bring the two together, it seems hardly justifiable to place modulation as 
primarily part of the ideational function of language since the roles of the participants 
are of paramount importance. In fact, these roles and positions of the participants are 
central in giving the content of the message its semantic value. The same utterance 
exchanged by different participants of different social statuses even in the same 
context of situation would have a completely different meaning, let alone effect. 
Similarly, modality not only affects, but rather lies at the heart of and is therefore 
inseparable from the content of the clause l . In short, although this approach is both 
functional and has practical potential, a more adequate view of modality and 
modulation should account more accurately for the intermingling of these two main 
branches of modal use especially in the light of the involvement of the participants. 
3.2.7 Marino's (1973) Semantic Approach 
Marino's (1973) account of the meaning of modals is based on the presence or 
absence of a set of distinctive semantic features. After acknowledging the difficulties 
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and "nuances of the modal system" in terms of accounting for the multiplicity of 
meanings, he declares the need for a "system of description [which] should be at least 
powerful enough to account for the range of meanings in modality" (Marino 1973: 
312). He then proposes eight categories under which modals are arranged (categories 
such as obligation, advisability, possibility, etc.) each of which depends on the 
presence of the following three features (necessity, possibility and execution). These 
three features are in tum labelled as pluses or minuses to indicate the strength or 
weakness of each feature in specifying the meaning of the modal. The way meanings 
of modais are derived is thus based on the strength or weakness of the above features. 
For instance, OBLIGATION is seen as [+ necessity, - possibility, + execution]. 
Although Marino is not suggesting that his approach presents a neat taxonomy of 
categorised modals, he argues that his proposed features represent an "apparatus ... for 
generating and discussing the multiple meanings" of modals in English (Marino 1973: 
318). 
This is where Marino's (Marino 1973: 318) discussion stops since he does not 
present an analysis of modals in English but is instead satisfied by calling for one. 
This, however, seems only to suggest the difficulty in taking up the extra step 
especially in the light of a set of unjustifiable and essentially subjective decisions he 
makes. For instance, the reasons why FUTURE is given the feature "+ execution" 
while IMPERATIVE" -execution" (Marino 1973: 315) are left without adequate 
explanation. Surely that should depend on who is involved and the power-relation 
between the participants in that instance of language-use. Moreover, the very bases 
for selecting those features proposed by Marino are also questionable since these are 
founded on a subjective view concerning what he considers present in the meaning of 
I And this explains Halliday's later (1985) re-evaluation of both these categories of modals in the light 
of his multifunctional theory of language. There he realises that the divisions are not that clear-cut. 
88 
a specific modal and absent in another. In short, these decisions represent a very 
narrow view of language with minimal reference to the role of context as a key factor 
in assigning meanings to modals. And consequently, his account of modality becomes 
less useful when dealing with real instances of language use. 
3.2.8 Johannesson's (1976) FunctionaVPragmatic Approach 
Johannesson (1976) adopts a functional approach to classifying six modal 
auxiliary verbs (can, may, must, ought to, shall, and will). He argues that his approach 
is considered functional and not semantic since the basic question asked is not "What 
is the meaning of this modal auxiliary?" but rather "For what purpose can a speaker 
use a sentence with this modal auxiliary?" (Johannesson 1976: 11). It is therefore 
intended to show how sentences with modal auxiliaries "can be used to express the 
speaker's (or in certain cases, some other participant's) involvement with a 
proposition". In this sense, J ohannesson claims that his aim will not be to "devise a 
neat system with 'one meaning per modal auxiliary'" (Johannesson 1976: 11), thus 
avoiding a monosemantic approach. 
His categorisation is then based on three main types of speaker involvement 
which he distinguishes. These are the speaker's "volition", hislher "attitude to the 
truth of a proposition", and the "speaker's evaluation of an event" (Johannesson 1976: 
7). Under the first type of involvement which establishes or describes "relations 
between person and person" (Johannesson 1976: 71), he groups the following 
categorising functional-semantic units "obligation, permission, willingness and 
insistence" on the basis that they have "one member in common, the concept of 
volition" (Johannesson 1976: 13). Each modal expression (not just modal auxiliary 
verbs) is then assigned a functional paraphrase and grouped accordingly. Examples of 
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these are "desperative sentences", "desiderative sentences", "insistence sentences" 
etc. 
Under the second type of involvement which establishes or describes 
"relations between person and proposition" (Johannesson 1976: 71), he groups 
different types of "commentative sentences" such as "evidential constructions" , 
"conjectural sentences" and "predictive sentences"; i.e. those expressing possibility, 
probability, prediction, etc (Johannes son 1976: 49). Finally, under the third type of 
involvement are "fictive sentences" which are used by the speaker to express "a 
conditional relationship between two propositions" (Johannesson 1976: 71). 
In these groupings, it is evident that Johannesson (1976) tries to account for as 
many meanings (or interpretations) of specific modals as possible. For instance, we 
see the modal auxiliary 'must' under several 'functional' headings with different 
interpretations for each mapped by a description of the syntactic-functional context 
within which they are found. Such a heading is, for example, "covert desiderative 
sentences" like in "you must tell me the truth", where 'must' is characterised by the 
following conditions: "if the speaker is the modal agent, if the volition is simultaneous 
with the speech moment, and if the addressee is the agent of the modal object 
proposition" (Johannesson 1976: 25). 
Also, Johannesson (1976: 52) argues for the inclUSIon of other extra-linguistic 
factors which can playa part in determining the interpretation of 'must' such as 
"stress patterns". In this case, "you must be 'very 'careful ... " has a desiderative 
interpretation, while "you must be very 'carefuL .. " has a commentative interpretation 
(Johannesson 1976: 51). Other sets of conditions also apply for instances when 'must' 
expresses 'necessity' and 'propriety' rather than 'volition'. Again, 'must' is seen to 
communicate "strong evidence" (Johannes son 1976: 50) as in "you must be worn out, 
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you poor darling," as well as "eligibility" like in "you must be under 22 of age at the 
time of departure" (Johannes son 1976: 82). 
Although he is not trying to present a neat system with 'one meaning per 
modal auxiliary', what lohannesson (1976) actually does is propose one meaning per 
modal auxiliary within a defined context. In other words, he is suggesting that given a 
specific context with a limited set of accounted for variables, only one possible 
interpretation of the modal used is available. Yet this contradicts the very basis on 
which modality stands: the concept of ambiguity (as will be discussed later). And this 
concept stands mainly for two reasons: a) because no one can account for all the 
variables which surround an utterance within a context, and b) because different 
people can interpret the same modal use differently. Following this, how can one, for 
instance, decide whether "the modal agent believes (at the moment of volition) that it 
is possible for the 'object of volition' to come true" (emphasis mine) (Johannes son 
1976: 19)? Even in lohannesson's (1976) supposedly most obvious situations like the 
difference between 'must' in these two sentences, 
1 ) You must be very careful when you draw your diagrams, and 
2) You must be very careless when you draw your diagrams 
one cannot rule out the interpretation where 'must' is be seen as "a realisation of a 
desiderative proposition" (Johannes son 1976: 26) in both sentences. It seems that 
lohannesson (1976) is indirectly attempting an exhaustive account of all possible 
meanings of modals under a functional disguise. 
3.2.9 Hermeren's (1978) Semantic Approach 
Hermeren's (1978: 14) approach to categorising modals is based on semantic 
criteria with the main objective of making "a semantic classification of the modals in 
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contemporary English". His first promising step is his acknowledgement that 
modality can be expressed by different parts of speech: nouns, adjectives, adverbs, 
and verbs (both main and modal) as well as combinations of them (Hermeren 1978: 
10-11). This, he argues is simply a natural "consequence of the rather comprehensive 
content of modality in linguistics", and it is therefore "only to be expected that the 
number of its manifestations in language will be equally comprehensive" (Hermeren 
1978: 10). In short, modal auxiliary verbs are only one way of expressing modality. 
Hermeren (1978: 68-71) adopts the view that meaning is neither completely 
independent of context, nor completely dependent on it. His position is that meaning 
of modals (specifically modal auxiliary verbs) is reflected through the grammatical 
context in which it is found and indirectly argues for a formal corollary (similar to 
Palmer's) between meanings of modals in relation with other parts of speech in a 
sentence. For instance, Hermeren (1978: 71) holds the position that "changes in 
various types of sentences" (active-passive, positive-negative, statement-question, 
etc.) as well as "changes in basic sentence units (subject, verb, etc.) affect the 
meaning of the modal". Therefore, both semantic and syntactic categories which 
affect the meaning of modals "should be accounted for in a description of the 
semantics of the modals" (Hermeren 1978: 74). 
After going through the different notions expressed by modals, he groups them 
under three categories. 'Internal modalities' are those which are "inherent in their 
surface subjects" like in 'John can work hard' and 'John won't eat his supper'. These 
modals express "ability" and "volition" respectively and are justified as "inherent" 
since in both cases it is John who is able and determined (Hermeren 1978: 95). The 
second category is that of "external modality" which includes those modal 
expressions refening to notions like "necessity" and "permission" as in 'John must 
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sleep in the car' and 'John may sleep in the car'. This is essentially the same as what 
is referred to "as root" modality and is justified on the basis that "someone or 
something outside the subject decides what the subject is obliged or permitted to do or 
be" (Hermeren 1978: 95-96). The third and last category is that traditionally referred 
to as the epistemic senses of modals, and these are termed by Hermeren (1978: 97) as 
"neutral modalities" since they are neither internal nor external. Finally, the different 
modals in each system are arranged on the assumption of implication (i.e. what they 
imply). They are placed on some sort of a continuum fulfilling this criterion. 
Looking closely at Hermeren's (1978: 98) main chart of modality, it becomes 
obvious that although he claims a semantic approach, the different groupings of 
modals under each system are done based on a combination of semantic and syntactic 
criteria, where in some cases, syntactic criteria override semantic ones. For instance, 
internal modalities comprising the notions of "determination", "intention" and 
"willingness" are grouped together since they share the concept of "volition" as well 
as a relationship of "implication" (Hermeren 1978: 99). However, the notion of ability 
is also grouped with the first three although it does not express the notion of 
"volition" nor does it share a relationship of "implication". 
Yet Hermeren (1978: 100) justifies this decision for the reason of "keeping all 
four modalities ih the same scale ... [since] .,. for all four the surface subject of the 
modal in the active sentence is also deep subject both of the modality and the 
process". 
Moreover, although Hermeren (1978) in his criticism of earlier approaches to 
categorising modality in English promisingly lists the various forms of modality, he 
does not actually consider them in his analysis of the Brown corpus. Instead, like most 
of his predecessors he restricts his description, categorisation and analysis to modal 
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auxiliary verbs mainly because these are the ones which fulfil those syntactic criteria 
discussed above. In this, he again contradicts his declared objective which is to 
provide a semantic account of modals in English. 
3.2.10 Coates's (1983) Semantic/Pragmatic Approach 
Coates' (1983) main contribution to the ongoing struggle of adequately 
accounting for modality in English is her inclusion of "indetenninacy" as an essential 
criterion for subcategorising modals. Her investigation into the meanings of the modal 
auxiliaries in modem British English is based on a corpus of both written and spoken 
English (Coates 1983: 1). She explains that the reason behind this corpus-based study 
is to avoid relying on the researcher's own intuition (both in terms of providing 
invented and targeted examples as well as interpreting the meanings of modals), 
which she considers to be a subjective way of going about the project, characteristic 
of earlier defective approaches (Coates 1983: 3). Moreover, such a corpus would 
allow her to take into consideration stylistic variations (Coates 1983: 1). 
Coates (1983: 4) begins by restricting her account to only ten modal 
auxiliaries: must, should, ought, may, might, can, could, will, would, shall and this 
choice is based on formal characteristics (the NICE properties as well as Palmer's 
(1974) "paradigm test" outlined above). She then criticises earlier approaches by 
pointing out that the problems they faced were due to their attempts to either define 
one core meaning for each modal or to account for all meanings. In the first 
"monosemantic" case, the account is unrepresentative and too general to be of any 
use, while in the other "polysemantic" account, it is "messy and untidy" (Coates 
1983: 9-10). In that, she argues that the main problem with these earlier approaches is 
their failure to consider "indeterminacy" as a basic feature in modality, which she 
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believes is. And she maintains that this does not have to be at the expense of precision 
in description since "it is surely not impossible to be precise about indeterminacy" 
(Coates 1983: 10). Therefore, attempting to do that, Coates (1983: 9) distinguishes 
three kinds of indeterminacy: gradience, ambiguity and merger, and explains the 
differences between them in the following manner. 
She clarifies "gradience" by illustrating how the meaning of 'can', for 
instance, lies on a "continuum of meaning [extending] from the core of 'Ability' to 
the periphery of 'Possibility'" (Coates 1983: 14). Her decision on which is considered 
as the "core" meaning of a modal as opposed to the "peripheral" meaning is based on 
the degree of frequency of a modal in the corpus. This meaning is then fixed based on 
set of consistent semantic! syntactic! functional features exhibited by the whole 
utterance. For example, the "core" meaning of 'can' is said to be distinguished by the 
following features: 
1) subject is animate and has agentive function; 
2) main verb denotes physical action/activity; 
3) the possibility of the action is determined by inherent properties of the subject. 
(Coates 1983: 14) 
A similar set of features set the bases for all "core" and "peripheral" meanings of all 
those modal auxiliary verbs she analyses. 
As for "ambiguity", Coates (1983: 15) ~ x p l a i n s s that "an indeterminate 
example is said to be ambiguous when it is not possible to decide which of two 
meanings is intended". For instance, the modal 'must' in the utterance "He must 
understand that we mean business" could be "epistemic" (Surely he understands that 
we mean business) or "root" (It is essential that he understand that we mean business) 
(Coates 1983: 16). 
Finally, "merger" is "indeterminate in the sense that the context fails to 
exclude one of the two possible meanings". Yet it is different from ambiguity in that 
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"it is not necessary to decide which meaning is intended" before the utterance can be 
understood (Coates 1983: 16-17). The example she gi ves is the following: 
A: Newcastle Brown is a jolly good beer. 
B:lsn'tit? 
A: Well it ought to be at that price. 
Here she argues that although it is not clear whether the speaker is referring to the 
maker's "obligation to provide good beer (Root OUGHT)", or whether he is "making 
a logical assumption - 'it costs a lot, therefore it is good' (Epistemic OUGHT)". Both 
ways, the meanings involved "are mutually compatible" (Coates 1983: 17). 
eoates (1983: 18) then explains the differences between "epistemic" and "root 
modality" in that the first is concerned with "the speaker's assumptions or assessment 
of possibilities and, in most cases, it indicates the speaker's confidence (or lack of 
confidence) in the truth of the proposition expressed" while the latter are defined in 
terms of the "syntactic patterns associated with them, which distinguish them from 
their Epistemic counterparts". These features associated with Root meaning are 
"animate subject, agentive verb and passive voice" as well as certain "stress and 
intonation patterns" (Coates 1983: 18). 
Finally she suggests that "gradience is an essential feature of Root modality" 
since while epistemic modals "vary only in terms of Subjectivity (with Objective 
cases occurring rarely)", root modals "vary both in terms of Subjectivity and in terms 
of a strong-weak continuum" (Coates 1983: 21). In this sense, "the strength or 
otherwise" of, for instance, "Root MUST seems to depend on the person of the 
subject, and on the involvement of the speaker (subjectivity)". And the relationship 
between subjectivity and strength is reflected in the following manner where 
"subjectivity is typically associated with the strong end of the continuum" and where 
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weak examples are normally objective, but that "this is not necessarily true" (Coates 
1983: 36-37). 
In statements like the last one, Coates (1983) allows for possible incongruous 
interpretative standpoints despite the set of restrictive features she argues for. She 
seems to be doing all of the following. While she appears to be trying for a neat 
categorisation of a limited set of modal auxiliary verbs in English, she still tries 
avoiding the trap she points out for anyone who does so. On the one hand, in her 
attempt to propose as many meanings of modal auxiliaries as possible, her approach 
vaguely resembles 'polysemantic' approaches although she refuses to label it as such. 
On the other hand, she is simultaneously interested in the 'core' meaning of a modal, 
and in this sense her approach appears to be a 'monosemantic' one. This opens the 
door to more serious criticisms. 
To begin with, the idea of a fixed corollary between the meaning of a modal 
and a group of set features (whether they be syntactic, semantic, or even functional) is 
always subject to criticism. This is because generally speaking, the process of arriving 
at this corollary is necessarily based on a certain degree of subjectivity since 
'meaning' is not an objective label inherent in and reflected through 'form'. And this 
is evident in copious cases where different language users interpret the same modals 
in the same contexts differently. As illustrated by Perkins (1983: 37), 'can' in its 
"ability" sense "has been regarded by various linguists within the space of a few years 
exclusively as a root modal, exclusively as an epistemic modal, and as not a modal at 
all". 
The same could be argued about determining the force and subjectivity of a 
modal where the lack of consensus can have highly disruptive effect on the 'rule' or 
those defining features. Close (1975: 273), for instance, arranges modals on a 
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continuum of certainty ranging from the least to the most certain in the following 
manner: might, may, could, can, should, ought to, would, will, must. She differs from 
Leech (1974) for example because he considers 'may' as more probable than 'can', in 
his selected examples ("the pound may be devalued" as opposed to "the pound can be 
devalued"). Moreover, according to Palmer (1986: 62), in the light of the argument 
where "may indicates a possible judgment, WILL a reasonable judgement and MUST 
the only possible judgment", then "WILL falls between weak MAY and strong 
MUST", a view which contradicts Leech's intuition. In short, deciding on the force of 
a modal is dependent on an interpretation, and this is not an entirely objective process 
reflected in an occurrence of certain structural features since indeterminacy in 
interpretation does exist. And this leads us to the issue of questioning why gradience, 
according to Coates (1983: 21), is a feature of only root modality in the sense that it 
varies "both in terms of Subjectivity and in terms of a strong-weak continuum". 
Surely, epistemic modality can also be seen to vary not only in terms of subjectivity, 
as Coates suggests, but also in terms of strength. Strength can also be reflected in 
terms of degrees of certainty: i.e. knowledge as strength (see Chapter Four for further 
discussion). 
Finally, the same argument applies for 'core meaning theory'. One cannot 
deny that whether the meaning of a modal is deemed to be close to the core or not 
depends on an interpretation of that modal. Although the notion of 'indeterminacy' 
offers a way out of the dilemma (and has potential from a practical analysis 
perspective), in presenting a formal corollary between the meanings of modals and 
certain fixed grammatical, textual and contextual features, Coates does not make the 
most efficient use of a notion with such potential. 
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3.2.11 Perkins's (1983) Semantic Approach 
In a more inclusive account of modality in English, Perkins (1983) takes into 
consideration those previously neglected modal expressions. His decision is based on 
the view that a use of a modal auxiliary verb on the one hand, and what is commonly 
regarded as its paraphrase (such as 'may' and 'it is possible that') on the other are 
different. He therefore sets out to provide an account of modality which takes into 
consideration these differences. At the same time, he adopts a 'monosemantic' 
approach which aims at isolating "a core meaning for each modal" and then proposing 
an analysis of these core meanings (Perkins 1983: 25). This springs from his belief in 
the presence of a single core meaning for each of the English modals which is 
"independent of its context of use" (Perkins 1983: 26). 
According to Perkins (1983: 1-2), the origin of the problem lies with 
traditional approaches which have restricted the notion of modality "to a syntactically 
defined subset of auxiliary verbs" as these were considered to constitute "the only 
formally coherent class of modal expressions in English". This meant that the 
tendency has always been to isolate this class "on distributional grounds, and only 
then to attempt to characterize them semantically" (Perkins 1983: 19). However, he 
argues, since "there is a wide range of linguistic devices in English which are equally 
deserving of the semantic label 'modal''', the "semantic concept of modality" should 
serve as the basis [emphasis mine] (Perkins 1983: 2). Therefore, his account of 
modality would be more "exhaustive" than previous accounts extending "far beyond 
the formal category of modal auxiliaries" and incorporating "dynamic and boulomaic 
modality" as well as "alethic, epistemic, and deontic modality" (Perkins 1983: 4). 
One key issue in his view is the importance of accounting for both "the 
particular conceptual subcategory of modality which a given expression realizes" as 
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well as for "the way in which it interacts with the function of the utterances in which 
it may be used" (Perkins 1983: 18). He argues that "modality itself may be regarded 
as a single conceptual system which takes on different characteristics according to the 
various other semantic and pragmatic systems with which it intersects" (Perkins 1983: 
18). And there are so many factors that playa role in determining the meanings of 
modals within a specific context. 
He bases his core-meaning approach to the modals on that used by 
Wertheimer in his analysis of OUGHT where he describes its "anomalous behaviour 
'in terms, not of different senses, but of [its] employment in connection with various 
more or less independent systems of laws'" (Perkins 1983: 28). These laws are 
summarised as follows: 
(a) a system K of organized belief, (b) a set of circumstances C under which the system is 
relevant, and (c) the consequence y that the system specifies under those circumstances. 
(Perkins 1983: 28) 
Perkins' own analysis of the meaning of modal CAN is done in the following manner. 
To him, CAN 'roughly' relates: 
the event referred to in the propositional content to some external circumstance which is not 
explicitly identified but whose existence is presupposed, and the precise relationship between 
the circumstance and the event appears to be that the nature of the circumstance is not such as 
to preclude the event occurring. 
(Perkins 1983: 33) 
In this sense, the following example is analysed as follows: 
John can swim. 
K (C does not preclude that e occur) 
where: 1. K = natural laws 
II. C = an empirical circumstance 
iii. e = an event 
IV. K(x) = x is the case relative to K 
Speaker ~ ~ Asserts ----+ Circumstances exist which do not preclude ----+ John swim. 
(Perkins 1983: 34) 
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When used in this sense, he continues, "CAN expresses dynamic modality _ 
i.e. it is concerned with the disposition of certain empirical circumstances with regard 
to the occurrence of some event" (Perkins 1983: 34). 
He defends such a characterisation of the meaning of a modal as non-circular 
since it is not merely a paraphrase. Moreover, such a characterisation emphasises that 
the meaning of any modal cannot be adequately stated without considering and 
referring to the above mentioned variables. In this sense, the semantics of modal 
auxiliary verbs can be expressed as "a relationship between a system of organized 
belief K a set of circumstances C, the truth of a proposition p, or the occurrence of an 
event e, and, in the case of the secondary modals, a condition Z" (Perkins 1983: 28-9). 
One does not even have to specify the values of these variables for a particular 
context in order to define the core meaning of a modal (Perkins 1983: 29). This core 
meaning can be characterised as "a relationship between, at most, these four variables, 
and such a relationship may thus be regarded as a semantic definition of 'modal 
expression'" (Perkins 1983: 59). 
Of course, there are problems with this approach, the most serious of which is 
proposed by Perkins' own analysis of 'deontic MAY' whose core meaning is 
'permission'. If the utterance 'you may go' is uttered by "someone in a position of 
authority to someone of much lower authority" it would 'probably' be understood as a 
command and not as permission. He justifies this by saying that although such 
"pragmatic factors may override ... the core meaning of MAY", they are nevertheless 
separate from it (Perkins 1983: 36-7). Yet this is close to what he himself criticises 
Huddleston for doing; i.e. finding a paraphrase for MAY in each environment and 
turning it into a label for a category of use (Perkins 1983: 36). True that Perkins' 
approach does account for these different uses in "a less ad hoc manner by relating a 
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core meaning to a limited set of laws", he does not escape accounting for individual 
pragmatic inferences from the context of use. 
Moreover, the fact that Perkins does not specify the values for his proposed 
parameters opens possibilities where those parameters of the same modal expression 
together with the relationship between them are given different specifications by 
different language users, and thus interpreted differently. In other words, setting up 
the parameters/ the factors that playa role in determining the meaning of the modal 
neither accounts for exceptions to what is considered as the 'core-meaning' of a 
modal, nor does it consider the possibility for different interpretations by different 
people. In short, the possibility that specific circumstances may 'override the core 
meaning of' a modal means that this approach is neither general nor specific enough. 
In other words, it is not inclusive enough. 
Finally, there is a great degree of ambiguity in Perkins' choice of terminology. 
For instance, terms like "entails" or "does not preclude" which describe the meaning 
of a modal are not that precise (Perkins 1983: 34). Maybe these are indirectly 
signalled by the use of modalised expressions (such as "typically") to describe such 
rules (Perkins 1983: 37). All in all, the highly theoretical, general and therefore 
ambiguous nature of Perkins' account makes it less implementable practically. 
3.2.12 Palmer's (1986, 1990) Semantic/Structural Approach 
Palmer's (1986) account of modality is somewhat different from his earlier 
accounts since he is interested in the way modality is grammaticalised not only in 
English, but also in other languages. In this sense he openly relies on semantic criteria 
for grouping modals and does mention, although briefly, other modal expressions than 
traditional modal auxiliary verbs. He maintains a division between "epistemic 
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modality" which is concerned with "language as infonnation, with the expression of 
the degree or nature of the speaker's commitment to the truth of what he says" and 
'deontic modality' is concerned with "language as action, mostly with the expression 
by the speaker of his attitude towards possible actions by himself and others" (Palmer 
1986: 121). He elaborates on the tenn 'epistemic' and explains that it should not 
simply apply "to modal systems that basically involve the notions of possibility and 
necessity, but to any modal system that indicates the degree of commitment by the 
speaker to what he says" (Palmer 1986: 51). This means that it should include 
-
'speculative,' 'deductive' and 'quotative' types of modalised utterances. 
Following Givon (1982), he argues that these three types belong to two 
separate systems of epistemic modality where "opinions and conclusions involve 
judgments by the speaker" [i.e. the system of judgements], while "reports indicate the 
kind of evidence he has for what he is saying" [i.e. the system of evidentials] (Palmer 
1986: 53). Although Palmer (1986) does not explicitly state it, he seems to be 
suggesting that what differentiates these two systems of epistemic modality has to do 
with varying degrees of subjectivity. He concludes his discussion of epistemic 
modality by suggesting a typological system within which to handle epistemic 
modals. This would take into account: 
(i) The two main modal systems, Evidentials and Judgements, plus the related system of 
Discourse. 
(ii) The sub-systems of Judgements: Inference and Confidence. . 
(iii) The different sub-systems of Evidentials in terms of the treatment of sensation. 
(iv) Possible equivalences in different systems, especially Declarative, but also involving 
Deductive and Assumptive and the problem of Interrogative. 
(v) The notion that some terms are stronger than others and that one may be unmarked. 
(Palmer 1986: 94) 
As for deontic modality, which has to do with "language as action", the 
meanings associated with each system are naturally quite different from those 
associated with epistemic modality (Palmer 1986: 121). The two most important types 
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of deontic modality are "Directives" and "Commissives" (Palmer 1986: 97). 
Borrowed from Searle's (1983: 166) rethinking of speech-act theory, directives are 
defined as those expressions in which "we try to get our hearers to do things", and 
commissives as "where we commit ourselves to doing things". Again, similar to the 
weak and strong system of epistemic modality, there is also a weak and strong system 
of deontic modality (at least of directives) (Palmer 1986: 98). 
Although at the semantic level, "epistemic and deontic modality might seem to 
have little in common", there are two features that they share: subjectivity, i.e. the 
involvement of the speaker, and non-factuality (Palmer 1986: 96). As Palmer (1986: 
16) explains, "modality in language is ... concerned with subjective characteristics of 
an utterance". In this sense, modality would be defined as "the grammaticalization of 
speakers' (subjective) attitudes and opinions". As for "non-factuality", he adopts 
Lyons' (1977) distinction between "straightforward statements of fact" (categorical 
assertions) which may be described as "epistemically non-modal" on the one hand, 
and modalised utterances on the other (Palmer 1986: 17). 
Yet Palmer is not entirely satisfied with the first of these two criteria. In fact, 
he contests it by pointing out that if we take "subjectivity" as essential semantic 
criterion for modality, then the auxiliary verb 'can' which expresses ability would 
(following that criterion) be outside the realm of modality. Also, the modal auxiliary 
'must' in "you must leave at once", can be interpreted as indicating "the speaker's 
insistence or a general (objective) necessity for leaving, or it could well be 
indeterminate between the two readings" (Palmer 1986: 17). He concludes that the 
chief reason for treating both types of modality as a single category lies in the fact that 
"in English, and many other languages, the same forms (e.g. modal verbs) are used for 
the expression of both" (Palmer 1986: 96). 
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And this is reflected in his later (1990: 1-3) account where although he speaks 
of modality in English as an essentially "semantic-grammatical category", he still 
insists on discussing only modal auxiliary verbs because they can be distinguished bv 
"formal criteria". In that, it seems that Palmer (1990) is only interested in the 
phenomenon that one modal form can be used to express more than one meaning, and 
this makes 'form' of primary importance in his accounts. Yet the view of modality as 
a "semantic-grammatical category" is potentially paradoxical except in a very 
restricted sense in referring to an even more restricted set of modal auxiliary verbs. 
-Such a description can only make sense at the descriptive level in that the term 
'modal' is essentially semantic while the term 'auxiliary' is syntactic. For one thing, 
we cannot deny the existence of a syntactically well-defined set of auxiliary verbs in 
English. However, even within this set, there are cases where semantic and 
grammatical criteria are of conflicting rather than complementary nature2 . In other 
words, these criteria are not compatible, and trying to account for modality within 
both the semantic and syntactic frames creates a dilemma even when only dealing 
with modal auxiliary verbs (let alone modal expressions in general). And this self-
contradictory nature of the "semantic-grammatical" character of modality makes 
Palmer's (1990) account unconvincing at the theoretical level and even less 
~ ~
convincing at the practical level. 
3.2.13 Werth's (1999) Text World Theory-Based Approach 
Werth's (1999) approach to categorising modality in English is based on text 
world theory. In fact, his approach is not targeted at providing an account of modality 
2 This is the case with "can" (in reference to ability) which Palmer finds difficult to a c c o ~ n t t for because 
it does not strictly fulfil semantic criteria but is still treated as a modal auxiliary because It fulfils 
grammatical criteria. 
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inasmuch as clarifying the workings of text world theory itself where modality fulfils 
a central function in discourse: that of "world building" (Werth 1999: 182). 
According to Werth (1999: 176), modality broadly reflects the "relationship between 
the speakers and the text" and is therefore defined as generally dealing with the 
speakers' "assessment of such factors as truth, probability and reliability". This 
speaker-assessment, however, is not done in terms of whether propositions are true or 
false but rather reflecting the various levels and degrees of possibility (Werth 1999: 
177). 
Based on text world theory's distinction between the "informational" and the 
"modality part of a discourse", where modality is characteristically "world building" 
while the informational part of discourse is concerned with "propositional meaning", 
modality's world-building function is attained by "situating ... information with 
respect to the current context" in terms of "location, physical or abstract, ... 
interaction, or social relationships, '" or probability" (Werth 1999: 157, 182, 183). 
These are the three types of modality from which the three categories of sub-worlds 
respectively emerge: "deictic sub-worlds", "attitudinal sub-worlds" and "epistemic 
sub-worlds" (Werth 1999: 216). Finally, based on the notions of 'accessibility' and 
'remoteness' each of these sub-worlds reflects the type and level of modality's world 
building function, its relationship between the speaker and the text. In other words, 
depending on the accessibility and remoteness of each sub-world, different types and 
levels of the relationship between the speaker and the text can be distinguished. 
For example, "the deictic sub-worlds", according to Werth (1999: 217-227), 
are created through "temporal", "spatial" and "entity displacement". Here, the 
remoteness and accessibility of these sub-worlds are based on each type of 'locative' 
displacement and dependent on the levels of deictic!modal displacement. This means 
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that the 'here-now' deictic spatio-temporal marker is, for instance, more accessible 
and less remote to a speaker than the 'there-then' spatio-temporal marker. In other 
words, the sub-world 'built' through one or the other type of deictic displacement is 
more or less accessible to a specific participant. 
Similarly, "attitudinal sub-worlds" are divided into three main sub-worlds 
reflecting interactional displacement. These are "desire (want worlds), belief (believe 
worlds) and purpose (intend worlds)" (Werth 1999: 227). Again, the degrees of 
accessibility and remoteness of these sub-worlds depends on the "predicates" 
associated with each of these sub-worlds (Werth 1999: 227). This means that 
'wishes', for instancc,-are seeatD-he_illOre remote and less accessible than 'desires'. 
- - - - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - -----------
Finally, the "epistemic sub-worlds" are those covered under "the scale of 
certainty-impossibility" (Werth 1999: 239). The three main epistemic sub-worlds are 
"hypothetical", "assumptions" and "modal" worlds, all of which reflect d i s p l a _ c ~ m e ~ t t
in terms of the notions of possibility and probability. I1}Jhat sense, the 'probability' 
sub-world is seen as more accessible and lesst:emote than the 'possibility' sub-world 
---------- ---
All in all, and as mentioned above, Werth's categorisation of modality is 
primarily employed in order to clarify the workings of text world theory rather than to 
provide an account of the notion of modality per se. In other words, it is a practical 
account whose main objective is to see how modality functions in a text world 
approach to discourse analysis. This, in my view explains some of the vagueness and 
overlapping that the notions of modality, tense and deixis undergo. Modality in 
Werth's view seems to be understood in terms of a relationship of distance between 
the speaker and the text. The modal sub-worlds 'built' function in relation to how 
accessible they are to a participant and this justifies Werth's inclusion of deixis in his 
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coverage of the notion of modality. In fact, deixis to Werth (1999) is a subsection of 
modality. Similarly, tense is seen to fall under both the hypothetical and deictic sub-
worlds as well as part of the "conditional", "politeness" and "narrative" applications 
of the epistemic sub-world (Werth 1999: 240), and this makes tense also an essential 
part of modali ty . 
However, this I argue constitutes a dangerously inclusive, non-distinctive 
approach to categorising modality since modality can but does not correspond 
exclusively to the notion of distance. This is and should be the task of deixis (as 
envisaged by Levinson (1983)). Modality, as Werth admits at the beginning of his 
account, is traditionally concerned with two main areas of meaning and functions 
(epistemic and root modality). Yet while deixis or tense can have modal functions, the 
notions of accessibility and remoteness which constitute the core of the notion of 
modality from a text world theory perspective seem too accommodating modal 
criteria. Distance can indeed reflect modal uncertainty in certain contexts. However, 
deictic sub-worlds are not necessarily always subsections of modality. The same is the 
case with tense. 
Another limitation in Werth's account is the placement of the "belief' sub-
world under "attitudinal" rather than "epistemic" sub-worlds. This is an interesting 
categorisation which Werth (1999: 233) subdivides in terms of accessibility by 
distinguishing between two different kinds of "belief-contexts", "depending on the 
status of the propositions involved in the Common Ground (CG)". If for instance the 
proposition syntactically below the "belief-predicate" is "given" (as in 'John believes 
that a Pear is better t!zan a Banana' where a pear is known to be better than a 
banana), then the only "new" information corresponds to John's position and 
therefore both given and new information are accessible to the participants in the 
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discourse. If, on the other hand, both are new information, then the participants 
accessibility is relativised to John's position, where the "credibility and 
authoritativeness of John's beliefs largely depend on who John is, relative to the 
content of his beliefs" (Werth 1999: 233, 234). In short, the first sub-world is more 
accessible than the latter. Yet what Werth fails to justify is the inclusion of the whole 
"belief' sub-world under "attitudinal" rather than "epistemic" sub-worlds. 
3.2.14 Papafragou's (2000) Semantic/Cognitive Approach 
Papafragou's (2000) 'monosemantic' account of modality in English presents 
a 'cognitive' approach to the meaning of modals. It is cognitive in the sense that she 
proposes a "univocal semantic analysis of the English modals" which corresponds 
with data from "the acquisition of modal interpretations by the language-learning 
child" (Papafragou 2000: 8). Rejecting what she calls the 'ambiguity view' and the 
'polysemy view' of modals in English, she proposes that meanings of modals should 
be treated as 'underspecified' or 'incomplete' rather than ambiguous or polysemous. 
She argues that as is the case in natural language, it is the manipulation of context 
which yields "the rich modal concepts" (Papafragou 2000: 7, 10) and insists that "an 
adequate theory of modality should address the nature of '" background assumptions 
and explain when and how such assumptions are recovered and monitored during 
verbal communication. And in the light of these objectives, she approaches modality 
based on "a cognitive account of utterance comprehension" (Papafragou 2000: 13), an 
approach which finds its roots in 'relevance theory'. 
Her aim is not to "provide a fully comprehensive account of the state of affairs 
in the English modal system" (Papafragou 2000: 9), but rather to "contribute towards 
the characterisation of the context-dependence of modal expressions" in order to shed 
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more light on the nature of the "interaction between lexical semantic information and 
pragmatic inference". And due to the sheer number of factors involved in undertaking 
such a task, she focuses mainly on what she calls "a representative sample of modal 
verbs in English" (mainly must, may, can, should, and secondarily ought to) 
(Papafragou 2000: 7). 
She argues that "the semantic content of modals consists of two components: a 
logical relation R (basically: entailment or compatibility), and a domain D of 
propositions". It follows that modals are used to convey that "a certain proposition p 
bears a certain logical relation R to the set of propositions in a domain D" 
(Papafragou 2000: 40). She then distinguishes between several ways in which a 
proposition can be "entertained and stored in memory", and these are: as a 'factual' 
domain, a 'regulatory' domain, a domain of 'moral beliefs', a domain of 'desirability' 
and of 'abstract representations' (Papafragou 2000: 42). Domains of propositions then 
serve a 'two-fold purpose': they offer "the means for pragmatically restricting modal 
relations". Moreover, they provide "a conceptual pool for grammaticalisation 
processes to draw on" (Papafragou 2000: 42). To illustrate, the modals (can, may, 





P is compatible with D factual 
p is compatible with D unspecific 
p is entailed by D unspecific 
p is entailed by D normative 
(Papafragou 2000: 43) 
This is elaborated on through the following example and its analysis: 
'Computer-aided instruction can co-occur with more traditional methods of teaching' 
which is presented as: p[Computer-aided instruction can co-occur with more 
traditional methods of teaching] is compatible with D factual (Papafragou 2000: 48). 
This is further narrowed down (or 'restricted') contextually to "pick out a sub-domain 
of factual assumptions" which are: 
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a. In view of the way schools are run these days, 
b. In view of the technical equipment available for education purposes, 
c. In view of the teachers' encouraging stance, 
Computer-aided instruction can co-occur with more traditional methods of teaching. 
(Papafragou 2000: 48) 
She then explains that each of these paraphrases "captures a different concept 
of potentiality, which may be constructed ... during comprehension". Therefore, in 
the derivation of a modal interpretation, a number of variables interact in an optimally 
relevant way to provide an interpretation which is "accessible enough for the hearer, 
and c a p ~ b l e e of achieving adequate cognitive effects in a way compatible with the 
speaker's abilities and preferences". Thus, the resulting interpretation "should be one 
that the speaker could reasonably have intended to be optimally relevant for the 
addressee". There, the hearer "typically makes use of assumptions which are easily 
accessible from the encyclopedic entries of the concepts in the complement 
proposition and other assumptions which are contextually available". Finally, this is 
all based on the 'familiarity presupposition' for domain selection where the hearer 
"aims at reconstructing the type of background propositions the speaker has in mind" 
(Papafragou 2000: 49). 
What Papafragou seems to be doing is attempting to provide asystematic 
account of possible variables which playa role in pushing forward one or another 
interpretation of a modal within a pseudo-Grician set of assumptions/rules about what 
'normally' is the case if communicative interaction is to proceed with no hindrance. 
And these variables are mainly related to Context in all its phases, both in relation to 
the speaker/hearer as well as to the situation (linguistic and extralinguistic), but with 
special emphasis on the cognitive aspect of acquisition and language processing. 
Naturally (and rightly so), these variables are very general since the only way to 
capture the richness and variety in meanings and interpretations of modals is to be as 
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least restrictive as possible. Still, in a situation where a modalised utterance is 
'underspecified' at the contextual level, this approach does not present any 
groundbreaking account of this 'ambiguity'. There seems to be a suggestion that in 
the light of a given context, all speakers/hearers interact, or should interact, in the 
same way. The extreme version of this position would lie within Chomsky's (1965) 
"homogeneous speech community". This 'ideal situation' for communication is, 
however, only attractive at the theoretical level. In reality, there are several 
unanswerable questions which shed doubt on, for instance, the hearer's ability to 
practically account for these variables; i.e. the intention of the speaker, what is 
available for the hearer, etc. In short, her attempt at providing "a broad description of 
the intended modal domain" is based on what she deems as "necessary for the 
comprehension of a modal utterance" (Papafragou 2000: 50). And her main 
drawback, apart from the extremely restricted set of modal auxiliary verbs that she 
selects, is the absence in her 'cognitive' model of a realistic account of those socio-
cultural determinants which influence the hearer's process of acquisition. The mind, 
after all, does not work in isolation from these social variables. 
3.3 Discussion and Conclusions 
In view of the list of approaches outlined above, the following conclusions can 
be made. Firstly, one cannot but comment on the large number as well as the diversity 
of approaches tackling, more or less, the same topic. The fact that 'modality' is 
approached from so many perspectives points at both the differences in the ways 
linguists perceive the term as well as the degrees of vagueness and generality that 
accompanies it. While in some cases modality is viewed as merely a grammatical 
category, in others it is considered strictly semantic, and yet in others as a 
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combination of both, etc. Yet apart from the strictly syntactic or strictly semantic 
ones, most approaches seem to be dealing with essentially the same set of variables 
which are reshuffled in terms of varying degrees of emphasis. Most approaches seem 
to acknowledge the presence as well as the importance of 'form', 'meaning', and 
'context' as general categories. And despite sharing some common factors, each 
approach claims complete detachment from previous ones. However, one main 
characteristic they all share is their limitations both at the theoretical and practical 
levels. 
Starting with syntactic approaches (Twaddell (1960); Palmer (1965; 1974)), 
their main problems are that they do not pay enough attention to meaning (if they do 
at all), and that they usually target only and exclusively modal auxiliary verbs. The 
less the role of meaning is acknowledged in these accounts, the more limited such 
accounts are. However, the more they acknowledge the role of meaning (Palmer 
(1986; 1990)), the more inconsistent the account is. This is due to the fact that strict 
formal (syntactic/distributional) categories are largely incompatible with strict 
semantic ones, and trying to provide a meeting point between the two will inevitably 
result in contradiction and inconsistency. The reasons for this are simply the rigidity 
and incompatibility of both criteria. 
The same type of controversy also faces predominantly semantic approaches 
(Perkins (1983)) which try to account for a relationship between form and meaning. 
Although sometimes there are recognisable consistencies and patterns between 
structure and meaning, one questions the value and usefulness of accounting for them 
in the light of the many exceptions which sometimes outweigh these consistencies. In 
all cases, the existence of so many exceptions is a constant reminder that no one-to-
one correlation exists. 
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As for those strictly semantic approaches which do not try to account for a 
relationship between form and meaning, they too have their shortcomings. Starting 
with 'monosemantic' approaches (Joos (1964); Ehrman (1966)), in order for these 
approaches to make sure that the area of meaning of a modal is covered, they have to 
be general in order to be inclusive. The more general they are, however, the less 
informative the account is. This is the dilemma Coates (1983) has to deal with where, 
according to Papafragou (2000: 25), she constantly "has to expand the semantic 
component so that it includes information about the degree of 'subjectivity' or 
'strength' of the modality". 
With 'polysemantic' approaches (Marino (1973); Hermeren (1978)), on the 
other hand, the tendency becomes an attempt to cover all the possible meanings of 
each use of a modal, and this is impossible in the sense that meaning is never 
detached from interpretations, and different readers can disagree about the meaning of 
the same modal in the same utterance. Again, the rigidity of strictly semantic 
approaches, where precision in description and use of terminology is essential, lies at 
the heart of the problem. This is because one cannot dissociate the variety of 
meanings expressed by modals from the contexts in which they occur, and one cannot 
account for all possible contexts. In short, it seems that the more rigid an approach is, 
the more limitations it has. At the same time, it seems that a general characteristic of 
the semantics of modals is irregularity. As Lakoff (1972, 229) points out, modals are 
"semantically highly irregular and unpredictable". 
More flexible approaches on the other hand are those which rely more openly 
on context for modal interpretation (such as functional approaches like Halliday 
(1970); Johannesson (1978)). Yet, these seem to provide an account of modality 
which is not only general, but also relatively individualised and partly subjective. 
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However, this does not signal a dead end for these approaches. In fact, those notions 
of generality and partial subjectivity lie at the heart of the concept of modality. For 
instance, while trying to explain and justify the different interpretations of modals 
from a semantic point of view necessarily leads to one of those tricky situations 
discussed above, a pragmatic approach would not face such a problem mainly because 
of its flexibility. Acknowledging the existence of so many variables (such as context 
with all its sub-variables) that interact in the production of meaning is a direct 
indication that, unlike semantic approaches, precision in description is hardly the goal 
in more-pragmatic approaches. This, to begin with, is the first step out of the 
traditional descriptive trap. 
It follows that, as far as context is concerned, the argument of whether there 
are 'core' meanings (monosemantic approaches) to modals or not (polysemantic 
approaches) is irrelevant and unimportant. This means that the questions of whether 
different contexts bring out the different meanings of modals, or whether the 
meanings of modals are inherent in the actual word but vary with differences in 
contexts are quite trivial and unessential. What is more significant is that there is an 
interactive relationship through which context plays a decisive role in the 
interpretation of a modalised utterance both at the semantic and functional levels. At 
the same time, context does not 'determine' meaning. There are individual differences 
not resolved by context and this accounts for the fact that not everyone arrives at 
exactly the same interpretation of the same modalised utterance in the same context. 
Ambiguity is present and is quite often deliberately sought. This is an indication that 
speaker and hearer-related factors are also central in any approach. Whether 
'indeterminate,' 'fuzzy,' 'ambiguous' or 'underspecified', the main point remains that 
the process of interpretation is partly subjective and therefore not straightforward. 
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This ultimately raises the following question: in the absence of a precise and 
neat system of categorising modality, is a systematic use of modality in text analysis 
an impossible task? The answer to this question is a strict 'no', an answer based on 
the view that despite the possible variance in interpretation, the range of this variance 
still falls within very limited parameters, accountable within a system. And this is 
evident from the substantial level of consensus regarding the general area of meaning 
of modals in a text or, in the worst-case scenario, a consensus concerning what such 
modals do not mean. This would however be entirely dependent on an approach to 
categorising modals which is both functional and pragmatic, an approach which will 
be tackled in detail in the following chapter. The need for these two bases for such an 
approach is reflected in one of the most descriptive definitions of modality as defined 
by Halliday (1985: 356): that which covers "the area of meaning that lies between yes 
and no". In short, since modality is characteristically general, subjective, and 
therefore vague, accounting for these characteristics must be done in the light of a 
more pragmatic, inclusive approach. This would be the only wayan account of 
modality has practical potential. 
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IV Ideology through Modality in Discourse 
4.1 Introduction 
After an overview of those major difficulties and problems surrounding the 
definition of discourse in the first chapter, the issues tackled in the second chapter 
dealt with relating other key yet problematic notions to that view of discourse and 
redefining most of them in the light of the main objectives of a critical analysis of 
discourse. The major underlying motivation behind these discussions was and is the 
argument that different instances of discourse can be approached in essentially the 
same manner, using the same analytical model. As long as the main purpose of a 
critical analysis of discourse is the examination of the underlying ideologies and 
possible ideological inconsistencies and effects in these texts, there should be no 
obstacles to approaching this issue by utilising the same linguistic tools in a 
framework which would relate linguistic features to underlying ideological stances 
and attitudes. This was seen to fall in line with the broad objectives of a functional 
view of discourse: analysing the relationship between the linguistic system and social 
structures. 
Modality was selected as the linguistic feature with such potential, and the 
third chapter attempted to provide an overview of those approaches which defined 
that linguistic notion together with the different groupings of its various 
manifestations. It was concluded that only a pragmatically oriented categorisation of 
modality which cOlTesponds to the functional view of discourse discussed above 
would be of practical use. 
The aim of this chapter is to outline such a framework which focuses on the 
two main modality systems in the English language (epistemic and deontic) as playing 
a decisive role in indicating the type and degree of involvement a speaker has in the 
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content of his/her message, and ultimately, an attitude/position towards the object of 
his/her message. This attitude/position can be directly relatable to the notion of 
ideology in the light of a view of an existing relationship between modality and 
ideology in discourse. Therefore, the overall claim which the framework proposed in 
this chapter is based on is that an analysis of modal expressions in a text can give us at 
least a reading of, if not access to, the ideologies communicated in that text. 
4.2 Ideology and Discourse Analysis 
As discussed in the first chapter, ideology and discourse intersect and interact 
in a complex manner. To begin with, the view of ideology as "a system of beliefs 
which has come to be constructed as a way of comprehending the world" (Fowler 
1981: 26) presents ideology as a necessary constituent of the cognitive makeup and 
development of people as social beings in social communities. This view is supported 
by Burton (1982: 196) who points out that "all observation, let alone description, must 
take place within an already constructed theoretical framework of socially, 
ideologically and linguistically constructed reality". This means that it cannot be 
removed but can only be replaced by alternative ideologies since "no person can 
engage with the world without the cognitive support of ideology" (Fowler 1981: 26). 
It is therefore omnipresent in that it represents those ways in which our language as 
well as our thoughts interact with society. 
The importance of this view lies in its implication that ideology is both a 
social and a cognitive phenomenon, as well as highlighting the principal intermediary 
role that language plays. The social aspect of ideology corresponds to those shared 
values and beliefs which result from the individual's interaction with society and its 
institutions. However, ideology is not only social and shared. Speaking of ideology as 
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also a cognitive phenomenon illustrates, in my view, the importance of the individual 
factor. Fairclough (1989: 24) alludes to this dimension of ideology in his discussion of 
"member resources" which encompass knowledge structures that "people have in 
their heads and draw upon when they produce or interpret texts". These, according to 
Fairclough (1989: 24) are "cognitive in the sense that they are in people's heads, but 
they are social in the sense that they have social origins". Yet characterising the 
cognitive aspect of ideology in this manner (i.e. cognitive = in people's heads) is a 
non-distinctive way of highlighting this aspect of ideology since the individual 
cognitive mind acts as a filter to everything that individuals are in contact with. In 
other words, there is no 'non-cognitive' interaction with any aspect of life, and in this 
light, Fairclough's definition is not a helpful one. 
Weber's (1992; 1998) view on the matter is of more practical relevance. In his 
book, Critical Analysis of Fiction, Weber (1992: 13) argues that in the reading 
process, for instance, the reader "has to rely on hislher own background knowledge of 
the world in his/her own ideological assumptions", those "stored in the memory" in 
the "inferential process of meaning construction". On the one hand, readers often use 
different assumptions in their inferential processing of one and the same text, and this 
leads to a possible "divergence in interpretation". On the other hand, "where readers 
share similar assumptions and reach similar ihterpretative conclusions", then they 
form an interpretive community, and in this line of argument, ideology becomes 
precisely that "set of assumptions that they have in common" (Weber 1992: 13-14). In 
1998, he elaborates·this view by discussing the same issue in the light of schema 
theory. Weber writes that information is stored in the mind: 
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... not individually but in trunks, sets of beliefs, assumptions and expectations ... If the 
s p e a ~ e r ' s s schemata are highly similar to the hearer's, with many shared assumptions, they will 
find It easy to communicate and understand each other. " Such a set of shared pre-set 
positions, assumptions, beliefs, values and cultural practices constitutes a world-view, a 
version of reality which comes to be accepted as 'a common sense' within that particular 
community. 
(Weber 1998: 115) 
In speaking of "schemata" which serve as cognitive representations of the way 
language users see the world, construct and reconstruct it, Weber (1992; 1998) makes 
this cognitive relationship between ideology on the one hand and the conceptual mind 
and memory on the other much clearer and more useful. Yet still, following Weber's 
cognitive, schema-dependent characterisation of ideology, one essential distinction 
must be made between personal-experience related schemata and shared-experience 
related schemata even within the same "interpretative or discourse community". In 
this sense, the difference between the two is meant to highlight the 
personallindividual side to ideology which is nonetheless existent within each 
individual in a community, and this essentially arises due to different personal 
individual experiences. 
In my view and in line with the objectives of this thesis, this distinction 
reflects an emphasis on the individual side to ideology. In other words, ideology is not 
a completely socially governed phenomenon since there are both individualJpersonal 
as well as social/shared bases for it. And this is a central tenet in the case argued for 
concerning the process of reading and interpretation (see Chapter Two). There it was 
seen that the main forces at work included the central role the reader played at the 
socio-individuallevel; i.e. both as an individual with hislher own view and private 
experiences as well as belonging to a society, a group of interpreters. Hence, the 
ability of the individual reader to differ from and disagree with a group-interpretation 
is more than just a possibility. This stands in opposition with the view that ideology is 
a completely socially-determined, or indeed, merely a social phenomenon. 
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Here, the implications of a socio-cognitive view of ideology are translated into 
a set of theoretical and practical restrictions and demands made on any approach to its 
analysis. At the theoretical level, because ideology is so intermeshed with language, 
society and thought in general, the only adequate view of discourse to fit such an 
approach will necessarily have to be one which considers language not only "in the 
context of social systems and institutions" (Carter and Nash 1990: 21) but one which 
also allows for individual variety in interpretation. In other words, it should be a view 
which accounts for both the social as well as the individual variable since as Miller 
-(1990: 22) argues, reading is affected by, but always exceeds what is predictable from 
"certain historical, personal, institutional and political ... circumstances". Of course, 
the more serious problem is how to consider this individual/cognitive aspect of 
ideology in a critical analysis of discourse at the practical level. The ability and 
intention to do so are, I argue, central characteristics of a functional-pragmatic view 
of discourse, and these issues will be taken up in the framework proposed in this 
chapter as well as the practical applications carried out in the following three chapters. 
However, the main point concerning the place of ideology in discourse 
analysis is based on the view that ideology is "an ineluctable feature of social life", 
that it is a highly "dependent" feature (Aronowitz 1988: 146), and that it has an 
individual-cognitive side to it. Consequently, ideology cannot be analysed in isolation 
especially "by linguistic analysis at a single level or with reference only to 
decontextualized sentences" (Carter and Nash 1990: 21), but rather through an 
approach which both considers the shared aspect of context (in its widest scope) as 
well as allowing for variance in interpretation by different readers. Of course, all this 
is dependent on the central role language plays in acting as a primary medium 
responsible for transmitting different ideologies in a social community. It is in this 
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sense that ideology can be referred to as "a socially and politically dominant set of 
values and beliefs which are not 'out there' but are constructed in all texts especially 
in and through language" (Carter and Nash 1990: 20). 
Finally, the motivation for analysing ideology in discourse corresponds with 
the multifunctional view of language where language is regarded as a tool (at the 
textual level) for communication (at the ideational level), of social interaction (at 
interpersonal level), as well as, in Hodge and Kress' (1993: 6) words, "an instrument 
of control" (a subsection of the interpersonal level). In this light, language becomes a 
distinctive and central site of struggle since it can be "used by powerful groups to re-
enforce [a] dominant ideology" (Simpson 1993: 6), and this is illustrated by Carter 
and Nash (1990) in their consideration of the dynamics of the relationship between 
writers and readers. According to Carter and Nash (1990: 51) "many writers want to 
gain a reader's attention and to persuade him to action or to a particular view of 
things". Yet because this cannot be done blatantly without the risk of displacing the 
reader "from a secure place in the normal scheme of things", writers resort to more 
subtle and implicit methods in order to represent the world as "essentially 
unproblematic" (Carter and Nash 1990: 51). Following from that, one of the main 
objectives of analysing ideology in language becomes to highlight those sometimes 
delusive discursive practices in order for these practices to be challenged. 
Yet despite its departure from the classical Marxist stance (i.e. ideology as 
false-consciousness), the notion of ideology as presented here still falls in line with an 
essentially left-wing position highlighting the negative goals of i d e o l o g y ~ ~ where 
manipulation of the weak by the strong is ideology's primary goal. Even a milder 
view like Weber's (1992) explains ideology in terms of those oppositions: 
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Reading is both transformatory and reproductive, a matter of constructing and reconstructing. 
In so far as the reader draws upon his/her own background knowledge in the inferential 
processing of the text, s/he constructs its meaning; but at the same time the text 
metaphorically fights back, text-based assumptions interact dynamically with the reader's 
a s s u ~ p t i o ~ s , , and the latt,er c a ~ ~ b ~ ~ positively or negatively manipulated. In the case of negative 
~ a n l p U l a t l O n , , the r e ~ d e r r s p ~ e J u d l c ~ S S or stereotypes are strengthened to the point of hardening 
mto more and more IrreversIble attItude schemata; whereas positive manipulation shakes the 
reader out of his/her complacency by opening up seemingly monologic schemata and setting 
free their polyphonic reverberations. 
(Weber 1992: 27) 
In my view, there is more to ideology than simply qualifying it in terms of a 
negative-positive scale, a position still present in (Weber 1998: 114) who, as 
mentioned above, clarifies his cognitive, schemata-dependent characterisation of 
i d e o l o g ~ ~ in those terms. Following Weber's cognitive, schemata-dependent 
characterisation of ideology, the reason we speak of ideologies [as opposed to an 
ideology] reflects the differences in ways by which people regard and construct their 
ideas of the world and experiences as well as influencing others' ideas and attitudes. 
Yet although these views can never be neutral, it is these differences in points of view 
reflecting the differences in human perceptions and experiences that call for more 
attention than an evaluation of these ideologies. In line with Mills' (1997: 29) 
argument (see Chapter One), no theory whether of discourse or ideology can offer an 
apolitical way of thinking about hegemony. However, the idea here is that political 
hegemony is not the only ideology that is worth investigation. 
Therefore, in this thesis, approaching the issue of ideology in discourse is 
mainly targeted towards stressing the differences in, and variety of, ideological 
positions adopted by different speakers in different instances of discourse, where there 
are personal as well as shared aspects to ideology. It is an attempt to pinpoint the 
range of underlying ideological affiliations and ideological objectives in the texts 
analysed where, although these objectives might fall in line with the struggle towards 
hegemony in the political sense (outlined by left-wing proponents), the possibility that 
some writers display no such objective in their ideological positions is also existent. 
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In that light, the upcoming critical analyses will investigate the underlying 
ideologies present in the different instances of discourse and examine non ad hoc 
possible interpretations behind their presence. The main reason behind doing that is 
ultimately to raise the awareness of language users concerning the power of language 
in its multifunctional nature, where one manifestation of this power is indeed political 
hegemony. 
4.3 Modality and Ideology: Setting the Theoretical Bases 
After clarifying the intended specific objectives for analysing ideology in 
discourse, the next immediate task concerns relating modality (the key linguistic 
feature to be used in the analyses) to ideology both at the theoretical and practical 
levels. This is a particularly complex and thorny issue especially in the light of those 
accounts of modality discussed in the previous chapter. The problem with regards to 
these accounts is that a vast majority of them either does not fall in line with the 
functional view of discourse, or is not targeted at a practically applicable and 
workable objective. In fact, most of them have tried to provide a systematic 
categorisation of modality in English based on entirely descriptive criteria for the 
inherent purpose of classifying t h e s ~ e e modals. This has constantly led to criticisms that 
each approach has produced a more or less narrow and positioned account of what 
modality entails (both at the theoretical and practical levels) and which expressions to 
be included under the heading of modality. 
And the main drawbacks that all these approaches share boil down to the 
following areas (which are discussed in detail in Chapter Three). The first relates to 
their restrictive selection of modal expressions where most approaches have focused 
either exclusively or mainly on modal auxiliary verbs as the one class comprising, 
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representing and summarising modality in general. This effectively resulted in a 
narrow and non-inclusive view of modality as is evident in the works of several 
linguists discussed in the previous chapter. 
Secondly, most approaches have aimed at presenting modality as a neat 
system, and this resulted in overemphasising one or another criterion which helped 
towards that goal. On the one hand, with some predominantly semantic approaches, 
this precision in categorisation often led to an unrealistic view of modality which is 
not only decontextualised, but is also quite distant from the general intuitions of 
-
native speakers. On the other hand, some purely syntactic accounts (and by far the 
most popular) have inaccurately viewed modality as a purely grammatical category, 
while the issue of meaning (let alone interpretation) lay in the background. 
Thirdly, some of the less restrictive but non-functional accounts carry internal 
contradictions. This is evident in Palmer's (1990: 1) description of modality as an 
essentially "semantic-grammatical" category, a description which is potentially 
paradoxical even when modality refers only to that restricted set of modal auxiliary 
verbs. Even with this limited set, such a description is sensible only at the theoretical 
level in that the term 'modal' is in essence a semantic description while the term 
'auxiliary' a syntactic one. In reality, however, these criteria are incompatible, and 
trying to account for modality within both the semantic and syntactic frames creates a 
dilemma even when only dealing with modal auxiliary verbs (let alone modal 
expressions in general). Consequently, in a more inclusive account of modality, none 
of the above criteria seem satisfactory or appropriate. 
Based on the drawbacks of such approaches, the following observations and 
conclusions are made. On the one hand, there seems to be a conflict between 
presenting both an inclusive as well as a neat system of categorised modals, and in 
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their attempt to avoid this conflict, most approaches have restricted their accounts to 
modal auxiliary verbs. On the other hand, there appears to be a general neglect of the 
interpretative dimension in the light of contextual restrictions, and this is mainly due 
to the inability of semantic-syntactic criteria to account for a variable which both lies 
outside the scope of semantics and syntax as fields of study and is, on top of that, so 
difficult to control. 
These two points suggest that any practically useful account will need to 
sacrifice neatness for inclusion and will have to take into consideration the possible 
range in interpretation. And both goals can go hand in hand in the light of a more 
pragmatic account of modality. In fact, the more pragmatically oriented an account is, 
the more indusive it can be, and this is due to the fact that excessive and meticulous 
attempts at precision in description, categorisation and use of terminology would no 
longer be a goal, a view indirectly arrived at in Palmer's (1986) account. 
4.3.1 Modality and Subjectivity 
In his book Mood and Modality, Palmer (1986) tackles the issue of modality at 
the cross-linguistic level, and therefore both the perspectives and objectives of that 
account are considerably different from his earlier approaches. Because at the cross-
linguistic level structural criteria do not present adequate and reliable bases for modal 
categorisation, Palmer is forced to resort to more inclusive ones thus pointing out 
SUbjectivity (along with indeterminacy and non-factuality) as the first basic and 
common characteristic shared by all modals in all languages. Unfortunately, for the 
one reason that it lacks structural foundations, he expresses his reservations 
concerning subjectivity as a useful criterion for a neat categorisation of modals. In 
other words, Palmer's (1986) conclusion concerning the inadequacy of subjectivity to 
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serve as a basis for categorising modals only arises because of his refusal to 
acknowledge the inability for structural and semantic approaches to fully account for 
modality cross-linguistically. This insistence on a structural-semantic basis seems to 
fall in line with theoretical tendencies associated with structural schools of linguistics, 
which have consistently aimed at presenting language as a structured system of 
systems. However, the limitations of such approaches only draw attention to the need 
for more functional-pragmatic bases of any inclusive account which, in effect, 
highlights the need for considering such criteria as subjectivity for categorising 
.-
modals. 
4.3.2 Modality and Indeterminacy 
The other main pragmatically useful criterion3, which also transcends cross-
linguistic barriers, is that of indeterminacy. Initially suggested by Coates (1983) as 
part of an essentially semantic approach to categorising modals, indeterminacy, along 
with its three sub-divisions discussed in the previous chapter is unfortunately not 
stretched out to its full potential. This is evident in Coates's (1983) restrictive 
selection of only ten modal auxiliary verbs as opposed to other expressions of 
modality in general. However, indeterminacy is a notion which, I argue, is founded on 
fundamentally pragmatic bases since interpretation lies at the heart of indeterminacy. 
Consequently, it can serve as another essential foundation for a functional and 
potentially more inclusive account of modality. 
3 The third and final criterion (non-factuality) is not accounted for in this thesis because it does not 
relate to the notion of ideology in a way that could be utilised in a practical analysis. Although ideology 
is non-factual in the sense that it is positioned, as mentioned, the notion is of little practical use. 
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4.3.3 Ideology and Subjectivity 
The significance of these two criteria (subjectivity and indetenninacy) can be 
illustrated through the role they play in providing the bases for generally 
characterising modality in English as well as relating modality to the notion of 
ideology. As Palmer (1986: 6) argues, modality in language is "concerned with 
subjective characteristics of an utterance" and could thus be defined as "the 
grammaticalization of speakers' (subjective) attitudes and opinions" [emphasis mine]. 
It is essentially "the qualification of the categorical and the absolute as realized [in 
linguistics] within the code of language" (Perkins 1983: 18). This qualification is the 
main indication of subjectivity since it represents an involvement of the producer of 
an instance of language in his/her production. More specifically it can be an indication 
of the producer's point of view in tenns of types and degrees of this modal 
involvement. 
Yet subjectivity is also an essential feature of ideology. According to Hodge 
and Kress (1993: 6), ideology can be defined as "a systematic body.of ideas organized 
from a particular point of view", and this definition places considerable emphasis on 
the notion of subjectivity. Although the point of view referred to could be the 
aggregate sum of different sources of presenting states of affairs, and is subject to 
many restrictions, the role of the immediate producer's point of view is recognised as 
the last filter through which ideology is organised and ultimately presented. Here 
modality can potentially represent one fundamental linguistic feature through which 
the speaker's point of view can be detected in an utterance. 
As Perkins (1983: 34) explains, modal expressions can be regarded as "a 
realisation of a semantic system which intervenes between the speaker and some 
aspect of the objective world". This interesting metaphor of intervention suggests both 
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a facilitating role as well as a hindering role to modality. In the first case, modality 
can intervene in a 'positive' way by serving as some sort of link or a mediation 
between the speaker and the objective world and is thus a carrier of at least part of the 
speaker's meanings and intentions. However, in the second case, modality could 
simultaneously serve as some sort of obstacle between the language producer and 
receiver. And this is particularly relevant when addressing the issue from the 
receiver's end since any 'negative' hindering characteristic of modality can playa 
significant ideological role in masking some aspects of the message communicated as 
-
well as possible inconsistent ideological positions. In both cases, subjectivity, which 
is regarded as an indispensable notion associated with the use of modality, is also 
quite crucial when considering ideology. 
4.3.4 Ideology and Indeterminacy 
Secondly comes indeterminacy. As Coates (1983: 9) argues, indeterminacy, 
which is characteristic of all natural languages, is of particular relevance to modal 
auxiliary verbs4• Her three different types of indeterminacy (outlined in Chapter 
Three) exemplify various ways through which modals seem to have more than one 
sense of meaning in which the same forms are used. Indeterminacy, she argues, lies at 
the heart of the meanings and interpretations of modal auxiliary verbs and is therefore 
an indispensable criterion for categorising and sub-categorising such auxiliaries. 
Again, this main feature works hand in hand with ideology whose 
effectiveness is maximised "when its workings are least visible" (Fairclough 1989: 
85). Indeterminacy directly serves one of the main objectives of an ideology of 
hegemony as well as the masking of possibly inconsistent ideologies. It is therefore 
4 Indeterminacy is characteristic of all forms of modality as will be shown in the upcoming analyses. 
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through these less visible workings of ideology that modality plays its most decisive 
role. It serves as a linguistic tool which, in line with their ideological stance, language 
users can resort to in order to reflect, refract or totally obscure their views and 
attitudes. In that sense, modality is seen as "a major exponent of the interpersonal 
function of language" (Simpson 1993: 47). 
Consequently, in the light of the relationship between ideology and discourse, 
the significance of modality as a linguistic tool for the analysis of ideology becomes 
more visible and can be more easily highlighted. Its significance in terms of its 
practical potential is based on the two central aspects of modality which it combines: 
1) a coverage of an extremely wide area of meaning as well as 
2) a structured system within which different meanings fall. 
This means that modality can be simultaneously quite general in one sense, and 
systematic in another. These are areas where modality systems both correspond 
perfectly with the objectives of ideology and also help its analysis in discourse at the 
practical level. 
First of all, it is undeniably easier for ideologies to be more vaguely 
communicated when one is being more general in expressing one's views towards 
states of affairs. Generality seems to be an essential feature of both modality and 
ideology. Then again, according to Hodge and Kress (1993: 20), "if a systematic 
theory, an ideology, is guiding the use of language ... then we would expect a 
systematic use of linguistic forms to be evident". Analysing this systematic use of 
linguistic forms becomes easier when these forms display a certain level of internal 
organisation, and this is another feature of modality as will be illustrated below. 
Consequently, a systematic reading of modality has the potential of providing insight 
into the different underlying ideologies and possible ideological inconsistencies in 
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discourse. It seems that modality combines those characteristics which provide both 
the lock and its key. 
As a result, and based on this relationship between modality and ideology, the 
main argument put forward in this thesis is that a reading of modality in a text can 
give us a clearer and more accurate idea about where a speaker/writer stands, at the 
ideological level. Of course, this presupposes an account of modality which is 
inclusive, systematic, as well as interpretation-sensitive in that it is able to 
accommodate the possible range in interpretation within contextual (social, cognitive 
-and linguistic) restrictions. Ultimately, this means that the account should essentially 
be a pragmatic-functional one, which should also have practical potential so that it 
could be used in analysing discourse. 
4.4 A Pragmatic-Functional Account of Modality 
Trying to implement all those variables mentioned above to achieve a 
pragmatic-functional account of modality which is systematic, inclusive as well as 
practically useful is a particularly challenging task in the light of all the contradictions 
and lack of compatibility of criteria and variables. From a pragmatic perspective, this 
means that any account "does not stop at the system of linguistic devices, bl;lt 
develops the system from the quality of action connected with the linguistic forms" 
(Hoffman 1988: 156) in their context of use. In other words, as Lakoff (1972) points 
out: 
In order to define the class of modals, or to provide the set of environments in which a modal 
may be correctly or appropriately used, one must refer to many levels of language: the purely 
syntactic environment, ... the logical structure, ... and the context of the u ~ t e r a n c e ~ ~ the 
assumptions that are shared by speaker and addressee, whether or not p r e ~ I ~ u s l y y g ~ v e n n
linguistic expression in the discourse; the social situation assumed by partICIpants In the 
discourse; the impression the speaker wants to make on the addressee; and so on. 
(Lakoff 1972: 229-230) 
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Here, the key for accomplishing this lies primarily in ensuring a functional 
basis for such an account. This is the case since an inherent component of a functional 
theory of language and discourse is, in fact, the interaction of most of the above 
mentioned variables. As a result, before proposing my own categorisation of modality 
which is intended for practical use, a brief preview of the two main approaches which 
illustrate the functional view of modality is the next immediate task. These are 
Halliday's (1985) and Simpson's (1993) accounts. 
4.4.1 Halliday's (1985) FunctionallPragmatic Account 
Halliday's (1985) account of modality is based on his multifunctional view of 
language discussed in previous chapters. As an extension to his examination of mood, 
which covers the four basic clause structures: declarative, imperative, interrogative 
and exclamatory, Halliday tackles the notion of modality. He describes modality as 
representing those choices in language which lie between the two polarities ("yes" 
and "no"), thus covering all intermediate degrees as well as the "various kinds of 
indeterminacy" that fall in between these two extreme, categorical choices (Halliday 
1985: 85-86). 
His functional bases emerge quite clearly as he subdivides modality into 
modalization and modulation, depending on the two types of communicative activities 
to which it relates, the two areas of meaning which it covers. The first area of 
meaning deals with propositions and is tackled under modalization. This branch of 
modality is seen to reflect the speaker's judgement of the likelihood of the 
proposition, and is, according to Halliday further subdivided into two sections 
depending on the two kinds of intermediate possibilities: degrees of probability and 
degrees of usualitv (Halliday 1985: 86). The second area of meaning deals with 
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proposals and is covered under modulation, the second main subsection of modality. 
This branch of modality, Halliday (1985: 86) explains, essentially reflects the 
speaker's desirability of the proposition and is also divided into two kinds of 
proposals: obligation and inclination. 
Based on these main divisions, Halliday (1985) points out the three variables 
which modality is subject to. The first is the already mentioned distinction between 
the two different types: modalizaiton and modulation. The second is what Halliday 
(1985: 336) refers to as the different orientations in modality. These are four which 
--
could be either subjective-explicit (I think Mary knows) or subjective-implicit 
(Mary'll know) on the one hand, or they could be either objective-explicit (it's likely 
that Mary knows) or objective-implicit (Mary probably knows) on the other. And 
finally, the third variable is what Halliday refers to as the different values attributed to 
modal forms and these can be low, median or high (Halliday 1985: 337). In that light, 
modalization would include various intermediary degrees of probability (possible/ 
probable/ certain) and usuality (sometimes/ usually/ always), while modulation would 
cover different degrees of obligation (allowed! supposed! required) and inclination 
(willing! keen! determined) (Halliday 1985: 335). These correspond respectively to 
the low, median and high values (See Figure 1). 
Halliday (1985) concludes his account by discussing the different structural 
realisations of modality. Here he suggests that modalization is typically realised by 
finite modal operators (such as might) and!or modal adjuncts (such as certainly), 
while modulation is typically realised by finite modal operators (such as must), a 
passive verb predicator (such as supposed) or an adjective predicator (such as 
anrious) (Halliday 1985: 87). 
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MODALITY 
MODALIZATION (propositions) MODULATION (proposals) 
~ ~
PROBABILITY USUALITY OBLIGATION INCLINATION 
Low Possible Sometimes Allowed Willing 
Median Probable Usually Supposed Keen 
High Certain Always Required Determined 
Figure 1 
Two noticeable features about Halliday's (1985) account are its functional and 
its pragmatic dimensions. The first is explicitly pointed out since Halliday's theory of 
language which modality is part of is a functional one. The second, however, is only 
implicitly signalled out by the central role that interpretation plays in determining the 
meanings of different modals. Doing that, Halliday (1985) avoids the trap which 
monosemantic approaches fall into and does not assign one interpretation per modal. 
This suggests that although he makes such accurate divisions under the different 
orientations of modality, these o n l y ~ s e r v e e as guidelines as to the variables involved in 
assigning different meanings of modals. In fact, assigning the exact orientation for 
different modal expressions in English is extremely hard, if not impossible since one 
cannot rule out the possibility where different readers do not interpret the same modal 
in exactly the same way. And the same argument holds when discussing Halliday's 
examples of the different values assigned to different modals. This drives Halliday 
(1985: 339) to the conclusion that "the actual number of semantic distinctions that can 
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be recognized as systematic within the modality system runs well into the thousands". 
In short, the essence of Halliday's account and its usefulness lies in its setting of the 
theoretical bases from which any practically useful account of modality can depart. 
This directly links it to Simpson's (1993) more practically oriented approach. 
4.4.2 Simpson's (1993) Practical Account 
Simpson's (1993) categorisation of modals is specifically targeted at 
presenting a workable account of modality. Although he does not provide an 
extensive and exhaustive description of the modal system in English, his proposals 
reflect a much more inclusive as well as a practically useful account. It is an approach 
which is quite similar to Halliday's (1985) account discussed above. 
Simpson (1993: 47) starts by defining modality as referring "broadly to a 
speaker's attitude towards, or opinion about, the truth of a proposition expressed by a 
sentence" as well as their attitude "towards the situation or event described by a 
sentence". He then subdivides modality into four main categories. These are the 
deontic system, along with the closely related boulomaic system on the one hand, and 
the epistemic system, with its subsystem of perception modality on the other 
(Simpson 1993: 47). 
Deontic modality is defined as the system of duty since it is "concerned with a 
speaker's attitude to the degree of obligation attaching to the performance of certain 
actions". And this generally manifests itself on "a continuum of commitment from 
permission through obligation to requirement" (Simpson 1993: 47). It includes modal 
auxiliary verbs (MAY, SHOULD, MUST, etc) as well as other deontic adjectives plus 
participle constructions (BE ... THAT) as in "it is necessary that you leave" which 
reflect the same atti tude. 
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Deontic modality is closely related to boulomaic modality "which is 
extensively grammaticized in English in expressions of 'desire'" (Simpson 1993: 48). 
This includes modal lexical verbs indicating the wishes and desires of the speaker 
(such as HOPE, WISH and REGRET), adjectival and participial constructions (as in 
BE ... TO and BE '" THAT) as well as modal adverbs (HOPEFULLY, 
REGRETABLY). In short, Simpson's (1993) deontic modality parallels Halliday's 
(1985) "obligation" branch of "modulation" while boulomaic modality falls close to, 
but not quite in line with Halliday's "inclination" branch of "modulation" outlined 
above. 
The epistemic system on the other hand is associated with "the speaker's 
confidence or lack of confidence in the truth of a proposition expressed" (Simpson 
1993: 48). It includes different types of epistemic expressions like modal auxiliary 
verbs (MAY, MIGHT, MUST), modal lexical verbs (BELIEVE, SUPPOSE, THINK) 
and epistemic modal adverbs (PROBABLY, POSSIBLY) and adjectives in "BE ... 
TO" and "BE ... THAT" constructions ("you are sure to be right", "it is certain that 
you're right") (Simpson 1993: 48). It largely manifests itself on a continuum of 
epistemic commitment to a proposition. 
Directly related to the epistemic system is perception modality which is 
. 
regarded as a subcategory of epistemic modality. It also manifests itself in "BE ... 
THAT" constructions ("it is apparent that you're right") as well as through modal 
adverbs (APPARENTLY, OBVIOUSLY). Following Perkins (1983), Simpson (1993: 
50) argues that the difference between the two is only due to the fact that "the degree 
of commitment to the truth of a proposition is predicated on some reference to human 
perception, normally visual perception". In comparison to Halliday's (1985) account, 
Simpson's (1993) epistemic and perception modality would both be seen to fall under 
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the former's "probability" branch of "modality" while Halliday's "usuality" branch is 
not accounted for. 
Yet this sub-branching in epistemic modality has its purpose. When analysing 
point of view, distinguishing between epistemic and perception modality could signal 
the difference between internal and external narratorial stances. Since Simpson's 
(1993) account of modality is specifically targeted at the examination of point of view 
in discourse (specifically literature), his division is well founded and therefore utterly 
justifiable. In contrast, although Halliday's divisions do have practical potential, they 
are not targeted at any specific manner of application. Hence, they are more general, 
theoretical and they include other sections of modality which are of less value for 
Simpson. 
Nevertheless, as argued earlier, both accounts share common basic functional 
grounds, and this is reflected in a set of more specific and valuable criteria shared by 
both accounts (which are, nonetheless, not always explicitly highlighted and signalled 
out). These include the three main scales on which modality wavers: a subjective-
objective scale, an epistemic-deontic one and a strong-weak one, bringing into light 
both the functional-pragmatic nature of these accounts as well as their dependence on 
the concepts of subjectivity and indeterminacy. The main premises are that an account 
of modality is characterised both by the type of activity modality communicates and 
corresponds to (at the functional level) as well as by the involvement of a 
speaker/writer in making propositions and proposals in addition to negotiating the 
degree of strength, subjectivity and indeterminacy propositions and proposals 
correspond to (at the pragmatic level). And on top of it all is the significant and 
central role these features play in accounting for ideology in discourse. 
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Consequently, both Halliday's (1985) and Simpson's (1993) categorisations of 
modality are quite valuable in serving as bases on which the upcoming proposed 
account will depend. The only central difference will then be in tenns of the practical 
objectives which the proposed account will be tailored to serve as opposed to any 
fundamental difference in the functional-pragmatic bases of all these accounts. 
4.5 An Inclusive Account of Modality 
Ensuring a functional-pragmatic basis for a systematic and practically useful 
account of modality is therefore an initial and fundamental step to take at the 
theoretical level. Yet moving on to the practical level calls, first, for a decision 
regarding which expressions to incorporate under the heading of modality if the 
account is to be an inclusive one. And this decision is, in tum, necessarily dependent 
on a definition of modality which is both general as well as adequate from a 
functional-pragmatic point of view. 
In order to ensure such a definition of modality, a primary point to 
acknowledge is that modality does not express a single area of meaning. There are, in 
fact, two main types of meaning. The first is covered under epistemic modality which, 
according to Palmer (1986: 121), is roughly concerned with "language as 
information". The second is dealt with under deontic modality which is generally 
concerned with "language as action" (Palmer 1986: 121). Defined more specifically 
by Simpson (1993: 48), the epistemic system is associated with "the speaker's 
confidence or lack of confidence ... in the truth of a proposition expressed". The 
deontic system, on the other hand, "is concerned with a speaker's attitude to the 
degree of obligation attaching to the perfonnance of certain actions" (Simpson 1993: 
47). 
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Yet before deciding what expressions to include under each type of modality 
defined above, one point worth mentioning here is the use of the term "commitment" 
by Palmer (1986: 51) and Simpson (1993: 50) as well as the term "confidence" by 
Coates (1983: 18), Palmer (1986: 64) and Simpson (1993: 48) in describing the 
speaker's modal position. This, I argue, can be a misleading notion in that carries a 
suggestion that the speaker is quite conscious in communicating her/his position and 
is rather aware of the positions s/he undertakes. Of course while this is a possibility, it 
is not always the case. Therefore, my proposition is to replace these expressions by 
-the term involvement which serves the purpose of linking the speaker to what s/he 
says while at the same time opening the possibility that the speaker's position is not 
always a deliberate, conscious one. In that light, modality would very broadly refer to 
the speaker's involvement in what s/he says, and this involvement would vary in type 
as well as degree (see the next section for further discussion). Hence, while the 
speaker is no doubt 'involved' in what s/he might have said, the direct responsibility 
of the speaker regarding the possible effects his/her words may have will always be a 
debatable issue. And this summarises one of the main characteristics of the use of 
modality in language. 
Going back to the earlier argument, in order to avoid the drawbacks of earlier 
approaches, all expressions reflecting these two areas of meaning should to be 
included under modality. Consequently, under the epistemic set, not only epistemic 
modal auxiliary verbs but also different manifestations and realisations of the 
epistemic modal system should be included. In English, epistemic and deontic 
modality can be realised in different forms. Most of these are best captured in the 
following examples which reflect the majority of these expressions. 
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Realisations of Epistemic Modality 
- He is crazy. 
- He must be crazy. 
- He is probably crazy. 
- It is possible that he is crazy. 
- It is a possibility he is crazy. 
- I think he is crazy. 
- I assure you he is crazy. 
- He is crazy, isn't she? 
- He is sort of crazy. 
- It is apparent that he is crazy. 
- It seems he is crazy. 
- It seems to me he is crazy. 
- I'm told he is crazy. 
- It is as though he is crazy. 
Realisations of Deontic Modality 
- Leave. 
- You must leave. 
- You are obliged to leave. 
- It is best that you leave. 
- It is an order that you leave 
- I order you to leave. 









sensory perception adjective 
implicit subjective reference 
explicit subjective reference 
evidential (hear-say) 
analogical metaphor 






These examples clear! y show that there are numerous manifestations of 
modality, and in order to be more accurate and inclusive in an analysis which is based 
on an examination of modality in a text, all of these must be accounted for. 
4.6 A Practically Useful Account of Modality 
After deciding which modal expressions to include under the heading of 
modality, the second step is accounting for these expressions in a systematic manner 
that is functional and pragmatic in essence; i.e. an account which both reflects a 
functional view of discourse while simultaneously being flexible enough to allow for 
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a pragmatic approach to its analysis, serving the main objective of analysing ideology 
in discourse. As repeatedly pointed out earlier, the two key features which constitute 
the bases for such a task are subjectivity and indeterminacy. Whether deciding on a 
meaning of a modal expression or on the force of that expression, both subjectivity 
and indeterminacy are central at the levels of production and reception. Therefore, the 
starting point in this section springs from the view that any systematic functional-
pragmatic account of modality which has practical potential needs to acknowledge the 
importance of these two basic factors. 
--At the interpretive level, subjectivity in the use of modality signals the 
writer/speaker's type and degree of involvement in what is being said as seen from the 
reader/hearer's perspective. Subjectivity is therefore directly related to the notion of 
interpretation in that it highlights the role of the reader/hearer who acts as the final 
stage responsible for deciding on the general area of meaning within which a modal 
falls. Translated into practical terms, the notion of subjectivity is essential in 
accounting for modality since it rules out the misconception that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between a modalised expression and its meaning(s) since it is the 
language user who plays a central role in determining that meaning. This implies that 
any adequate model for categorising modals should allow for differences in 
interpretation as an essential facet of modality in general. Of course, that does not 
imply that interpretation is an entirely subjective process since the readerlhearer is not 
the only one responsible for assigning meanings and interpretations. There is in fact a 
set of restrictions which an interpretation of a modal cannot go beyond. 
This is an extremely delicate issue since two opposing forces/processes appear 
to be simultaneously present. While on the one hand subjectivity can, taking the 
argument to an absolute extreme, potentially lead to a countless variety of 
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interpretations, there also exists, on the other hand, a general area of meaning as well 
as contextual restrictions which an interpretation of a modal cannot surpass. The main 
feature here is the presence of boundaries on subjectivity that set the parameters 
within which an interpretation of a modal is allowed to manoeuvre. In short, just as 
important as the role of subjectivity in categorising modals is the function of this 
control on subjectivity by contextual restrictions. Both this variance and control on it 
are best captured at the practical level by the use of scales within continua. As a 
result, an essential constituent of a pragmatic account of modality is the presence of a 
set of scales under which modal interpretations will be seen to vary. This brings us to 
the next essential criterion - indeterminacy. 
Indeterminacy is, again, a fundamental constituent of a pragmatic account of 
modality. In fact, indeterminacy is directly related to the notion of subjectivity here 
since the area within which an interpretation of a modal expression is seen to 
manoeuvre is essentially an indeterminate area. And this is evident at more than one 
level. Indeterminacy is present in determining the sense in which a modal is used (Le. 
epistemic or deontic), the degree of strength of the modal (i.e. authority of the 
speaker) and degree of subjectivity reflected in the use of the modal expression (Le. 
the explicit or implicit interference of the speaker). 
, As a result, when accounting for modality from a pragmatic point of view, we 
are in effect looking at a three-dimensional continuum, and both subjectivity and 
indeterminacy are evident in each of these dimensions: in the sense of the modal, in 
terms of degrees of strength, and of degrees of subjectivity. This means that the three 
scales that make up this practical continuum, the last two of which correspond with 
Halliday's (1985: 336,337) "orientations" and "values" to modality, are: 
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1) an epistemic - deontic scale, 
2) a weak - strongS scale and 
3) a subjective - objective scale. 
The first of these scales targets the two main systems of modality, thus 
reflecting the speaker/writer's type of involvement in an utterance. The second two 
sets are essentially indicative of the speaker/writer's degree of involvement and 
therefore authority in an utterance, both in terms of degrees of strength and 
subjectivity. As a result and for practical purposes, the most efficient way of fitting 
.-
these variables in a framework is through the use of two continua reflecting the two 
types of modal involvement - the two main senses of modality (epistemic and 
deontic). 
Under the epistemic system, the continuum reflecting degrees of certainty 
would include such modal notions as possibility, probability, necessity, prediction, 
certainty (as well as other epistemic notions) ranging from the lowest to the highest 
degrees. However, even at this level of generality, it is not always accurate or 
straightforward to map each modal expression used in the upcoming texts to one area 
of meaning listed above. There will still be areas of meaning which overlap, and 
therefore, the most appropriate branches of epistemic modality which reflects the 
degrees of certainty on that scale are best captured by Halliday's (1985: 337) three 
values: low, median and high. This can be exemplified by the utterances below. 
5 Here deciding on the weakness and strength of the modal are made in terms of degrees of authority 
communicated through the use of the modal expression. 
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The Scales of Epistemic Modality (Degrees of Certainty) 
That may, might, could be the postman low 
That should be the postman median 
That must, will be the postman high 
That is the postman factuality 
The degree of certainty reflected in the use of a modal expression would 
correspond to its level of placement on the epistemic scale. The lower the speaker's 
degree of certainty, the lower level of authority s/he displays and visa versa. This 
seems highly logical since knowledge can be equated with authority and 
consequently, with power. In that light, the continuum representing the epistemic 
scale would reflect these varying degree of certainty from low, through median and 
high, all the way to factuality. Between these values are a number of arrows and these 
are meant to emphasise the continuity, lack of boundaries as well as possible 
variations in interpreting modals among different readers. This opens the door for the 
possibility that the same modal might be interpreted as falling under one or another 
category, somewhere between the two or as part of both. Again, with the subjective-
objective scale, there is a possibility that an expression be placed closer to one or the 
other end by different readers. 





Under the deontic system, on the other hand, the scale of obligation would 
include such notions ranging from permission to command including duty, obligation. 
insistence (as well as other deontic notions). Again, these reflect Halliday's low, 
median and high values to modality as exemplified in the following utterances. 
The Scales of Deontic Modality (Degrees of Obligation) 
You may, can leave low 
You should leave median 
-You must, will leave high 
Leave command 
Here too the lower end of the scale corresponds with the weaker level of 
authority while the upper end with the stronger one. In this case, it is the degree of 
obligation associated with the use of a modal expression which reflects the authority 
of the speaker on the deontic scale. 




One central point to clarify in light of the modal categorisation proposed 
above is how this categorisation is considered pragmatic rather than purely semantic. 
Initially, it is not a semantic in the traditional sense (monosemantic or polysemantic) 
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in that no specific meanings are attached to specific modals. The only 'meanings' 
attached to modals reflect the division between epistemic and deontic modality, and 
that is more a functional rather than a semantic one. Moreover, any 'meaning' 
attached to modals is dependent on the context in which it is used. It is in fact an 
interpretation of a specific modal in a specific context, both linguistic and 
extralinguistic. This is the other dimension to the pragmatic nature of the modal 
categorisation proposed: the involvement of a hearer/reader in the process of 
interpretation of a specific use of a modal in a unique linguistic and situational 
context. 
Looking at these two continua then, the next point to clarify concerns the 
relationship between the subjective-objective scale and the strong-weak scale. The 
question asked relates to whether there exists a direct and consistent relationship 
between either end of each scale. Attempting to answer this question, it is crucial to 
point out that the general tendency is to relate subjectivity and weakness (see Coates 
1983). Yet this is not always a clear-cut case as is evident in the dilemma Hodge and 
Kress (1993) face in their discussion of the difference between first, second and third 
person point of view. 
Hodge and Kress (1993: 92) argue that with I as subject, for instance, the 
, < 
utterance has "all the reliability of a first-hand claim". This makes its source or 
authority "absolutely clear, and if it seems less than certain that is because of doubts 
about the honesty of the speaker" (Hodge and Kress 1993: 92). With the third-person 
ronn, on the other hand, there is detachment from any particular speaker. Yet this 
distance and detachment give the utterance an impersonal force rather than making 
seem unreliable since its modality no longer depends on "an assessment of the 
reliability of its source" (Hodge and Kress 1993: 92). As a result, in comparison with 
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the first-person form which according to Hodge and Kress (1993: 92) is seen to limit 
the scope of the utterance, the "third-person form implies a neutral transmitter and ... 
is the form in which to present a statement as authoritative". 
Following this line of reasoning, Hodge and Kress (1993) seem to provide 
support for each end of the argument at the centre of which is the role, reliability and 
power status of the source of a proposition or proposal. Therefore, while it is a valid 
argument that the less overtly subjective a proposition is, the more impersonal and 
authoritative it seems, one can also argue for the other equally valid point where 
explicit subjective interference of a recognised authoritative source in a proposition 
would have a stronger effect than an implicit engagement of this source. In short, 
while authority is expressed in different manners (i.e. both in term of knowledge as 
well as power status), there is no one-to-one correspondence between each end of the 
scale from a pragmatic point of view. In line with the pragmatic nature of the 
proposed framework, it is crucial that every modal utterance be considered as a 
unique case in its context of use where context refers both to the immediate linguistic 
context as well as the context of situation in general. Interpretations should then be 
negotiated depending on the unique factors present in each case, where just as 
essential as the area of meaning covered by a modal is the power status of the source 
of that expression. Hence, approaching the subjective-objective issue in the pragmatic 
way suggested is essential to arrive at a functional-pragmatic interpretation of 
ideology. 
The final question concerns the practical potential of this framework for 
categorising modality in English in the light of the general objective for this 
functional-pragmatic categorisation: i.e. the analysis of ideology in discourse. As 
argued above, ideology and modality can be related based on the two notions 
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characteristic of both: subjectivity and indeterminacy. Therefore, the case pushed 
forward is that an analysis of modal expressions in English can give us insight as to 
the type and degree of involvement of a speaker/writer in his/her propositions and 
proposals. Depending on this information, categorising modalised expression in a text 
under these two continua would serve as the bases for providing a more accurate 
reading of the position(s) of the producer(s) of a text regarding specific areas of 
content. And depending on the speakers' positions, their worldviews at the ideological 
level concerning the issues communicated would emerge. 
This last point helps justify my inclusion of those expressions of "neutral 
modality" (Lyons 1977: 793) like factuality and commands in the continua. Although 
these expressions are epistemically and deontically "non-modal" (Lyons 1977: 793), 
the main reason for including them in the continua serves the main purpose of 
analysing ideology in a text. From that perspective, the absence of explicit modality 
does not render such expressions neutral on the ideological scale since they do 
express the speaker's highest degrees of certainty and/or obligation. In effect, not 
accounting for them would present an incomplete picture of the degrees of strength 
and subjectivity of the ideologies involved. And that is what renders this account 
more pragmatic rather than strictly semantic in nature since the goal is to see how 
different types of modalised utterances function in a variety of contexts of use in 
terms of strength and, consequently, ideological effects. 
As a result, analysing ideology through an analysis of modality in discourse 
starts from an isolation of modalised expressions in a text and grouping them under 
the two continua. These groupings would reflect several characteristics of the 
framework used. They should therefore be primarily based on an interpretation of 
each modal expression within the context of the utterance, both the immediate 
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linguistic context as well as background information. Moreover, they should reflect a 
serious and practical consideration the role of the producer of the text (the source) in 
tenns of his/her social power/status. In this sense, modalised utterances will be 
grouped under specific or a number of categories based on the way they interact with 
the relevant variables in that specific linguistic and extralinguistic context. Finally, 
these groupings should display the framework's pragmatic flexibility in allowing for 
possible variability in interpretation, i.e. the interpretive role of the reader. 
Consequently, at the practical level, the proposed analyses will proceed in the 
following manner. First, both modalised and non-modalised expressions in each text 
are isolated and grouped under the more appropriate categories within each 
continuum. Deciding on what constitutes an 'utterance' is dependent on the function 
of modality in one specific utterance in relation to preceding and following ones. This 
means that the length of an utterance may vary from a string of clauses with no 
change in the type and degree of modal involvement to a subsection of a clause where 
modal involvement varies in each of these subsections. 
Secondly, based on the clustering of modality under each continuum 
(epistemic/deontic) as well as under a general area of strength and subjectivity, the 
type of speaker/writer involvement we well as the degree of that involvement in 
his/her proposition/proposal becomes clearer. ~ A s s discussed above, this grouping will 
involve an analysis and interpretation of each modal utterance in light of the linguistic 
and extralinguistic context with special emphasis on the role of the producer of the 
text and hislher power status. And this serves as the basis for clarifying the producers' 
ideological positions regarding the issues involved which is originally overshadowed 
by the possible ambiguities usually associated with the use of modality. In short, the 
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systematic, more inclusive reading of modality is what provides an overview 
concerning the ideologies communicated. 
4.7 Conclusions and Implications 
In this chapter, the main objective was to provide functional-pragmatic 
account of modality which had practical potential. Its main purpose would be to relate 
modality to ideology in analysing discourse in order to bring to surface the 
underlying, possibly inconsistent, ideological affiliations and positions of producers 
of texts. This task was seen as feasible only in the light of functional-pragmatic 
criteria which are both inclusive and systematic. In that, the account would comprise 
different manifestations of modality (not just modal auxiliary verbs) in a systematic 
way to help provide a systematic analysis. The suggested criteria were named as 
subjectivity and indeterminacy, and these essentially pragmatic criteria were seen to 
provide the bases for modal categorisation which not only has practical potential, but 
is specifically targeted at areas which help the analysis of ideology in discourse. 
After reviewing the two directly related accounts of modality put forward by 
Halliday (1985) and Simpson (1993), the parameters of the framework proposed in 
this chapter were set. A key feature was the use of a continuum in order to ensure the 
functional-pragmatic bases of the proposed account. More specifically, a three 
dimensional continuum, which included an epistemic - deontic scale, a weak - strong 
scale and a subjective - objective scale, was proposed in order to account for possible 
variation in interpretation by the reader. Consequently, placing modals on a 
continuum means a consideration of not only the type of meaning covered by a 
modal, but also the degree of strength and subjectivity reflected by its use within each 
specific context of use. This would ultimately be related to ideology in that the type 
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and degree of involvement a speaker has in what s/he says reflects a position, an 
attitude towards the ideas communicated and towards the participants involved in that 
discourse. In short, it reflects the speaker's worldview at the ideological level. 
Following from that, the main direction in which this thesis will next proceed 
is based on the findings and arguments of the previous four chapters. In the light of 
the view of discourse adopted in this thesis, the plan in the next three chapters is to 
present practical analyses of modality and ideology in six instances of discourse 
which traditionally fall under three different genres. The rationale behind doing that is 
twofold. First, it is to support the view argued for earlier - that all instances of 
discourse can be approached in essentially the same manner for this very specific 
purpose in critical analysis. Second, it is to reveal the different ideological affiliations 
(political, racist, religious, ethical, economic etc.) of the speakers/writers of these 
texts. 
More specifically, the next three chapters target literary discourse, political 
discourse and scientific discourse for the following reasons. The choice of these 
genres is meant to highlight the different objectives usually associated with their use. 
While political discourse is usually expected to have an explicit ideological agenda, 
literary discourse is expected to be only implicitly ideological while scientific 
L 
discourse explicitly non-ideological. Therefore, the goal in analysing these three 
different types of discourse emphasises both the different underlying ideological bases 
for these texts as well as the significance of using modality to analyse these ideologies 
no matter how different texts are. 
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V Modality, Ideology and Literary Discourse 
5.1 Introduction: Literature and Literary Discourse 
The objectives of the second chapter were essentially to describe and analyse 
the associations and interactions among a set of traditionally controversial terms: 
literary language and non-literary language, style and stylistics, ideology and 
discourse. There, it was argued and concluded that literature did not constitute a 
special type of discourse since it is subject to the same linguistic and social 
determinants as any other type of discourse. Therefore, and in line with the aims of 
this thesis, if we are to approach literary discourse from a critical perspecti ve, then 
this means that the area of focus is not as much the aesthetic features of a text but 
rather its ideological aspects. In other words, as long as a text (literary or non-literary) 
addresses ideological concerns, and as long as the primary objective of analysing it is 
to explore the ideological implications of that text within a social setting, no unique 
approaches which specifically target literary discourse as opposed to non-literary 
discourse can be justified. 
These basic assumptions fall in line with the guiding view adopted in this 
thesis, that all texts are essentially ideological. In effect, the extent to which texts may 
vary on the ideological scale relates to differences in both the levels of ideological 
commitment and to the degrees of explicitness of this commitment. As argued in 
Chapter Four, modality is seen as a basic linguistic tool which, in line with their 
ideological stance, language users can resort to in order to reflect, refract or totally 
obscure their views and attitudes. It can be utilised by the text producer6 in order to 
6 Of course, the level of consciousness suggested here is not characteristic of all text producers. 
Nevertheless, modality still performs the function stated. 
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help finely adjust and attune those various degrees of ideological involvement and 
explicitness. At the same time, it was suggested that a systematic reading of modality 
has the potential of providing insight into ideological twists in discourse by helping 
point out some of these inconsistencies. In other words, modality can serve the 
requirements and objectives of both text producers and receivers and is a valuable tool 
for the analysis of ideology. 
Until now, all the above arguments were kept at the theoretical level. This 
chapter, however, aims to provide a practical examination of how modality and 
-ideology interact with specific reference to two literary passages from Conrad's Heart 
of Darkness. The first objective of doing so is to present the first of three practical 
implementations of the theoretical issues discussed so far. The second objective is to 
show the workability of the approach proposed with what is unanimously 
acknowledged as a work of literature. And finally, the analysis aims at providing a 
reading of what is generally deemed as the ambiguous and/or dualistic ideological 
position of the main narrator in the novel, Marlow. All these are done through a 
pragmatic and systematic analysis of the way modality and ideology functionally 
interact in discourse. 
5.2 Texts and Backgrounds 
The texts selected for analysis are two excerpts from Heart of Darkness, a 
novel (or novella) written by Joseph Conrad at the tum of the twentieth century (in 
1902). The main incentives behind selecting Heart of Darkness are a) its content 
which, although fictional, addresses a set of highly controversial ideological issues of 
the time such as racism, colonialism, and imperialism, and b) the high level of 
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ambiguity involved in tackling these matters7• These two reasons make the novel 
particularly relevant and appropriate for the intended analysis. Indeed, the high level 
of ambiguity in the novel has sometimes led to conflicting opinions and 
interpretations of these controversial topics. Obviously, the analysis presented in this 
chapter does not aim at resolving the issue of ambiguity and presenting the 'correct' 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ~ ~ however, the claim made here is that the forthcoming analysis will 
shed light on at least some reasons behind this ambiguity, helping narrow the margin 
for misinterpretation. 
Before embarking on the analyses, however, it is essential to start by providing 
an overview of the historical, socio-economic background of the period. This serves 
as a prerequisite which helps clarify the underlying ideological setting of the novel. 
Moreover, it is crucial to briefly outline the range of available and conflicting 
interpretations in order to narrow down the key areas regarded by most critics as 
controversial. This ultimately helps illuminate the correlation between the central 
topics in this thesis: ideology and modality. 
5.2.1 The Victorian Period and the 'Fin de Siecle' 
The time-phase coinciding with the publication of Heart of Darkness in 1902 
~ ~
is that commonly referred to as the ''fin de siecle" (Ledger 1999: 217). Yet apart from 
its literal meaning ('the end of the century'), this was generally a period characterised 
by change and a rethinking of the previously unquestioned way of life. The fin de 
siecle signalled both the end to an era of unrivalled British supremacy as an 
imperialist power and all those matter-of-fact ways of life. It was the first step away 
1 In addition, what further motivates this project is argument that Conrad's use of language is highly 
conscious since English is his third language. This strongly suggests that ambiguity in Heart of 
Darkness is not merely an accident and is thus worth investigating. 
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from the preceding Victorian Age which covered the period between the 1830s and 
the 1880s. 
During the Victorian Age, Britain economically "ruled the world" since it 
exclusively dominated world marketplaces due to the large number of British colonies 
spread worldwide (Ledger 1999: 216). Moreover, that period was characterised by a 
prevailing set of beliefs, views and circumstances relating to the status and mission of 
imperialist Britain. These greatly influenced and were influenced by the way Britain 
(and to a large extent imperialist Europe) conducted its affairs in colonised countries. 
To begin with, there was a general positive attitude towards Britain's role as a 
coloniser. The dominant view of the time was that Britain's mission in Asia and 
Africa was similar to that which Rome fulfilled in Europe, "the greatest function 
which any Government can ever be called upon to discharge" (Childs 1999: 4-5). This 
elevated the status of the British endeavours all over the world to that of a civilising 
mission. The British Empire, it was believed, would bring a new era of "peace in 
which unity and good would spread over the world as in the best years of the Pax 
Romana" (Childs 1999: 4). 
Moreover, earlier British and European views concerning Africa had changed 
with the onset of the Victorian Age. According to early nineteenth century Romantics, 
Africa was considered to be a place of "innocence, a possibly Edenic, paradisiacal 
garden", a view which had served as a primary factor culminating in humane socio-
political positions such as the British abolition of slavery in 1833 (Childs 1999: 11). 
However, for the Victorians who followed in the 1830s, Africa became "a site of sin 
and cannibalism, a 'Dark Continent' of licence and barbarity, not innocence and 
Simplicity" (Childs 1999: 11). This view was perfectly compatible with the dominant 
religious moral ideologies of Puritanism with its "disquiet over sexuality, the body 
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and the uncivilised other" (Childs 1999: 11). This meant that one of the main 
objectives of Victorian's missions in these 'uncivilised' continents was, in Milton's 
(1643) words, "teaching nations how to live" (Childs 1999: 4). And this provided 
religious and moral justification to utilise all the means available (no matter how 
immoral they could be) to achieve this 'civilising' goal. 
In addition, advances in the fields of biological sciences had the deepest and 
the most pervasive effects on the way man perceived his "personal and historical 
destiny" (Watt 1979: 155), thus complementing the above view. In light of the 
development of Darwinism, ethnology and anthropology as well-established 
disciplines in the 1860s, these relatively new sciences further promoted the ideas of 
there being a "gulf between African and European" (Childs 1999: 11). Following that 
line of thought, Europeans would constitute the advanced race while the Africans 
were seen as being "arrested in the infancy of the species" (Childs 1999: 12). 
These studies ultimately led to the founding of 'practical Darwinism' by 
Francis Galton who argued that civilisation had been on the decline since it reached 
its climax of intellectual accomplishment represented by the Greeks. The historical 
end of that time of intellectual supremacy raised fear that the same fate was awaiting 
the "confident 'civilisation' of mid-Victorian Britain" with its ethos of progress and 
domination of the world (Ledger 1999: 219). In fact, the historical reality of how the 
Greeks civilisation died out and the similarity in what was almost imminent for 
Britain represented no less than a reversal to the course of nature, to the 'natural 
selection' of Darwinism. Hence, serving the call of nature provided the scientific 
justification for colonial practices. 
In line with the above arguments, the agenda for the future became quite 
obvious. Galton's "eugenics project" aimed at counter-reversing "the process of 'race' 
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degeneration" (Ledger 1999: 218), a scientific mission which also coincided with the 
religious puritan outlook regarding individual morality. In that, there were now even 
more imperative reasons for "widening the gap between civilised man and his animal 
antecedents" (Watt 1979: 156). Consequently, the traditional view of man's 
supremacy in the divine plan was reinforced with the idea that "an equivalently 
splendid status could be attained through the working-out of humanity's secular 
destiny" (Watt 1979: 156). Man was perhaps meant to actively find his way to the top 
of the evolutionary chain rather than just wait for changes to occur. This ultimately 
underlay and justified the ideology of colonial expansion. As Watt (1979: 156) 
adequately phrases it, "by occupying or controlling most of the globe, the European 
nations had demonstrated that they were the fittest to survive". Yet all this was on the 
verge of change by the end of the century - the fin de siecle - i.e. at the time when 
Heart of Darkness was written. 
During the writing of Heart of Darkness, according to Watt (1979: 161), it had 
become increasingly evident that the Victorian world order was collapsing. At the 
economic level, the prosperous years of the mid-Victorian age had come to an end in 
the 1880s as increasing competition from abroad meant that Britain no longer 
dominated world marketplaces with the ease which had been accomplished earlier in 
Victoria's reign. There were c.oncems as well as realisations that Britain was 
increasingly becoming "a parasitic rather than a competitive world economy, living 
off the remains of world monopoly" (Ledger 1999: 216-217). 
Furthermore, at the socio-politicallevel, the end of the nineteenth century 
witnessed the renaissance of the women's movement as well as the formation of the 
first tiny Marxist parties in England (Ledger 1999: 216). This, along with revelations 
of atrocities which began appearing in the British press from as early as 1888 (during 
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a period when "the population of Congo was decimated, perhaps halved") 
(Brantlinger 1999: 193), meant that the previously dominant and unchallenged view 
of the legitimacy of imperialist and colonialist endeavours became a less prominent 
and increasingly less convincing. In other words, changes in the economic, social and 
political status quo gave rise to what in my view was an inquisitive and doubtful 
attitude which was the seed for later challenging that status quo. 
In the midst of this transitional period, Conrad published Heart of Darkness. 
As is normally the case during intermediary, transitional periods, the looming changes 
in the dominant ways of life and ideas of the age were the roots for more questions 
and uncertainties. And this, in my view, is adequately reflected in Heart of Darkness. 
It is an ideology of uncertainty, a rethinking of unsatisfactory states of affair and an 
inquisitive search for alternatives. 
5.2.2 Conrad, Heart of Darkness and Ambiguity 
The greatest authors are rarely representative of the ideology of their period; they tend rather 
to expose its internal contradictions or the very partial nature of its capacity for dealing with 
the facts of experience. 
(Watt 1979: 147) 
As mentioned above, Heart of Darkness was published in Britain during the 
period directly following one characterised by absolute certainty in the civilising 
effects and legitimacy of imperialism in Europe. It was initially published serially in 
Blackwood's magazine in 1899, and this meant that the immediate audience were the 
subscribers to this magazines who, according to Parry (1983: 1), were at that time an 
upper-class, educated audience "still secure in the conviction that they were members 
of an invincible imperial power and a superior race" and for whom "colonial 
pOssessions appeared a natural extension of their own national boundaries". In short, 
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the novel was written in English and the immediate audience was British8• Yet 
although its setting was a geographical location which Britain was not directly 
involved in (i.e. Belgian Congo), the general topics of imperialism and colonialism 
addressed by Heart of Darkness were matters that Britain was quite familiar with. 
These were the same controversial issues which at that time were subject to scrutiny 
and serious rethinking. Briefly then, Heart of Darkness was written at a time 
characterised by change and uncertainty, addressing issues which were the subject to 
rethinking, to an audience still secure in a way of life which was, in fact, no longer 
accessihle. 
In this sense, Harris's (1999: 228) description of Heart of Darkness as "a 
frontier novel" is quite a representative one in that it reflects the mixed ideologies of 
that period of change. According to Harris (1999: 228), Conrad was more or less 
prophetically conscious of the changes in those times and therefore, of the task he was 
undertaking. And this is evident in a novel which is seen to anticipate "an original 
necessity for distortions in the statuses of appearance that [seemed] sacred and that 
cultures [took] for granted" [emphasis mine] (Harris 1999: 228). The indirectness and 
"distortions" in representing those mixed ideologies have indeed branded Heart of 
Darkness as one of the rriost ambiguous and controversial works of literature of that 
period giving rise to numerous, sometimes conflicting interpretations. Whether 
Conrad's ambiguous 'style' was seen as "his most praiseworthy quality", or a 
negative quality, "a means of obfuscation, allowing [Conrad] to mask his nihilism or 
to maintain contradictory values, or both" (Brantlinger 1999: 192), the fact remains 
that the large number of interpretations all arose from Conrad's indirectness and 
vagueness. This vagueness is evident at three main levels: 
8 This makes the background of Britain's Victorian time discussed earlier of more relevance than 
Belgium's although the incidents of the novel take place in Belgian Congo. 
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1) the framing and discrediting of narrators, 
2) the linguistic ambiguity of the novel and 
3) the symbolisms which the novel evokes. 
To begin with, the type and depth of narrator framing which the various tales 
are composed of and subject to are particularly complicated. Apart from the author, 
there is a first anonymous narrator who is the initial source of the narration. He 
describes the story of Marlow, who in tum narrates a story in which he as well as 
other participants are characters, characters who also occasionally narrate their own 
experiences. This is best illustrated in the following manner: 
Conrad [ First narrator [ Marlow (Nar) [ Marlow (Chr) and other characters] ] ]. 
In addition, each and every stage of narration is shrouded with a high degree 
of narratorial discreditation. According to Parry (1983: 26), just as the speech of the 
anonymous first narrator "discredits the authority of the opinions he advances, so does 
Marlow's narration draw attention to the lacunae and inconsistencies in his own 
outlook". In other words, the distance created through the levels of narratorial framing 
is not the only form of indirectness in advancing the content of the novel and the 
issues involved; there is also direct doubt in the authority of the two framing and 
therefore filtering narrators as signalled by their own words. 
Moreover, the language used in the novel, mainly at the semantic level, is also 
highly unspecific and, it seems, deliberately ambiguous. For instance, Marlow's 
deSCriptions of the geographical locations in the book are almost always extremely 
vague. He is always seen travelling along "a formless, featureless coast, as if still in 
the making" (Conrad 1902: 37). This apparent reluctance in being explicit and 
specific in describing situations is further reinforced by Marlow's joining of 
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disparities through his semantic choices. According to Parry (1983: 38-39) self-
contradictory phrases like "abominable satisfactions", "exalted degradation" and 
"diabolic love" also reflect Conrad's unorthodox ways and are seen as overt signs of 
the novel's "heterogeneous and incompatible meanings". Such patterns lie at the root 
of Conrad's ambiguous novel and partly justify the numerous and conflicting readings 
present. 
Finally, there is a high degree of vagueness in the symbolisms the novel 
evokes. As Parry (1983: 20) suggests, the title of Heart of Darkness can be seen to 
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signify "a geographical location, a metaphysical landscape and a theological 
category". Even more specific and traditionally straightforward symbolisms are quite 
elusive. For instance, the symbolic terms 'white' and 'light' are used both in the long-
established traditional sense to denote "truth, integrity, knowledge, decency and 
reason" (Parry 1983: 5) as well as, in a diametrically opposite sense in describing the 
clean white city of Brussels for instance which "is the place from where a rapacious 
colonialism is organised" and which serves as an emblem of avarice and an agent of 
corruption (Parry 1983: 20). 
Accordingly, the outcomes of all these levels of complication ultimately 
manifested themselves in an array of analyses of the novel and the issues which it 
addressed. These covered a wide area of interpretations ranging from those which 
considered the book as "an attack on imperialism, a parable about the construction of 
ethical values, a mythic descent into primal underworld" as well as those viewing it as 
"a night journey into the unconscious self and a spiritual voyage towards transcendent 
knowledge" (Parry 1983: 20). However, apart from this abundance in the number of 
readings, a more significant aspect (from the point of view of this thesis) is that some 
analyses of the ideological issues in the novel are in fact in total opposition with each 
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other. For instance, Heart of Darkness has been interpreted as an attack on 
imperialism by some critics (Watts 1983; Said 1993), a racist defence of imperialism 
by others (Achebe 1997), or a mixture of both by still a third group (Watt 1979; Parry 
1983). Ultimately, this disagreement in accounting for the ideological issues in the 
novel is attributed to the already discussed ambiguous style of Conrad. Hence, this 
ambiguity constitutes a central issue to address. 
The first step towards approaching that topic is, in my view, by clarifying 
some terminological mix up. After acknowledging the key role Conrad's ambiguous 
language played in the generation of these conflicting interpretations, it is imperative 
not to confuse 'complexity' or 'ambiguity' with 'inconsistency'. These are very 
distinct matters in that the presence of the first two notions does not necessarily imply 
the presence of the third. The main question to answer in the upcoming analyses then 
becomes the following: Is there any contradiction and inconsistency in ideological 
involvement of Marlow the narrator, for instance, or is his involvement merely 
ambiguous? If it is a matter of ambiguity, which is the view argued for in this chapter, 
then a systematic examination of modality should help clarify the 'ambiguous' and 
'complex' ideological positions of the character under study. If, on the other hand, it 
were a matter of inconsistency, then Marlow's dualistic position would emerge 
through the analysis. 
Of course, at the heart of the problem is the difficulty in determining whose 
point of view is responsible for what information or set of events. Addressing this 
issue is also vital because a prerequisite to determining the ideologies attributed to 
one or another character is deciding whose point of view is responsible for filtering 
these positions (Weber 1989: 95). This is directly related to the above question of 
consistency and ambiguity since an apparent inconsistency in a character's ideology 
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could simply be the result of two intermeshing points of view rather than the dualistic 
standpoint of one character's perspective. In short, the upcoming analyses will 
approach two texts from Heart of Darkness bearing in mind the questions raised 
above: 
1) whose point of view is responsible for the information (and by 
extension, the ideologies) presented, 
2) are the ideologies put forward inconsistent and contradictory or 
merely complex and ambiguous, and 
3) how does an examination of modality help clarify the ideological 
positions suggested? 
As a result, the plan in the next section is to start by locating the modalised 
expressions in the texts and grouping them under the two modal scales reflecting the 
two main types of modality (epistemic and deontic). In doing that, a clearer 
systematic view of the type and degree of involvement and authority expressed by the 
different speakers in reflecting their ideological stances is arrived at. As discussed in 
the preceding chapter, the presence of epistemic modality would reflect, in various 
degrees, the speaker's certainty in the truth-value of the proposition s/he makes and 
therefore his/her various degrees of epistemic authority in presenting information as 
factual or as doubtful. On the other hand, the presence of deontic modality reflects the 
speaker's level of (interpersonal) power in relation to other participants. These 
strengths in positions are in tum related to the force of the ideologies communicated 
in each text. 
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5.3 Texts and Analyses 
The two texts selected for analyses represent two different first encounters: a) 
between Marlow and Kurtz (text 1, see appendix 1), and b) between Marlow and the 
Intended (text 2B, see appendix 3). These are seen to demonstrate two very dissimilar 
interactions between modality and ideology. In comparison with each other, the first 
text is the more ambiguous one in terms of the directness in which the ideologies 
involved are communicated. In its depiction of Marlow's initial encounter with Kurtz, 
this first text suggests a possible contrast in Marlow's attitude towards Kurtz, on the 
one hand, and towards the natives, on the other, a feature which is worth investigation 
(see analysis below). At the face of it, the text seems to present a vague and 
inconsistent position adopted by Marlow towards both Kurtz and the nati ves. 
However, an analysis of the way modality functions in relation to the ideologies in the 
text helps produce a more coherent interpretation. 
In the second text, ambiguity is not a major issue. However, the high 
frequency of modalised expressions signals a possible internal ideological struggle 
within Marlow as well as an external one between Marlow and the Intended. And it is 
these ideological struggles that occupy the focal point of the second analysis. By 
paying particular attention to the w.ay modality functions, it becomes possible to 
provide a consistent reading and even a partial justification for some of Marlow's 
seemingly conflicting positions. Moreover, an analysis of modality reveals the 
dynamics of the power relations between the two characters highlighting the level of 
strength of each position and each character. In short, the main objective of the 
upcoming analyses is to show how a systematic analysis of modality does help clarify 
the dominant ideologies in a text irrespective of the level of ambiguity in that text. 
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5.3.1 Analysis 1 
Two general points emerge at the onset of this first analysis in relation to the 
nature of the text under investigation. Initially, the almost total absence of deontic 
modality in the text implies that only one area of modal meaning is the dominant one. 
Effectively, this means that the type of speaker involvement present relates almost 
exclusively to reflecting that speaker's various degrees of certainty in the truth-value 
of the propositions expressed and the events and states described. Secondly, a division 
in point of view between Marlow the narrator and Marlow the participant (character) 
becomes apparent in the text. Both the effects of this branching in point of view as 
well as the consequences of the dominance of epistemic modality are quite significant 
in relating the ideologies communicated in the text. These are explained in detail later 
in the analysis and indicated in the table below (see table 1). 
Overall, the main categories discussed in the analysis convey the speaker's 
different degrees of epistemic involvement. These respectively express the speaker's 
1) certainty and commitment to the truth of the propositions, 
2) lack of certainty and commitment to the truth of the propositions, and 
3) detachment from the source of the propositions9• 
The main division in the utterances grouped above seems to be almost 
exclusively between the highest and the lowest category on the episternic scale with 
the majority under the Factuality end. There are indeed very few utterances under the 
Median and High categories. Under the Factuality branch of the episternic scale are 
those utterances which reflect a categorical unmodalised certainty in the truth-value of 
the propositions and evaluations made. These emphasise the narrator's highest 
Q The utterances that signal this category are the underlined verb phrases under the factuality branch of 
the eplstemic scale. 
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degrees of epistemic force through his non-negotiable certainty in what he says. This 
forcefulness corresponds to the following three content areas: the natives and their 
actions (3, 23, 25), Kurtz's appearance and actions (5, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18,20,22) and 
Marlow's feelings and attitudes (6, 7, 12). 
Low Med 
4- .,. as if petrified 
8- ... as if to be at 
the mercy of that 
atrocious phantom -+-+ 
had been a 
dishonouring 
necessity. 
13- He looked at 
least seven feet long. 
16- It was as though 
an animated image 
of death carved out 
of old ivory had 
been shaking its 
hand with menaces -+-+ 
at a motionless 
crowd of men made 
of dark and 
glittering bronze. 
19- as though he 
had wanted to -+-+ 
swallow all the air, 
all the earth, all the 
men before him. 
24- '" and almost at 
the same time ... 
Table 1 representing Marlow's 
authority on a scale of certainty 
High Factuality 
1- The bushes shook, the grass swayed for a time, 
2- ... and then everything stood still in attentive immobility. 
3- The knot of men with the stretcher had stopped ... 
-+-+-+ -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
5. I saw the man on the stretcher sit up, lank and with an 
11- uplifted arm, above the shoulders of the bearers. 
Kurtz- 6- 'Let us hope that the man who can talk so well of love ... 
Kurtz- will find some particular reason to spare us this time,' I said. 
that 7- I resented bitterly the absurd danger of our situation ... 
means 9- I could not hear a sound, 
short in 10- ... but through my glasses I saw the thin arm extended 
German- commandingly, the lower jaw moving, the eyes of that 
don't it? apparition shining darkly far in its bony head that nodded 
with grotesque jerks. 
-+-+-+ 12- Well, the name was as true as everything else in his life-
and death. 
14- His covering had fallen off, and his body had emerged 
from it pitiful and appalling as from a winding sheet. 
+-+-+- 15- I could see the cage of his ribs all astir, the bones of his 
arm wavmg. 
-+-+-+ 17- I saw him open his mouth wide ... 
18- it gave him a weirdly voracious aspect, ... 
21- He 20- A deep voice reached me faintly. 
must 22- He fell back suddenly. 
have 23- The stretcher shook as the bearers staggered forward 
been 25- I noticed that the crowd of savages was vanishing 
shouting without any perceptible movement of retreat. 
< 
Yet even within that Factuality category, more than one attitude is projected. 
Starting with the simplest and briefest of all descriptions (relating to the natives), 
Marlow the narrator categorically describes them as "a knot of men" (3), "the bearers" 
(23) as well as "the crowd of savages" (25). These illustrations can carry more than 
one interpretation. On the one hand, they could suggest an overall negati \'c attitude 
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towards the natives through describing them as men with 'savage' characteristics and 
tendencies. Here, by highlighting the savagery of the Africans and by portraying them 
as lacking in civilisation, Marlow indirectly emphasises the contrasting civilising 
power of imperialism. This juxtaposition encourages the reading that Marlow's 
negative attitude towards the natives portrays him as a sympathiser with imperialism, 
indirectly justifying the imperialist mission. On the other hand, the other possible 
interpretation of these descriptions would be that highlighting Marlow's mixed 
attitude towards the natives. In describing them as both 'men' and 'savages', Marlow 
simultaneously endows them with human and subhuman qualities. This would 
ultimately present Marlow either as the self-contradicting narrator or one projecting a 
dualistic attitude. Yet, as argued later, neither of these problematic views represents 
the reading arrived at through a comprehensive analysis of the way modality and 
ideology interacts in the text. 
Again, similar potential inconsistencies reflect Marlow's representation of 
Kurtz. On the one hand, Kurtz is described as the "lank" "man on the stretcher" who 
is seen by Marlow to "sit up" with his arm "uplifted" probably in order to halt the 
movements of his bearers. Marlow's initial classing of Kurtz as a "man" is also 
reinforced by the other complementary images also placed under the Factuality end of 
the epistemic scale, thus reflecting Marlow's extreme certainty. These essentially 
recount all the components Kurtz the man is made of (arms, jaws, eyes, head, a body, 
rib cage, bones and a mouth) as well as a set of human-like dynamic movements and 
behaviours (Kurtz is a "man who can talk so well of love", he sits up, talks, extends 
his arm, moves his jaw, nods his head, waves his arm and opens his mouth). In short, 
two main area of focus in Marlow's categorical descriptions are the actil'e and 
manlike qualities of Kurtz. 
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On the other hand, there are some actions surrounding Kurtz which portray 
him as an inactive, lethargic character. For instance, Kurtz's covering falls off and his 
body emerges from it without any attempt on his behalf to hold the cover. Also, Kurtz 
is seen to fall back suddenly, an action which also stresses Kurtz's inability to control 
his movements. And finally, even some of the more active human-like performances 
by Kurtz are rendered inactive through emphasising an alternative point of view. For 
instance, the act of shouting is not directly attributed to Kurtz since the dominant 
point of view is that of Marlow's ("a deep voice reached me faintly") (20). 
-Yet one consistent and indisputably clear set of evaluations and categorical 
descriptions is that relating to the malicious and negative nature of Kurtz and his 
actions. Kurtz's eyes shine "darkly", his head nods "with grotesque jerks" and his 
body emerges "pitiful and appalling" (10, 14). Such evaluations culminate with 
Marlow's portrayal of Kurtz as an "atrocious phantom 10" (8) which deprives him of 
the human characteristics previously endowed with. This is further emphasised by 
Marlow's assessment of the situation that Kurtz inflicts upon him as not only 
'dangerous' but also "absurd" thus deserving Marlow's expression of 'bitter' 
'resentment' (7). 
One possible interpretation for these mixed views is the following. In 
describing Kurtz as non-human, Marlow is asserting his negative attitude towards 
Kurtz, his actions and all the ideologies that he stands for. Yet at the same time, his 
reluctance to strip him completely of human characteristics reflects Marlow's stronger 
connection with Kurtz in contrast to that with the savage Africans. In this sense, it 
seems that although Marlow dislikes Kurtz, he indirectly acknowledges some sort of 
10 Here, the use of the epistemic modal phrase "as if' refers more to a lack of certainty in describing the 
situation as a necessity. Yet although it does not necessarily doubt the evaluation of Kurtz as an 
"atrocious phantom", the metaphorical nature of the utterance explains its placement under the lower 
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bond with him, possibly a biological bond which he does not share with the natives. 
The two issues in the balance become Marlow's disagreement with Kurtz's deeds, on 
the one hand, and his bond with him at the human level, on the other. As these two are 
weighed against each other, the outcome is the mixed, non-committed attitude by the 
narrator. 
All in all then, the picture drawn under the factuality branch of the epistemic 
scale relates to Marlow's utmost certainty in his evaluations of Kurtz as a man with 
all the active dynamic characteristics and components of a man, as well as his 
categorical evaluation of him as a non-human creature with inactive characteristics. 
Similarly, Marlow categorically describes the natives as "men" as well as "savages". 
In this sense, Marlow's attitude regarding Kurtz and the natives seems to be a struggle 
towards singularity in point of view. While Marlow cannot discount the human 
characteristics and qualities of Kurtz, he cannot but see his subhuman (or possibly his 
harmful superhuman) qualities and is therefore repulsed by him. Concurrently, his 
views of the natives seem to emphasise Marlow's dualistic position where, in seeing 
the natives simultaneously as men and savages, Marlow cannot disregard the savage 
subhuman nature of these, otherwise, human beings. This culminates in the only 
clearly unopposed attitude in the text: that of utter resentment of the situation as a 
whole. Such descriptions can only be interpreted as a suggestion of Marlow's 
dualistic position and lack of commitment to one consistent attitude. 
Under the other main category, the Low end of the epistemic scale, is a set of 
modalised utterances expressing the speaker's lowest degrees of certainty regarding 
the following areas: the natives and their feelings (4, 16), Kurtz's appearance and 
end of the epistemic scale with the arrows pointing towards the factuality end symbolising the strength 
of the evaluation. 
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actions (13,16,19,21) and Marlow's feelings (8,11)11. One significant point to note 
is that the uncertainty in most of these utterances is coupled with, and partly springs 
from, their metaphorical nature. In other words, since the relationship of similarity 
between the two compared areas is not a direct one, the evaluations and descriptions 
are not literal ones, making the position of the speaker lower on the scale of certainty. 
These expressions are signalled by the use of the modal expression "as if' and "as 
though". However despite their indirectness, the argument made here is that these 
expressions still serve the purpose of reflecting the speaker's attitudes towards and 
evaluations of the issues involved. 
Starting with the non-metaphorical modalised expressions, the first example 
(4) indicates Marlow's doubt in his judgement that the men were indeed "petrified". 
Although the strength of Marlow's position on the scale of certainty is relatively low, 
being unsure of the feelings of another entity is nothing unusual. In fact, rather than 
undermining the narrator's power of knowledge, this uncertainty only emphasises his 
credibility as a faithful reporter of events. In a similar fashion, Marlow seems to 
exaggerate Kurtz's height by describing him as "[looking] at least seven feet long" 
(13). Again, in reflecting the narrator's uncertainty of the height of Kurtz when this 
height is an exaggerated one, the modality in this utterance also seems to serve the 
purpose of making the speaker more reliable and stronger. Indeed, being categorical 
with such a description would achieve the opposite effect: that of shedding doubt on 
the credibility of the speaker since it is highly unlikely that Kurtz is in fact at least 
seven feet tall especially seen from that distance. At the same time, this exaggeration 
allows for the extra dimension of interpretation. It suggests the non-human 
characteristics of Kurtz through depicting him as someone with abnormal height. In 
11 The italicised numbers reflect the utterances falling under the High category of the epistemic scale. 
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other words, the use of the modalised expression coupled with the use of exaggeration 
here serves the double purpose of presenting Marlow as a truthful reliable source 
while at the same time allowing his hinting at the non-human characteristics of Kurtz 
, 
thus revealing Marlow's attitude towards Kurtz. This interpretation falls perfectly in 
line with subsequent expressions. 
In the next set, modality is used as a tool in aiding a metaphorical description 
and evaluation of three successive situations. In its metaphorical use, modality is a 
tool facilitating the comparison of two objects or situations where the relationship of 
similarity is an implicit one. In its epistemic use, it signals the speaker's degree of 
involvement on a scale of certainty in the (metaphorical) judgements and evaluations 
he makes. 
The first utterance, ("as if to be at the mercy of that atrocious phantom had 
been a dishonouring necessity") (8), primarily underlines Marlow's doubt that the 
situation at hand is a necessity. Yet this utterance involves several evaluations. For 
instance, there is the metaphorical description of Kurtz as an "atrocious phantom". 
This picture is seen to signal an implicit relationship of similarity between Kurtz and 
the entity he is being compared to. Through doing that, I argue, the strength of 
Marlow's negative feelings towards Kurtz are accentuated since using a metaphorical 
utterance in this situation clusters and concentrates several layers of negative 
associations in extremely concise form. Such a metaphor evokes a set of negative 
associations far wider in referential (denotational and connotational) scope than can 
be expressed in the two words used. Some of the more obvious attributes linked with 
the word "phantom" in this context would be both the skeleton-thin features as well as 
the non-human ghostly associations. Yet there is also a set of negati ve symbolic 
references to the word "phantom" which are beyond this specific context, all of which 
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are evoked through the use of the metaphor. Together with the other evaluation of the 
situation as "dishonouring", Marlow's negative attitude towards Kurtz and the 
situation he is placed in are further intensified. 
Another issue is the area covered by the use of the modalised expression "as 
if'. In my view, the uncertainty of the modal expression "as if' relates more to the 
description of the situation as "dishonouring" and less to the description of Kurtz as 
"an atrocious phantom". In other words, Kurtz's portrayal as "an atrocious phantom" 
is stronger on the epistemic scale than Marlow's assessment of that situation as 
necessary. Hence, this utterance emphasises Marlow's categorical negative attitude 
towards Kurtz, his resentment of the situation he is in and his doubt in the necessity of 
the situation. This is indicated by the use of arrows signifying the movement of the 
utterance on the whole towards the stronger end of the epistemic scale thus reflecting 
the possible variation in interpreting the utterance as a stronger form of modality than 
it initially appears to be. 
The next two metaphorical utterances (16, 19) differ from the first one in that 
the modal expressions cover all levels of the situation described and evaluated. The 
utterance "It was as though an animated image of death carved out of old ivory had 
been shaking its hand with menaces at a motionless crowd of men made of dark and 
glittering bronze" suggests the following interpretation. To begin with, the 
metaphorical modalised utterance in this instance emphasises the reliability and 
credibility of Marlow, the source of the evaluation, while at the same time revealing 
Marlow's attitude towards Kurtz. In using a modalised expression, Marlow is further 
accentuating the non-literal metaphorical association between Kurtz and "an animated 
image of death". Yet at the same time, the correlation between Kurtz and "death" 
from the narrator's perspective highlights the latter's negative projected attitude. 
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Extending this line of argument to the other sections of the utterance, Marlow also 
seems to express doubt in some aspects of the "shaking [of the] hand" as well as some 
aspects of the "motionless crowd of men made of dark and glittering bronze". By 
focusing on the aspect of 'dynamism', placing these two in contrastive juxtaposition 
accentuates the differences between Kurtz and the natives from the narrator's 
perspective. This is reflected in Marlow's position of doubt concerning any dynamic 
characteristic of Kurtz which is juxtaposed with his doubt of the static nature of the 
men as 'motionless' and their idol-like composition 'made of dark and glittering 
bronze'. Here, in doubting Kurtz's dynamism and the natives' lack of dynamism, 
Marlow indirectly achieves the opposite effects; i.e. emphasising the staticness of 
Kurtz as opposed to the dynamism of the natives. 
Again, a similar interpretation can be conferred on utterance 19 ("as though he 
had wanted to swallow all the air, all the earth, all the men before him"). Here, the use 
of the metaphorical modalised expression also stresses the reliability of the source of 
this evaluation as well as the depiction of Kurtz's uncontrollably gluttonous desires. 
By extension, Kurtz is portrayed as a voracious character willing to do anything and 
everything to achieve his egotistical goals. 
In short, the utterances placed under the modalised categories of the epistemic 
scale seems to present a very consistent picture of Kurtz and the natives as opposed to 
those under the Factuality end of the scale. Yet despite this partial uniformity, the 
overall pictures drawn of Kurtz and of the natives in the text as a whole is still an 
incoherent one. While Kurtz is described by Marlow as a man with human 
characteristics, he is also portrayed as a non-human character. Again, he is seen both 
as an active dynamic character as well as an inactive one. Similarly, the natives 
appear to be represented as the activelinactive, men/savages. At this level of analysis, 
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it seems that Marlow is indeed presenting a self-contradictory dualistic standpoint 
regarding the issues at hand. It follows that his attitudes towards the ideological issues 
of colonialism and imperialism (symbolised by Kurtz) also waver from support and 
justification to resentment and repulsion. As argued above, being repelled from the 
savage natives while exhibiting an indirect bond with Kurtz (the man) suggests his 
acceptance of imperialism's civilising mission. At the same time, in portraying Kurtz 
as a non-human character who is less active than the natives suggests Marlow's 
comparative closeness to the natives and therefore his rejection of the need for 
imperialism. This is underlined by his resentment of the non-human, static Kurtz and 
his evil deeds. 
Yet this apparent discrepancy, I argue, only reflects the ambiguity in the text 
rather than the dualistic position of the narrator. Accounting for one additional 
structural pattern in the text within a slightly variant grouping of the utterances 
involved allows a clarification of the situation. As mentioned earlier, a third category 
can be highlighted in reflecting the speaker's involvement in the content of his 
discourse. This category is signalled by a conspicuously frequent structural pattern in 
this text: the first person singular pronoun'!' followed by a perception verb 'see, hear, 
and notice'; i.e. I + perception verb + embedded clause structure. 
The overwhelming frequency, and therefore foregrounding, of the structure 
under discussion can in my view achieve several effects in this context. Firstly, since 
the embedded clause serves as the grammatical object of the perception verb with'!, 
as the subject, the role of the grammatical subject of the embedded sentence becomes 
secondary in terms of the dominant point of view. For instance, in the utterance "I 
saw the man on the stretcher sit up", although "the man" is the grammatical subject of 
the verb "sit up", "the man" is head of the sentence serving as the grammatical object 
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of the verb "saw," the subject of which is "I". In other words, the dominant viewpoint 
is that of the entity to which the first person singular pronoun refers. Consequently, 
one of the possible effects of this structural recurrence is highlighting the perspective 
of the speaker (which at this level could be either Marlow the narrator or Marlow the 
character). 
Secondly, by subjectifying the source of these descriptions, a dominant 
interpretation of this repetition could be one of emphasis as to the realism of these 
events and the credibility of the speaker. Such emphasis arises from foregrounding 
structural patterns which link the percei ver of these events to their reporter. In that, 
the objective behind repeating the utterances "I saw" and "I heard" would be to 
possibly stress and ultimately persuade the narratees of the realism of the narrated 
events. And this is quite common in situations when the reported events are bizarre to 
a point where they require such repetitive weight to stress their realism. 
Finally, the third possible effect and interpretation that may arise out of this 
type of foregrounding is that of distance. The pattern discussed above could be seen 
to serve as a dividing line between the one doing the seeing and the one reporting it. 
Instead of directly describing the events in the following manner (the man on the 
stretcher sat up, his thin arm extended commandingly, the lower jaw moving, the eyes 
of that apparition shining darkly far in its bony head that nodded with grotesque jerks, 
the cage of his ribs all astir, the bones of his arm waving, he opened his mouth wide, 
the crowd of savages was vanishing without any perceptible movement of retreat), 
there is an insertion of the first person pronoun and a perception verb making the 
involvement of the narrator more explicit. 
Looking at the utterances under discussion within the context of situation, the 
next step is to query the most probable justification for this structural shift. This signal 
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to an explicit and direct narrator involvement through the shift from the objective 
realism of third-person narration to first-person narration makes Marlow (the narrator) 
the explicit and undisputed centre of focalisation. 
Yet the set of events and evaluations reported as part of this structure do not 
reflect any unusual situation. These are merely seen to refer to the human actions of 
Kurtz, a weak and thin man, and to a group natives labelled as savages. In short, there 
are no inconceivable peculiarities about the events described which justify such 
consistent and persistent emphasis. 
It therefore follows that the most convincing interpretation for the possible 
effects of the recurrence of the "I saw" and "I heard" pattern would be to underline 
the split in point of view between Marlow the narrator and Marlow the character. 
Doing that would emphasise the faithfulness of Marlow the narrator in truthfully 
reporting what Marlow the character witnessed without committing himself 
ideologically (as a narrator). The direct interference of the narrator shifts the centre of 
focalisation, redirecting the reference of the act of perception from the here/now of 
Marlow the narrator to the there/then of Marlow the character. In that, by highlighting 
the role of the character who does the seeing, the narrator is emphasising the 
detachment between the person doing the seeing and the one reporting the seeing . 
. 
Knowing that all of these utterances only describe Kurtz as a "man" doing actions that 
are characteristic of human beings, I would argue that Marlow the narrator wishes to 
express his detachment at the ideological level from Marlow the character seeing 
Kurtz as human in any fonn. In that light, a more consistent reading of the text 
emerges. 
These three groups of utterances draw an extremely unifonn image reflecting 
the narrator's standpoint. His attitude towards Kurtz is clarified as that expressing his 
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highest degree of categorical certainty in seeing Kurtz as inhuman, doubt in his 
humanity, and detachment from anyone (including himself at an earlier time) 
regarding Kurtz as human. At the same time, while Marlow (the narrator) is certain of 
Kurtz's inactivity, he is uncertain of his activity and detached from Marlow (the 
character) perceiving Kurtz as active. The narrator's attitude can be clearly 
summarised as that of 'bitter resentment' of the situation (an 'absurdly dangerous' and 
"dishonouring" situation) which someone or something (a "phantom") as "atrocious", 
'pitiful', and "appalling" as Kurtz, sOI?eone as incapable of any action (apart from 
evil deeds) as Kurtz, someone not even once described categorically as a "man" is 
putting him through. 
This now apparent reluctance in categorically describing Kurtz as a man is 
contrasted by Marlow's descriptions of the natives as "men". Again, although 
described a lot less often than Kurtz is, a similar uniformity in views is highlighted in 
the form of the narrator's certainty of the natives' activity and his uncertainty in their 
inactivity ("motionless" crowd of men). Concurrently, the narrator is emphatically 
portraying the natives as active men while detaching himself from the view 
suggesting their inactivity and savagery. 
By clarifying these binary divisions, Marlow's ideological positions become 
more obvious. On the one hand, Marlow's extremely negative attitude towards Kurtz, 
at all the possible levels, represents his rejection of, or at least his distance from, the 
imperial mission that Kurtz stands for. On the other hand, his positive attitude towards 
the natives reflects his closeness and sympathy towards their ordeal which is largely 
due to and arising from the imposition(s) of the colonial world. As argued earlier, 
Marlow's ambiguous position neither represents an inconsistent nor a dualistic one. 
And this reading was possible only after considerable pragmatic-functional analysis of 
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the system of modality in the text and how it functions in relation to the ideologies in 
that text. 
5.3.2 Analysis 2 
In the above analysis, the targets of examination were the implicitness and 
ambiguities of ideologies in text 1. In the following text, however, the effects of the 
high frequency of modalised expressions do not extensively correspond with 
ambiguity in interpretation. Rather, they signal the ideological struggles and the 
dynamics of the power relations between the two participants in the text. As a result, 
the target of the upcoming analysis relates to the role modality plays in reflecting the 
dynamics of the interaction between the two participants and how that largely 
determines the ideological positions of each participant. 
As mentioned earlier, there are two main conflicting ideological positions: the 
first surfaces through the dialogue between Marlow and the Intended (text 2A, see 
appendix 2), while the other is reflected through Marlow's internal thoughts (text 2B, 
see appendix 3). These ideological disparities intermingle throughout the passage, yet 
for ease of analysis, the text is divided into two sections reflecting these main poles. 
Making this division is helpful from a practical perspective in that each section is 
respectively the closest pure representation of the Intended's and of Marlow's 
ideological positions. This ultimately makes the analysis of each text more consistent 
for later comparison and contrast. 
Starting with text 2A, and placing the modalised utterances under the 
epistemic and deontic scales, the following pictures emerge (see tables 2, 3,4, and 5). 
In tables 2 and 3 we see an extremely positive image of Kurtz drawn by his Intended 
and represented at the highest levels of authority (both certainty and obligation). This 
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image is not disputed by Marlow (in tables 4 and 5) although in text 2B, it is apparent 
that Marlow strongly disagrees with her. This raises a familiar question: why does 
Marlow not openly object or stop her when he shows his disapproval of what she is 
saying in 2B? Is, in other words, the absence of his explicit protest an indication of his 
dualistic position, an internal struggle of indecisiveness and lack of ideological 
affiliation, and does this explain his lie at the end of the text? This I argue can be 
better clarified by looking at the way modality reflects the power relations in the 
interaction between Marlow and the Intended. In my view, one of the main reasons 
for the manner by which the conversation proceeds is the uneven power relation 
between the two participants. This becomes quite explicit through analysing the use of 
modality in each of the participants' utterances. 
Generally, the Intended's words (see table 2) are seen to communicate the 
following information in the following manner. She expresses the highest degrees of 
certainty in portraying Kurtz as a "noble" and 'great' person whose "goodness shone 
in every act," who has immortal words, "vast plans" and who attracts "men by what is 
best in them". He is a man that one would be "proud" to be "worthy of', and she 
strongly believes that she knows Kurtz better than anyone else. All of these 
evaluations and descriptions of Kurtz are presented under the highest degree of 
certainty. From her p e r s p e ~ t i v e , , therefore, there is no dispute concerning these issues. 
Yet looking more closely at the factuality branch of the epistemic scale, it 
becomes apparent that the utterances grouped there generally fall into three main 
categories. First, there are those which relate to the Intended's highest degrees of 
certainty concerning what she knows and feels. Then there are others ~ h i c h h reflect 
her position towards what Kurtz wanted and how great he was. But most interestingly, 
there are utterances which strangely enough pertain to Joylarlow 's internal processes. 
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Low Median High 
10- I feel 3- it was 4- (it was 
I can imuossible imuossible 
speak to to know him not to} love 
you and not to him. 
26- I admire him. -+-+-+ 
could Was it? 15- who was 
not not his friend 
perhaps 9- you must who had 
under- have been heard him 
stand (his friend), sueak once? 
43- if he had -+-+-+ 
perhaps glven you 23- It is 
no one this and sent imuossible 




lost - that 

















near him to 
understand 
him the way I 
would have 
understood 
Table 2 representing the Intended's 
authority on a scale of certainty in 2A. 
Factuality 
-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
1- you knew him well 
2- you admired him 
5- no one knew him so well as I 
6- I had all his noble confidence 
7 - I knew him best 
8- you were his friend 
-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
11- you who have heard his last word 
12- I have been worthy of him 
13- I am proud to know I understood him better than 
anyone on earth 
14- he told me so himself 
16- he drew men by what was best in them 
17 - it is the gift of the great 
18- you have heard him 
19- you know 
20- what a loss to me - to us! To the world. 
21- I have been happy ... and now I'm unhappy for life 
22- nothing remains but memory 
24- you know what vast plans he had 
25- I knew of them too 
27- others know of them 
29- his words at least have not died 
30- men looked up to him 
31- his goodness shone in every act 
-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
32- but I do not. 
33- I cannot believe. I cannot believe [that I shall never see 
him again, that nobody will see him again] 
34- he died as he lived 
35- and I was not with him 
36- I believed in him more than ... 
37- he needed me 
-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
39- I have mourned so long in silence 
40- you were with him- to the last? 
41- I think of his loneliness 
45- I loved him - I loved him - I loved him 
46- I knew it 
47- I was sure 
The most curious examples of the third set are the following categorical 
statements: "you knew him well" (l) and "and you admired him" (2). Normally, the 
unmarked syntactic structure for such utterances would be the interrogati \'c and not 
the declarative form since the Intended only assumes that this information is true 
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(which in fact are incorrect assumptions). However, using the interrogative structure 
would portray her as someone lacking in knowledge which considerably weakens her 
position. This, of course, does not correspond with the overall objectives of her 
mission which, I argue, seem to be more a matter of seeking confirmations of her 
views rather than a matter of authentic enquiry. The forcefulness and power of her 
positions spring from her certainty that she knows everything related to Kurtz. 
Therefore, in order to ensure that the outcome of that enquiry falls in line with her 
expectations, the Intended asks using statements. Even when Marlow's reply is 
probably a hesitant one ("it was impossible not to ... "), she gladly completes his 
statements with what she wants to hear (" ... love him"). 
The strength of her position continues even with utterances of non-factuality. 
She is quite certain about what she would have done if she had been given the chance 
to. Utterances like, "I would have treasured every sigh ... " and "I would have 
understood him", I argue, carry the force of a conditional but unfulfilled prediction, 
thus falling under the High end of the epistemic scale. The fact that the conditions for 
the fulfilment of these statements were non-existent, and the fact that such 
conditionally-bound events did not happen as a result do not in any way undermine 
her certainty. In reality, the only reason that these utterances are not factual is that 
they did not happen and not that they lack the forcefulness or strength. This 
interpretation is reflected through the arrow movements which point towards the 
Factuality end of the scale. 
Moreover, other sets of utterances placed under the Median and High branches 
of the epistemic scale (and distinguished by underlining) are doubly forceful in that 
they allow for both a deontic and an epistemic interpretation. Even with some of the 
utterances grouped under the weaker Median category of the epistemic scale, the 
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Intended's approach to extracting infonnation fonn Marlow is still quite forceful. This 
is the case since many of these utterances are extensions of other unmodalised 
expressions. For example, the Intended starts with the factual utterances "you knew 
him well" (1) and "you admired him"(2) and then concludes with a sweeping 
generalisation linking the first to the second "it was impossible to know him and not 
to admire him" (3). She therefore constructs a necessary and sufficient condition 
between knowing him and admiring him, and later on, loving him. Such 
generalisations, I argue, set solid and specific nonns which indirectly place 
-
considerable pressure on the participants in that conversation to be integrated in that 
norm. 
However, the reason this relatively strong utterance is placed under the 
Median branch of the epistemic scale is the presence of the tag question "was it?" 
which indicates some degree of weakness on behalf of the speaker. It seems, 
therefore, that there are two forces working in opposition in this utterance: the almost 
categorical strength springing from the absence of possibility in the compatibility of 
the two conditions, and the relative uncertainty of the tag question. The outcome of 
these two non-complementary forces is represented by placing this utterance under 
the Median branch of the epistemic scale with the arrows going all the way to the 
Factuality end of the scale. The arrow movement signifies the strength of the 
Intended's utterances and position as well as allowing for an array of interpretations 
falling within the arrow's parameters. 
In fact, this example perfectly demonstrates the deficiency in assigning one 
definitive interpretation and position for the force of a modalised utterance. Here, this 
specific utterance exhibits two kinds of indetenninacyl2: that reflecting the type of 
12 The first kind of indeterminacy is tackled under the discussion of table 5. 
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speaker involvement on the epistemic-deontic scales, and that reflecting the degree of 
speaker involvement on the low-high end of each scale. Yet at the same time, this 
indeterminacy does not suggest that any sUbjective interpretation stands. There are 
limits on the degree of variation within the epistemic scale in that it is extremely hard 
to justify an interpretation which claims that this utterance communicates low 
modality. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the partial subjectivity which characterises 
interpreting such utterances reflects both the flexibility of subjective interpretation 
and the rigidity of contextual restrictions on this sUbjectivity. The interface between 
these two seemingl y opposing forces ensures the pragmatic nature of the approach in 
that there is room for a limited variation in the analysis of a text without distorting the 
overall picture (as becomes evident later). It also emphasises the view that the 
utterances under investigation acquire their effects from the contextually-bound 
functions they serve both at the communicative and ideological levels more than from 
the semantic correspondence of the modal expression used. 
A similar strength of effect is achieved by the rhetorical question, "who was 
not his friend who had heard him speak once?" (15). Again, although this utterance is 
placed under the High branch since it expresses a necessary-sufficient condition (if 
you had heard him speak once, then you were necessarily his friend), its strength 
seems to exceed that category as shown by the arrow movement. Like earlier 
expressions, this utterance seems to have the strength of a generic factual statement 
with the force of imposing what is considered as the norm. 
Finally, what the Intended feels the least confident about is her ability to speak 
to Marlow and her ability to understand Kurtz's vast and complicated plans. Here, the 
main cue for placing these utterances under the low modality branch is the presence of 
183 
the sensory verb "feel" and the evaluative adverb "perhaps". It is not the effect 
achieved by the auxiliary "can" since can of ability does not reflect any form of 
uncertainty and is therefore not treated as an epistemic modal verb. This view 
explains the reason the utterance "I cannot believe that I shall never see him again ... " 
(33) is placed under factuality since it reflects the speaker's highest degree of 
certainty in her inability to accept the permanent absence of Kurtz. It follows that the 
Intended's attitude towards Kurtz remains quite positive and consistent even in those 
cases where she expresses the least certainty. These statements, I argue, do not 
-
contradict her overall position since her only doubt is towards her own ability to 
understand Kurtz's vast plans but not his character. In fact, these achieve the 
conforming effect of elevating Kurtz's status to that endowed with superior 
intelligence. 
These positions are consolidated and confirmed by looking at the way 
modalised utterances function under the deontic scale. Here, the Intended is not only 
forceful in presenting what she knows, but also in what she wants to know from 
Marlow and what she wants Marlow to know (see table 3). 
Low Med High 
1- it was imuossible to know him and not to admire him 
2- (it was imuossible not tOllove him 
3- I must speak 
5- who was not his friend who had heard him sueak once? 
6- it is imuossible that all this should be lost 
7- that such a life should be lost 
8- something must remain 
10- don't vou understand? 
Table 3 representing the Intended's 
authority on a scale of obligation in 2A. 
Command 
4- I want you to 
know 
-+-+-+-+ 
9- forgi ve me 
11- repeat them 
-+-+-+-+ 
The one threatening uncertainty she had earlier (doubting her ability to speak 
to Marlow), she immediately endorses with a subsequent expression of high neccssit) 
18.+ 
and self-obligation ("I must speak"), an obligation initiated by her love for Kurtz 
which drives her to impose it on Marlow rather than share it with him. The use of this 
structural formation as in "I must speak" (3) and in "I want you to know" (4) to 
communicate self-obligation and desire, is, I argue, the strongest pragmatically 
acceptable forms. The only stronger deontic forms would be the use of the 
pragmatically inappropriate imperative form such as "*speak ... " in reference to 
herself and "*know that ... " in reference to Marlow. The Intended is in fact utilising 
the most powerful means to express her views, and this is represented by the use of 
arrows for utterances 3 and 10 which move towards the Command end of the deontic 
scale. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, some of the utterances (the underlined ones) 
originally placed under the epistemic scale are also placed under the deontic scale. 
This results in an additional dimension of force being conferred upon these 
expressions. For instance, utterance (1) which has an almost generic force in its 
epistemic interpretation (knowing him necessarily meant that one admired him) can 
also carry deontic force in such an interpretation as (knowing him forced/obliged one 
to admire him). Most importantly, the blatant force of such statements is persistent 
irrespective of Marlow's position. As argued later, the power of the Intended's 
ideological position is transferred not to what Marlow says, but to what the Intended 
has made him say. 
The last set of forceful utterances, grouped under the High category of the 
deontic scale, relates to the Intended's refusal to accept the loss of all Kurtz's great 
life. These culminate with the utterance "something must remain" (8) whose deontic 
interpretation suggests her decision to actively ensure that something does indeed 
remain. The deontic interpretation of these utterances would emphasise the Intended's 
185 
resolution not to allow "all of this" (6) and "such a life" (7) to be 10st13, a position 
strong enough to have the force of not only obligation, but also insistence, almost a 
command. 
In short, the Intended's use of modality in her utterances only serves one 
purpose: the unconditional exaltation of Kurtz. All her words are an exclusive 
reflection of how noble a man she feels and knows Kurtz is, and how desolate she is 
for his loss. The overwhelming numbers of factual utterances and high epistemic and 
deontic modality also reflect how heroic she believes everyone else feels Kurtz is, and 
how they must feel (both necessity and obligation). In this, she is both consciously 
and unconsciously forcing her position on the only participant in the dialogue: 
Marlow. Ironically, her confidence is built on partial ignorance. Her certainty ("I 
knew it - I was sure") is based on a lie. 
Marlow's utterances in 2A therefore reflect his position as a passive recipient, 
or possibly someone who agrees with all the Intended says. However, as discussed 
above, the forceful nature of the Intended's discourse favours the view that Marlow's 
words reflect almost exactly what he is forced to say without any overt attempt for 
resistance. In his very limited words, overshadowed completely by the Intended's, he 
faithfully rehearses all she wants to hear. The only noticeable attempt for resistance is 
< 
in table 5 through the utterance "don't" (3). This indication of his desire for her to 
bring to a complete halt whatever she is doing, whether feeling sorry for Kurtz or 
simply talking about Kurtz the way she is, is the strongest suggestion of resistance. 
However, this utterance is unacknowledged, misinterpreted or simply unnoticed by 
the Intended. 
13 0 0 0 hObO 0 ) h 0 that °t would have The way I interpreted the use of the negatIve + permISSIon (or pro I , l t l O ~ ~ ere IS. I 
the same force as obligation. 'Not allowed to' would be interpreted as oblIged not to . 
186 
Low Med High 
4 it was 
impossible not to ... 
7- we shall always 
remember him 
8- his words will 
remain 
Table 4 representing Marlow's 
authority on a scale of certainty in 2A. 
Low Med 
Table 5 representing Marlow's 
Factuality 
1- intimacy grows quickly out there 
2- I knew him as well as it is possible for one man to know 
another 
3- he was a remarkable man 
5- you knew him best 
6- yes I know 
9- his end was in every way worthy of his life 
10- I heard his very last words 
11- the last word he pronounced was your name 
High Command 
1- it was impossible not to ... 3- don't 
2- his words will remain 
authority on a scale of obligation in 2A. 
In conclusion, the analysis of text 2A suggests the overwhelming strength of 
the Intended's discourse in comparison with Marlow's. By analysing the way 
modality is utilised by both speakers, the dominant role of the Intended in the 
dialogue becomes apparent, thus suggesting one possible explanation for why Marlow 
reacts the way he does. Through the high level of authority she has in what she says 
which is reflected in both uses of modality (i.e. her degree of certainty about her 
knowledge and beliefs on the one hand, and her power in communicating obligation 
and duty at the interpersonal level), she easily dominates the conversation, forcing her 
views on Marlow who in response seems to occupy the role of a passive recipient 
both through the quantity and quality of what he says. Moreover, the Intended's use of 
modality not only reflects her strong feelings of love and respect for Kurtz, but also 
her strong positions regarding what she believes Kurtz stands for, the ideologies he 
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represents. However, as discussed in detail in the next section, this does not suggest 
that Marlow accepts her views. 
In the second section of the text (2B), Marlow's views seem to be in direct 
opposition with those of the Intended's discussed above. Placing the utterances on the 
epistemic scale of certainty (since deontic modality is generally absent in 2B), the 
main division in the categorisation of these utterances seems to be between those 
reflecting the highest and lowest degrees of certainty. The following picture then 
emerges (see table 6). 
Looking at the factuality branch of the epistemic scale, it seems that Marlow is 
experiencing a set of conflicting feelings. On the one hand, he is repeatedly angered 
("appalling", "dull anger") by the Intended's forceful remarks which impel him into 
saying something he disagrees with and which cause him to feel the room growing 
darker and darker. On the other hand, her radiating "smooth" and "white" forehead 
"illuminated by an inextinguishable light of belief and love" together with her deep 
"pain" gives him an overwhelming "feeling of pity". Therefore, while he feels 
infuriated by her strong remarks, he cannot help but respectfully bow his "head before 
the faith that was in her". This mixed position portrays Marlow as someone on the 
verge of exhibiting a dualistic non-committed attitude: a simultaneous self-
contradictory acceptance and rejection, anger and pity towards an embodiment of a 
set of ideologies he is faced with. 
Yet these two potentially contradictory attitudes are not coexistent. In fact, 
arranging both (what he is certain of and what he is uncertain of) in chronological 
order, a very consistent interpretation emerges. Marlow seems to move from 
questioning what he is uncertain of to relying on what he is certain of and what he 
sees. When he entertains the thought that The Intended might actually know Kurtz the 
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way he does, it stirs a feeling of anger in him. When, however, Marlow is certain that 
she is ignorant of Kurtz's deeds, his anger turns to pity. The result is that he decides 
not to tell her the truth. Based on what he now knows and feels, he is able to predict 
his inability to defend her from the darkness that accompanies her possible knowledge 
of the truth. He lies. 
Comparing the Intended's way of communicating her ideas to Marlow's, two 
completely opposite senses which reflect completely different ways of viewing the 
world, or different ideologies emerge. The Intended appears to be totally dependent 
on her own internal interpretation of the way the world is as the source of reality. Her 
starting point is the certainty of her beliefs ("you knew him well", "you admired him", 
"you were his friend") and based on them, she makes assumptions about the external 
world. Her strategies to achieving her desired effects are the following. On the one 
hand, she starts by a generalisation ("it was impossible to know him and not to admire 
him") forcing her view of the world on others and then makes sure she has achieved 
her ,goal ("was itT'). On the other hand, she starts by making sure she has the consent 
of the other participant in the dialogue ("you must have been his friend if he had gi ven 
you this and sent you to me") and then generalises based on that consent ("who was 
not his friend who had heard his speak once?"). Both ways, the starting point is her 
own worldview and the final point is a forcing of her ideologies. It follows that in her 
mind, everything that Kurtz represented is noble in every sense. As Hawthorn (1990: 
182, 184) argues, the Intended plays the role of "the preserver of idealism" not 
knowing the effects of this "corrupting alliance with imperialism". All her 
conclusions are therefore based on simple ignorance. 
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Low Med High 
3-that seemed to watch 16-he 21-the 
for more words on my had triumphant 
lips gIven me darkness 
5-perhaps she did some from which I 
(know Kurtz) reason could not 
9-1 was not even sure I to infer have 
had given her the right that it defended 
bundle was his her 
10-1 rather suspect he Im- 22-from 
wanted me to take care patience which I 
of another batch of his of com- could not 
papers parative have even 
14-he wasn't rich poverty defended 
enough oI.something that myself 
15-and indeed I don't drove 24bof tears 
know whether he had him out that would 
been a pauper all his there not fall 
life 33-1 shall 
18-and the sound of her see his 
low voice seemed to eloquent 
have the phantom as 
accompaniment of all 43-don't long as I live 
the other sounds full of you hear -+-+-+ 
mystery, desolation, them? 34-1 shall 
and sorrow ... see her too a 
19-1 said with -+-+-+ tragic and 
something like despair familiar 
in my heart Shade 
26-her fair hair seemed resembling 
to catch all the another one, 
remaining light tragic also 
37-1 felt like a chill -+-+-+ and 
grip on my chest bedecked 
44-whisper that seemed with 
to swell menacingly powerless 
51-it seemed to me that charms 
the house would -+-+-+ 42-i was on 
collapse before I could the point of 
escape, that the heavens crying at her 
would fall upon my 56-i could 
head not tell her 
54-would they have 57-it would 
fallen if 1 had rendered -+-+-+ have been 
Kurtz that justice which too dark ... 
was his due 
Table 6 representing Marlow's authority 
on a scale of certainty in 2B. 
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Factuality 
I-I said unsteadily 
2-before the appealing fixity of her gaze 
4-she finished eagerly, silencing me into an 
appalling dumbness 
6-the room was growing darker and only her 
forehead, smooth and white remained illuminated 
by the inextinguishable light of belief and love 
7-1 listened 
8-the darkness deepened 
II-after his death, I saw the manager examining 
(the papers) 
12-the girl talked, easing her pain in the certitude of 
my sympathy 
13-1 had heard that her engagement with Kurtz had 
been disapproved by her people 
17 -she looked at me with intensity 
20-bowing my head before the faith that was in her, 
before the great and saving illusion that shone with 
an unearthly glow 
-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
23-she corrected herself with beautiful generosity 
24-1 could see the glitter in her eyes full of tears-
25-she stood up 
27-1 stood up too 
-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
28-she went on mournfully 
29-1 said hastily 
30-she put her arms out. .. 
31-never see him again! (irony) 
32-1 saw him clearly enough then 
35-said I, with dull anger stirring in me 
36-my anger subsided before a feeling of infinite 
pity 
38-1 said in a muffled voice 
39-1 said shakily 
40-1 stopped in a fright 
41-she murmured in a heart-broken tone 
45-she insisted 
. 
46-1 pulled myself together and spoke slowly 
47-1 heard a light sigh and my heart stood still, 
stopped dead short by an exulting and terrible cry 
of inconceivable triumph and unspeakable pain 
48-she knew, she was sure (irony) 
49-1 heard her weeping 
50-she had hidden her face in her hands 
52-but nothing happened 
53-the heavens do not fall for such a trifle 
55-hadn't he said he wanted only justice 
In Marlow's case, the opposite is true. While his position towards the Intended 
is reflected through the changes in his feelings, his position towards Kurtz is left 
unchanged. Just like the previous text, the descriptions associated with Kurtz and his 
deeds are either directly or metaphorically negative. However, Marlow neither forces 
his position on the Intended not is he forced to change his position towards Kurtz. 
This is evident since his audience on board of The Nellie (and by extension, the 
reader) knows that what he decides to tell the Intended is a lie. This last decision to lie 
is in direct relation with the preceding utterance "[rendering] Kurtz that justice which 
was his due" (54). His words "I could not tell her" (56) signal his inability (I was 
unable to tell her) or the impossibility (it was not possible for me to tell her) of the 
fulfilment of the act suggesting that telling her was beyond him. Overall, both 
interpretations reinforce Marlow's doubt that telling her would in fact achieve justice. 
At that point, justice was already lost. The Intended's knowledge of reality would not 
make Kurtz pay for his crimes. Only she will. 
5.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the main objective was to present the first of three practical 
applications of the. framework proposed in Chapter Four. The specific targets for 
analysis were two literary passages, and the aim was to show how, as long as literary 
texts address ideological issues (presupposing that all texts are ideological), these 
texts could be approached using this pragmatic-functional framework. 
Firstly, the dominant historical, social, scientific and religious ideologies of 
the period were considered. The aim was to set the ideological backgrounds against 
which or based on which the novel departs. The period was seen to be one of change 
and therefore the altering ideologies of the period were of considerable magnitude. It 
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was argued that these altering ideologies were adequately captured in the novel, and 
this partially explains the ambiguity in positions communicated in the texts. Unlike 
previous views that that altering ideologies imply a dualistic position and 
consequently an inconsistent ideology in the text, an analysis of the way modality is 
utilised in the two texts suggested otherwise. It was concluded that while the two texts 
were indeed ambiguous, these ambiguities were not seen as signs of duality or 
inconsistency in positions. By relating the way modality functions in association with 
ideology, it was seen that, in the first text, Marlow exhibited a highly consistent 
-position and attitude regarding characters and issues involved. His position towards 
Kurtz and what Kurtz symbolically stands for was seen as standing in stark contrast 
with his position towards the natives and what they represent. In fact, at one point, it 
was argued that Marlow even tries to distance himself as a narrator from an earlier 
image of himself as a character in the story he narrates. All this was seen to fall into 
one consistent reading of Marlow's positions at the ideological level. 
More specifically, in completely rejecting the image of Kurtz as human or 
active, Marlow points out the inhuman or subhuman qualities of imperial Europe and 
its inactivity and therefore inability to bring about the necessary positive change to 
Africa. It is a direct criticism of the inhumane imposition of western ideologies. At the 
same time, in portraying the natives as the direct contrast of Kurtz, i.e. human and 
active, Marlow emphasises his view that the West's imported ideologies have done 
nothing but hinder and obstruct life. And finally, by distancing himself from his early 
positions in his narrative, he achieves the same effect. 
In the second text, the analysis of modality again showed the independently 
consistent, though contrasting, ideologies of Marlow and the Intended. On the one 
hand, the Intended's strong use of deontic and epistemic modality was seen to reflect 
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her extremely strong authoritarian position regarding what she believes and what she 
wants everyone else to do in line with those beliefs. On the other hand, Marlow's 
thoughts and feelings concerning the issues argued for by the Intended and towards 
Kurtz reflected his utter rejection of the propositions made by her. The Intended's 
idealistic view of imperialism and her belief in 'the idea' behind Europe's actions in 
Africa were placed in direct opposition with Marlow's realism and knowledge of the 
negative outcome of Europe's intervention in Africa. Yet her extreme use of deontic 
and epistemic modality magnifies her forcefulness to a point where she is completely 
isolated from the reality that surrounds her. In that contrast between her false 
impression of the reality of the situations she refers to and Marlow's undeclared 
views, only a sense of irony remains. This reading, it is argued, emerged from a 
pragmatic and systematic analysis of the way modality functions with respect to 
ideology in 'literary' discourse. Consequently, the same is to be attempted with 
'political' and 'scientific' discourse in Chapters Six and Seven below. 
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VI Modality, Ideology and Political Discourse 
6.1 Introduction 
The central role that language has played in the evolution of political thought 
as well as the transmission of political agendas cannot be overemphasised. In fact, the 
relationship between language and politics has always, and especially more recently, 
been an openly targeted field of exploitation in political discourse. This is the case 
since the relationship is an essentially dialectical one in the sense that political 
doctrines develop alongside their terminological manifestations. Just as political 
ideas, particularly new ideas and positions, create a need and consequently give rise to 
labels whose task is to describe and popularise these views, it is these labels which 
eventually define, shape and restrict the scope of meaning and connotations of these 
ideas and views. Based on this dialectical relationship between language and politics, 
this chapter aims at examining the manner by which different ideological positions are 
reflected through a distinctive use of modality in two political speeches. 
6.2 Politics and Political Discourse 
The use of the word politics has undergone considerable change during 
different stages of the last century, mainly reflecting the various phases of political 
development and changes in the structure of society, its needs, requirements and 
ambitions. According to Hudson (1978: 1) for instance, in the early 20 th century 
during the times when Conservative views in Britain were "as natural as breathing 
and eating", Conservative politics "were not politics at all". In that sense, the use of 
the word politics was associated merely with the introduction of socialist ideas and 
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was therefore "almost synonymous with controversy and disturbance of the peace, a 
distasteful and antisocial activity, a piece of bad manners" (Hudson 1978: 1). 
Similarly, reflecting the moods of the early thirties in Europe, i.e. those of 
early Nazism, Fascism and Stalinism, Hudson (1978: 2) quotes the Oxford English 
Dictionary of 1933 which defined politics as "the science and art of government; the 
science dealing with the form, organisation, and administration of a state or part of 
one, and with the regulation of its relations with other states" as well as "the political 
principles, convictions, opinions or sympathies of a person or party". Here, the 
general connotations associated with the word politics are its organisational-
administrative potential and almost scientific status. This perfectly corresponds with 
the rising political figures as well as political ideologies and organisational tendencies 
of the age, namely those of Nazism and Fascism. 
In the early seventies, Roberts (1971: 222) defines politics as referring "both 
to an activity and to the study of that activity": 
As an activity, politics is the process in a social system - not necessarily confined to the level 
of the national state - by which the goals of that system are selected, ordered in terms of 
priority, both temporarily and concerning resource allocation, and implemented. It thus 
involves both co-operation and resolution of conflict by means of the exercise of political 
authority and if necessary coercion. 
Roberts (1971: 222) 
Here, the use of the word carried not only these organisational properties of politics, 
< 
but also the relationship between a ruling power (which can possibly be unjust as in 
the case of military dictatorships) and the ruled as a society. This too reflected the 
various political systems present by the seventies which varied between democracy 
through communism to military dictatorships. 
However, the one recurrent and common theme associated with the use of the 
term is the overwhelming negative connotations it conveys. This has been the case 
since the days of Plato who described politics as "nothing but corruption" and have 
195 
continued through the days of Jonathan Swife 4 and George Orwell, whose description 
of politics is that of "a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred and schizophrenia" (Beard 
2000: 4-5). In fact, it is these negative connotations that have fuelled the search for 
more adequate positive replacements (like 'statesman' instead of 'politician') in 
situations where a political figure is regarded with universal respect like in the case of 
Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, or Nelson Mandela (Beard 2000: 4-5). Yet one 
of the most representative and appealing words in Orwell's description of politics is 
the adjective "evasive" as it carries two suggestions: first, that the process of evasion 
is a conscious one, and second, if evasion were to succeed, it would have to open 
possibilities for a number of different interpretations. This matches any definition of 
the adjective evasive, which in fact is based on concepts like "generality", 
"imprecision" and "ambiguity". It is the area where politics and modality, as a 
specific aspect of language, go hand in hand particularly in the light of Halliday's 
(1985: 356) definition of one major section of modality as referring to "the area of 
meaning that lies between yes and no". 
The central implication of the above view is the value and effecti veness of 
modality as a linguistic tool in political discourse. Since language is a highly 
"committing medium" of communication (Fowler 1977: 76), one way for language 
users to be "evasive" within this "area of meaning between yes and no" (Halliday 
1985: 356) is by drawing on modalised expressions. Therefore, it is not in the least 
surprising to see a high dependence on, and I argue, a conscious utilisation of such 
expressions in political discourse. Yet the level of frequency of modalised expressions 
largely depends on an interaction among a set of factors. It depends on who is 
involved (who the addresser and addressee/s are), the power relations between them 
14 There was a period of time in the late 18 th-early 19 th centuries where t h ~ ~ term 'politick' also meant 
polite and tactful. In this sense, its negative connotations have not been unmterrupted. 
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(namely at the socio-political/economic level), the content of the political text and its 
objectives, the context of situation, etc. This means that no one-to-one relationship 
necessarily exists between all instances of political discourse and a high frequency of 
modal expressions. The utilisation of modality is an extremely delicate process and its 
overuse may have undesirable effects. This is precisely what I aim to show in my 
analysis: i.e. the effects of the use of modality on the ideological positions of two 
speakers in two political speeches. More precisely, it is how differences in the 
frequency, type of modal expressions, and degree of strength of these expressions 
between the two political speeches present two completely diverse ideological 
positions reflecting the ideological restrictions of the two different political parties 
and the demands of the two very different audiences. 
6.3 Texts and Political Backgrounds 
The texts chosen for analysis are two political speeches by George Bush (see 
Appendix 4), the current president of the United States of America, and Tony Blair 
(see Appendix 5), the current Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. These two 
speeches were both delivered on the i h of October 2001 following the historic 
terrorist attack on the Twin Towers buildings and the Pentagon in USA. Both 
essentially revolve around a very similar set of themes mainly announcing the 
beginning of the military strike against Afghanistan, the involvement of subsequent 
military forces, the objectives of the mission and the justness of the cause. Of course, 
each lays different degrees of emphasis on various sections and themes in the text, 
and this is what differentiates both speeches ideologically more than content-wise. 
However, although both address the same issue, the fact that Bush's speech 
preceded Blair's by a few hours signals the first explicit difference in content in that 
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while the first introduces novel infonnation, the second does not. Another difference 
relates mainly to the varying degrees in how directly each country is involved in the 
conflict. For instance, it is only common sense to argue that the USA is more directly 
involved in the incident since the terrorist attacks took place on US soil destroying US 
landmarks, financial centres and governmental buildings, and claiming more US 
citizens' lives than of any other nationality. Nonetheless, Blair portrays the UK as 
being just as directly affected by the terrorist attacks on the USA as the USA itself. 
The support for his position comes from the view that the death of British citizens in 
the attack makes the UK equally involved. My point is, however, that the urgency for 
military action and the power arising from that urgency are not the same for both 
countries since the directness of involvement is quite different, a view which needs to 
be acknowledged. 
Additionally, the two texts distinctly differ in audience and, consequently, the 
types of potential oppositions. In the light of the directness of involvement of the 
USA and the UK in the attacks, Blair faces potentially more dangerous ground to 
tread especially in the English Parliament in a country known for its outspokenness 
regarding such controversial and dangerous endeavours as partaking in a war. Finally, 
the most significant area of difference between the two texts is the distinct political 
background behind each. Bush is head of the Republican Party (a right wing party) in 
the USA while Blair is the leader of New Labour (a centre-left wing party) in the UK. 
The political and ideological foundations of these two parties have a dramatic effect 
on the content and underlying ideologies of each speech. This point is a central one 
and needs considerable elaboration since one of the main constraining factors in the 
content of each speech is the underlying ideology or ideologies behind these political 
parties which affect, restrict and even possibly dictate the policies reflected in each 
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speech. It is necessary, therefore, to start by presenting a brief description of the two 
concerned political parties in light of which the content of these speeches can be 
better understood and interpreted. 
6.3.1 The Republican Party 
Generally speaking, unlike their European counterparts which have "quite 
vivid public images based on class, regional, religious, linguistic, ethnic or ideological 
divisions", American political parties cover a "much narrower band of the ideological 
spectrum" (McKay 1997: 87). In that, they "appear non-ideological [and] 
organizationally weak" (McKay 1997: 87), a view supported by other political 
analysts such as Roche (1999: 8) who also argues that "the framers of the Constitution 
should be remembered less for their ideological commitment than for their political 
skills" . 
Yet by and large, The Republican Party has always been regarded as a 
traditionally right wing, more conservative party which came into existence in its 
opposition to monarchy (Miller 1987: 433) as well as opposition to "the extension of 
slavery in the territories" (McCarthy 1962: 136). Its very broad ideological bases are 
the two notions of liberty and virtue. By liberty, republicans mean both "private 
liberty - such as property rights", and "public liberty - the right of the people to have 
a collective say in government" (Mirrof et ai. 1998: 18). It is both "freedom from the 
arbitrary power of tyrants, together with the right of the citizens to run their common 
affairs by participating in government" (Miller 1987: 433). As for virtue, they mean 
"patriotism and public spirit", "the willingness of indi viduals to subordinate their 
private interests to the common good" (Miller 1987: 435,436). In this sense, virtue 
sUpersedes liberty as it is seen to act as some sort of self-control on liberty, since 
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liberty pushed to an extreme would inevitably lead to anarchy in the visions of the 
Republicans. Republicans therefore rely on a people "characterized by virtue, ... a 
passion for the public good superior to all private passions" (Mirrof et ai. 1998: 18, 
19). 
However, the main danger in the notion of liberty as an ideological basis for 
the republicans today is that it seems to lie in a constant state of tension with 
democracy. As Hofstadter (1999: 22) argues, liberty in the minds of the Founding 
Fathers "was linked not to democracy but to property". This is why the Republicans 
today are the party most interested in "defending free enterprise and corporate power" 
(McKay 1997:89) and least interested in "the active intervention of the government" 
to limit free enterprise (Aldrich 1995: 8). Ultimately, RepUblicans have sought 
support from those people who favoured these policies; i.e. the middle class and up, 
forging coalitions consisting mainly of "a religious/moral component (the 
fundamentalist Christian right) and an economiclideological component (the middle 
classes and supporters of a 'return' to free enterprise)" (McKay 1997:89). 
In short, these economic and religious routes are what constitute the 
ideological bases of the politics of the Republican Party today. At the economic level, 
and based on the concept of liberty, the Republican Party favours free enterprise, 
corporate power and the lack of government intervention. They seek a decentralised 
government to ensure more power to states and localities and therefore lower federal 
taxes. Finally, they encourage national isolationism by using a strong defensive 
military. At the religious level, the Republican notion of virtue is inextricably linked 
to traditional American Christianity, which was heavily influenced by Calvinist and 
Puritan ideals. This means that personal moral issues are of extreme importance, and 
in this sense, "punishment", for instance, is seen as the preferred alternative to 
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"rehabilitation" (Wilson 1998: 24). This is evident in Republican views on such 
'moral' issues like the death penalty (which they favour), abortion and homosexual 
marriages (which they oppose), etc. 
6.3.2 New Labour 
New Labour, on the other hand, is slightly less straightforward. Historically, it 
is based on a relatively recent set of political views labelled the "Third Way", a way 
which claims both to find a meeting ground between the left and right, as well as to 
transcend those classic divisions (Fairclough 2000: vi). However, the ideological 
affiliations and positions of New Labour are not that clear-cut, a situation which 
initially resulted in a high degree of confusion especially on behalf of other political 
parties and political factions' understanding of New Labour. According to Ludlam 
(2001: 1, 2) for instance, the Tories, Socialists and Social Democrats were at first 
unable to decide whether the Third Way is merely "diluted Thatcherism", "diluted 
social democracy", or indeed, "a new political 'paradigm', a visionary 'radical 
centre'" which presented its own unique way of delivering economic growth and 
social justice. This confusion was the root of numerous theories, views and 
speCUlations as to the political standing of New Labour on the traditional right-left 
political scale. Again, such speculations varied from those who argued that New 
Labour has developed a synthesis which really is "beyond Left and Right" to others 
who saw the politics of New Labour as "pragmatic and beyond ideology", to even 
others who suggested that "Labour's new politics have sealed a right-wing consensus 
in British politics just 'beyond Left'" (Driver and Martell 1998: 175). 
The main reason behind this confusion is that New Labour today is founded 
on a selective set of policies from 'old' Labour as well as another set from the right 
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wing Thatcherite views. On the one hand, it both distances itself mainly from the 
economic policies of the extreme left wing Labour Party of the late seventies and 
beginning eighties (which had planned complete nationalisation and unilateralism) 
while at the same time holding on to "traditional socialist ideas", morality and values 
(Smith 1992a: 9). On the other hand, New Labour seems to accept the Thatcherite 
agenda by "appealing to individualism, the market and private ownership" (Smith 
1992b: 14), the eminency and inevitability of economic change due to globalisation 
(Newman 2001: 2), while at the same time opposing decentralisation of the 
government. 
In short, New Labour's policies are an attempt to retain the economic gains of 
Thatcherism, while invoking a set of moral and civic values through which Labour 
seeks to reshape civil society (Coates 2000:2). And this is best summarised directly in 
Blair's words: 
The socialism of Marx, of centralised state control of industry and production, is dead. It 
misunderstood the nature of development of a modern market economy ... 
By contrast, socialism as defined by certain key values and beliefs is not merely alive, it has a 
historic opportunity now to give leadership. The basis of such socialism lies in its view that 
individuals are socially interdependent human beings - that individuals cannot be divorced 
from the society to which they belong ... 
It is from this combination of analysis of the world as it is and prescriptions of the means of 
changing it that the values of democratic socialism - social justice, the equal worth of each 
citizen, equality of opportunity, community - came. 
(Blair 1994: 3-4) 
These two directions in the politics of New Labour are reflected in what 
Fairclough (2000: viii) calls the "rhetoric of reconciliation", which portrays it as both 
a supporter of "'economic dynamism as well as social justice', 'enterprise as well as 
fairness"'. However, the Third Way does face its own self-contradictions since, 
according to Fairclough (2000: 11), its intention to make us believe that "the two 
previously incompatible terms ... are made compatible" does not always stand. 
:20:2 
Indeed, it is this multidirectionalism which places New Labour in an unorthodox 
position in terms of ideological consistency. This implies that many New Labour 
policies are seen to waver on the right-left ideological scale influenced by each unique 
situation. 
In conclusion, the disparity between the two speeches arise out of the 
following three areas: a) the situation itself and the directness of its effects on each 
country, b) the audiences and their varying degrees of political awareness and 
outspokenness, and c) differences in the speakers and the distinct ideologies of the 
parties which they represent. Consequently, the main objective in this chapter is to 
examine the role modality plays in reflecting the ideological positions of the two 
speakers in the light of these three main areas of difference. 
6.4 Texts and Analyses 
Based on the differences between the two texts discussed above, this chapter 
will analyse each text independently and then compare and contrast them by focusing 
on how the use of modality in each dictates the differences in the forcefulness and 
ultimately in the ideological positions of the two speakers - George Bush and Tony 
Blair. It also questions the consistency of ideologies communicated in each text 
independently and in contrast with each other. 
6.4.1 Analysis 1: Bush 
Starting with Bush's speech (see appendix 4), and following the information 
grouped under the Factuality branch in a chronological manner, three main sets of 
utterances are seen to fall into general areas of content. The unifying factor in all them 
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is their indisputably factual content communicating the highest degrees of non-
modalised certainty as reflected in their syntactic makeup (see table 1). 
The first of these groups, (4-8), relates to America's allies in its mission. It 
outlines the actual actions of those supporting the American-initiated war in tenns of 
what they have offered or will offer in practical factual terms. Then comes another set 
of factual utterances which directly relate to America's position towards the Afghani 
people as well as Islam in general, one which is contrasted with its stance towards the 
Afghani government and the terrorist network (18-23, 25-30). Here, the main forceful 
message is America's position which on the one hand supports the Afghani people 
since they constitute a central part of a peaceful Moslem world. On the other hand, 
America is seen to oppose the Taliban government because of the latter's support of 
an "evil" terrorist organisation. This theme continues in the next set of utterances (33-
36) in which both the Afghani people and Islam are viewed as victims of the same 
enemy that threatens the United States of America and all it stands for ideologically. 
These are the ideological notions of liberty and freedom which carry the force of 
America's readiness and willingness to defend those beliefs at any cost. This too is 
presented in the highest form of certainty and is linked by the transitional sentence 
(33) "we did not ask for this mission" to another set of views relating to the feelings 
of the Americans (37), the sacrifices being made by America's "dedicated", 
"honorable" "sons and daughters" who are defending it (42), and the president's 
confidence in them and in the justness of their cause (43, 45). 
Low Med High Factuality 
~ - ' ' to ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I I 1- On my orders, the United States milita? has begun s t n k e ~ ~
disrupt +-+- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- 2- These carefully targeted actions are designed ... 
and to 4- We are joined in this operation 
attack the 11- And now the Taliban 5- Other friends ... have pledged forces.. . 
military will pay a price. 6- More than 40 countries ... have granted air transit ... 
~ a b i l i t v v 16- At the same time, the 7- Many more have shared intelligence. 
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-
... people of Afghanistan 
13- the will know the generosity 
terrorists of America. 
may I ~ ~ ~ ~
burrow 
22- we will win this deeper into 
conflict caves 
26- If any government 
15- to sponsors the outlaws, 
clear the they have become 
way for ... outla ws themsel ves 
operations 
-+-+ -+-+1 to drive 
them out 
and bring 27 - And they will take 
them to that lonely path at their 
justice. own peril. 
31- there can be no 
41 - peace in a world of 
patience in sudden terror. 
all the 
sacrifices 34- but we will fulfill it 
that may 
come. 40- our patience will be 
one of our strengths --
with the long waits that 
will result from tighter 
security; patience and 
understanding that it will 
take time to achieve our 
goals; 
46- and you will have 
every tool you need to 
carry out your duty. 
54- We will not waver; 
55- we will not tire; 
56- we will not falter; 
57 - and we will not fail. 
58- Peace ... will prevail 
Table 1 representing Bush's 
position on a scale of certainty. 
8- We are supported by the ... world. 
9- I gave TaIiban leaders specific demands: 
10- None of these demands were met. 
14- Our military action is also designed ... 
18- The United S t a t e ~ ~ of America is a friend to the Afghan ... 
19- and we are the fnends of almost a billion. " who practice 
the Islamic faith. 
-+-+1 
2?- The l!nited States of America is an enemy of those who 
a I ~ ~ t ~ r r o n s t s s and ~ f f .the barbaric criminals who profane a great 
relIgIOn by commIttmg murder in its name. 
21- T?is military action is a part of our campaign against 
terronsm, another front in a war that has already been joined 
through diplomacy, intelligence ... 
23- Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. 
24- Every nation has a choice to make. 
25- In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. 
-+-+1 
28- I'm speaking to you today from ... a place where 
American Presidents have worked for peace. 
29- We're a peaceful nation. 
30- Yet, as we have learned ... 
32- the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who 
threaten it. 
33- We did not ask for this mission ... 
35- The name of today's operation is Enduring Freedom. 
36- We defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the 
freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children 
free from fear. 
37- I know many Americans feel fear today. And our 
government is taking strong precautions. All law enforcement 
agencies are working ... around the clock. 
38- At my request, many governors have activated the 
National Guard to strengthen airport security. 
39- We have called up Reserves to reinforce our military 
capability and strengthen the protection of ... 
42- those sacrifices are being made by members of our Armed 
Forces who now defend us so far from home ... 
43- A Commander-in-Chief sends America's sons ... into a 
battle ... only after the greatest care and a lot of prayer. 
44- They are dedicated, they are honorable; they represent the 
best of our country. And we are grateful. 
45- I say this: Your mission is defined; your objectives are 
clear; your goal is just. You have my (ull confidence 
47- I recently received a touching letter that says a lot about 
the state of America 
49- This is a precious gift, the greatest she could give. 
51- This young girl knows what America is all about. 
52- Since September 11, an entire generation of young 
Americans has gained new understanding 
53- The battle is now joined on many fronts. 
The second set of utterances categorised under Factuality are those whose 
extensions are epistemically non-factual (2,14). These are syntactically variant in that 
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while the first section of the verb phrase (the enveloping verb) is a pseudo-factual 
one, the embedded clause acquires a degree of non-factuality. In these utterances, for 
instance, the verb phrases "is designed" and "are designed" are both passive 
structures, thus suggesting an element of forceful objectivity, as well as appearing to 
be non-modalised straightforward factual verbs. However, while no degree of 
uncertainty characterises these verbs and the initial parts of the clauses (i.e. there is no 
doubt as to the design of these actions), the second parts are far from being factual 
and are, as a result, grouped according to the level of modality they reflect - in this 
instance, low modality. This is the case since a verb phrase like "is designed to" 
carries a certain degree of internal modality, some doubt (i.e. low certainty) in the 
ability to deliver, which is projected onto the second section of the verb phrase. The 
whole verb phrase, "is designed to disrupt", therefore foreshadows the possibility that 
this "military action" might fail to disrupt. In other words, while in theory the referred 
to military action should disrupt the military capabilities of the Taliban, this 
disruption is in no way a definite one. This explains the two arrow movements from 
the factuality category (under which these utterances are grouped) towards the lower 
end of the scale (under which their extensions are located). 
The third and final set of utterances categorised under "factuality" are those 
which carry both an e p i s t ~ m i c c as well as a deontic interpretation. These are initially 
grouped under "factuality" mainly because they are either reports of a deontic action 
(rather than a performative verb or the deontic action itself), or they are indirect 
commands, demands, etc., which have the form of a factual statement. An example of 
the first instance is the utterance "I gave the Taliban specific demands" (9) which is a 
report of a demand that is both an expression of factuality as well as a bearer of 
deontic force. An example of the second is the utterance "every nation has a choice to 
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make" (24) which carries both an epistemic as well as a deontic interpretation without 
being a report of some degree of duty. It can be interpreted as a statement of fact as 
well as some form of duty or even obligation that every nation does make the choice. 
This final group reports a set of requests, demands or commands directed at the U.S. 
army (1, 38) to mobilise and at the Taliban (9) and all nations (24, 32) to make a 
choice (between good and evil) and work towards peace through action. Most 
importantly, the content areas they tackle are presented in the highest degree of non-
modalised certainty making it categorically forceful on the epistemic scale. 
All in all then, the main picture that can be drawn from looking at the non-
modalised, Factuality end of the scale is the speaker's highest degree of certainty and 
therefore forcefulness in 
1) The allied support for America, 
2) The view of the Afghani people as victims, 
3) The view of Islam as a peaceful religion, 
4) The view of the Afghani government as evil in its support for an evil 
organisation, 
5) The justness of the actions requested and demanded of the American army, the 
Taliban and the world, as well as 
6) The need and urgency for action in light of America's set of ideologies in 
order to restore the pre-September 11 th status quo. 
Under the High end of the epistemic scale is a set of utterances which are 
primarily non-factual. Divided in terms of the content areas which they cover, the first 
set mainly contrasts the American view of the Taliban (11, 27), with their view of the 
Afghani people (16). It reflects some form of prediction, a relatively high degree of 
207 
certainty regarding what will happen to the Taliban and the Afghani government on 
the one hand as opposed to the Afghani people, on the other. The first "will pay a 
price" and "will take that lonely path at their own peril" while the latter "will know 
the generosity of America". The second set of utterances also communicates a high 
level of certainty in what will happen to America and the American people, how their 
objectives will be fulfilled and what America will be able to achieve (22, 34-58). 
Through "patience [which] will be" one of America's strengths, and although it "will 
take time" for this conflict to be over, America "will [ultimately] win" the war. 
Finally, the last set grouped under the High category of the epistemic scale is that in 
which the utterances have the force of categorical statements of an almost prophetic 
nature (26, 31) but nevertheless are not full factual statements. The first of these is a 
conditional statement "if any government sponsors the outlaws," with factual 
consequences "they have become outlaws themselves". In the light of these 
consequences ("have become" rather than 'will become'), this utterance no longer 
represents a hypothetical situation, and therefore it wavers in strength towards the 
factuality end of the scale as signified by the use of the arrow. The second is a 
statement with a negated modal expression "there can be no peace in a world of 
sudden terror" (31), where the absence of possibility takes the utterance from the low 
< 
end of the scale (which would be the case in the absence of the negative as in "there 
can be peace" - i.e. it is possible for there to be peace) to the high end. Still, although 
it falls short of being a completely factual statement, it is seen to have an almost 
factual force as signified by the arrows. 
In short, the content areas presented under the High modality category are 
those reflected through the use of high modal certainty and which consequently 
communicate a relatively high degree of forcefulness. These relate the highest degrees 
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of modal certainty that the Taliban "pay a price" for their evil deeds while the 
Afghani people "know" the generosity of America. Also a strong position is reflected 
in the view that while the whole campaign will take time and patience from the 
American people, eventually America is most certain to win the war. And finally 
comes the high certainty of a conditional statement which explicitly equates an 
outlaw-sponsoring government with an outlaw. Likewise, it reflects high certainty in 
the impossibility for the coexistence of peace and terror in the same world where 
America (and all it stands for) exists. All these utterances are highly certain and 
forceful; yet it is essential to accentuate the fact that they nevertheless fall short in 
terms of forcefulness from those factual statements discussed above, and are therefore 
less emphatic on the epistemic scale. 
Finally, under the Low end of the epistemic scale are the extensions to two of 
the factual statements mentioned above. These relate to '''disrupting' and 'attacking' 
the military capabilities" of the Taliban (3) as well as "'clearing' the way for ... 
operations to drive them out and bring them to justice" (15). As discussed above, 
these utterances are placed under the lower end of the epistemic scale mainly because 
these verbs are subordinate to the other verb in the verb clause "are designed to" and 
"is also designed to" which carries a certain degree of internal modality. Following 
this uncertainty, both subordinating expressions are primarily placed under the lower 
end of the epistemic scale. However, the existence of a high level of vagueness opens 
the door for more than one possible interpretation. The expression "is designed to 
disrupt" could vary in interpretation from as Iowa modal force as "may disrupt" 
through a median modal force like "should disrupt" up to a high modal "must 
disrupt". Yet while it cannot extend its interpretation to a factual statement, the most 
likely interpretation is the second middle ground interpretation which places thc 
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utterance under the Median category on the epistemic scale. Finally, the other two 
separate utterances grouped under the lower end of the epistemic scale (13,41) relate 
to the existence of possibilities that terrorists manage to hide ("the terrorists ma\ 
burrow deeper into caves") and that sacrifices from the American people are to come 
("all the sacrifices that may come"). 
On the other hand, grouped under the Command category of the deontic scale 
(see table 2) are straightforward orders by Bush for the Afghani government to 
perfonn certain actions (3-5). Although described by Bush as a list of "demands" (2), 
these utterances are expressed in the highest form of deontic force; i.e. through the 
absence of any form of explicit modality and the use of the imperative-mood 
structure. At the syntactic level then, these expressions take the form of direct 
commands ("close", "hand over", and "return") which infuses them with maximal 
force. This force is further accentuated in a context of situation where these 
"demands" are backed by the full might of the United States army. Additionally, the 
directness of the action involved is what differentiates them from utterances (1) and 
(2). Following that, the first two utterances are grouped under the High category on 
the epistemic scale with two arrows showing the direction of the force of these 
"orders" and "demands". In short, while the first two are reports of what Bush ordered 
and demanded, the second set is a list of direct orders. 
As for those utterances grouped under the High end of the deontic scale, three 
different sets of expressions can be isolated depending on the different grammatical 
subjects of each verb and on the content area each corresponds with. One of these sets 
is that where the Taliban and the people of Afghanistan are the grammatical subjects 
(6,8, 12). As noted above, these expressions were initially grouped under the High 
end of the epistemic scale which mainly refers to what will predictably happen to the 
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Taliban and the Afghani people. However, as well as their epistemic interpretation 
where these expressions "will pay", "will know" and "will take" are interpreted as 
"they will most probably/predictably pay, know and take", they also allow for a 
deontic sense in their meaning. In other words, they can also be interpreted as '\\'e 
will make sure that they pay, know and take", or "we will make them pay, know and 
take" thus carrying a deontic orientation and therefore, deontic force. It is a form of 
enforced obligation or even insistence that these actions do happen. 
Low Med 
16- At my request, many 11- every 
governors have nation has 
activated the National a choice to 
Guard to strengthen make 
airport security. 
I+-+-+- +-+-+-+-
18- We ask a lot of those 14- We 
who wear our uniform. did not 
We ask them to leave ask for this 
their loved ones, to mission ... 
travel great distances, to 
risk injury, even to be 20- "As 
ureuared to make the much as I 
ultimate sacrifice ... don't want 
my Dad to 
fight," she 
wrote, 
'1 "I' 'II' , 
.:. - m WI mg to give 
him to you." 
-+-+1 
. 
Table 2 representmg Bush's 
position on a scale of obligation 
High 
-+-+1 
1- On my orders, the U. S military has begun strikes 
2- I gave Taliban leaders specific demands: 
6- the Taliban will pay a price 
7- we will make it more difficult for the network to 
train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans. 
8- the people of Afghanistan will know the 
generosity of America. 
9- we'll also drop food 
-+-+1 
10- we will win this conflict 
12- they will take that lonely path at their own peril. 
13- the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those 
who threaten it. 
-+-+1 
15- but we will fulfil it 
17 - our patience will be one of our strengths -- with 
the long waits that will result from tighter security 
19- and you will have every tool you need to carry 
out your duty . 
22- We will not waver 
23- we will not tire 
24- we will not falter 
25- and we will not fail 







4- hand over 
leaders of the 
al Qaeda 
network; 
5- return all 
foreign 
nationals ... 
The second set is where the USA, its president, or its people are grammatical 
subjects (1,2,7,9,10,12,14,17,19,22-25). Again most of these utterances were 
initially grouped under the Factuality or High end of the epistemic scale but are also 
seen to have a deontic sense and interpretation. Apart from the first two discussed 
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above, the other set of utterances refers to what America will do to the Taliban 
(making it difficult for them to train and coordinate their evil plans), to the Afghani 
people (dropping food for them) and regarding the general outcome of the war 
(winning the conflict, fulfilling the mission, not wavering, not tiring, not faltering and 
not failing). Again, all these expressions are interpretable as a form of self-enforced 
obligation or a determination in making sure these actions do or do not happen. As a 
result, they are placed under the High end of the deontic scale. However, one 
expression stands out and that refers to America's intentions to prevent the Taliban 
from training and coordinating their "evil plans" (7). Similar to those discussed under 
the Factuality category on the epistemic scale ("is designed to"), the presence of the 
adjective "difficult", which is epistemically modal, lessens the overall force of the 
utterance. While there is no doubt as to the difficulty the Taliban plans will face, the 
subordinate section of the verb phrase ("to train" and "to coordinate") does not carry 
that same force in terms of degrees of certainty. There will not be any prevention of 
further training and coordination but merely an attempt to make it harder to achieve. 
This epistemic form of modality is seen to affect the deontic force of the utterance as 
a whole and this is signalled by a motion towards the weaker end of the deontic scale 
as represented by the arrow which moves all the way through the Median to the Low 
category. 
Finally, the third set is that where the subjects are universal ones (13, 26). 
Again here, both utterances were initially grouped under the Factuality and High ends 
of the epistemic scale respectively; yet both are seen to have deontic senses. The 
deontic interpretation of the first utterance would have the following form: "to pursue 
peace forces us to pursue those who threaten it", and this interpretation becomes more 
acceptable in the light of the subsequent utterance - "we will fulfill it" which also 
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carries a deontic force. As for the second, the following deontic interpretation is also 
possible: "we will make sure that peace does prevail". Here, the main contributor to 
the force of these utterances is the underlying objectivity which characterises their 
sources. In fact, it is a seeming objectivity which masks the actual but implicit agent 
necessary for the fulfilment of these actions. And this is characteristic of all the 
utterances placed under the High category of the deontic scale: that the force behind 
all these utterances is either explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly, the United 
States of America. 
Under the Median category within the deontic scale are two utterances (11, 
20), the first of which carries deontic force although it resembles a non-modalised 
statement. In saying "every nation has a choice to make", Bush is indirectly pointing 
out the duty or even an obligation (even possibly a threat since this statement is 
backed by the full military force of America) that each nation has to make the choice 
of siding with America or with "evil". Like the other modalised utterances which are 
essentially indeterminate, this one is characterised by both types of indeterminacy: the 
epistemic-deontic interpretation and force, as well as the direction of its force which is 
seen to move from the Median category towards the High end of the deontic scale. As 
for the second utterance, it is a statement of desire expressing a young girl's lack of 
desire that her father goes to battle. This too is 'seen to waver towards the High end of 
the deontic scale to reflect the strength of the girl's desire, a desire which culminates 
in her expressed willingness to let her father go to battle (21). This second section of 
the girl's utterance (21) is placed under the Low end of the scale as it expresses at 
least a lower degree of desire than the first part. Still, as the first section of the 
utterance wavers upwards on the deontic scale, the second section is seen to folio\\' 
with one step behind. 
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Finally, under the Low end of the deontic scale are a number of expressions 
which reflect a lower degree of forcefulness. They mainly correspond to a set of 
requests made by the president of the USA, directed at his governors and army (I5, 
16,18). These are placed under the Low end of the deontic scale simply because the 
noun "request" and verb "ask" are clear indications of the exact type of modality 
communicated, which narrows the margin for manoeuvre. However, taking context 
into account (that of an army's chain of command), in the light of the political 
background and power status of the initiator of these actions, a request made by a 
country's president to his army is closer to a command than a request. What comes 
across as a clash between the context of situation and the linguistic choices made 
highlights an alternative interpretation of the force passed on through these utterances 
and their effects. Using Low modality, especially when higher modality would be the 
less marked structure, emphasises the close, possibly paternal, relationship that the 
American president conveys through his words to his governors and army. And this 
relative softness in communicating (as a superior) with his under-staff is in sharp 
contrast with the directness and forcefulness used when communicating with the 
Taliban. With the first it is a "request", with the latter, a "demand", a situation which 
contradicts the unmarked scheme of things but highlights the positions and possible 
intentions of the speaker. 
To summarise, the expressions grouped under the deontic scale reflect the 
speaker's varying positions with respect to the following issues: the speaker's highest 
degree of forcefulness is expressed through a number of orders and demands directed 
at the Tali ban as well as a High level of forcefulness that the Taliban will pay a pricc. 
that the Afghani people will get help and that the USA will win the conflict. 
Expressed under the Median and Low levels of forcefulness is the need for evcry 
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nation to make a choice and the lack of desire Americans (as represented through the 
little girl) feel in relation to launching this war. This is followed by other weaker 
deontic expressions regarding the requests made by the president for the army to 
perfonn certain actions together with the sacrifices that may follow. 
6.4.2 Interpretations and Implications 
Looking at the categorisation of modalised expressions in both scales, the 
following picture of the position of the speaker, his forcefulness and ideology 
emerges. The speaker is most forceful when presenting facts relating to the support 
America is getting from its allies, still quite forceful when demanding that support 
from all other nations, and the least forceful when requesting it from the American 
people and the American army. Here, the image of Bush that seems to be projected as 
a result of this variety in degrees of modal strength is respecti vel y that of a popular 
world leader whose cause is supported worldwide, a strong world leader who has the 
power to create quite a following, and finally of a father to his nation who understands 
their concern regarding the issue at hand. It is the power of a speaker who 
undoubtedly believes in the justness of his cause and hence in his own judgements 
and evaluations of what is right and wrong. 
Moreover, Bush is both highly certain and emphatic when describing the 
Afghani government as "evil" in its support for an evil organisation, when making a 
set of demands on them, and when both predicting and insisting that they will pay a 
price. This again indicates his unquestionable belief in the correctness and justness of 
his Own judgement concerning what constitutes an evil entity and what does not. It is 
an extension of the moral ideologies of the USA which are indirectly forced on the 
rest of the world through that binary division which Bush makes between good and 
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evil. This evaluation is backed by the high power reflected through High epistemic 
and deontic force associated with the view that the USA and all who support it are 
'good' while those who stand against it are 'evil'. Indeed, "every nation has a choice 
to make", a choice which would define its location on the American good-evil scale 
along with all the responsibilities and penalties that accompany that choice. 
Yet despite all this strength and forcefulness, the speaker relatively uncertain 
about the impact his war will have on the Afghani government and the al Qaeda 
network. The possibility that this mission will "disrupt and ... attack [their] military 
capability" and that it will "clear the way for operations to drive them out and bring 
them to justice" is communicated with a low degree of certainty. On top of that, there 
also appears to be a possibility that initially, "the terrorists may burrow deeper into 
caves", suggesting that they might escape that price which earlier on the audience was 
told that the terrorists "will pay". This inconsistency and discrepancy in the message 
communicated has serious repercussions. On the one hand, through expressing doubts 
in the achievability of the main objectives of the mission, the certainty, emphaticness 
and ultimately the forcefulness behind the mission as a whole is seriously 
undermined. However, on the other hand, this seemingly contradictory position does 
not disagree with the religious bases of Republican ideology. The speaker's certainty 
and insistence that the terrorists will pay a price without the certainty that they will be 
brought to justice highlights the higher degree of importance that Bush (and by 
extension the Republican Party and the American people) pays to immediate and 
direct punishment in contrast with long-term justice, a position which falls in line with 
the radical Christian right basis of the Republican Party. In that, Bush's varying use of 
modality emphasises a position which is closer to vengeance than justice. 
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Moreover, the two notions of freedom and duty occupy a central position in 
the speech and are basic in determining the forcefulness of the speaker. After stressing 
the importance of freedom as a central trait of America, which the Americans defend 
on behalf of themselves and the rest of the world, the possibility of "sacrifices that 
may come" is introduced with low epistemic modality. It immediately follows a string 
of high modalised utterances, where those sacrifices seem less eminent than the rest of 
the propositions. 
In the months ahead, our patience will be one of our strengths -- patience with the long waits 
that will result from tighter security; patience and understanding that it will take time to 
achieve our goals; patience in all the sacrifices that may come. 
The first impression given is that sacrifices are not something any government 
wants. However interestingly enough, sacrifices are later linked to the notion of duty 
which is the price for freedom, and it is done with categorical certainty. This is where 
sacrifices become more eminent and inevitable, even something to be desired by all 
American people as exemplified by Bush's anecdote about the young girl. Just like 
this young girl, all Americans have "gained a new understanding of the value of 
freedom, and its cost in duty and in sacrifice"; i.e. that freedom is only achievable 
through sacrifice and this sacrifice is the people's duty. All these positions are 
communicated with the highest degrees of certainty and forcefulness giving Bush's 
speech ultimate potency. It is power arising from the full ideological backing of the 
Republican Party based on which Bush was elected president. It is therefore 
something expected of the American people and should not require any persuasIve 
effort on behalf of the speaker. 
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6.4.3 Analysis 2: Blair 
In Blair's speech on the other hand, the way modality is utilised by the speaker 
helps present a somewhat different picture both of the speaker and of the overall 
situation (see appendix 5). To begin with, on the Factuality branch of the epistemic 
scale, Blair projects an image of extreme strength and confidence through his 
categorical certainty when addressing the topics of: 
1) the involvement of British forces, (which he is confident and proud 
of) in the action, 
2) the need for the action (in the absence of any other alternative) and 
its moral and economic justifications and 
3) the internationality of the effort. 
Yet when tracking the chronological development of Blair's argument, an 
interesting mix of modalised expressions surfaces (see table 3). Looking at the 
epistemic scale, Blair starts by confirming the engagement of UK forces in the 
military action against Afghanistan (2, 3), stating his pride in and confidence in these 
forces as they are "amongst the very best in the world" (4, 7, 8). The reasons and 
justifications for this offensive are, however, based on a set of modalised utterances. 
The first is conditional where the British "part in [this] action" is dependent on 
knowing "who was responsible" (9), an utterance placed under the Median branch of 
the epistemic scale due to the lack of certainty and factuality of this condition. Again, 
this condition is followed by a subjective statement with an embedded negative - "no 
doubt in my mind, nor in the mind of anyone who has been through all the available 
evidence ... " (10). In comparison with the previous utterance, this one is slightly 
higher on the epistemic scale despite the high subjectivity of the utterance. This is 
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justified due to the high power status and consequently power-reliability of its source. 
Finally the third consequent modalised utterance is used to establish the connection 
between the Taliban government and the terrorist network (11). The latter is again 
slightly stronger on the epistemic scale since its source of reference, in contrast to the 
previous, is objective. In short, these three consecutive modalised utterances become 
respectively stronger in terms of degrees of certainty until we get to the next set of 
factual statements. 
Low Med High Factuality 
33- The -+-+- 1- As you will 2- military action against targets inside Afghanistan has begun. 
coalition know from the 3- I can confirm that UK forces are engaged in this action. 
has, I 9- that announcement by 4- There is no greater strength for a British PM ... than to know that 
believe, we President Bush ... the forces we are calling upon are amongst the very best. .. 
strength would 5- They and their 7- But we can take pride in their courage, their sense of duty and the 
-cncd take families are, of esteem with which they're held throughout the world. 
not part in course, carrying 8- No country lightly commits forces to military action ... but we 
weak- action an Immense made it clear following the attacks ... 
ened in once it burden at this 12- It is now almost a month since the atrocity occurred, 
the 26 was moment 13- it is more than two weeks since an ultimatum was delivered to 
days clear the Taliban to yield up the terrorists or face the consequences. 
since the who -+-+- 16- They were given the choice of siding with justice or siding with 
atrocity was terror and they chose to side with terror. 
occurred. respons 17- There are three parts to the operation of which we're engaged: 
-ible. +-+-+- 20- This military plan has been put together mindful of our 
58- about determination to do all we humanly can to avoid civilian casualties 
what the 6- and will be 23- We have set the objectives to eradicate bin Laden's network and 
terrorists feeling deep to take action against the Taliban regime that is sponsoring it. 
may 44a- anxiety as will the 24- As to the precise British involvement I can confirm that ... 
seek to But British people 25- the US made a specific request that a number of UK military 
doin even if assets be used in the operation which has now begun. 
response. no -+-+. 26- And I gave authority for these assets to be deployed. 
British 27- They include the base at Diego Garcia, ... Missile firing 
69- so citizen 10- There is no submarines are in use tonight. 
that those had doubt in my 29- The United States are obviously providing the bulk of the force 
responsib died it mind, nor in the required in leading this ... 
Ie could would mind of anyone 30- this is an international effort. 
be be right who has been 31- as well as UK, France, Germany, '.' have also committed 
yielded to act. through all the themselves to take part in the operation. . . 
up by available 32- in the time I've been Prime Minister I cannot recall a sItuatIOn 
those evidence, that that has commanded such a powerful coalition... . 
shielding these attacks were 34- And this is in no small measure due to the statesmanshIp ()f 
them. carried out by President Bush to whom I pay tribute tonight. . 
the al -Qaeda 35- The world understands that whilst, of course, there are dangers tn 
network ... acting the dangers of inaction are far, far greater. . 
36- we are assembling a coalition ... which IS as \Ital as .. , 
11- Equally it is 37 _ Even before 11 September four million Afghans were on the 




supported by the 
Taliban 
14- It is clear 
beyond doubt 
that they will not 
do this 
18- The military 
action we are 
taking will be 
targeted against 
places we know 
to be involved ... 




long this action 
will last but ~ ~
will act with 
reason ... 
28- The air assets 
will be available 
for use in the 
coming days 
45- We know the 
al-Qaeda network 
threaten ... any 
nation that does 
not share their 
VIews. 
57 - People are 
bound to be 
concerned ... 
65- We only do it 
if the cause is just. 
Table 3 representing Blair's 
position on a scale of certainty. 
38- so . t h ~ t t people from. that region stay in that region. 
39- Bntam, of course, IS heavily involved in that effort. 
40- So we are taking action on all those three fronts. " 
41- ... why this matters so much directly to Britain. 
42- ... the attacks ... ~ ~ p r e s e n t e d d the worst terrorist outrage ... 
43- The m u r d e ~ ~ o.f BntIsh ... whether it happens overseas or not. is an 
attack upon Bntam. 
44b- This atrocity was an attack on us all ... 
46- So we have a direct interest in acting in our own self defenc ' t 
protect British lives. C ...Q 
47- It was also an attack ... on livelihoods. 
48- We can see ... how economic confidence has suffered with all 
that means for British ... industry. 
49- We act also because the al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime are 
funded on the drugs trade. 
50- 90 per cent of all the heroin sold on British streets originates from 
Afghanistan. 
51- Stopping that trade is, again, directly in our interests. 
52- ... that this is not a war with Islam. 
53- It angers me, as it angers the vast majority of Muslims, to hear 
bin Laden and his associates described as Islamic terrorists. 
54- They are terrorists pure and simple. 
55- Islam is a peaceful religion and the acts of these people are 
contrary to the ... Koran. 
56- These are difficult ... times. 
57- ... there is at present no threat that we know of and that we have 
in place tried and tested plans which are the best possible response 
59- This, of course, is a moment of ... gravity ... 
62- We are a peaceful people. 
63- But we know that sometimes to safeguard peace ... 
64- Britain has learnt that lesson many times ... 
66- This cause is just. 
67- The murder of almost seven thousand people was an attack on 
our freedom ... 
68- We waited ... 
70- That offer was refused, 
71- we have now no choice 
73- And our determination in acting is total. 
These modalised utterances have a significant impact on the overall certainty 
and forcefulness of the propositions conveyed. When relating the degrees of epistemic 
modal force to the content area which each of these utterances cover, the following 
reading emerges. While there is a high degree of certainty in relating the Taliban and 
al Qaeda, this certainty decreases when relating al Qaeda to the terrorist attacks, thus 
providing a weak basis to satisfy the conditions for the British invol\'cment in the 
action. In fact, it is ultimately the (subjective) credibility of the Prime ~ l m l s t c r r whIch 
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serves as a central pillar to help present the information as reliable since what 
constitutes the bases for the decision to take part in the military offensive is merely a 
set of modalised utterances. 
The subsequent two factual utterances address the "ultimatum" gi ven to the 
Taliban "to yield up the terrorists or face the consequences", to side "with justice or 
[side] with terror" (13, 16). Here again, an important decision is arrived at following 
and based on a modalised utterance: "it is clear beyond doubt that they will not do 
this" (14). Although this utterance is a relatively strong form of epistemic modality, 
and is thus placed under the High end of the continuum, it nonetheless communicates 
a lack of absolute certainty in what serves as grounds for drastic measures (a war) 
taken against a whole country. Similar to the expressions discussed above, the 
underlying basis for yet another set of factual utterances lies in a preceding modalised 
expression. This, I argue, undermines the categorical forcefulness associated with 
these factual statements and consequently the content which they communicate. 
The following set of factual utterances describes the operation and its 
objectives (17,20,23). It includes both a set of factual verbs as well as one specific 
verb which carries some form of internal uncertainty ("our determination to do all we 
humanly can to avoid civilian casualties"). Initially, there is no doubt as to the 
absoluteness of the "determination" of the British forces to do all they can "to avoid" 
civilian casualties (20). However, the verb "avoid" is in no way categorical in terms 
of ruling out the possible/probable/almost certain unavoidability of civilian casualties. 
In addition to that, the presence of the adverb "humanly" in this verb phrase further 
stresses and foreshadows such inevitability since humans are vulnerable, inaccurate 
and susceptible to miscalculations. This interpretation is signified by the use of arrows 
that point out the tendency for that verb to move downwards on the epistcmic scale 
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reflecting its lower epistemic force. Here, the use of arrows is intended to foreground 
the internal modality of a verb disguised as a factual one, which in tum reflects the 
possible variability in its interpretation along the epistemic scale. 
The next set of utterances describes in more detail the mission which is 
specified in response to American requests. In fact, it is these requests (25) which are 
directly translated to an authorisation given by Blair for specific "assets to be 
deployed" (26-29). These utterances are mere reporting of processes that have already 
occurred and are therefore presented with the highest degree of certainty since they 
convey a set of factual events ("made a specific request", "gave authority", "they 
include", "are providing"). The same is the case of the next set whose content area 
relays the fact that the mission is "an international effort" joined by different countries 
(30,31), and that Britain is also "heavily involved" (39, 40). The only utterance which 
stands out, in that it is placed under the High category of the epistemic scale, is that 
whose non-factuality is related to the futurity of the event to come (28). 
The following utterances also placed under Factuality refer to moral as well as 
economical justifications for the mission (37, 38,41-51). These start by describing the 
current situation of the Afghani people (37, 38), and move on to explain "why [the 
military action] matters so much directly to Britain" (41). The primary objective of 
this mission is the protection of British lives, livelihoods and the economy. Moreover, 
Blair characterises potential military action as both a defence against Afghani 
terrorists and the drugs which originate from Afghanistan under the current regime 
(49-51). In short, it is a necessary action which is aligned with Britain's ideological 
disposition. 
Next, Blair describes Islam as "a peaceful religion" stressing the contrast 
hetwcen the followers of Islam on the one hand and Moslem terrorists on the other 
Y), 
(52-55). This is followed by a final section which targets the topics of the need 
, 
urgency and most importantly, absence of choice concerning how to tackle this 
problem of terrorism. All these utterances are placed under the highest degree of 
epistemic force as they present a summary of what has happened in America (67), 
how Britain has learned lessons of history (64), how the cause is just (66) and how 
there is no choice but military action (68, 70, 71, 73). 
In sum, the non-modalised utterances grouped under the factuality end of the 
scale present the speaker's highest degree of certainty and therefore forcefulness in 
reporting on 
1) The involvement of British forces in the action 
2) The Prime Minister's pride and confidence in these forces 
3) The need for the action paralleled with absence of any other alternative 
4) The moral and economic justifications for this action 
5) The internationality of the effort, and 
6) The absence of a connection between Islam and terrorism. 
However, as mentioned above, not all these statements have the categorical 
force of factuality. In fact, some of the most critical ones which relate more directly to 
the British people have underlying modality iii that they are either straightforward 
factual inferences that spring from modalised bases, or that the main verb in the verb 
phrase carries some kind of internal modality. Further, these critical utterances shed 
doubt on the justifications for military action in light of the proof needed for such 
justifications. They also shed doubt regarding an extremely important moral issue for 
the British people, which is the unavoidable killing of innocent civilians in these 
attacks by British forces. Yet the indirectness in presenting this information stems 
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from the way by which modalised utterances are backgrounded while non-modaIised 
ones are foregrounded in light of what presumably serves the purposes and ideologies 
of the speaker. This is quite significant since those seemingly factual utterances are 
not explicitly related to their underlying modal bases and this plays the central role in 
backgrounding the modal determinants for these utterances while foregrounding their 
outward factuality. In other words, and more specifically, while no doubt whatsoe\'er 
overshadows the actual involvement of British forces in the action, the Prime 
Minister's confidence and pride in these forces and the internationality of the effort, 
there is considerable doubt concerning the certainty and hence the forcefulness 
regarding the justification for this action especially at the moral level, as well as the 
direct confirmed involvement of the party deemed to be the guilty one. In short, the 
point made here concerns what appears to be an inconsistency in the relationship 
between the varying degrees of importance of different topics and the amount of 
attention given to them. It is argued that most of those utterances that require a more 
urgent need to be presented as categorical are modalised and backgrounded, while the 
less urgent and significant ones are fore grounded and unmodalised. 
The utterances placed under the High end of the epistemic continuum are 
divided into two main groups: 
1) those which exhibit explicit subjectivity in the source of the 
judgement (10, 18, 45) and 
2) those which are essentially non-factual in that they either make 
reference to a future incident which has not occurred yet (11,14,22, 
28, 72, 74) or are based on an indirect judgement by the speaker 
concerning certain states of affairs (5,6, 57). 
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The overall effects of these utterances are to communicate a high but not a 
categorical degree of certainty in the propositions put forward. This, of course, is 
characteristic of the "will + infinitive" construction which is the unmarked structure 
with utterances referring to future events, specifically those where the speaker is the 
subject of the main verb or directly responsible in making the decision of the agent. 
Yet, curiously enough, several utterances under this epistemic category express the 
speaker's high degree of certainty in what someone or something else is doing 
whether it is the British people and the army (1, 5, 6, 57), as well as the terrorists 
whom the speaker is highly certain "will not do this" (14). For instance in the last 
utterance, the speaker communicates his high degree of certainty in his own 
judgement concerning what the Taliban are highly unlikely to do, a modalised 
judgement which serves as a basis for justifying military action. 
Moreover, the speaker seems to make use (whether consciously or 
unconsciously) of the indeterminacy characteristic of modality. For instance, Blair's 
statement (22), "I cannot disclose, obviously, how long this action will last. .. " carries 
several interpretations. One interpretation is that the Prime Minister has intentionally 
decided not to "disclose" such information mainly because it constitutes some sort of 
top-secret military information. This implies that the speaker has prior knowledge 
L 
regarding the possibly planned duration of this operation, but prefers, through a 
conscious decision, not to disclose this knowledge. Another interpretation suggests his 
inability (or mere absence of possibility) to disclose such information since he is 
uncertain of how long it will last. This dual 15 interpretation is quite significant in that 
it outlines the difference between a forceful, reliable speaker who has everything 
planned and under control, and a less forceful, less reliable speaker who is uncertain 
-'I T---------- . I .. 
. here .is a third interpretation where "cannot disclose" is interpreted as "am not allowed to diSC ose . 
hllhls Interpretation seems quite improbable here since the PM is the head of government. 
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of the temporal margins of a mission he is proposing. At the same time, this possible 
multiplicity in interpretations can be seen to serve the interests of the speaker 
especially since the latter interpretation is quite probable. In other words, opening the 
possibility for an interpretation which portrays the speaker as reliable and certain is 
always a sought after effect especially when juxtaposed with the latter more probable 
interpretation. However, a deeper analysis of the modality in this utterance sheds 
serious doubt concerning this extremely crucial information as far as the British 
people are concerned. 
-In short, the main content areas placed under the High modality category of 
the epistemic scale are those communicating a high degree of modalised certainty in: 
1) what the British people and army know and the way they feel, 
2) the responsibility of the al Qaeda behind the terrorist attacks and how 
dangerous they are 
3) the unwillingness of the Taliban to hand in these terrorists 
4) the temporal boundaries of the mission and 
5) the availability of air support for the American led mission. 
Under the Median category of the epistemic scale are two hypothetical 
utterances which r e l a t ~ ~ to the involvement of British forces in the military action. 
These exhibit lower modality in that their possible factuality is conditional on the 
availability of evidence and dependent on the overall British views of right and 
wrong. Yet again, as argued above, these modalised utterances set the grounds from 
which other non-modalised pseudo-factual implications are derived. This explains 
why they are placed under the Median category since the fulfilment of their 
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conditions is based on a subjective assurance of the availability of adequate 
incriminating evidence. 
Finally, under the last category of the epistemic scale are low modalitv 
utterances which reflect the lowest commitment as to the truth-value and factuality of 
the propositions involved. These exhibit a combination of subjective and low 
modality verbs such as "I believe" (33), or they simply reveal the lack of certainty in 
what may happen as in "what the terrorists may seek to do" (58). Once more, what 
makes these uncertainties significant is the content area to which they relate. They 
communicate the lowest degrees of certainty and therefore strength and forcefulness 
when describing the state of the "coalition" and the possible actions of the Taliban, 
both of which are extremely critical issues which necessitate the utmost certainty. 
In conclusion, the main picture that can be drawn from looking at Blair's 
utterances as grouped under the epistemic scale is a very mixed one. While it exhibits 
a clear majority of non-modalised utterances, the far fewer modalised utterances have 
substantial effects on the overall strength and forcefulness of the speaker with regards 
to specific content areas. As discussed above, the issues which relate to the evidence, 
justifications, objectives and temporal parameters behind the campaign are either 
modalised (with the possible addition of a subjective reference) or they are factual 
deductions with modalised foundations. The other strictly factual non-modalised 
utterances communicate such matters as the Prime Minister's pride and confidence in 
the British forces and the involvement of these forces in the action. They also relate 
infonnation regarding the internationality of the effort as well as the absence of a 
connection between Islam and terrorism. Comparing the two in terms of how critical 
the issues are, it seems that the topics that are most likely to demand much higher 
certatnty and forcefulness on behalf of the speaker are those which are recei ving less. 
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Of course this can be justified and is understandable from a political point of view 
since while the speaker is uncertain about these issues, he is still under immense 
pressure to act in support of the USA. 
Looking at those utterances grouped under the deontic scale (see table 4) the 
most obvious feature is the absence of direct commands. An analysis of the 
distribution of all the utterances under that scale yields four main categories. The first 
groups a set of indirect commands initiated by an unspecified protagonistic power, 
which the speaker associates with, and aimed at the Taliban (3,4). These utterances 
-portray their source as a forceful entity, assuming a superior power status than that of 
the receivers of the action. They are the origins of "an ultimatum ... delivered to the 
Taliban to yield up the terrorists" as well as a "choice" for them to "[side] with justice 
or ... terror". In fact, the modal area here varies between a requirement-duty and a 
demand-obligation and is even quite close to a command-threat, hence the High 
classification in the deontic scale. 
The second is a set of utterances where the speaker or other protagonist's 
political or military powers are not the source of this deontic force, but its receivers. 
These are instances where the speaker, the British people and army, or other 
supporting nations are requested, required, or obliged to do perfonn some action (6, 8, 
9,14, 15, 17). In the first instance (6), it is the US which is making "a request that a 
number of UK military assets be used". Although this is placed under the Low end of 
the scale, the request has greater force when considering the political context of 
situation and the power statuses of participants involved. The arrows showing the 
movement of this utterance towards the higher end of the scale reflect the very 
unlikely possibility (and even inability) that the UK refuse the US "request". This 
Would indicate that such a request could in fact have a stronger interpretation and 
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therefore stronger placement on the deontic scale having the force of a requirement, 
almost a demand. The existence of this possibility is signified by the arrows that mo\'e 
all the way to the High end of the scale. 
,.. 
Med Low 
6· the US -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
made a 1- I want to pay tribute at the outset 
Weeifle to Britain's armed forces 
request 2- ... if I might ... 
that a 8- the force required in leading this 
number of operation 
UK 10- I also want to say very directly to 
military the British people why this matters so 
assets be much directly to Britain. 
used in 11- First let us not forget that the 
the attacks ... represented the worst 
operation terrorist outrage 
12- So we have a direct interest in 
acting ... to protect British lives. 
l3- I wish to say finally ... that this is 
not a war with Islam. 
14- Our prosperity and standard of 
living ... require us to deal with this 
threat. 
16- I should say there is at present no 
threat 
18- None of the leaders want war. 
None of our nations want it. 
Table 4 representing Blair's 
position on a scale of obligation 
High Command 
-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
3- an ultimatum was delivered to the 
-+-+ 
Taliban to yield up the terrorists or face 
the consequences. 
4- They were given the choice of siding 
-+-+ 
with justice or siding with terror 
5- our determination to do all we 
humanly can to avoid civilian 
casualties 
-+-+ 
7 - And I gave authority for these assets 
to be deployed 
9- We have to act ... to alleviate the 
suffering of the Afghan people and 
deliver stability ... 
15- People are bound to be concerned 
17- ... we have to fight. 
19- so we will act. 
20- The air assets will be available for 
use in the coming days 
21- We will not let up or rest until our 
objectives are met in full. 
Then, under the Median category are two utterances (8, 14) where the UK and 
the US are also "required to deal" with the situation. And in both cases, the force 
behind this "requirement" is an inanimate subject. It is either an unknown source 
where the US and the UK are required, presumably by the need to act, to provide the 
necessary force (8), or it is "our prosperity and standard of living" which require the 
l'l\. "to deal with the threat" (14). And finally, under the High category, the three 
utterances (9, 15, 17) also communicate similar information, where the people "are 
bound to be concerned" and where the UK and the US "have to act"" and "han? to 
light" in order to help themselves as well as the Afghani people. These utterances 
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portray the receivers of these varying degrees of obligation as only reacting to higher 
forces and not initiators of any action since they are left with no choice. 
The third set mainly communicates the desires of the speaker. The five 
utterances placed under the Median category are those reflecting the speaker's desire 
to "pay tribute ... to Britain's armed forces if [he] might" (1,2), "to say ... to the 
British people why this matters" (10), "to say ... that this is not a war with Islam" 
(13), and that "there is at present no threat" (16). As for the last utterance 
communicating this type of information, it is placed under the High end of the deontic 
scale as it reflects more than the speaker's desire but rather his "determination to do 
all we humanly can to avoid human casualties" (5). 
Finally, the last set of utterances consists of a mixture of the second and third 
categories above; i.e. those which communicate the speakers' desires as well as their 
being required or even forced to perform an action. Utterances like "let us not forget 
that the attacks ... represented the worst terrorist outrage" (11), "we have a direct 
interest in acting ... to protect British lives" (12), and "none of the leaders want war" 
(18) reflect this mixed position of both desire as well as an imposed or even some sort 
of self imposed duty or obligation to act. These utterances are placed under the 
Median category of the deontic scale since they mark a relatively low degree of 
< 
forcefulness to perform the actions desired/required. These can be interpreted as "we 
should not! must not forget ... " (11) and "we want to and should act to protect ... " 
(12). As for the last utterance, this is moved towards the High end of the scale since 
the absence of desire becomes closer to an obligation. As this utterance (18) is 
preceded by a stronger utterance of obligation ("we have to fight"), not wanting to 
fight but doing it anyway suggests an extension of that interpretation: i.e. being forced 
into it. This is followed by the two concluding utterances placed under the High end 
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of the scale "so we will act" (19), and "we will not let up or rest until our objecti ve are 
met in full" (21). These two communicate a mixture of the speaker's desires and 
obligation, and here, even insistence that this does happen. 
6.4.4 Interpretations and Implications 
In light of the ideologies of New Labour discussed above, this speech is quite 
a representative one. To begin with, the situation that Blair faces is in fact rather 
similar to that which New Labour faced in their campaign to win the elections in 
Britain. In other words, it is a highly complex situation reflecting the need to reconcile 
several variables in virtual opposition. In this sense, the language used in this speech 
does, in a way, attend to a familiar situation. 
Two ideological poles reflect this opposition. On the one hand is the socialist 
moralistic ideology based on which a large part of New Labour's national electoral 
support stems. This involves doing what is considered right and moral from the 
socialist as well as the humanitarian perspective. On the other, there are matters 
relating to economic globalisation which are issues in need of international rather than 
national support and which, in return, require political and economic 'favours'. These 
revolve around the capitalist mentality of a profit-oriented economy mainly headed by 
the USA, a set of beliefs which can be in direct opposition with socialist ideology. Yet 
these two potentially conflicting views are reconciled through the role that the Taliban 
and al Qaeda play in the terrorist attacks. And it is done in the following manner. 
First of all, the speech portrays the Taliban and al Qaeda as evil entities and 
organisations whose effects are seen in the September 11 th attacks on the USA and 
where many British civilians died. In that, it establishes common ground through 
emphasising the destructive role of these two organisations which stands in stark 
231 
opposition common western moral ideologies. Following that, the British are forced 
to react in such a way to stop future inevitable attacks from such organisations. 
However, central to the argument is the use of modality in association with different 
infonnation. The two very important issues which are presented using modality are a) 
the evidence that these organisations are indeed behind these attacks and b) the 
manner by which the British themselves can deal with the situation without falling 
into the 'immoral' trap themselves; i.e. by not killing as many, if not more, civilians 
on the other side of the conflict. These two issues are backgrounded through the use 
... 
of low, medium or high modality, marginalizing both the evidence on the basis of 
which the attacks are justified as well as the moral question of the active British 
involvement in a potentially destructive war. 
Moreover, the contrast in emphasis which Blair places on the actions of the 
Taliban as opposed to those of the British forces also contributes to that effect. Blair 
stresses the centrality of moral ideology only when describing the terrorist attacks as 
well as the drug problem in Britain which is directly related to the same group of 
terrorists. These issues are presented in the highest degrees of certainty through the 
absence of any form of modality. In contrast, the view that Britain might inflict death 
on innocent civilians is modalised to emphasise the low certainty that this might 
happen as well as to justify, or at least minimise it when it does happen. 
As discussed above, despite the fact that such information is sometimes 
relatively high on the epistemic scale, it is very hard to justify any force less than that 
of factuality to serve as bases for waging a war. In other words, having undisclosed 
evidence (non-factual proof) which is backed (and therefore potentially masked) by 
the high socio-political status and power of the speaker might raise suspicion 
regarding the urgent need to wage war. Modalised utterances simply do not constitute 
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reliable bases for such a decision. Concurrently, utilising them in this specific 
situation does rhetorically demarcate the degree to which involvement is necessary. 
It follows then that Blair's speech carries dualistic non-complementary 
justifications since it reflects a need to juggle and balance the ideologies of moral 
socialism, profit-oriented capitalism as well as a politically and morally conscious 
audience. There is an incessant need both to emphasise the link between moral and 
economic issues (where the al Qaeda and the Taliban are seen as a threat to human 
lives as well as the economy) as well as to present the situation at hand as imposed on 
the British (where the British are not and cannot, from a moral perspective, be 
initiators of it). 
In short, the differences in the use of modality reflect the differences in the 
issues at hand. Modalised utterances relate to the evidence, justifications, objectives 
and temporal parameters behind the campaign while factual non-modalised utterances 
target such matters as the Prime Minister's pride and confidence in the British forces 
and their involvement in the action as well as the internationality of the effort and 
absence of a connection between Islam and terrorism. And the proportion of one to 
the other adds to the effects sought in the speech. Statistically speaking, non-
modalised utterances greatly outnumber modalised ones, and this type of 
foregrounding (at the level of frequendy) encourages an interpretative view of the text 
as a straightforward, categorical and forceful one. However, comparing the two in 
terms of how critical the issues are, it seems that the topics that are most likely to 




The aim of this chapter was to examine the different effects of the varying use 
of modality in reflecting the ideologies put forward by two political texts addressing 
the same political issue. After tracing the political backgrounds which the two 
speakers represent, the differences in the frequency, type of modal expressions, and 
degree of strength of these expressions between the two political speeches were 
analysed and interpreted. This was done in light of the enveloping ideologies of the 
two political parties, the varying audiences and the differences in the situation for 
each of the USA and the UK. 
Comparing the texts with each other, I pointed out that both speeches initially 
reflect the ideologies of the political parties of which they are a part. In this light, 
Bush's speech was shown to exhibit clarity. It reflected not only the more 
straightforward ideologies of the Republican Party but also the more direct 
involvement of the USA in the attacks and therefore the expectations of the American 
people to take action against these attacks. This gave rise to Bush's propositions: that 
the USA will attack whom it thinks is behind the assault especially after that party 
failed to comply with US demands, a proposition reflected in the high frequency of 
deontic modality. 
The overall use of modality in the Bush speech was seen to represent the 
speaker, and by extension the nation that backs him, as a very forceful one especially 
in his high certainty and emphaticness when describing the Afghani government as 
evil in its support for an evil organisation, when making a set of demands on them, 
and when both predicting and insisting that they will pay a price. This indicated his 
unquestionable belief in the justness of his own judgement concerning what 
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constitutes an evil entity, and when demanding that support from all other nations, 
thus indirectly forcing America's moral ideologies upon the rest of the world. 
On the other hand, the speaker's position becomes weaker when addressing 
other issues. He seems to open the possibility that this mission may not completely 
achieve its objectives as reflected in his uncertainty about the impact the war will 
have on the Afghani government and the al Qaeda network. Still, insisting that the 
terrorists will "pay a price", he settles for that objective rather than bringing them to 
justice. As discussed above, this highlights the higher degree of importance that Bush 
(and by extension the Republican Party and the American people) pays to immediate 
and direct punishment in contrast with long-term justice, a position which falls in line 
with the radical Christian right leanings of the Republican Party. In other words, he is 
under no pressure to justify the mission at the moral level mainly because of the direct 
involvement of the USA in the September the 11 th terrorist attacts which creates a 
sense of urgency to react. As a result, even in his uncertainty, Bush has a relatively 
strong position. 
In short, the image of Bush that seems to be projected as a result of this variety 
in degrees of modal strength is his might as a world leader whose cause is just and 
supported both nationally and internationally regardless of the effects that the war 
might have on the rest of the world. 
Blair's speech, on the other hand, involves more variables and is therefore less 
singular in purpose. Yet it too falls in line with the ideologies of New Labour and the 
Third Way which seeks to reconcile the morality of socialism and the economic 
market forces of capitalism. This is evident in the varying use of modality to reflect 
the altering strength and forcefulness of the speaker concerning the issues at hand. 
Blair is most certain and thus forceful when announcing the involvement of British 
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forces in the action, his pride and confidence in them, the need for the action and the 
internationality of the effort. Yet as argued above, the less certain but highly relevant 
moral issues are backgrounded by the use of modality and drowned by the 
overwhelming majority of non-modalised utterances. While non-modalised utterances 
relate to those matters mentioned above as well as the absence of a connection 
between Islam and terrorism, modalised utterances target the evidence, justifications, 
objectives and temporal parameters behind the campaign. And the proportion of one 
to the other adds to the effects sought in the speech. The vast majority of non-
modalised utterances in comparison to modalised ones suggests a reading of the text 
as a straightforward, categorical and forceful one. However, this lies in contrast with 
the criticalness of the issues involved. As concluded earlier, it seems that the topics 
that are most likely to demand higher certainty and forcefulness on behalf of the 
speaker are the ones receiving less. 
Of course, the motive behind Blair's use of modality also springs from the 
disparity in the situation between the USA and the UK. As mentioned above, the 
urgency for military action which arises out of the directness of involvement of the 
two countries is quite different. Moreover, the ideologies of the two ruling parties as 
well as the differences in the audience in each country makes it particularly important 
for Blair to c o n v i n ~ i n g l y y justify war for the British people while this is not of equal 
weight for Bush. All this is handled by the use of modality. 
In conclusion, this chapter has tried to present practical examination of the 
central role modality plays in analysing political ideologies in political texts. This was 
done through a systematic analysis of the two different types and of modality and the 
way these reflect the speakers' types and degrees of involvement and authority. The 
placement of each modal expression under one or more categories of each or both 
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scales depended on each unique context and the way that particular context of use. 
This allowed for controlled variance in different interpretations which, I argued, was 
characteristic of a pragmatic view of discourse. More importantly, however, this 
served as a practical method by which the role of the reader in text analysis is 
realistically and practically considered. To summarise, by considering all those factors 
relating to the producers of the texts (along with their backgrounds and ideological 
affiliations), the texts (in the contexts of their writing and delivery) and the readers (as 
influence by socio-cultural/political/economic factors), and through a reading of 
modality in these texts, the speakers' levels of involvement and authority were 
analysed. This ultimately helped determine the speakers' ideological positions 
towards specific information and beliefs on the one hand, and towards their 
relationships with others on the other. 
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VII Modality, Ideology and Scientific Discourse 
7.1 Introduction 
The historical view of Science as a field of enquiry has always placed it in 
virtual opposition with literature, on the one hand, and with religion, on the other. In 
the first case, contrasting science with literature symbolised the stereotypical split 
between 'rational' and 'objective' detachment on one end, and 'emotional' and 
'subjective' involvement on the other. The effects of this split following the 
"scientific revolution" in Europe lead to people feeling quite "disturbed by the picture 
that science presented, of a universe regulated by automatic physical laws and of a 
vast gulf between humanity and the rest of nature" (Halliday 1993: 2). Science had 
certainly enlarged the size of the universe; however, it had turned it into "a lifeless 
machine, which worked by forces that could be expressed in mathematical formulae, 
not in poetry" (Davie 1963: 2). This was referred to as "the paradox of classical 
science" since while science was seen to initiate "a successful dialogue with nature", 
the first outcome of this dialogue was "the discovery of a silent world" (Prigogine and 
Stengers 1984: 6). In their book Order out of Chaos, Prigogine and Stengers write: 
[science] revealed to men a dead, passive nature, a nature that behaves as an automation 
which, once programmed, continues to follow the rules inscribed in the program. In this sense 
the dialogue with nature isolated man from nature instead of bringing him closer to it. A 
triumph of human reason onto a sad truth. It seemed that science debased everything it 
touched. (Prigogine and Stengers 1984: 6) 
From a scientific perspective, what was judged as 'real' was, therefore, "what 
could be measured, weighed, and expressed in numbers" (Davie 1963: 2). Unlike 
literature which focused on the emotional, experiential and sensual aspects to life, 
science presented a stark contrast of a dry, lifeless "mechanistic uni verse run on 
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mathematical principles and devoid of colour, scent, taste and sound" (Davie 1963: 
1). 
Viewing science as standing in opposition with religion, on the other hand, 
reflected the threat that science posed to the dominant religious powers at different 
times and its direct challenge to religion's sometimes totalitarian authority. The 
reason for that threat was that science provided an alternative way of perceiving the 
world and how it operated; i.e. a new understanding of the world and a more 'rational' 
account of many previously unexplained natural phenomena. This largely affected 
-people's lives, sometimes in extreme ways whereby science became the new religion. 
Such effects in the developments of the numerous fields of science, especially at 
earlier stages of scientific evolution, can be easily traceable in the altering modes of 
thinking of societies at different times. According to Aronowitz (1988: 129) for 
instance, "the Enlightenment and its aftermath imposed the rigors of scientific 
thought" upon the whole of society in a fashion resembling the traditions of religious 
institutions. Instead of regarding science and its rules as one mode of thinking among 
others, "instrumental reason became the only possible mode of thinking, and all other 
modes were relegated to the realm of myth", especially those of religion (Aronowitz 
1988: 129). 
In line with the guiding view adopted in this thesis, i.e. that all texts are 
essentially ideological, science and scientific discourse 16 seem to address the issue of 
ideology in a unique way. While political discourse explicitly addresses ideological 
issues, literary discourse (the examples selected for analysis) was seen target 
ideological matters in an implicit manner. Here, scientific discourse seems not to fall 
within any of these categories. Indeed, historically, science seems to occupy the status 
16 As will be explained later, the development in the field of science is hard to separate from that of 
scientific discourse. 
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of an objective truth-oriented field of inquiry whose ultimate goal is the understandin a 
t::: 
of human and natural phenomena as they are. This consequently gives the impression 
that science is that field of inquiry which has no ideological moti vation except the 
good of all. 
In the light of this argument, the multiple aims of this chapter are the 
following: firstly, I wish to argue against this historical notion of science and 
scientific discourse based on more recent Post-Marxist views. Secondly, I aim to 
assess the way modality functions and is utilised in scientific discourse and how that 
relates to the ideological commitments of the two texts under study. Finally, and in 
line with the view adopted in this thesis, I argue that ideologies and possible 
ideological struggles in discourse are not always political struggles whose main 
objective is political hegemony. 
7.2 Science, Truth and Objectivity: A Historical Review 
The evolution of science was the evolution of scientific thought. The evolution of science was 
... the evolution of scientific grammar. 
(Halliday 1993: 12) 
The type and level of interdependence of the field of science, scientific 
dIscourse, scientific language and the philosophy of science on one another are rather 
intricate in that their development has historically been interrelated. Commenting on 
this interrelationship, Sankey (Forthcoming: 1) describes the "linguistic aspects of 
science" as key factors in almost all topics in science, "from the topics of 
confirmation and explanation to those of laws of nature and the dynamics of theory 
change". Moreover, one of the main areas of interest in the philosophy of science is 
"the semantic and epistemic features of scientific discourse" which are mainly 
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concerned with the traditional philosophical/linguistic Fregean 'sense' and 'reference' 
of the vocabulary used by scientists. Hence, the centrality and importance of usina the 
~ ~
most suitable and appropriate language and terminology in scientific discourse 
reflects not only the importance of precision as a fundamental quality in scientific 
description but also the precision of science in general and therefore, its image as a 
reliable field of inquiry. 
In fact, historically speaking, major views in scientific theory have been 
highly influenced by, and have sometimes even sprung from, philosophical and 
linguistic arguments concerning the objectives and methodologies of science. One of 
the earliest is that of the logical positivists which was the dominant view between the 
1920s and 1930s17 • This group mainly argued that the bases for scientific data were 
"sense-data", and therefore, the central theme of logical positivism in Sankey's words 
is "the principle of verifiability" (Forthcoming: 5). This view had its toll on scientific 
circles from within since "verificationism" became indeed the central objective and 
methodology adopted by physicists, for example, to gain general acceptance in these 
circles and beyond (Forthcoming: 5). At that time, verificationism proved as one 
arbitrator for differentiating between valid sciences and invalid ones, valid arguments 
and invalid ones. This meant that metaphysics, for instance, was dismissed as 
"meaningless nonsense" since metaphysical claims about a transcendent reality lying 
beyond experience were essentially unverifiable (Sankey Forthcoming: 6). 
The verifiability of claims by reference to sense-data meant that science 
sprang from what was considered "indubitable data" and such data can therefore "be 
described in a neutral observation-language independent of all theories" (Barbour 
1974: 94). Emphasis was therefore laid on "observation and its independence from 
17 Logical positivism has usually been regarded as an extreme form of empiricism. 
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theory" (Barbour 1974: 94). Then, experimental verification served as the main 
'objective' criterion for judging between rival theories. In short, the positivists' 
accounts of science which were prevalent during that time defended the 'objectivity' 
of science through three claims: 
1- that science starts from "publicly observable data which can be described 
in a pure observation-language independent of any theoretical 
assumptions" , 
2- that theories can therefore be "verified or falsified by comparison with this 
fixed experimental data", 
3- and that the choice between rival theories is "rational, objective, and in 
accordance with specifiable criteria" (Barbour 1974: 92-93). 
As a result, whether implicitly or explicitly stated, science was equated with 
the truth, and this, according to Aronowitz (1988: viii) meant that science was "held 
immune from the influences of social and historical situations". This dominant view 
that "the aim of science is to discover the truth about an objective reality, and that 
scientific progress consists in an increasing convergence on the truth about such a 
reality" (Sankey Forthcoming: 22) remained the prevalent one until the 1950s. 
In the 1950s a milder and modified version of 'empiricism' sprang from , 
philosophers of science like Nagel, Hempel, Braithwaite and Popper who argued for 
two distinct levels in science: an unproblematic lower level of unchanging, objecti ve 
data, "describable in a pure observation language on which all observers can agree" 
and a separate upper level of theoretical constructs, acknowledged as "products of 
man's creative imagination" (Barbour 1974: 94). 
2.+2 
This first level of science, for Popper (1959: 36), is established by statements 
that can be subjected to refutation, or "empirical validation". Although there might be 
some serious and often profound "disputes of interpretation" within "true science" 
, 
there is a common basis which "all scientists share" and that is the "method" which 
underlies all scientific endeavours (Popper 1959: 36). This dominance of shared 
methods is what guarantees "the reliability of what counts as science" and it can be 
reduced to two procedures: 
a- mathematical calculation, and 
b- experimental validation/falsification of results. 
These two work hand in hand in that the role of mathematics is to ensure "the 
rigor of investigation, establishing measurable relations" while that of 
experimentalism is to "[restore] to observation its role as final arbiter of knowledge" 
(Aronowitz 1988: 8). Here, again, experimental data was seen to fulfil the role of the 
unbiased final arbitrator testing the validity of theories in a neutral manner. And the 
most important criterion in doing so is "the number and variety of supporting 
experimental observations" (Barbour 1974: 92). This means that a theory is valued if 
it "accurately accounts for known observations and yields precise predictions of 
future measurements" (Barbour 1974: 92). 
It follows that for most scientists c o n t e m p o r a n e o ~ u s s with post-positivist 
thought, the experimental method was believed to be "ideology-proof' and 
constituted the only device to ensure the neutrality of inquiry with respect to interests 
that contaminate the results (Aronowitz 1988: 149). This is the case since the truth 
claims of science are "tied to the methodological imperative" which are directly 
founded on and constituted of these unarguable agreed-upon bases. (Aronowitz 1988: 
Viii). This ideology promotes a definition of science as "the concatenation of 
2.+3 
empirical and a priori mathematical knowledge whose detennining moment is 
independent experience" (Aronowitz 1988: 239). The only troublesome level of 
science was the second theoretical one since it was possibly subject to a priori 
ideological influence. However, this level was completely disregarded as less 
important by shifting emphasis to the first empirical level with which "true science" 
was concerned (Popper 1959: 36). 
Even the highly sceptical Marxist theory shared this scientific understanding 
and its ideology. According to Aronowitz (1988: 37), Marxism treated empirical 
-
scientific theory and the development of technology "as an outgrowth of these 
sciences that arise from observation and experiment rather than from ideologically 
mediated institutions". In fact, Marxism believed only in a partial ideological basis to 
science. While it acknowledged the possibility that the findings of science could be 
used to serve the purposes of one class with one dominant ideology, it did not 
recognise the ideological sub-basis for scientific research in the first place. In 
Aronowitz' (1988: 38) words, Marxist theory has not generally acknowledged the 
way in which "bourgeois" social relations "influence the relations of humans to 
nature, detennine or condition the nature of scientific discovery, and provide a basis 
for a critique of the methodology of the sciences". 
Based on such opinions, even these moderate views of science were subject to 
mounting criticism in the 1960s. The argument gaining increasing credibility was that 
the "expectations" and "conceptual commitments" of both scientists and non-
scientists influence perceptions whether in everyday life or in science (Barbour 1974: 
95). At every stage of a scientific experiment, the scientist's presuppositions influence 
the way she formulates a problem, the kind of apparatus she builds, and which 
variable she considers important. In other words, the theory in light of which a 
~ 4 4 4
scientist is working permeates observation, and this is reflected in the language in 
which observations are reported. There are, in brief, "no bare uninterpreted data" 
(Barbour 1974: 95). 
In line with this view, the late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed the rise of the 
historical school of the philosophy of science which highlighted "developmental and 
contextual aspects of science" in what Sankey (Forthcoming: 10) calls "the historical 
turn". In a direct challenge to the earlier empiricists' views that anything that can be 
theorised is based on corresponding "sense-data", the first counter-argument put 
forward by the historical school is that science does not always deal directly with 
natural phenomena. As Von Weizsacker (1980: 183) points out, theoretical physics, 
for instance, "may posit phenomena for which the data not only are unavailable but 
cannot be observed or measured". For reasons of physical difficulty of experimenting 
with the primary system or the sheer abstractness of the system, scientific models are 
used to serve as a practically manageable representation or illustration of the system 
under study. Of course, as Barbour (1974) rightly argues, the model can bring into 
prominence only certain aspects of the world while other aspects are neglected. This 
means that science models are highly selective since they allow scientists to deal with 
only restricted aspects of scientific and natural phenomena. Moreover, the fact that 
< 
science deals with the unobservable means that the claim that scientific models lead to 
theories which can be tested against observations does not always stand. 
Another counter-argument put forward by Kuhn (1962: 94, 103) stressed that 
individual scientific theories are developed within the context of a set of underlying 
theoretical assumptions which he termed "paradigms". These underlying bases for the 
thought and action of a scientific community, its "paradigms", are defined as 
"standard examples of scientific work which embody a set of conceptual, 
245 
methodological and metaphysical assumptions" (Kuhn 1962: 94). This meant that 
scientific theory is both paradigm and context dependent, and consequently, as the 
history of science shows, scientific 'method' according to the historical school is also 
"open to revision" and change as 'theory' is (Sankey Forthcoming: 12). Such change 
during a scientific revolution is, however, hardly "a matter of logical argument" but 
rather "of conversion" (Kuhn 1962: 103). 
In short, in their rejection of the three initial claims of the logical positivists, 
and the paradigms of the post-positivist empiricists, the three counter-claims 
advanced by the historical movement are: 
1- that "all data are theory-laden; there is no neutral observation-language", 
2- that "theories are not verified or falsified; when data conflicts with an 
accepted theory, they are usually set to one side as anomalies, or else 
auxiliary assumptions are modified", 
3- and that "there are no criteria for choice between rival theories of great 
generality, for the criteria are themselves theory-dependent" (Barbour 
1974: 93). 
And the main point in this latest movement is to stress the ideological 
underlying basis for all levels of scientific research: scientific theories, scientific data, 
scientific methods and scientific language. While Wittgenstein (1968) maintains that 
observation is "theory laden", Heisenberg (1958: 9) concludes that,facts "are theory, 
language, and technique laden, making relations, not things, the true object of inquiry 
in contemporary science". Thus, the main critical issue remains whether and to what 
extent that which is considered as scientific knowledge is subordinate to 
ideology/power, not only in relation to the social conditions necessary for its 
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emergence development or its political and social uses, but also and more importantly 
with respect to the constitution of scientific facts, laws and methodology. 
7.2.1 Scientific Discourse, Power and Ideology 
As mentioned above, the different views regarding the relationship between 
science, objectivity and the truth came about and developed more from the philosophy 
of science and discourse on science rather than the discourse of science. Indeed, 
philosophers of science like Wittgenstein and Heisenberg were the ones who 
highlighted the direct relationship between language and scientific terminology. It 
was they who pointed out that the language used in interpreting the data and which 
"supplies the categories of interpretation" is just as "influenced by prior theories" as 
the finding themselves (Aronowitz 1988: 250). Consequently, in line with the main 
view adopted in this thesis concerning the dialectical relationship between language 
and ideology, the position taken on in this chapter is that the underlying theory not 
only influences 'observation' and the methods of undertaken in science, but also the 
language that frames and reports what is seen. In other words, the 'names' for the 
observed in science are generated by language which can in tum be theory-laden 
(Aronowitz 1988: 250). As Halliday (1993: 8) adequately phrases it: 
The language of science is, by its nature, a language in which theories are constructed; its 
special features are exactly those which make theoretical discourse possible. But this clearly 
means that the language is not passively reflecting some pre-existing conceptual structure; on 
the contrary, it is actively engaged in bringing such structures into being. 
(Halliday 1993: 8) 
Therefore, science - just like any type of discourse - cannot be free of 
histOrical and discursive presuppositions. Here, the main outcome of the presence of 
these presuppositions is an overall undermining of the autonomous power of science 
and its claims of truth and objectivity. As Aronowitz (1988: viii-ix) suggests, the 
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claim of authority by science can result only from science's alleged "possession of 
legitimate knowledge, of which scientific discourses are supreme" and is sustainable 
only within that argument. Such power, I argue, has been achieved in scientific 
discourse through several layers of distancing and self-isolation. 
From a Hallidayan multifunctional view, looking at the question of distance is 
reflected in the relationship between linguistic and social structures (particularly 
ideology). According to Halliday (1993; 1998), science seems to make use of 
linguistic choices and features namely "nominalisation" for two distinct 
ideological/functional purposes: 
Ideationally, the nominalising grammar creates a universe of things, bounded, stable and 
determinate; and (in place of process) of relations between the things. Interpersonally, it sets 
itself apart as a discourse of the expert, readily becoming a language of power and 
technocratic control. In both aspects, it creates maximum distance between technical scientific 
knowledge and the experience of daily life. 
(Halliday 1998: 228) 
A similar view is adopted by Kress (1985: 57) who argues that "the ideology 
of science insists on ... objectivity" since historically speaking, the traditional aim of 
science has been the 'objective' uncovering of the truth behind natural phenomena. 
This claim of non-ideological commitment, therefore, is reflected and reinforced by 
what Kress (1985: 57) describes as "the appearance of immutable truth and factuality 
to the statements of science". This according to Kress (1985: 57) typically 
characterises the structure of scientific discourse. 
Another angle of looking at the issue of distance in the discourse of science, is 
Aronowitz's (1988: 147) argument that today's scientific circles are heavily reliant on 
"the notations of mathematics" and "adaptations of symbolic logic", and this is seen 
as a quality exclusive to intellectuals, and more specifically, to those who have 
undergone the necessary education in accredited institutions. In such scientific 
circUits, ordinary language, its syntax and characteristic modes of utterance gi ve way 
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to mathematics and specialised discourses, which in fact "count as scientific 
knowledge" (Aronowitz 1988: 148). In this sense, the general view of science \\hich 
emerges is that where science is seen to concern itself not with '''meaning,' only with 
truth, which [in tum] is construed as the confonnity of a proposition to the outcome of 
a procedure of scientific experiment" (Aronowitz 1988: 148). And all this is 
accessible only to that very exclusive group mentioned. 
Moreover, this exclusivity brings out further related arguments which 
complete the circle of distancing and self-isolation and intensify the view that science 
... 
belongs to a close-knit circle of intellectuals. Such arguments highlight science's 
claims of "self-referentiality" where the only possible criticism of science would have 
to spring from within the boundaries of its own normative structures. This means that 
"only those inducted, by means of training and credentials, into its community are 
qualified to undertake whatever renovations the scientific project requires" 
(Aronowitz 1988: viii). Indeed, science's legitimatisation of its power has been 
achieved and is achievable through its claims of "self-referentiality" (Aronowitz 
1988: viii). 
This view of science as a type of discourse with special languages, rules of 
investigation, and forms of inquiry that determine the form of the result reinforces the 
ideology which e q u a t e ~ ~ science with the truth. And it is the type of linguistic 
distancing discussed above which serves as one central tool utilised by scientific 
discourse in order to maintain its authoritative status. 
7.2.2 Scientific Discourse and Modality 
Rephrasing the conclusions reached above, the use of mathematical notations 
and symbolic logic in the language of science are two main characteristics which 
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serve the objective of helping maintain science's authoritative status. Moreover, the 
use of nominalised structures (Halliday 1993; 1998) and of passive structures (Kress 
1985) are two specific linguistic structures which achieve the distance-power effect. 
Yet another prominent but less discussed area, which surfaces more visibly in light of 
the sometimes-incompatible views discussed above, is the use of modality. In light of 
the importance of the role and functions of modality in this thesis, the next issues to 
address are the manner by which scientific discourse utilises modality and the effects 
of its use on the field of science in general. 
K10dality is a central notion in science and scientific discourse since according 
to Blackburn (1986: 127), science deals more with necessities and less with facts. The 
centrality of the concept of modality is evident, to begin with, in standard scientific 
deductions where modality is a common feature in the phrasing of these statements. 
As Blackburn (1986: 119) argues, "conclusions properly drawn" in science "must be 
true when the premises are" (emphasis mine). And this is quite common in scientific, 
especially mathematical, theorems which are more often phrased as necessarily true 
rather than being plainly true. The reason for the presence of modality, according to 
Quine (1986), is that the truth of scientific deductions depends on the truth of 
underlying premises, which in tum is based exclusively on the criterion of 
"obviousness" . 
The criterion of obviousness is, nonetheless, problematic on two levels. First, 
being 'obvious' is a relative circumstantial evaluation since while the expression "'it 
is raining' is obvious only in particular circumstances; '1+1=2' is 'obvious outright'" 
(Blackburn 1986: 129). Secondly, regarding '" 1 + 1=2' as necessary" is more because 
"we have chosen to do so" rather than because "we have to do so" (Blackburn 1986: 
128). This means that the very bases on which scientific deductions rely are in effect a 
250 
set of agreed upon presuppositions rather than outright 'obvious' ob1ective f' t 
J ac s, 
Here, the underlying conditions for the obviousness in "1 + 1=2" is an agreement on 
what '1' and '2' stand for as well as on the relationship of addition and equality. all of 
which are agreed upon constants, on the basis of which and in relation to which 
different variables function. In short, the criterion of obviousness constitutes the bases 
for what count as "paradigms" in Kuhn's (1962) terminology and is therefore not 
always an effective way assessing the truth-value of propositions because of its partial 
subjective nature. This partly subjective assessment is directly linked to the notion of 
modality, and this means that modality is a central notion in describing scientific, 
particularly mathematical notions and theorems. 
Of course, the use of modality, which reflects different degrees of subjectivity, 
indeterminacy, certainty and authority, is not done in the same way in all branches of 
science. The type and level of modality utilised by different scientific fields depends 
on how 'factual' and 'objective' a particular field regards itself and is regarded to be. 
On a scale of subjectivity, and influenced by positivists and post positivist scientific 
theory, there is a tendency to view mathematics as the purer, more objective/pure 
form of science while other forms are less objective/pure. This scale becomes, in fact, 
a continuum of 'scientificness', where mathematics occupies one end while social 
sciences the other. And this is the case since mathematics is founded on a limited 
number of axioms (paradigms of mathematics) which constitute a recognised/actual 
bases of mathematics (Lindberg 2002: personal communication). 
However, even with those axioms which are agreed upon at the intersubjecti \c 
level within the field of mathematics and the sub-group of mathematicians. there are 
other groups of mathematicians (such as the constructivist group) who do not approve 
on all these bases (Lindberg 2002: personal communication). In other words. even 
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with 'extreme' and 'pure' science, those 'objective' bases do not constitute 
completely reliable, agreed-upon footing. This makes axioms in mathematics a set of 
agreed-upon presuppositions constituting pseudo-factual foundations on which 
mathematical theorems are based. And this explains why even within this least 
subjective field of science (mathematics), there are few factual non-modalised 
statements. In fact, mathematical theorems are mostly made up of "necessary-
sufficient" conditional statements. As Blackburn (1986: 127) concludes, in science 
"we allow possibilities, rule out impossibilities, and insist upon necessities". Science 
is, in brief, a field of inquiry which is based on the modalities of subjectivity, 
possibility and necessity, and the language of scientific discourse reflects these bases. 
Therefore, modality should be present in the 'purest' sciences as well as social 
SCIences. 
Moreover, another and a principal dimension to the presence of modality in 
scientific discourse is the role of ideology in science. This is an extension of the 
previously discussed philosophical views of science. On the one hand, there is the 
unchallengeable authority of scientific enquiry which springs from the certainty and 
objectivity claims of positivist thought. This is reflected through science's non-
modalised, nominalised and passivised statements of facts stressing the "immutable 
truth and factuality" of science, and an ideology of objectivity as referred to by Kress 
(1985: 57). On the other hand, more recent scientific discourse reflects two conflicting 
views and directions in science. The first is that which pushes for the authority and 
strength of the more objective, less ideologically motivated quests in scientific 
research and experimentation. The second is a view which reflects the weakness of 
the partiality of scientific knowledge and the underlying ideological determinants for 
scientific research. 
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However, the relative modal weakness that reflects the uncertainty and 
partiality of scientific knowledge is, as I argue in detail below, what guarantees the 
continuity of science as we know it. In the interest of accuracy to scientific findings, 
the use of modality in the discourse of science plays a central role in acknowledging 
science's uncertainties, thus both maintaining the view that the 'truth' is its ultimate 
goal as well as drawing a clear dividing line between what is considered indisputable 
evidence (non-modalised, nominalised and objective-passive utterances) and that 
considered experimental (modalised, yet still nominalised, objective-passive 
utterances). This, I claim, falls in line with what I see as an ideology of preservation, 
a preservation of the traditional dichotomy between scientificness and non-
scientificness, and the continuity of science. 
Therefore, in line with these arguments and claims, the aim of the next section 
is to practically explore the role of modality in reflecting the ideologies in two 
scientific texts. The main objective is to show how, through a systematic analysis of 
the way modality is utilised in these two scientific texts, different ideologies are 
communicated, and whether these ideologies reflect the positions brought up by the 
philosophical arguments discussed above. This will start, however, by first 
introducing and justifying the choice of the two scientific texts selected for the 
analyses. 
7.3 Texts and Backgrounds 
The two texts chosen for analysis are those targeting the issue of the role of 
vitamins in nutrition and combating disease. The first text is a selection from a 
scientific article entitled "Modification of Neoplastic Process by Vitamin A and 
Retinoids" (1984) found in the edited book, Recent Vitamin Research (see appendix 
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6). This book is essentially a collection of scientific articles targeting a highly specific 
audience who is supposedly familiar with the jargon of that particular field of science. 
It is an article written by a medical doctor addressing the medical circle. 
The second is a selection from a text on a website which essentially deals with 
nutritional products including vitamin supplements. Although this text also discusses 
the role of vitamins in nutrition and fighting disease, it is not targeted at a restricted 
group of readers. This is suggested through its presence on a website with easy access 
as well as through the elaborate explanation in non-scientific jargon of any use of 
scientific terminology, probably to make its comprehension more accessible. The title 
of the article is "Homocysteine and Cardiovascular Health" (1998) and it is also 
written by a Ph.D. holder although no specification is made whether the author is a 
medical doctor (see appendix 7). 
Both texts are therefore comparable in that they target a very similar topic: 
vitamins and their nutritional and disease combating properties. Their areas of 
difference, however, are essentially related to the type of audiences they target as well 
as the way information is displayed in each article. The first one, which targets a 
highly specified audience, is quite descriptive. It describes a number of experimental 
processes, findings and conclusions which deal with the possible associations between 
vitamin A and a skin curing process. This is done in a highly speculative manner 
acknowledging the limitations of the field's knowledge. The second text, while also 
being descriptive, is nevertheless significantly more argumentative. It argues for a 
specific view concerning the positive effects of vitamins and consequently the link 
between vitamins and vitamin supplements. 
In this sense, and as will be shown later, while the ideologies of the first text 
do not greatly depart from those more traditional claims of scientific discourse 
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mentioned above (and discussed in more detail below), the underlying commercial 
bases behind the second text seem to determine its ideological affiliation. These 
readings are clarified through a systematic analysis of modality in both texts and how 
modality reflects the ideological positions of each text. First, however, it is crucial to 
justify the choice of the selected texts in the light of the historical views of science 
introduced above and the inseparability of science as a field of inquiry and the 
language of scientific discourse. 
The main reason the general area of 'vitamin research' was selected is due to 
its high controversiality in the views of many experts in the field. This controversy 
can be seen to go to the roots of what are considered by many as the unshakable 
foundations of our knowledge about vitamins and nutrition: "the guidelines for 
Recommended Dietary Allowances (RDA)" (Tolonen 1990: 35). In his book Vitamins 
and Minerals in Health and Nutrition, Tolonen (1990: 36) argues that although RDA 
constitutes the core of our reference, "very few people, and this includes most doctors, 
really know what the recommendations are based on, or precisely how these figures 
are arrived at". In fact, the bases on which RDAs stand are not only over 60 years old, 
but also arise from ways of experimentation which are referred to as "nul-
experiments" (Tolonen 1990: 38). Such experiments, according to Tolonen (1990: 38, 
39) were either methodologically flawed, or took animals as their subjects knowing 
that animals react very differently to different vitamins than humans do. In short, "our 
knowledge about vitamin and mineral requirements is so lacking" that dietary experts 
and "many doctors tend to be of the opinion that a varied diet is sufficient, and that 
food supplements are therefore unnecessary" (Tolonen 1990: 36,38). 
The same argument is made by Bender (1980: 40) who concludes by saying 
"there is no evidence that these [vitamins] are necessary, but equally there is no 
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evidence that they are hannful (apart from the possibility of massive, toxic 
overdoses)". The controversial nature of the general area of research (i.e. that referred 
to by Bazennan (1998: 17) as "science-in-the-making") from which the two texts are 
selected is what constitutes the main interest for analysis. This interest springs from 
Bazerman's (1998: 17) view that this controversial science would be "deeply 
competitive and contentious, [while] science-once-made appears co-operative and 
harmonious". In other words, both texts should exhibit certain ideological struggles, 
possibly inconsistencies, which an analysis of modality can potentially help shed light 
on. 
7.4 Analysis 1 
As discussed earlier, the first text is a selection from a scientific article written 
by a medical doctor addressing the medical circle, a highly specific audience who 
should at least be familiar with the jargon of that particular field of science. In that, 
the level of fonnality of the text is very high and this is exemplified in the overall 
absence of the first person pronoun. Also, the text is generally less argumentative and 
more descriptive, addressing a number of experimental processes, findings and 
conclusions that deal with the possible associations between yitamin A and a process 
which cures skin disease. 
The first noticeable aspect of text 1 (as far as modality is concerned) is the 
presence of a vast majority of non-modalised factual utterances. This reinforces the 
view that scientific discourse is essentially concerned with presenting relatively 
factual descriptions of the workings of science, where science characteristically deals 
with natural phenomena as well as with experiments on these phenomena conducted 
in a systematic, methodological way. 
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Another prevalent characteristic of the text is the predominance of passive 
structures which also contributes to the sense of objectivity highlighted through 
describing scientific processes and findings. Therefore, both the factuality of 
unmodalised utterances along with the uninvolved objectivity of passive structures 
overwhelming projected in this text play the leading role in reflecting the degree of 
knowledge communicated and the power associated with that knowledge. The 
combined effects of these two features ultimately underline the force and forcefulness 
of the information in the text. 
-Yet the overall picture of the presentation of knowledge throughout text 1 is 
not that constant. Going through both the modalised and non-modalised utterances 
systematically, the following features concerning the positions conveyed in the article 
arise. Under the factuality end of the scale, the utterances presented in the highest 
degree of authority relate to two main areas. The first is a set of definitions of certain 
biochemical categories such as vitamin A (2) and retinol reductase (4). The second is 
a set of factual descriptions of states and techniques which, presumably, constitute 
generally agreed-upon, intersubjective-factual bases in the medicallbiochemical 
world. They describe processes by which certain bio-chemical reactions occur and 
their well-known effects such as the fact that "Retinol is .,. re-esterified with 
unsaturated fatty acids and transported in chylomicrons to the liver" (6). These are 
straightforward groupings (see table 1). 
The groupings of utterances under the modalised branches of the epistemic 
scale are, on the other hand, not that straightforward. These constitute of a set of 
utterances which are graded in terms of the level of confessed knowledge or 
ignorance associated with different hypothetical situations. These are either entirely 
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contemplative situations or ones based on variant types and degrees of supporting 
evidence: whether direct explicit evidence, perceptions or other scientific suggestions. 
Low Med High Factuality 
25-If -+-+-+-+ 5-there is I-Animal species lack the biochemical pathways necessary to 
epoxidation is 13-this evidence of synthesize the carotenoid structure, a precursor of vitamin- A. 
blocked, the protein reduced 2-Vitamin A is a generic term for compounds with the 
function of associates conversion of biological activity of retinal and was initially called fat-
retinoic acid with B-carotene to soluble A, as it is absorbed in the small intestine with lipids. 
is not prealbumin, retinol in zinc 3-Carotenoids are likewise absorbed and are split in the 
inhibited, presumably deficiency. intestinal mucosa into two molecules of retinal which is then 
suggesting to form a 15- ... and reduced to retinol. 
that - larger estimation of 4-Retinol reductase is a zinc-dependent enzyme and 
epoxidation is molecule retinol-binding 6-Retinol is then re-esterified with unsaturated fatty acids and 
not a that is not protein in transported in chylomicrons to the liver. 
necessary filtered by urine has 7-At the liver, the ester linkage is hydrolysed and the 
metabolic step the recently been molecule enters the liver cells as retinol, where it is re-
for biological glomerulus. proposed as a esterified and stored associated with lipid droplets. 
activity. 21-However means of 8-The esterification of retinol is analogous to that of other 
27 -The 4-oso recent detecting cellular lipids, such as cholesterol, and is catalysed by fatty 
and 5,6-epoxy evidence disturbed renal acyl coenzyme A retinol acyl transferase. 
metabolites suggests that tubular 9-Much retinol (19% of liver vitamin A) is found in high 
appear to retinoic acid function. molecular weight lipoprotein complex in rat liver cytosol; this 
have less stimulates 19-There is complex also contains the cytosol - retinol-binding protein, 
biological testosterone evidence that retinyl palmitate hydrolase as well as triolein, cholesterol 
activity than production retinol is oleate, and dipalmitoyl phosphatidyIcholine hydroslase 
retinoic acid. by Leydig metabolized to activities. 
29-0xidation cells in the retinoic acid in 10-The complex was isolated by gel filteration and 
ofretinoic testis. several ultracentrifugation, but it may represent an artifact generated 
acid is 26-The specIes; during tissue homofenization. 
believed to be reaction is 20-retinoic 11-The principal liver cell involved in storage of retinol is the 
mediated by probably a acid has all the Ito or stellate cell which can be found in the space of Disse 
a cytochrome non-specific biological adjacent to the sinusoids. 
P-type lipid properties of 12-1f retinol is required by the peripheral tissues, it is 
enzyme peroxidation retinol except transported by a retinol-binding protein, which is synthesized 
system. reaction. that it will not in the liver and migrates with the serum globulins; 
31- '" and 37- Liver support vision 14-The retinol-binding protein concentration in plasma and 
may be either stores of and plasma retinol is increased in chronic renal disease ... 
an active vitamin A reproductive 16-Retinol-binding protein interacts with specific cell surface 
metabolite or are functions. receptors at the retinol requiring peripheral tissues. 
a tolerated probably 44-There is 17-Free retinol exerts a detergent-like action on membranes 
modification. the best evidence that and is responsible for vitamin A toxicity effects. 
32-The index of the low serum 18- The synthesis and secretion of retinol-binding protein is 
suggestion vitamin A vitamin A is regulated by vitamin A status, which is decreased in 
has been status; due to deficiency states, and by factors that alter liver protein 
made that -+-+-+-+ increased synthesis. 
glucuronida- 38-plasma renal loss in 22-There is some in vivo isomerization of all-trans retinoic 
tion ensures levels of these acid to 13-cis-retinoic acid, which is further metabolized as to 
conservation vitamin A circumstances more polar derivatives such as 5,6-epoxy retinoic acid and 4-
of vitamin A show little hydrozy-and 4-oxo derivatives in various rat tissues, 
in the body by correlation including liver. 
enterohepatic with dietary 23-There is a retinoic acid 5,6-epoxidase in rat kidney 
circulation; intake and microsomes which is dependent on ATP, NADPH. and 02. 
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34-As the 4- reflect the 2 ~ - 1 t t is stimulated by Fe2+ and has properties like 
hydroxylation amount of mIcrosomal lipid preoxidases. 
reaction may plasma 28-However, there are multiple metabolites which are at least 
represent a retinol- partially tissue specific and retinoids induce retinoic acid 
catabolic binding metabolism in vitamin A-deficient hamsters. 
pathway, this protein. 30-However, retinol-B-glucuronide, a major metabolite of 
could account :etinoic. acid in the small intestine that is also produced by 
for the mcubatmg 5,6-epoxy retinoic acid with uridine diphospho I a-
decrease in D-glucuronic acid in the presence of liver micorsomes, has 
liver vitamin increased biological activity ... 
A in rats 33-retinol, retinoic acid and 13-cis-retinoic acid are likewise 
consummg excreted in the bile as ~ - g l u c u r o n i d a t i o n n in the presence of 
ethanol. uridine diphosphoglucuronic acid (UDPGA). 
36- ... where 35-1n human skin extracts, the major retinoids are all-trans-
its further retinol and 3,4-dehydroretinol, the latter compound being 
metabolism found in dyskeratotic skin ... 
may be 40-If a dose of radioactively labelled retinol is given to a 
defective. deficient rat, there is an increase in the excretion of labelled 
39-Plasma metabolites in urine is comparison with an animal of normal 
levels may vitamin A status. 
decline when 41-This is because incoming retinol in such circumstances is 
the liver preferentially utilized by the peripheral tissues rather than 
stores are stored. 
exhausted. 42-The minimum liver concentration of retinol necessary to 
46-The favor storage rather than immediate turnover and breakdown 
suggestion is 60 IU/g liver. 
that vitamin A 43-When animals or humans are subjected to a variety of 
plays an stressful stimuli, there is a decrease in serum vitamin A, 
essential role -+-+-+-+ although there is no change in the amount of the vitamin in 
in steroid the liver or testis. 
hormone 45-During stress there is an accumulation of vitamin A in the 
dynamics is enlarged adrenal glands. 
borne out 47-the fact that vitamin A accumulates preferentially in the 
by ... adrenal glands when the vitamin is first administered to 
49-this has animals depleted of vitamin A. 
some possible 48- Interestingly, liver vitamin A stores are very low in 
bearing on the alcoholics even with mild liver damage, even though plasma 
increased risk vitamin A levels are often normal; 
of hepatic 50-Both uptake and liver storage of vitamin A are equally 
neoplasm in effective when the vitamin is administered in an aqueous 
persons with suspension or an oily solution, thus administration of vitamin 
alcoholic A and E in solutions given for total parental nutrition (TPN) 
cirrhosis. maintains blood levels and leads to storage. 
51-Illness, infections and prematurity affect both the storage 
and tissue requirements of vitamins A and E. 
Table 1 
For instance, under the low end of the epistemic scale are utterances 
expressing the lowest degree of certainty in the available knowledge. The modal 
expressions "appear to have" (27), "is believed to be mediated" (29), "may be" (31, 
36), "may represent" (34), "may decline" (39) and "possible" (49) represent the 
contemplative characteristics of some of the infonnation and conclusions presented 
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there. Although these vary in fonn, the main feature here is the low modality covering 
the general area of possibility. And this is what differentiates expressions 25, 32 and 
46 from the rest since the modal expressions "suggesting" and "suggestion" reflect a 
possible-probable range of interpretation as it is based on more reliable evidence. This 
is signified by the use of arrows moving towards the Median category of the epistemic 
scale. 
Expressions characterised by stronger modality are placed under the Median 
category of the epistemic scale since they express notions of probability rather than 
possibility. More specifically, the decision to place utterance 21, for instance, under 
this category is based on the comparison in degrees of modal strength among the three 
utterances: 32,21 and 20. The claim made here is that utterance 32 (placed under the 
low end of the epistemic scale) is weaker than 21, which in tum is weaker than 20 
(which is consequently placed under the High end of the epistemic scale). 
In utterance 32, "the suggestion has been made that glucuronidation ensures 
conservation of vitamin A ... ", the decision to place this utterance under the Low 
category is due to the absence of reference to any 'experimentally validated' evidence 
behind the suggestion which is of substantial significance in the field of science. In 
other words, it is vague whether the suggestions springs from an individual's personal 
(subjective) opinion or from more reliable experimental evidence. This renders the 
utterance a mere unsupported "suggestion" which ultimately reflects an unsupported 
possibility among many. 
In utterance 21, on the other hand, the verb "suggests" is based on evidence: 
"recent evidence suggests that retinoic acid stimulates testosterone production by 
Leydig cells in the testis". Here, although the source behind the "recent evidence" is 
not explicitly referred to, the presence of the word "evidence" constitutes a stronger 
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basis for the suggestion than its absence in 32. In this light, the reader is assured that 
the basis for the suggestion in this utterance is not a subjective opinion but some form 
of evidence available for possible refutation. This makes the suggestion in 21 stronger 
than that in 32. 
By extension, utterance 20, "there is evidence that retinol is metabolized to 
retinoic acid in several species" is placed under the High end of the epistemic scale. 
This is the case since the proposition put forward here is not a suggestion, but of pure 
evidence. Therefore, while the suggestions of 21 are elevated in degrees of certainty 
.-
through the underlying available evidence, in 20 there are no suggestions at all. 
Nevertheless, utterance 20 is still considered non-factual since the word "evidence" is , 
in my view, a fonn of strong supported suggestion, ultimately a type of proof which is 
open for debate and possible refutation, but not a fact. 
All in all then, despite the variety of utterances and the combination of 
modalised and non-modalised utterances in this text, the overall picture presented is a 
consistent one. To begin with, the detachment of the writer from the definitions and 
descriptions is maintained throughout the text. This falls in line with the conventions 
of scientific discourse which require such distance in order to maintain the appearance 
of objectivity. In other words, whether utterances are modalised or not, the overall 
objectivity reflected through the general absence of the individual investigator in the 
reported findings, this lack of "intrusion of [the writer's] 'subjectivity'" gives what 
Kress (1985: 57) describes as the "appearance of immutable truth and factuality to the 
statements of science". 
These effects are especially significant in the modalised sections of the text 
where the presence of modality, which typically lessens the degree of certainty in the 
propositions, is in direct conflict with the objectivity of the text. In other words, the 
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subjectivity and weakness of modalised utterances which work in opposition with the 
objectivity and strength of passive structures do not, I argue, undermine the 
objectivity of the descriptions and definitions. Thus, in terms of the force and 
forcefulness of the language exhibited in this text, there are two separate forces at 
work: the weakness and subjectivity of modality, and the strength and objectivity of 
the passi ve structure. 
Yet although the presence of modality appears to work in opposition with the 
characteristically objective appearance of scientific discourse, its effects, I argue, fall 
in line with the overall ideology underlying the aims of science. The use of modality 
in this text serves the purpose of presenting this specific field of study as objectively 
incomplete. This self-confessed lack of current knowledge only emphasises the 
desired view that the approach adopted is genuinely nonbiased, objective and 
therefore, scientific. This makes the information in the text quite consistent since it is 
presented in a pseudo-factual manner without jeopardising the scientific project and 
mISSIOn. 
Therefore, one noteworthy point to add to Kress's description of the language 
of science is the possibility for utilising modality in the service of the ideology of 
objectivity, self-preservation and continuity18. The two perhaps conflicting interests in 
scientific endeavours are a) the desire and possibly need to be as truthful as possible 
in presenting information and b) the desire to be knowledgeable and, therefore, 
powerful and authoritative. The first entails a likely acknowledgement of ignorance or 
at least, partiality of knowledge while the second a discourse of absolute certainty. 
Yet whereas focusing solely on the second interest may jeopardise the overall 
scientific project, taking into account the second has the potential of re-emphasising 
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the view that science is a reliable field of enquiry. Although modality can present 
science as less knowledgeable than desired, its presence reinforces the ideology that 
science is the most truthful, reliable and objective field of enquiry. In short, it is a 
faith-building project. 
7.5 Analysis 2 
As mentioned earlier, the second text is a selection from website which 
essentially deals with nutritional products including vitamin supplements. In that, it is 
similar to the first one since it also discusses the role of vitamins in nutrition and 
disease fighting, although it is not targeted at a restricted group of readers. This makes 
the text a lot less formal than the first one and this is exemplified by the overall easy-
access medical terms which are explained in everyday language for easier 
comprehension as well as the presence of the first and second person pronoun (we, 
you). Finally, while the text is partly descriptive, it is nevertheless significantly more 
argumentative. This is significant in that the ideology behind the author's attempt to 
persuade readers is easier to track than in predominantly descriptive texts. 
The first noticeable aspect of text 2 (as far as modality is concerned) is the 
presence of a high number of modalised non-factual utterances. This lies in contrast 
with the predominant view that scientific discourse is essentially concerned with 
presenting relatively factual descriptions of the workings of science, where science 
characteristically deals with natural phenomena as well as with experiments on these 
phenomena conducted in a systematic, methodical way. 
18 One possible extension to this line of argument is linking ~ h i s s i d e ~ l o g y y o.f s.elf-preservation t ~ ~ the 
larger underlying economic and political powers. However, 10 my View, thiS IS a farfetched claim 
which does not find support in my argument. 
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Another prevalent characteristic of the text is the predominance of acti ve 
structures which are also in contrast with the view that science aims at . .. mamtammg 
distance from the object of description. In that, both the non-factuality of modalised 
utterances along with the direct involvement of the writer create a sense of high 
subjectivity to the text, which, yet again, is not characteristic of the traditional view 
associated with scientific discourse. 
This mixture of modalised and non-modalised utterances create an 
inconsistent picture of the content of the text. Going through both the modalised and 
non-moaalised utterances systematically, the following features concerning the 
positions conveyed in the article arise (see table 2). 
Low Med High Factuality 
5-What is news is 21- 4-None of this ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
that in the U.S. Specifically is news, of I-Cardiovascular diseases ... kill at least 12 
between 13,500 to patients with course. million people each year. 
50,000 of these stroke and 13- ... the 2-ln the U.S., cardiovascular diseases are the 
deaths could easily other conclusions primary cause in about half of all deaths. 
be prevented by cardiovascular are strongly 3-ln 1995 cardiovascular diseases killed 
taking just 25 cents diseases tend supported by about 455,000 men and 505,000 women. 
worth of vitamin to have higher numerous 7 -You can't even buy a candy bar for a 
supplements a day. blood levels of articles and quarter any more. 
6-For a mere homocysteine editorials that 8-This is not hyperbole. 
quarter's worth of than subjects have appeared 9-This is not snake oil. 
vitamins, you can without in the two 10-This is not some quack cure. 
significantly disease. most 11-This is hard science, incontrovertible 
eliminate a major 4O-Probably prestigious evidence, based on the results of hundreds of 
independent risk L the most American studies going back more than 30 years. 
factor for heart important medical 12-Although conservative organizations like 
attack. contribution to journals ... the (AHA) still refuse to endorse the 
30-"Because high elevated 19- conclusions of these studies and to 
levels [of homocysteine ... essentially recommend that people take these vitamin 
homocysteine] can levels for most eliminating supplements, ... 
often be easily people is this very ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
treated with vitamin inadequate important risk 14-We are referring to the link between the 
supplements, intake of folic often within a amino acid homocysteine and cardiovascular 
homocysteine may acid, vitamins few days. disease and the fact that supplements of 
be an independent, B6 and B12, (although the vitamins B6 and B 12, folic acid, and betaine 
modifiable risk and betaine. damage done have been proven to sever that link. 
factor," the authors by long-term I5-Homocysteine is an amino acid formed 
concluded. elevated from the metabolism of another amino acid. 
33-Although only a homocysteine methionine, which is commonly found in 
small number of the takes longer to meats-especially red meat. 
subjects in this study resolve). 16-High homocysteine levels are now 
26.+ 
were taking vitamin +-+-+-+-+- +-+-+-+-+- widely recognized as an independent risk 
supplements, the factor for cardiovascular disease. 
authors noted that 17 -This means that high homocystei ne 
those who were +-+-+-+-+- +-+-+-+-+- levels along with cigarette smoking, obesity, 
taking supplements 44-Studyafter 22-Stampfer high blood pressure, high-fat diet, diabetes, 
appeared to have a study has points out that and a sedentary life style increase your risk 
"substantially lower demonstrated homo-cysteine of developing cardiovascular disease and 
risk of vascular beyond the levels do not dying of a heart attack or stroke. 
disease a proportion shadow ofa have to be 18-Taking supplemental B6, B 12, folic acid, 
of which was doubt that the elevated by and trimethylglycine quickly and effectively 
attributable to lower risks very much to restores homocysteine to safe levels, ... 
plasma homocysteine associated increase risk, 20- More than 20 case-control and cross-
levels." with elevated since most of sectional studies on more than 2,000 
34- High homocysteine the patients in subjects have provided what Harvard 
homocysteine in the can be quickly these studies epidemiologist Meir J. Stampfer, MD, calls 
blood can arise from and easily had levels that "remarkably consistent" findings regarding 
three primary causes eliminated by were within the relationship between homocysteine 
36-The most serious taking what is levels and cardiovascular diseases. 
defects IWlY result in adequate generally 23-A meta-analysis found a positive 
premature death, as amounts of regarded to association between hyperhomocysteinemia 
in the cases McCully folic acid, be the normal and thrombosis (formation of clots in blood 
encountered early in vitamins B6 range. vessels) in eight out of 10 studies involving 
his investigations. and B12, and 2,400 patients. 
37-More common betaine. +-+-+-+-+- 24-1n these eight studies, the risk of 
are less severe 56-d. On thrombosis was two to 13 times greater in 
defects, which may average, as people with hyperhomocysteinemia. 
produce mild or intake of folic 25- One cross-sectional study conducted by 
moderate elevations acid, betaine, Dr. Jacob Selhub of Tufts University and his 
of homocysteine. vitamin B6, associates, involved more than 1,000 elderly 
38-These defects are and vitamin people from the long-running Framingham 
quite common, B 12 increases, Heart Study. The investigators examined the 
occurring in perhaps the risk of relationship between the degree of carotid 
30% of the cardiovascular artery blockage (stenosis) and plasma 
population, and may disease homocysteine levels. 
account, at least in declines, and 26-After adjusting for other risk factors, they 
part, for the vice versa. found that those individuals with the highest 
inheritability of +-+-+-+- levels of homocysteine had twice the risk of 
cardiovascular a carotid stenosis than those with the lowest 
disease. levels. 
39- Although the 27-Moreover, the authors reported that those 
high fat content of patients who had the most carotid artery 
certain meats is stenosis had the lowest intake of folic acid 
usually blamed for and vitamin B6.5 
increasing the risk 28-The Physicians" Health Study, a 
of heart disease and Harvard-based study that tracked nearly 
stroke, the high 15,000 male physicians (aged 40-84 years) 
methionine content for up to five years, came to a similar 
of meat may be conclusion. At the start of the study, none of 
the physicians had ever suffered a heart equally CUlpable. 
attack or stroke. During the course of the 41-No matter what 
study, 271 of the men subsequently suffered the cause of hyper-
a heart attack. homocystei nemia, 
29- ... they found that the men whose 
even when there is a 
+-+-+-+- homocysteine levels were in the highest five genetic defect, it is percent had about three times the risk of 
almost always heart attack as those with the lowest levels. possible to reduce 31-Homocysteine's role as an independent levels to the healthy 
risk factor for cardiovascular diseases was 
range by taking +-+-+-+- confirmed in a large multicenter European 
sufficient quantities 
study that included researchers from nine 
of these nutritional 
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supplements. different countries. 
43-the ease with 32-The results showed a 2.2-fold greater 
which homocysteine incidence of cardiovascular disease in those 
levels can be whose homocysteine levels were in the top 
brought down and 20%. 
maintained within 35-The first is a genetic defect that impairs 
the safe range by homocysteine metabolism. Actually, several 
taking vitamin different genetic defects related to the 
supplements formation of the various enzymes required to 
containing folic acid metabolize homocysteine have been 
(folate), vitamin B6 identified. 
(pyridoxine), vitamin 42-Given the deadly consequences 
B 12, and betaine is of elevated homocysteine, ... 
truly remarkable. 45-Selhub's 1993 cross-sectional analysis of 
50- While most people from the Framingham study found 
studies have that (1) homocysteine levels increased with 
concentrated on age, (2) plasma homocysteine levels dropped 
using the B vitamins as folate intake increased, and (3) 67CJc of 
to normalize the cases of hyperhomocysteinemia were 
homocysteine related to inadequate plasma concentrations 
metabolism, some of one or more of the B vitamins. 
people do not 46- In a German study, injections of folate 
respond to this and vitamin B6 reduced homocysteine 
regimen, possibly concentrations in 175 elderly people, with 
because of a genetic maximum effect seen within five to 12 days. 
defect. Homocysteine levels returned to normal in 
51-Studies have 92% of the vitamin-treated group compared 
shown that by adding with only 20% of those treated with placebo. 
betaine to the 47-Another study compared 130 Boston area 
standard B vitamin patients hospitalized with their first heart 
regimen, attack with 118 matched controls who had 
homocysteine can be never had a heart attack. 
reduced to safe 48-The authors found that (1) homocysteine 
levels in nearly levels were 11 % higher in the heart attack 
everyone. patients, (2) dietary and plasma levels of 
54-b. Several vitamin B6 and folate were lower in the 
mechanisms by heart attack patients, and (3) ... 
which homocysteine 49- ... as intake of folate and vitamin B6 
appears to promote increased, the risk of heart attack decreased, 
atherosclerosis have +-+-+-+- independently of other risk factors. 
been identified. 52- To sum up the homocysteine-
57 -e. At the doses cardiovascular disease-B-vitamin story, 
recommended for there is no doubt that: 
normalizing 53-a. As homocysteine levels in the blood 
homocysteine stream rise, the risk of cardiovascular 
metabolism, the B +-+-+-+- disease also rises, and vice versa. 
vitamins and betaine 55-c. As intake of folic acid, betaine, 
appear to be vitamin B6, and vitamin B 12 increases, 
completely safe. homocysteine levels decline, and vice versa. 
Table 2 
The first section of the text (utterances 1 to 19) is concerned with introducing 
the main topic. It starts with a number of non-modalised utterances (1-3) highlighting 
the seriousness of cardiovascular diseases by quoting statistical evidence of the 
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number of deaths in the world in general and the USA in particular. The only 
uncertainty in these utterances relates to the lack of extreme precision and accuracy of 
the statistics ("at least 12 million people"; "about 455,000 men and 505,000 
women"), which is not unexpected in such situations. In other words, this uncertainty 
does not undermine the forcefulness of the utterances since the main point is merely 
showing how high the number of deaths is rather than being meticulously precise in 
these statistics. 
The next set of utterances (4-7) is concerned with making claims about the 
--availability of the means for preventing some of these deaths. The main point of 
emphasis is the affordability for these means which are accessible to the majority of 
people. However, these claims have two levels of modalisation. These have to do with 
the availability of a) a possibility for avoiding fatality in only b) a small percentage of 
the numbers quoted earlier. More specifically, what the author is claiming in 5 
("between 13,500 to 50,000 of these deaths could easily be prevented"), is that there 
exists a possibility for 1.3 to 5 percent of the people with cardiovascular diseases to be 
saved from death. 
The following utterance that one "can significantly eliminate a major 
independent riskfactor for heart attack" (6) is also worth close investigation. To begin 
with, the role of the adverb "significantly" is to emphasise the degree to which the 
recommended treatment is helpful. However, this adverb does not to conform with the 
following verb "eliminate" which is normally a no-gradience verb. In other words, 
one can either eliminate or fail to eliminate, but cannot partially eliminate. The more 
accurate and common collocation with the adverb "significantly" would be a verb like 
'reduce' or 'diminish'. In this sense, in attempting to stress the possible positive 
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effects of taking vitamin supplements, the writer faces the problem of using accurate 
language. 
Moreover, the phrase "risk factor" involves some kind of internal modality 
since a risk is in fact a possibility, at most a probability. Again, the adjective "major" 
also suggests that this risk is one of many. In other words, the whole utterance can be 
interpreted and therefore paraphrased in the following manner: There is a possibility 
(can) that taking these vitamin supplements will *greatly eliminate one (major) of 
several possibilities (risk factor) which lead to heart attacks, which in tum, can 
possibly lead to death. These layers of modality suggest high level of uncertainty but 
which the use of the adverb "significantly" tries to undermine. Still, the overall force 
of the utterance is weakened and it therefore is placed under the Low end of the 
epistemic scale. 
The following set of utterances (8-14) reassume a high level of certainty and 
are therefore placed under the Factuality branch. These are a set of categorical 
statements rejecting any other view but that of clear-cut scientific bases for the claims 
made earlier. The use of the expressions "hard science" and "incontrovertible 
evidence" (11) are meant to accentuate the "fact that supplements of vitamins B6 and 
B12, folic acid, and betaine have been proven to sever" the link between 
"homocysteine and cardiovascular disease" (14). These expressions fall in line with 
positivist and post-positivist ideology which stresses the objectivity and reliability of 
experimental validation in science. 
Then, homocysteine is defined and its connection with cardiovascular diseases 
is described in utterances 15 to 17. First, this definition is conducted in a very precise 
and factual manner using the adequate scientific jargon of the field (15). Next, the 
following utterance explains the link between homocysteine and cardiovascular 
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diseases, where homocysteine is described less categorically as one "risk factor" 
leading to cardiovascular disease (16). Then, and more interestingly, utterance 17 
("This means that high homocysteine levels along with cigarette smoking, obesity, 
high blood pressure, high-fat diet, diabetes, and a sedentary life style increase your 
risk of developing cardiovascular disease and dying of a heart attack or stroke") 
combines a number of risk factors to reach what appears to be a factual conclusion. 
However, looking closely at the different layers of modality employed here, 
the following overall interpretation becomes the more prominent one. High 
homocYSteine levels are recognised as one of many possible factors which increase 
the risk for developing cardiovascular disease which in tum can lead to heart attacks 
which can lead to death. The large number and different layers of modality employed 
in this utterance can be illustrated by the use of brackets where each bracket signifies 
one layer of modality. 
Factors [homocysteine[ increased risk[ cardiovascular disease[heart attack [death]]]]] 
This can be read in the following manner: 
1- Death from heart attacks is one of many possibilities. 
2- Heart attack resulting from cardiovascular disease is one of many possibilities. 
3- Cardiovascular disease resulting from a high l e v ~ l l of homocysteine is one of 
many possibilities. 
4- Homocysteine the only one of many "risk factors" (which in tum is a 
possibility) which is treatable with vitamin supplements. 
While at the face of it, the initial utterances seem to have factual bases, the implicit, 
but gradually rising modality in the immediately following utterances considerably 
lowers the level of certainty and ultimately the power of these statements. 
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On top of that, even the last unmodalised claim does not hold unchallenged. 
The use of the adverb "essentiall y" in utterance 19 " ... essentially eliminating this 
very important risk, often within a few days" sheds doubt on the confidence in the 
ability of the suggested vitamin supplements to eliminate this risk. Although the level 
of doubt is not high, thus explaining the placement of this expression under the High 
category of the epistemic scale as opposed to the lower one, it still removes it from 
the factual arena. In fact, this scepticism is later seen to intensify thus raising the level 
of uncertainty in what initially appears to be a factual claim. 
The next section of utterances under the heading "Homocysteine Increases 
Cardiovascular Risk" (20-33) draws upon a number of scientific experiments and 
findings in order to find support for the claims made earlier on. These start with non-
modalised descriptions of the processes undergone in the experiments (20, 23, 25-28) 
giving an air of factuality and objectivity to the whole scientific procedure. However, 
the only strictly non-modalised expressions are those which refer solely to the 
descriptions of the experiments and not to the conclusions and findings. The 
statements reporting the findings of the experiments are characterised either by 
explicit low modality suggesting an overt lack of certainty in the conclusions arrived 
at or they occupy the fOrIn of a pseudo-factual statement with an implicit internal 
modality. 
An example of the first is utterance 21 ("Specifically patients with stroke and 
other cardiovascular diseases tend to have higher blood levels of homocysteine than 
subjects without disease") where the modalised expression "tend to" is an explicit 
indication of the existence of a probability for the fulfilment of the proposition. In the 
other instance, utterances like 23 and 24 ("A meta-analysis found a positive 
association between hyperhomocysteinemia and thrombosis in eight out of 10 studies 
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involving 2,400 patients" and "In these eight studies, the risk of thrombosis was two 
to 13 times greater in people with hyperhomocysteinemia") appear to be quite 
categorical but are, I argue, modalised in a less explicit manner. In 23, the 
"association" spoken of is found only partially "in eight out of 10 studies" while in 
24, the "risk" of developing blood clots varies between "two [and] 13 times" more in 
"people with hyperhomocysteinemia". In short, none of these statements are strictly 
categorical but are rather probabilistic in reference, thus raising other serious 
questions. Such questions relate to the implications of the various degrees of 
probability in differentiating between twice as risky, 13 times as risky, and maybe 
even 100 times as risky. The problem would be determining the position on a scale of 
certainty of relatively low probabilistic claims such as "two times" as risky in contrast 
with the much higher probability of "13 times" as risky. 
This pattern of inconsistency and vagueness is recurrent throughout this 
second section where most of the descriptions of the experiments are categorical and 
factual, while most of the conclusions and implications of these scientific experiments 
are modalised, selective and partial. Most interesting of all are the direct quotations 
that the writer of the article makes use of (30,33). In the first one '''Because high 
levels [of homocysteine] can often be easily treated with vitamin supplements, 
homocysteine may be an independent, modifiable risk factor,' the authors concluded", 
the conclusions of the authors are enveloped with low modality, thus placing the 
whole utterance under the Low end of the epistemic scale. In the second utterance, the 
Whole quotation is framed with the modalised expression "appeared" ("the authors 
noted that those who were taking supplements appeared to have a 'substantially lower 
risk of vascular disease, a proportion of which was attributable to lower plasma 
homocysteine levels"'). Again, all these conclusions deal with the degree with which 
271 
vitamin supplements can be associated with lowering the level of one substance in the 
blood which is one of many "risks" leading to vascular disease. There are again more 
than one layer of modality and the findings deal with a possibility of another 
possibility. 
The next section, under the subheading "Why Homocysteine Levels Rise", 
(34-43) also echoes the same patterns. In a way, its content consists of a complication 
of the problem through listing several factors which are partially responsible for 
cardiovascular disease. This complication is further intensified by the use of numbers 
and statistics which are, in my view, meant to highlight the associations characteristic 
of positivist and post positivist thought between mathematics and objectivity, and 
consequently to stress the reliability of science. Yet, again, while the only categorical 
statements are those describing the procedures of the experiments, modalised 
expressions frame the majority of the concluding statements, thus shedding doubt on 
the certainty of these claims and consequently, on the overall credibility and force of 
the argument. 
Moreover, in the effort to characterise the statements made under this section 
with categorical power, some later statements seem to lie in contradiction with earlier 
ones. This is evident in utterance 42 for instance, where the "consequences of 
elevated homocysteine" are categorically characterised as "deadly" although in 
utterance (17) it is only high levels of homocysteine which are described as, again, 
one of many risk factors which, "along with cigarette smoking, obesity, high blood 
pressure, high-fat diet, diabetes, and a sedentary life style increase your risk of 
developing cardiovascular disease and dying of a heart attack or stroke". Based on the 
evidence repeatedly quoted in the article, the more likely interpretation falls in line 
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with the earlier one; i.e. that of the possible deadly consequences of elevated 
homocysteine. 
In the fourth and penultimate section (44-51), this pattern of inconsistency 
continues. Again the author's conclusions are not directly deduced from the 
previously quoted scientific evidence. His initial statement (44) makes use of 
emphatic modalised utterances like "beyond the shadow of a doubt" which is meant to 
stress the certainty of the author's claims. However, what according to the author is 
"demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt" is the possibility that "the risks 
associated with elevated homocysteine" are "quickly and easily eliminated by taking 
adequate amounts of folic acid, vitamins B6 and B 12, and betaine". And even the 
verb "eliminated" is challenged in utterance (49) where according to the findings of 
the referred to experiment, there is a decrease (rather than an elimination) in the risk 
of heart attack "as intake of folate and vitamin B6 increased". 
In the last section, similar conclusions are also made under the guiding factual 
statement "there is no doubt that" (52). However, each of the five concluding 
statements carries one or another form of modality. While the first one speaks of a 
increase in the risk of cardiovascular disease as homocysteine levels in the blood 
increase, the third one speaks of a decline in homocysteine levels "as intake of folic 
acid, betaine, vitamin B6, and vitamin B12 increases". These two utterances are 
connected in that the claim made by both put together is that of a certainty in the 
ability of these vitamins to decrease one possible risk factor which might lead to 
cardiovascular disease. This is also the claim of the fourth utterance "On average, as 
intake of folic acid, betaine, vitamin B6, and vitamin B 12 increases, the risk of 
cardiovascular disease declines". In short, these three are not factual statements in that 
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their main topic of discussion is a risk factor which is a probabilistic matter rather 
than a factual one. 
Finally, the last two utterances express a different type of uncertainty through 
the explicit use of the modal perception verb "appear". Yet of the two utterances 
, 
more interesting is the uncertainty associated with the modal expression in the last 
utterance, "At the doses recommended for normalizing homocysteine metabolism, the 
B vitamins and betaine appear to be completely safe" (51e). The intriguing matter is 
the fact that this conclusion effectively introduces a novel argument: that which 
concerns the safety of taking vitamin supplements. In other words, this topic is both 
introduced and brought to an end in one concluding yet modalised statement. 
Considering the seriousness of the claim made and the centrality of the topic, 
one statement, although modalised, does not give the issue any justice in terms of 
coverage. More importantly, it raises questions relating to the ideological objectives 
behind referring to this previously unmentioned link to vitamin supplements. The first 
and most convincing interpretation is that of an underlying economic motivation for 
doing making this reference considering that the article is published on a website 
which advertises a certain brand of vitamin supplements. In fact, when considering 
the general inconsistent picture that can be drawn by looking at the way modality is 
utilised in the text, the economic factor seems to lie at the core of these sometimes 
incompatible arguments. 
To begin with, the use of modality is predominantly associated with the more 
crucial claims which are central to the overall argument. Such arguments are either 
foundations on which non-modalised conclusions are based, or they are deductions 
which are derived from sometimes unrelated evidence. Moreover, some of the 
categorical deductions made by the author are based on modalised conclusions quoted 
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from different sources. And on top of it all, there are several levels of modality 
associated with most of these arguments which not only contribute to the overall 
inconsistency in the propositions made by the text, but also to the low level of 
authority associated with the claims arguments and conclusions made. All of these 
discrepancies arising from portraying possibilities as facts serve the one purpose of 
underlining the vital role vitamins play in nutrition and health. 
In comparison with the earlier text, this text is a lot less 'scientific'. It is 
motivated by what appears to be capitalist economic ideologies to a point where the 
-
old ideologies of science's quest for the truth are not only jeopardised but almost 
completely lost. 
Yet this text is not representative of the discourse of science in the traditional 
sense. In fact, it seems to make use of elements from more than one genre such as 
journalistic reports as well as medical articles. In that while it is sometimes quite 
sensationalised in its claims, the fact of the matter remains that it makes use of the 
power and authority associated with the field of science. It does that by addressing a 
medical issue, making use of medical jargon and making reference to medical 
research. Moreover, the fact that it is written by someone who holds a PhD (although 
the precise field the author is qualified in is unknown) adds to that power and 
authority. Therefore, taking into consideration the authority associated with science as 
a field of enquiry, the author makes modalised, incompatible and sometimes 
incoherent arguments and claims. 
7.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the target of investigation was the manner by which modality 
functioned in reflecting the ideologies present in two examples of scientific discourse. 
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In line with the initial premise that all types of texts (genres) can be approached using 
the same framework for analysis, the main objective was to examine the underlying 
ideologies in two scientific texts through a practical analysis of the system of 
modality in these texts. Based on the differences between the two texts in terms of 
formality, the intended audience and purposes, the use of modality in each text was 
expectedly dissimilar. 
In the first text, the overall picture was seen as an ideologically consistent one. 
The conventional positivist and post-positivist views of science as an objective field 
of enquiry were the dominant ones, emphasised by the detachment of the writer from 
the definitions and descriptions evident throughout the text. This was maintained in 
light of the relatively rare use of modality and the high presence of nominalised and 
factual passive structures. Moreover, despite the subjectivity and relative weakness 
associated with the presence of modalised utterances (which ultimately works in 
opposition with the objectivity and strength of nominalised and passive structures) it 
was argued that the overall air of objectivity was, nonetheless, retained. Instead, these 
two seemingly conflicting forces were seen to work towards one consistent reading of 
the underlying ideologies in the text. As argued above, the use of modality was seen 
to support one main aim of science which is its concern with 'the truth'. In that, this 
self-confessed partiality of current knowledge was only seen to emphasise the desired 
view that the approach adopted is genuinely nonbiased, objective and truthful. It was 
concluded that in this first text, even the presence of modality was utilised in the 
service of the ideology of objectivity, self-preservation and continuity. It did not in 
any way undennine the authority and power associated with the field of science. 
There were, in short, no apparent ideological conflicts or contradictions. 
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The second text, on the other hand, made use of modalised structures much 
more frequently, and the analysis of the modal system suggested an ideologically 
inconsistent reading of the text. The first problematic area was the fact that these 
modal expressions were associated with the more critical and central claims. While 
factual utterances characterised those less significant, more descriptive 
straightforward definitions and procedures, modalised utterances were seen to govern 
those more fundamental and critical statements and conclusions. Moreover, there 
surfaced several levels of modality associated with most of these crucial arguments 
which not only contributed to the overall inconsistency in the propositions made by 
the text, but also to the low level of authority associated with the claims, arguments 
and conclusions made. As a scientific text, the second text was therefore seen to 
display high subjectivity, inconsistency and an overall weakness. 
However, it was argued that the ideological motivation for these 
contradictions seemed to reside in the underlying economic bases governing the 
objectives of the article. As revealed above, the article was found in a website which 
essentially advertised a certain brand of vitamin supplements. This meant that the 
arguments and conclusions anived at in this text were seen to serve the financial aims 
of the advertisers. In this sense, the partial informality, subjectivity and high level of 
modality iii the text serve the purpose of portraying possibilities as facts in the 
economical interest of the aims of the website. 
This conclusion encourages the view that the second text draws upon different 
"orders of d i s c o u r s ~ " " (Fairclough 1995: 188) for multiple purposes. Firstly, the 
presence of this text on a website which advertises vitamin supplements points out its 
advertising characteristic. This is supported by the numerous arguments which aimed 
at highlighting the beneficial nature of vitamins and the detrimental consequences to 
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their absence in the human body. At the same time however, the fact that these 
arguments make use of scientific language usually characteristic of medical discourse 
suggests the hybridisation of the language in this text which draws elements from 
both types of discourse: advertising and medical science. This ultimately results in a 
hybrid text which unconvincingly argues in pseudo-scientific language for the 
benefits of a scientifically controversial bio-chemical substance. 
This explains why each passage is different in the ideologies it communicates 
and reflects although they are still both ideological. While the presence of modality in 
the first text serves science's ideology of continuity and self-preservation, modality in 
the second text is, I argue, meant to mask the controversial nature of the topic of 
discussion. Hence, while the use of modality in the first passage stresses the non-
biased nature of its language and its interest in pursuing the 'truth', its use in the 
second passage undermines the ideological consistency of the text and leads to a low 
level of authority. 
278 
VIII Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to provide a practically applicable approach to 
critically analysing ideology in discourse through a systematic analysis of modality. 
This very broad objective required a number of clarifications and discussions as to 
what constituted each of its elements and how these interacted with one another. In 
other words, before being able to embark on this project, it was seen as imperative to 
decide on: 
1) what exactly is meant by 'discourse' and how to select the most 
relevant approach to its analysis 
2) how to address the issue of literary discourse in the light of the 
adopted view of discourse 
3) how to account for the notion of interpretation through a 
consideration of the role of the reader 
4) why modality is essential in the selected approach to critically 
analysing discourse and how it is practically utilised in this 
approach 
5) how the notion of ideology is related to the whole endeavour 
6) and finally, how this can be practically and systematically achieved 
through a pragmatic-functional approach. 
Chapter One attempted to address the first issue: that of defining discourse and 
selecting the broad theoretical bases to its analysis in the face of a number of 
obstacles. These related to difficulties arising from: 
a) the varied uses of the term 'discourse' (section 1.1) 
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b) the diverse underlying linguistic theories of discourse and 
approaches to discourse analysis (sections 1.2 and 1.4) and 
c) the institutional confusion between 'discourse' and 'ideology' 
(section 1.3). 
It was seen that the definition of the term 'discourse' (i.e. the first obstacle) 
was not initially a straightforward matter for etymological reasons, 'contextual reasons 
and discipline-restrictions. This had given rise to varied and selective interests in 
--
'discourse' which ultimately led to a variability in its definition and use. 
In order to adequately define 'discourse', therefore, it was necessary to make a 
set of decisions, first with regards to the most appropriate linguistic theory underlying 
such a definition. This led to the second obstacle in approaching 'discourse' and its 
analysis. Deciding on the underlying linguistic theory would necessarily carry the 
demands and restrictions of that theory on the general constituents of discourse, and 
ultimately on any approach to its analysis. Hence, it was essential to examine the 
viability of the two main theories of language: the structural and functional theories, 
in order to analyse their views of discourse through exploring the manner each 
accounted for the relationships between language structures, functions and meaning in 
discourse. 
Through reviewing the tenets of each of these approaches, it was seen that 
while structural theories largely downplayed the roles of functions and meaning, 
functional theories generally presented a more balanced position of the 
indispensability of structure in any functional theory of language. Whereas structural 
theories deemed non-structural features of language as either "the weak point in 
language study" (Bloomfield 1933: 140) or simply "irrelevant" to the theory of 
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linguistics (Chomsky 1965: 3), the more balanced functional theory stressed the 
interrelationship between language structure and function as part of Halliday's (1978: 
1985) multifunctional view of language. In fact, this more balanced view of language 
was seen to constitute the underlying bases for the majority of practical approaches to 
discourse analysis. As Schiffrin (1994) concluded, in all approaches to discourse 
analysis (i.e. from a practical perspective), structure and function did not exist in 
isolation from one another. Insisting on isolating these two necessary constituents 
would inevitably lead to a narrow view of language. 
--I,n the light of these conclusions, _an initial decision was then made in the first 
---------
chapter concerning the appropriateness of a broad functional theoretical basis to 
approaching discourse analysis and the definition of 'discourse'. This functional basis 
was derived from the Hallidayan (1978; 1985) 'multifunctional' view of language (the 
ideational, textual and interpersonal) and his view of the relationship between the 
linguistic system and social structures. There, the broad objective of discourse 
analysis was seen as the examination of the relationship between the linguistic system 
and social structures. And at the centre of this connection between language and 
social structures within the multifunctional view of language was the notion of 
ideology. However, since that notion also had a certain degree of vagueness 
associated with its varied use mainly in Marxist and Post-Marxist contexts, the next 
step (and hence the next obstacle to resolve) was to clarify this vagueness and 
confusion between discourse and ideology due to the fundamental role ideology 
played in approaching discourse analysis from a multifunctional perspective. 
Initially, the Marxist view of ideology as "false-consciousness", which is 
located in the "superstructure" and whose objective is to mask the underlying "base" 
which is the "truth", was completely rejected in light of more recent post-Marxist. 
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less detenninistic views. Indeed, the idea of maintaining a division between the base 
and superstructure was questioned, and the view of the mutual interdependence of 
ideology and social institutions was forwarded instead. This was a view which 
stressed the dialectical co-constitutive relationship between ideology and social 
structures as well as an emphasis on the ability for individuals to locate and challenge 
certain worldviews, whether political and non-political, rather than simply submit to 
them. 
Subsequently, in the light of the clarified relationship between discourse and 
-ideology, and in the light of the broad objectives of a multifunctional view of 
language, i.e. analysing the relationship between the linguistic system and social 
structures, the following functional definition of 'discourse' was suggested. Discourse 
was defined as "a contextually occurring instance of language use which is not 
determined by the length and/or grammaticalness of its component utterance/s, but by 
the involvement of a speaker/writer and a hearer/reader in an act of communication, in 
a context saturated with ideologies resulting from cultural, religious, political, gender-
related, etc. modalities" (see section 1.5). This definition of discourse consequently 
raised other thorny issues relating to the inclusi ve nature of this definition in what was 
considered as discourse, as well as issues relating to the nature of this speaker-hearer 
involvement and how it could be accounted for in a practical way in discourse 
analysis. These two points were tackled in the second chapter. 
The Hallidayan multifunctional view of discourse as social interaction (see 
section 1.2.2) suggested that all instances of discourse (including literary discourse) 
could be approached in a similar fashion. This inclusive view was the guiding 
principle behind the second chapter which aimed at addressing those controversial 
notions that lay in opposition with the above view of discourse. Such notions as 
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'literature', 'literary' and 'non-literary language', 'style' in language and its effects on 
'stylistic analyses', and the positions and roles of 'text producers' as well as 'the 
reader' in interpreting texts and in determining the directions in which discourse 
analysis can proceed were seen in opposition to our inclusive functional view of 
discourse and, therefore, had to be addressed. This was done in the following manner. 
First, the bases for distinguishing literature as a special type of discourse were 
questioned in the light of the functional view of discourse argued for above (see 
section 2.2). It was argued that treating literature as discourse meant that discourse 
-
would be treated as an instance of "real communication in [aJ real social context" 
(Carter and McCarthy 1994: 135), and that meant that literature would also mediate 
"relationships between language-users: not only relationships of speech, but also of 
consciousness, ideology, role and class" (Fowler 1981: 80). In that light, both 
structural and functional bases which set literary language apart as a special type of 
language were examined and scrutinised. It was concluded that each of these bases 
was only partially valid. While structural restrictions did at one extreme determine the 
status of a work as literary (such as in a sonnet), these restrictions became less 
definitive the more we move along a continuum of literariness. On the other hand, 
functional features characteristic of literary texts (such as Iakobson's (1960) poetic 
function) were deemed as not exclusive to literature. In other words, the dividing line 
between literary and non-literary discourse was seen to blur both from a structural and 
functional perspectives, and the elevated status that Literature enjoyed was seen to be 
resulting from a long-standing socio-historical, institutional and specifically 
educational tradition, currently perceived as the standard status quo (see section 
2.2.2). 
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Similarly, the notion of style as a special, positive and distinctive 
characteristic of one's language use was criticised (see section 2.3). It was argued that 
traditionally, structural views of style as 'an evaluative index' or 'an individuating 
index' had serious flaws since the notions of 'choice' and 'deviation' constituted non-
distinctive criteria for defining style as a distinctive feature in language. The same 
conclusions were reached when considering style from a functional perspective (i.e. in 
terms of its effect on readers) where there were still no justifications for setting it 
apart from language use in general. Finally, in line with these decisions, the different 
-
approaches to stylistic analysis which aimed at analysing 'style' in literature were 
examined and criticised in the light of their inadequacy to correspond to the balanced 
multifunctional view of discourse adopted in this thesis, especially the role of the 
reader. 
That led to a consideration of the other issue arising from the definition of 
discourse proposed in the first chapter which is a major constituent of any critical 
analysis of discourse: the reader and her/his role in determining the directions in 
which interpretation proceeds. As part of the aim of providing an adequate account of 
that reader which was both theoretically and practically workable in the proposed 
approach, the different views of 'the reader' were examined in the light of reader-
response theories. It was initially observed thatLthe location of meaning was the 
underlying objective in all early approaches ('50s to early '80s) to reader-response 
criticism (see section 2.4.2). For some approaches, meaning was regarded as the 
property of the author; for others, a property of the text, while with others still, 
detennined by the reader. With more recent approaches (' 80s - '90s), different issues 
became prominent such as the implications of the social and historical determinants in 
what constitutes the notion of the reader (with feminist criticisms) or the 
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problematisations of deconstructionist views which questioned the existential nature 
of the text and the reader. 
The dissatisfaction which arose in light of these approaches to reader-response 
criticism emphasised the need to consider both the individual as well as the social role 
of the reader in her/his interaction with the text. This was based on the view that while 
there is a substantial degree of conformity in interpretation, the possibility that 
different readers may vary in interpretation should also be accounted for. And this 
was seen possible only through a functional-pragmatic approach which allowed for a 
consideration of all the mentioned variables in a systematic way. 
Modality was then identified as a key feature in the proposed analysis and the 
third chapter aimed at finding the most appropriate (i.e. systematic and practically 
useful) account of modality which was flexible enough to allow for a serious 
consideration of those elements of discourse discussed above. This involved a review 
of the most relevant approaches to categorising modality which have tackled this 
issue, and emphasis was laid on the diversity in approaches which have sprung from 
different theoretical views of language as well as the limitations of each. The diversity 
and limitations of these approaches pointed out both the differences in the ways 
linguists perceived the term as well as the degrees of vagueness and generality that 
accompanied the notion of modality. 
It was seen that the main problems strict syntactic approaches faced resulted 
primarily from their dismissal of the semantic aspects of modality. Moreover, their 
exclusive focus on the relatively neat, syntactically distinguishable category of 
modality (modal auxiliary verbs) further contributed to their limitations. The same 
was characteristic of strict semantic approaches which avoided accounting for a 
relationship between form and meaning. While 'monosemantic' approaches faced the 
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problem of having to be general in order to be inclusive, 'polysemantic' approaches 
aimed at covering all the possible meanings of each use of a modal. In the first case, 
'monosemantic' accounts faced the problem of being too general and relatively less 
informative while in the second case, 'polysemantic' approaches could not account 
for all possible meanings of modals which surface in all possible contexts. 
Yet again, when some syntactic approaches tried to acknowledge the role of 
meaning, or vice versa, they faced the drawback of being inconsistent. This dilemma, 
it was concluded, was due to the fact that strict syntactic categories were largely 
--incompatible with strict semantic ones, and trying to provide a meeting point between 
the two would inevitably result in contradiction and inconsistency. The rigidity and 
incompatibility of both criteria were seen to constitute the centre of this problem. 
Although there were sometimes recognisable consistencies and patterns between 
structure and meaning, the value and usefulness of accounting for them in the light of 
the many exceptions which sometimes outweighed these consistencies were 
questioned. The existence of so many exceptions was seen as a constant reminder that 
no one-to-one correlation existed or should be sought. 
Potentially more useful approaches were those which relied less on strict 
structural and/or semantic features of modality, and more on context for modal 
interpretation. These w e r e ~ ~ seen as more flexible and inclusive in their accounts of 
modality since their partial subjectivity in assigning meaning to modals as well as the 
diverse interpretations of different modals were deemed as imperative criteria to 
consider in any approach to categorising modality. These were in essence pragmatic 
approaches which negotiated different meanings of modals depending on the contexts 
in which these modals were found. Yet their overall tendencies and drive to ultimately 
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present a neater categorisation of modality either in structural or semantic terms at the 
expense of function constituted their main weaknesses. 
In consequence, the general dissatisfaction with available approaches to modal 
categorisation was one of the principal incentives behind the task undertaken in 
Chapter Four. In that chapter, the aim was to provide functional-pragmatic account of 
modality which had practical potential from a functional perspective. And this 
practical potential was directly concerned with the analysis of ideology in discourse in 
order to point out different and possibly inconsistent ideological affiliations and 
-positions of producers of texts. 
Therefore, in line with the two most relevant approaches to modal 
categorisation (Halliday 1985; Simpson 1993), the parameters of a functional-
pragmatic account of modality which was both inclusive and systematic were set. The 
importance of the criterion of inclusion was highlighted through the variety of modal 
expressions actually considered under epistemic and deontic modality (see section 
4.5). As long as modalised expressions reflected the areas of meaning covered under 
epistemic and deontic modality, these were included as expressions of modality. 
Structural features were not considered as essential criteria for grouping modal 
expressions. 
Then, the use of continua was seen as the only feasible way to capture the two 
essential features of modality (subjectivity and indeterminacy) in a functional-
pragmatic categorisation which is systematic, flexible and carries practical potential. 
This led, more specifically, to a three dimensional continuum which included an 
epistemic _ deontic scale, a weak - strong scale and a subjective - objective scale. The 
presence of these scales was necessary in order to account for possible \'ariation in 
interpretation by the reader. Consequently, placing modals under one or more 
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categories in a continuum suggested a consideration of not only the h f . 
• /pe 0 meamng 
covered by a modal, but also the degree of strength and subjectivity reflected by its 
use within each specific context of use. This, it was proposed, would ultimatel y be 
related to ideology in that the type and degree of involvement a speaker has in what 
s/he says reflects that speaker's position and attitude towards the ideas communicated 
and towards the participants involved. In short, it was proposed that a systematic. 
functional and pragmatic analysis of modality would reflect the speaker's worldview 
at the ideological level. 
--Modality was seen as the most suitable linguistic feature for the proposed 
analysis in that it carried the adequate theoretical and practical potential to accomplish 
this task. Theoretically, modality could be related to the notions of 'ideology' and 'the 
reader' through its characteristic features: subjectivity and indeterminacy. It was 
argued that both subjectivity and indeterminacy were essential in order to account 
realistically and practically for the role of the reader in communicating her/his 
worldviews and consequently ideologies. This was, in fact, the only way the variety of 
interpretations could be considered systematically, without losing focus (see section 
4.6). This was then carried out in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
The aim of the fifth chapter was therefore to present the first of three practical 
examinations L of how modality and ideology interact in discourse in line with the 
proposed approach. This was done with specific reference to two passages from 
Conrad's Heart of Darkness, where the choice of literary text sought to show the 
workability of the approach initially with literary discourse. Hence, this first analysis 
was meant to highlight the ability for the proposed pragmatic-functional framework to 
deal with literary discourse in the same fashion as other types of discourse. 
Concurrently, it was intended to present a reading which ultimately helped clarify 
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what was traditionally deemed as ambiguous and/or dualistI'c 'd I 'I ' . I eo ogica pOSItIOns of 
the main narrator in the novel, Marlow. 
The chapter started by introducing the dominant histon'cal s . I ' 'fi 
, OCIa, SClentJ IC 
and religious ideologies of the period since these constituted the ideological 
backgrounds against which the novel was set. Indeed, the ideological relevance of a 
period characterised as one of change was apparent and relatable to the alterin (J 
~ ~
ideologies adequately captured in the novel (see section 5.2). It was argued that these 
ideological backgrounds constituted one justification for the apparent ambiguities 
characterising the selected passages, and indeed the novel at large. 
In contrast with previous interpretations which saw altering ideologies in the 
extracts as signs of dualistic positions and consequently, inconsistent ideologies, 
analysing modality in the two passages suggested that the ambiguities there were not 
necessarily signs of duality or irregularity. In fact, by focusing on the way modality 
functions in relation with ideology, it was argued that Marlow exhibited a highly 
consistent position and attitude regarding characters and issues in both excerpts, That 
was interpreted, in the first passage, as a complete rejection of Kurtz and what Kurtz 
symbolically stands for, and an acceptance of the natives and what they represent. To 
recapture the conclusions of that first part of the analysis (see section 5.3.1), in 
completely rejecting the image of Kurtz as human or active, Marlow emphasised the 
inhuman or subhuman qualities of imperial Europe and its inactivity, and therefore its 
inability to bring about the claimed positive change to Africa. At the same time, in 
portraying the natives as the direct contrast of Kurtz (i.e. human and active), Marlow 
stressed his view that the West's imported ideologies achieved nothing except 
hindering and obstructing life as it was. And finally, by distancing himself from his 
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early positions in his narrative, Marlow recaptured and rehearsed th . d 
e same attl tu es 
and effects. 
Again, in the second passage, the analysis of modality showed the 
independently consistent, though contrasting, ideologies of Marlow and the Intended. 
It was argued that while the Intended's strong use of deontic and epistemic modality 
reflected her extremely strong position on a scale of authority concerning what she 
believed and what she wanted everyone else to do in line with those beliefs, Marlow's 
thoughts and feelings reflected his utter rejection of the propositions made by her. It 
-
was therefore concluded that the Intended's idealistic view of imperialism and her 
beliefin 'the idea' behind Europe's actions in Africa were placed in direct opposition 
with Marlow's realism and knowledge of the negative outcome of Europe's 
intervention in Africa. However, while that contrast in positions did not undermine 
her forcefulness, it only pointed out a sense of prevalent irony. 
The same approach was followed in the sixth chapter but with special 
emphasis on two political texts. The aim was to examine the different effects of the 
varying use of modality in reflecting the ideologies put forward by these texts. Here 
again, it was important to set the historical, political, economic and moral ideological 
backgrounds which the two speakers represented through their heading two distinct 
political parties. This meant that, along with the varying audiences and the 
dissimilarity in the situation for each of the USA and the UK, the differences between 
the ideologies of the two political parties signalled the most relevant area of 
divergence in the political affiliations of the speeches (see section 6.3). 
Consequently, in line with these differences, it was argued that Bush's speech 
clearly reflected the ideologies of the Republican Party as well as the more direct 
involvement of the USA in the attacks and, therefore, the expectations of the 
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American people to take action against these attacks His use of d I· 
. mo a tty \\ as seen to 
represent the speaker, and by extension the nation that backs h· f-1m, as a very orceful 
one. This related to his high certainty and emphaticness when: 
--
1) describing the Afghani government as 'evil' in its support 
for an 'evil' organisation, 
2) making a set of demands on them 
3) and when both predicting and insisting that they will pay a 
pnce. 
The use of modality in this manner was seen to indicate the speaker's unquestionable 
belief in the justness of his own, and by extension his nation's, judgement concerning 
what constitutes an evil entity, right and wrong. 
His weaker positions arose when addressing issues of presenting a temporal 
estimate of the duration of the war as well as the achievability of its objecti ves. Yet 
although Bush is relatively uncertain of the impact the war might have on the Afghani 
government and the 'evil' al Qaeda network, it was argued that his insistence that the 
terrorists "will pay a price" foregrounded a moral view which fell in line with the 
radical Christian right leanings of the Republican Party. In other words, even in his 
weakest positions, Bush was seen as quite forceful since he is under no obligation to 
justify the mission at the moral level. 
Blair's speech, on the other hand, did not reflect the same directness in 
involvement of Britain in the events although it too was seen to fall in line with the 
ideologies of New Labour and the Third Way. However, since the Third Way was 
argued to exhibit its own internal conflicts (see section 6.3.2), Blair's speech, by 
extension, exhibited these internal conflicts. Through his varying use of modality, 
Blair was seen to reflect the altering strength and forcefulness of the speaker 
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concerning the issues at hand. While he was quite certain and forceful when 
announcmg: 
1) the involvement of British forces in the action , 
2) his pride and confidence in them, 
3) the need for the action and 
4) the internationality of the effort, 
this certainty drops when discussing moral issues. It was pointed out that the topics 
that were thought to be more urgent and which required higher certainty and 
forcefulness on behalf of the speaker were the ones which received less. This anomaly 
was justified in the light of the internal conflict of the Third Way one of whose aims 
is to reconcile the morality of socialism and the potential immorality arising from the 
economic market forces of capitalism. Blair was in other words faced with a sceptical 
British audience on the one hand, and an indispensable economic/political giant (the 
USA) on the other. And through an analysis of the way modality was utilised by 
Blair, this ideological inconsistency was seen to surface. 
In the final chapter, the arenas for investigation were two scientific texts. In 
line with the initial premise that all types of texts (and by extension, different genres) 
could be approached using the same framework for analysis, the main objective was 
to examine the underlying ideologies in these two scientific texts through a practical 
analysis of the system of modality. Here again, the historical, political, moral 
ideologies of science and scientific discourse were addressed in order to set the 
background against which the two texts were set (see section 7.2). Moreover, based 
on the differences between the two texts in terms of formality, the intended audience 
and intended purposes, the use of modality in each text was analysed. 
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In the light of positivist and post-positivist views concerning the relationship 
between science and popular notions such as 'the truth' and 'objecti vity' , the overall 
picture in the first text was seen as an ideologically consistent one (see section 7.-+). It 
was argued that conventional positivist and post-positivist views of science as an 
'objective' field of enquiry were the dominant ones, emphasised by the detachment of 
the writer from the definitions and descriptions evident throughout the text. The 
consistency of this position was reinforced through the relatively rare use of modality 
and the high presence of nominalised and factual passive structures. Although the use 
of modalised utterances gave an air of subjectivity and consequently relative 
uncertainty concerning the issued involved, it was nonetheless argued that the 
dominant air objectivity of the text was retained. In fact, it was argued that these two 
seemingly conflicting forces worked towards one consistent reading of the underlying 
ideologies in the text. It was pointed out that the use of modality supported one main 
aim of science: its concern with 'the truth'. 
Hence, it was concluded that the self-confessed partiality of scientific 
knowledge was in fact an emphasis on the nonbiased, 'objective' and 'truthful' nature 
of scientific inquiry. In other words, even the presence of modality was seen to serve 
science's ideology of objectivity, self-preservation and continuity without either 
undermining the authority and power associated with the field of science enquiry or 
presenting any ideological inconsistencies or discrepancies. 
In the second text (see section 7.5), a different picture emerged. An analysis of 
the more frequent uses of modalised structures suggested an ideologically inconsistent 
reading. Similar to Blair's speech above, it was seen that modal expressions which 
undermined the certainty and force of the propositions were associated with the more 
critical and central claims while factuality characterised those less significant, more 
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descriptive straightforward definitions and procedures. Another important feature of 
utterances in the text also surfaced: the presence of several layers of modality 
associated with most of these critical arguments. This, it was argued, both affected the 
overall consistency of the propositions made by the text as well as reducing the 
authority associated with the claims and conclusions made. It became apparent that 
the second text presented a completely different approach to presenting scientific 
information than the first. This, it was argued, served the underlying economic 
ideological motivation and drive behind the second text. In other words, the 
.-
ideological inconsistencies in the text reflected the incompatibility in views between 
the 'morality' of genuine scientific inquiry on the one hand, and the potential 
superseding 'immorality' of the financial objectives of scientific inquiry. Of course, 
all these readings emerged from a systematic analysis of modality which is functional 
and pragmatically oriented. 
Based on these discussions and conclusions, the culminating and quite 
significant point raised here relates to the contribution the project undertaken in this 
thesis has made to the field of discourse analysis. In other words, what was/were the 
justification/s for undertaking this project and what has it achieved or attempted to 
achieve? In order to address this issue adequately, I intend to focus on presenting how 
those areas covered in this thesis differ either partially or fundamentally from earlier 
coverage/s of the same areas, and how that ultimately tackles different dimensions of 
discourse previously neglected. 
To begin with, though, it is crucial to restate the general theoretical linguistic 
basis underlying the modality framework in this thesis: i.e. the functional theory of 
language and linguistics. This is an important issue as reflected in the more balanced 
nature and scope of the theory which avoid the limitations of the structural view by 
accounting for both areas of function and structure in discourse Mor d' 
. eover, a optmg a 
critical view of discourse in this thesis meant that the functional nature of the 
proposed approach diverged from earlier less critical approaches to discourse analysis 
in that 'critical' referred to analysing discourse in a context saturated with ideologies. 
both shared and personal. 
This critical view of discourse and critical approach to its analysis adopted in 
the thesis are seen to differ, initially, from more traditional approaches (such as 
Conversation Analysis) which aimed at relating primary communicative functions to a 
-
set of linguistic structures. Moreover, these were also different from early Critical 
Linguistics which laid emphasis predominantly on the immediate linguistic context. 
Instead, the approach proposed in this thesis stresses the importance of both linguistic 
and situational context, where the latter includes historical, situational, intertextual 
context as well as the role of the reader. In a similar fashion, this proposed approach 
differs from later Critical Discourse Analysis mainly in the way ideology is perceived. 
While with Critical Discourse Analysis, the view of ideology adopted was essentially 
a left wing political view, the position argued for in this thesis is that of ideology as a 
partly individual, partly social phenomenon which does not correspond merely to the 
a narrow politically-oriented and politically-dominated view of society and thought. 
In the proposed analysis, emphasis is i n s t e a d ~ ~ laid on the diversity of ideologies 
present in discourse and most importantly, on ideological inconsistencies in a text 
rather than political ideologies. 
The view that ideology is partly the result of personal (individual) experience, 
and partly of shared (social) experience means that the role of the reader (both as an 
individual as well as belonging to a social community) and the role of ideology (as 
both partly personal and partly shared) are seen as two inseparable entities in the 
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practical analysis of discourse. Therefore, analysing ideology in discourse demands a 
realistic and practically feasible consideration of the role of the reader, an account 
which can capture the indi vidual/personal aspect of ideology by allowing for variance 
in interpretation yet without jeopardising the overall consistency of the process of 
interpretation. This constitutes a major challenge usually avoided by critical linguists 
and critical discourse analysts, and inadequately covered by reader-response critics. 
This is seen only possible through an approach which is not only functional, but also 
pragmatic in that variation in interpretation is accounted for realistically and 
.... 
practically in the analysis. 
Accounting for the reader is therefore not done in terms of aesthetic effects 
characteristic of early stylistic approaches. These stylistic effects are seen as 
impossible to pin down to any identifiable and specific structural/functional features 
of the text. Similarly, the reader's role is not defined in terms of where 'meaning' is 
located, the task undertaken by early reader-response approaches. Such effects, it is 
concluded, were predominantly based on a non-functional view of text and were 
consequently deemed less useful from the perspective of this thesis. Finally, the role 
of the reader is also different from critical linguistics ' account since this role is not 
based on a set of assumptions about the reader's political-ideological positions in the 
reading process. Instead, it is an account which allowed for variability in 
interpretation and therefore variability in ideological commitment based on shared as 
well as personal/individual aspects of ideology. 
This was done by focusing on the linguistic notion of modality, again, a 
"sorely neglected interpersonal" aspect of meaning (Weber 1992: 22). Because of its 
indeterminate and vague nature (Lakoff 1972: 229), modality was generally aH)lded 
by critics since it was seen as an extremely problematic notion to handle, especially at 
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the descriptive level. In that linguistic line of logic, a notion which metaphorically 
'resists' a systematic description becomes harder as well as less desirable to account 
for in practical linguistic analyses, which ultimately derive their authority from the 
reliability of a structured linguistic system. 
However, modality was viewed as an indispensable notion from the 
perspective of this thesis in that it embodies and reconciles those necessary features 
characteristic of a pragmatic-functional approach to critical analysis. First, modality 
essentially reflects the subjective 'interference' of a speaker in what slhe said. In other 
--
words, it signals the speaker's subjective involvement in projecting hislher attitudes 
and ideological positions. Secondly, modality is also characteristically vague or 
indeterminate, thus giving the speaker space to manoeuvre and not be entirely specific 
in her/his ideological involvement. This point has greater significance from the 
reader's perspective. In its indeterminate nature, modality opens the door for a variety 
of interpretations thus reflecting the different, yet limited possibilities in interpreting 
the positions communicated in a text. Here, in this limited permitted variability in 
interpretation, the subjectivity of the reader can be captured without running the risk 
of becoming a completely chaotic process. 
In short, the notion of modality adequately serves the pragmatic nature of the 
proposed approach. It works both ~ t t the level of expression and at the level of 
interpretation where both the speaker/writer and the hearer/reader are metaphoric all y 
allowed limited manoeuvre with expressing/interpreting utterances. In this 
manoeuvre, the speaker/writer and hearer/reader are allowed the same space in 
expressinglinterpreting utterances and consequently ideological commitments. Of 
th r 't fons on the \"lIiabilit\' course, the most important aspects of this process are e Iml a 1 <-
Th' 's wh \' the usc of 
within which the meaning of a modal is allowed to manoeuvre, IS I - ' 
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continua is seen as the most adequate framework to express these subjective-
indeterminate interpretative qualities of modality. This is also why different modal 
expressions are placed under more than one modal category within each scale with the 
use of arrows to signify these possible multiple interpretations. 
Answering the questions posed earlier, the justifications behind undertaking 
the project of this thesis are a number of dissatisfactions with the way earlier 
approaches tackled notions such as ideology, modality and the reader. Whether it is a 
narrow view (ideology), a sceptical view (modality) or an unpractical view (the 
reader), earlier treatment of these notions presented unsatisfactory accounts. This 
means that the contribution of this thesis to the field of discourse analysis lies in 
proposing a wider, more inclusive view of ideology, a structured account of modality 
which has practical potential in realistically considering the role reader in discourse 
analysis. This has been achieved, I argue, through a practically workable framework 
which reflects the more acceptable functional view of language in use. 
More importantly, the claims of this thesis are reinforced by the three different 
applications of this framework which targeted three traditionally different genres. The 
main objectives behind these analyses were twofold. First, these analyses were meant 
to emphasise the universality of this framework in transcending historical, 
institutional, structural and functional divisions between genres, especially between 
literary and non-literary texts. It was an attempt to show that language is best analysed 
when considering it in its ideological context with equal emphasis paid to the text and 
its background of production as well as to the text in its context of reception by 
readers who vary in interpretation. It was approaching language in use. 
Second, these analyses were intended to enrich, reinforce or undennine 
different reading of the texts under study. In the case of Heart of Dark1less, the 
298 
analyses were meant to argue for a reading of the novel whl'ch chall d h· f enge t e \"lew 0 
Marlow as a racist, colonialist supporter of western political, religious and moral 
ideologies and values. It was argued that the vagueness of Marlow's words and his 
use of modality in specific did not present inconsistent ideological positions. 
In the case of Bush's and Blair's political speeches, the analyses were 
intended to shed light on the underlying political, economic, religious and moral 
ideologies of the two political parties which they head, and place these in 
juxtaposition with the same ideologies in the two texts. By contrasting the ideologies 
reflected in each speech with those of the political parties which the speech presenters 
represent, it was possible to point out the ideological inconsistencies in the contents of 
these speeches. It was concluded that Blair faced a bigger challenge than Bush since 
his speech constituted an attempt to reconcile fundamentally disparate notions 
(morality and economic interest) in the face of a highly sceptical audience and in the 
light of dubious evidence. His use of modality, it was argued, reflected that 
ideological split. 
Finally, the analyses of two scientific texts were intended to clarify some of 
the linguistic techniques utilised by scientific discourse in the light of positivist and 
post-positivist ideologies. In the first text, the uncertainty arising from the use of 
modality was not seen to undermine the credibility and force of the claims made 
there. In fact, it was argued that that only contributed to reinforcing the view of 
science as an 'objective' field of inquiry whose aim is truthful accounts of scientific 
findings. This, it was argued, served the ideology of continuity and preservation of 
science. In the second text, however, the use of modality greatly undermined the 
persuasive force of the text. The duality in ideological affiliations between the 
'morality' of science and the superseding economic factors led to an apparent 
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inconsistency in ideological positions, reflected adequately through the use of 
modality. 
Based on these arguments, analyses and conclusions, the picture drawn by this 
thesis may seem fairly final. Far from it. There are several areas which need further 
specification, elaboration and, most importantly, empirical corroboration: namely, the 
role of the reader in interpreting modality and the variations in these interpretations. 
In order to support and be more specific in narrowing down the variations in reader 
interpretations, one must account for further group sub-divisions within what 
--
constitutes the notion of 'the reader'. Surely readers with a scientific background 
assign different values to modality than readers with a literary background. And this is 
only within the context of academic institutions. 
In fact, such projects are undertaken by some statisticians and reported in the 
journal Statistical Science. Interestingly, this is not an overtly linguistic project 
(although it is intrinsically linguistic) but an attempt to provide a "codification of 
probability phrases" in order to better understand what writers really mean when they 
use such phrases (Mosteller and Youtz 1990). Attempts are made to propose 
numerical percentage-correspondences of the most common probability phrases, 
namely in scientific discourse. These yielded interesting results such as the fact that 
"certain does not mean 100 percent" (Morris 1990: 1). Also, while some words like 
'even-chance' were seen to be quite precise, others such as 'possible' were seen to 
"vary dramatically among individuals" (Morris 1990: 1). 
The variables considered by a number of statisticians ranged from a 
consideration of different audiences (Wallsten and Budescu 1990) to those which 
emphasised the linguistic and situational contexts in which such expressions were 
found (Hormann 1983). Also, some studies concentrated on the effects the time 
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element has on interpretation. Simpson (1963) for instance studied the variability in 
meaning for 20 quantitative terms by comparing responses of two questionnaires, one 
completed in 1942, the other in 1962. It was seen that the results were strikingly 
similar. 
Again, others like Grigoriu and Mihaescu (1988) focused on possible variance 
in translated expressions of probability. They found that "the average numerical 
values were similar for different professional groups [physicians, medical students. 
and medical related professionals] and very close to the values reported in the English 
-literature" (Grigoriu and Mihaescu 1988: 364). 
On the more overtly linguistic front, Stubbs (1996) concentrated on the 
differences between modality in spoken as opposed to written discourse. He quotes 
Bell (1984) who studied how news stories arriving in New Zealand "in a form 
designed essentially for printed transmission in newspapers" were abbreviated "for 
transmission on radio news" (Stubbs 1996: 228). He then points out how the 
shortening of news stories affects the degree of commitment between the original and 
broadcasted version of the text. 
Similarly, he quotes Slembrouk (1992) who studied how the spoken language 
"of parliamentary debate is represented in a written form" (Stubbs 1996: 228). Again, 
the point i ~ ~ to show how those changes made to the spoken text in order to make it fit 
for written discourse significantly alter the intentions of the speakers and, 
consequently, the content of the message. 
Finally, Badran (2001) emphasises the differences in ideological commitment 
in two versions of the same political text: one in Arabic, the other, a translation into 
English. There he argues that the reasons for the differences in commitment arise 
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mainly due to sloppiness in translating modal expressions, but also because of the 
mismatch between the modal systems in English and Arabic in the first place. 
The possibilities for further research on the topic are, in short, endless. and this 
thesis constitutes one of numerous routes that approaching this topic can take. It 
neither accounts for differences between spoken and written discourse nor does it look 
at cross-linguistic variables which would not only be quite helpful at the theoretical 
level, but also in a classroom situation. Looking at how modality is perceived by 
second language learners as opposed to native speakers of English, for instance, 
--
would be quite useful in drawing cross-linguistic connections between the various 
manifestations of the notion. 
Yet allin-all, the project undertaken in this thesis signals a very realistic 
starting point to future empirical work that should subsequently arise. It represents a 
practical shift from the more theoretical to the more applied, from the more restricted 
and limited to the more inclusive. It is, in short, one major step forward towards the 
pragmatic tendencies of doing discourse analysis. 
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Literary Passage 1 
"The bushes shook, the grass swayed for a time, and then everything stood still in 
attentive immobility. 
"'Now, if he does not say the right thing to them we are all done for,' said the Russian 
at my elbow. The knot of men with the stretcher had stopped, too, halfway to the 
steamer, as if petrified. I saw the man on the stretcher sit up, lank and with an uplifted 
arm, above the shoulders of the bearers. 'Let us hope that the man who can talk so 
well of love in general will find some particular reason to spare us this time,' I said. I 
resented bitterly the absurd danger of our situation, as if to be at the mercy of that 
atrocioos phantom had been a dishonouring necessity. I could not hear a sound, but 
through my glasses I saw the thin arm extended commandingly, the lower jaw 
moving, the eyes of that apparition shining darkly far in its bony head that nodded 
with grotesque jerks. Kurtz -- Kurtz -- that means short in German -- don't it? Well, 
the name was as true as everything else in his life -- and death. He looked at least 
seven feet long. His covering had fallen off, and his body emerged from it pitiful and 
appalling as from a winding-sheet. I could see the cage of his ribs all astir, the bones 
of his arm waving. It was as though an animated image of death carved out of old 
ivory had been shaking its hand with menaces at a motionless crowd of men made of 
dark and glittering bronze. I saw him open his mouth wide -- it gave him a weirdly 
voracious aspect, as though he had wanted to swallow all the air, all the earth, all the 
men before him. A deep voice reached me faintly. He must have been shouting. He 
fell back suddenly. The stretcher shook as the bearers staggered forward again, and 
almost at the same time I noticed that the crowd of savages was vanishing without any 
perceptible movement of retreat. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Literary Passage 2A 
The Intended: You knew him well. 
Marlow: Intimacy grows quickly out there. I knew him as well as it is possible for 
one man to know another. 
The Intended: And you admired him. It was impossible to know him and not to 
admire him. Was it? 
Marlow: He was a remarkable man. It was impossible not to ... 
The Intended: Love him. How true! How true! But when you think that no one knew 
him so well as I! I had all his noble confidence. I knew him best. 
Marlow: You knew him best. 
The Intended: You were his friend. His friend. You must have been, ifhe had given 
you this and sent you to me. I feel I can speak to you - and oh! I must speak. I want 
you- you who have heard his last words- to know I have been worthy of him ... It is 
not pride ... Yes! I am proud to know I understood him better than anyone on earth- he 
told me so himself. And since his mother died I have had no one - no one - to - to -
Who was not his friend who had heard him speak once? He drew men towards him by 
what was best in them. It is the gift of the great. But you have heard him! You know ~ ~
Marlow: Yes, I know. 
The Intended: What a loss to me- to us! To the world. I have been very happy - very 
fortunate - very proud. Too fortunate. Too happy for a little while. And now I am 
unhappy for- for life. And of all this, of all his promise, and of all his greatness, of his 
generous mind, of his noble heart, nothing remains - nothing but a memory. You and 
I -
Marlow: We shall always remember him. 
The Intended: No! It is impossible that all this should be lost - that such a life should 
be sacrificed to leave nothing- but sorrow. You know what vast plans he had. I knew 
of them too - I could not perhaps understand - but others knew of them. Something 
must remain. His words, at least have not died. 
Marlow: His words will remain. 
The Intended: And his example. Men looked up to him- his goodness shone in every 
act. His example _ L 
Marlow: True, his example too. Yes, his example. I forgot that. . 
The Intended: But I do not. I cannot - I cannot believe - not yet. I cannot beheve that 
I shall never see him again, that nobody will see him again, never, never, never. He 
died as he Ii ved. 
Marlow: His end was in every way worthy of his life. 
The Intended: And I was not with him. 
Marlow: Everything that could be done - . 
The Intended: Ah but I believed in him more than anyone on earth - more than hIS 
Own mother m o r ~ ~ than - himself. He needed me! Me! I would have treasured e\'Cry 
, 
sigh, every word, every sign, every glance. 
Marlow: Don't .' . 
Th I t d d F · I I have mourned so long in silence- In sIlence ... 't l)U e n en e: orgl ve me. - - " " d h' 
were with him _ to the last? I think of his loneliness. Nobody near to understan 1m 
as I would have understood. Perhaps no one to hear ... 
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Marlow: To the very end. I heard his very last words ... 
The Intended: Repeat them. I want - I want - something - something _ to _ to live 
with. His last word- to live with. Don't you understand I loved him _ I loved him _ I 
loved him! 
Marlow: The last word he pronounced was - your name. 
The Intended: I knew it - I was sure. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Literary Passage 2B 
'You knew him well,' she munnured after a moment ofm . '1 
' ournlTIg S1 ence. 
"'Intimacy grows quickly out there,' I said. 'I knew him as well as it is possible 
for one man to know another.' 
. " ' A ~ d d you ad.mired him,' she said. 'It was impossible to know him and not to 
adffilre hIm. Was It?' 
"'He was a remarkable man,' I said, unsteadily. Then before the appealing fixity 
of her ~ a z e , , that seemed to watch for more words on my lips I went on 'It 
. 'bl ' ,was Impossl e not to --' 
'''Love him,' she finished eagerly, silencing me into an appalled dumbness. 'How 
true! how truel But when you think that no one knew him so well as I! I had all his 
noble confidence. I knew him best.' 
"'You knew him best,' I repeated. And perhaps she did. But with every word 
spoken the room was growing darker, and only her forehead, smooth and white, 
remained illumined by the unextinguishable light of belief and love. 
'''You were his friend,' she went on. 'His friend,' she repeated, a little louder. 'You 
must have been, if he had gi ven you this, and sent you to me. I feel I can speak to you 
-- and oh! I must speak. I want you -- you who have heard his last words -- to know I 
have been worthy of him .... It is not pride .... Yes! I am proud to know I understood 
him better than anyone on earth -- he told me so himself. And since his mother died I 
have had no one -- no one -- to -- to --' 
"I listened. The darkness deepened. I was not even sure whether he had given me 
the right bundle. I rather suspect he wanted me to take care of another batch of his 
papers which, after his death, I saw the manager examining under the lamp. And the 
girl talked, easing her pain in the certitude of my sympathy; she talked as thirsty men 
drink. I had heard that her engagement with Kurtz had been disapproved by her 
people. He wasn't rich enough or something. And indeed I don't know whether he had 
not been a pauper all his life. He had given me some reason to infer that it was his 
impatience of comparative poverty that drove him out there. 
"' ... Who was not his friend who had heard him speak once?' she was saying. 'He 
drew men towards him by what was best in them.' She looked at me with intensity. 'It 
is the gift of the great,' she went on, and the sound of her low voice seemed to have 
the accompaniment of all the other sounds, full of mystery, desolation, and sorrow. I 
had ever heard -- the ripple of the river, the soughing of the trees s\\'ayed by the WInd. 
the munnurs of the crowds, the faint ring of incomprehensible words cried from afar. 
the whisper of a voice speaking from beyond the threshold of an eternal darkness. 'But 
you have heard him ! You know!' she cried. 
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"'Yes, I know,' I said with something like despair in my heart but b . 
b f .. , owmg m: head e ore the fatth that was tn her, before that great and saving illusion th t h 
with an unearthly glow in the darkness, in the triumphant darkness from W h ~ c ~ ~ I ~ : e u l d d
not have defended her -- from which I could not even defend myself. 
" ' W h a ~ ~ a loss to me ~ ~ to us!' -- s h ~ ~ corrected herself with beautiful generosity: 
then added tn a murmur, To the world. By the last gleams of twilight I could see the 
glitter of her eyes, full of tears -- of tears that would not fall. 
"'I have been very happy -- very fortunate -- very proud,' she went on. 'Too 
fortunate. Too happy for a little while. And now I am unhappy for -- for life.' 
"She stood u p ~ ~ her fair hair seemed to catch all the remaining light in a glimmer 
of gold. I rose, too. 
"'And of all this,' she went on mournfully, 'of all his promise, and of all his 
greatness, of his generous mind, of his noble heart, nothing remains -- nothing but a 
memory. You and I --' 
"'We shall always remember him,' I said hastily. 
"'No!' she cried. 'It is impossible that all this should be lost -- that such a life 
should be sacrificed to leave nothing -- but sorrow . You know what vast plans he had. 
I knew of them, too -- I could not perhaps understand -- but others knew of them. 
Something must remain. His words, at least, have not died.' 
"'His words will remain,' I said. 
"'And his example,' she whispered to herself. 'Men looked up to him -- his 
goodness shone in every act. His example -' 
"'True,' I said; 'his example, too. Yes, his example. I forgot that.' 
"'But I do not. I cannot -- I cannot believe -- not yet. I cannot believe that I shall 
never see him again, that nobody will see him again, never, never, never.' 
"She put out her arms as if after a retreating figure, stretching t ~ e m m back and 
with clasped pale hands' across the fading and narrow sheen of the wmdow. Never see 
him! I saw him clearly enough then. I shall see this eloquent p h a ~ t o n : : as ~ o n g g as I 
live, and I shall see her, too, a tragic and familiar Shade, resemblmg m thIS gesture 
another one, tragic also, and bedecked with powerless charms, stretching ?are brown 
arms over the glitter of the infernal stream, the stream of darkness. She SaId suddenly 
very low, 'He died as he lived.' 
"'His end,' said I, with dull anger stirring in me, 'was in every way worthy of his 
life. ' 
"'And I was not with him,' she murmured. My anger subsided before a feeling of 
infinite pity. 
"'Everything that could be done -- ' I mumbled. 
"'Ah, but I believed in him more than anyone on earth -- more than his own 
mother, more than -- himself. He needed me! Me! I would have treasured e\en sioh 
every word, every sign, every glance.' . b' 
"I felt like a chill grip on my chest. 'Don't,' I said, in a muffled voice. 
"'Forgive me. I -- I have mourned so long in silence -- in silence .... You \vere 
with him -- to the last? I think of his loneliness. Nobody near to understand him as I 
would have understood. Perhaps no one to hear. ... ' 
"'To the very end,' I said, shakily. 'I heard his very last words .... ' I stopped in a 
fright. 
"'Repeat them,' she murmured in a heart-broken tone. 'I want -- I want __ 
something -- something -- to -- to live with.' 
"I was on the point of crying at her, 'Don't you hear them?' The dusk was 
repeating them in a persistent whisper all around us, in a whisper that seemed to swell 
menacingly like the first whisper of a rising wind. 'The horror! The horror!' 
"'His last word -- to live with,' she insisted. 'Don't you understand I loved him -- I 
loved him -- I loved him!' 
"I pulled myself together and spoke slowly. 
"'The last word he pronounced was -- your name.' 
"I heard a light sigh and then my heart stood still, stopped dead short by an 
exulting and terrible cry, by the cry of inconceivable triumph and of unspeakable 
pain. 'I knew it -- I was sure!' ... She knew. She was sure. I heard her weeping; she had 
hidden her face in her hands. It seemed to me that the house would collapse before I 
could escape, that the heavens would fall upon my head. But nothing happened. The 
heavens do not fall for such a trifle. Would they have fallen, I wonder, if I had 
rendered Kurtz that justice which was his due? Hadn't he said he wanted only justice? 
But I couldn't. I could not tell her. It would have been too dark -- too dark 
altogether .... " 
APPENDIX 4 
President Bush Announces Military Strikes in Afghanistan 
The White House 
Office of the Press Secretary 
October 7, 2001 
Statement by the President The Treaty Room 1:00 P.M. EDT 
THE P ~ S I D E ~ T : : Good afternoon. On my orders, the United States military has 
beg.un s t n k ~ s s a ~ a 1 n s t t al Q ~ e d a a terrorist training camps and military installations of the 
T.ahban regIme m A f g h a ~ l s t a n . . These carefully targeted actions are designed to 
dISrupt the use of Afghamstan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the 
militarl capability of the Taliban regime. 
We are joined in this operation by our staunch friend, Great Britain. Other close 
friends, including Canada, Australia, Germany and France, have pledged forces as the 
operation unfolds. More than 40 countries in the Middle East, Africa, Europe and 
across Asia have granted air transit or landing rights. Many more have shared 
intelligence. We are supported by the collecti ve will of the world. 
More than two weeks ago, I gave Taliban leaders a series of clear and specific 
demands: Close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; 
and return all foreign nationals, including American citizens, unjustly detained in your 
country. None of these demands were met. And now the Taliban will pay a price. By 
destroying camps and disrupting communications, we will make it more difficult for 
the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans. 
Initially, the terrorists may burrow deeper into caves and other entrenched hiding 
places. Our military action is also designed to clear the way for sustained, 
comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice. 
At the same time, the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of 
America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we'll also drop food, medicine 
and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of 
Afghanistan. 
The United States of America is a friend to the Afghan people, and we are the friends 
of almost a billion worldwide who practice the Islamic faith. The United States of 
America is an enemy of those who aid terrorists and of the barbaric criminals who 
profane a great religion by committing murder in its name. 
This military action is a part of our campaign against terrorism, anothe.r front ~ n n a v.:ar 
that has already been joined through diplomacy, intelligence, the f r e ~ z I n g g of f I n a ~ c l a l l
assets and the arrests of known terrorists by law enforcement agents In 38 c o u ~ t n e s . .
Given the nature and reach of our enemies, we will win this conflict by th.e p ~ t l e n t t
accumulation of successes, by meeting a series of challenges with determInatIOn and 
will and purpose. 
Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader Every t' h h . 
. '. . na Ion as a c Oice to 
make. In thIS conflIct, there IS no neutral ground If any govern t h 
" . men sponsors t e 
outlaws and killers of m ~ o c e n t s , , they have become outlaws and murderers. 
themselves. And they WIll take that lonely path at their own peril. 
I'm speaking to you today from the Treaty Room of the White House a pIa 'h 
. . , ce \\ ere 
Amencan PresIdents have worked for peace. We're a peaceful nation. Yet. as \\e have 
learned, so suddenly and so tragically, there can be no peace in a world of sudden 
terror. In the face of today's new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue 
those who threaten it. 
We di? nO.t ask for. this mission, but we will fulfill it. The name of today's military 
operatIOn IS Endunng Freedom. We defend not only our precious freedoms, but also 
the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear. 
I know many Americans feel fear today. And our government is taking strong 
precautions. All law enforcement and intelligence agencies are working aggressively 
around America, around the world and around the clock. At my request, many . 
governors have activated the National Guard to strengthen airport security. We have 
called up Reserves to reinforce our military capability and strengthen the protection of 
our homeland. 
In the months ahead, our patience will be one of our strengths -- patience with the 
long waits that will result from tighter security; patience and understanding that it will 
take time to achieve our goals; patience in all the sacrifices that may come. 
Today, those sacrifices are being made by members of our Armed Forces who now 
defend us so far from home, and by their proud and worried families. A Commander-
in-Chief sends America's sons and daughters into a battle in a foreign land only after 
the greatest care and a lot of prayer. We ask a lot of those who wear our uniform. We 
ask them to leave their loved ones, to travel great distances, to risk injury, even to be 
prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives. They are dedicated, they are 
honorable; they represent the best of our country. And we are grateful. 
To all the men and women in our military -- every sailor, every soldier, every airman, 
every coastguardsman, every Marine -- I say this: Your mission is defined; your 
objectives are clear; your goal is just. You have my full confidence, and you will have 
every tool you need to carry out your duty. 
I recently received a touching letter that says a l ~ t t about the .state of ~ m e r i c , ~ ~ in these 
difficult times -- a letter from a 4th-grade girl, WIth a father In the mIlItary: As much 
as I don't want my Dad to fight," she wrote, "I'm willing to give him to you." 
This is a precious gift, the greatest she could g i v ~ . . This y o u ~ g g girl knows what. 
America is all about. Since September 11, an entire generatIOn of young A m e n ~ a n s s
has gained new understanding of the value of freedom, and its cost in duty and In 
sacrifice. 
The battle is now joined on many fronts. We will n o ~ ~ waver: .we will not tire: we will 
not falter; and we will not fail. Peace and freedom wIll prevail. 
Thank you. May God continue to bless America. 
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APPENDIX 5 
STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER, TONY BLAIR D O ' Y ~ I ~ G G
STREET, SUNDAY 7 OCTOBER 2001 ,. . 
'START OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST TARGETS IN A F G H A ~ I S T A ~ ' '
As you will know from the announcement by President Bush mI'lI'tary t' , 
, , , ac Ion agaInst 
targets InsIde Afghamstan has begun, I can confirm that UK forces ar d' h· 
" e engage In t IS 
actIOn. I want to pay tnbute if I might right at the outset to Britain's arm d f 
Th 
' e orces, 
, ere,Is no ,greater strength for a British Prime Minister and the British nation at a 
tIme lIke thIS than to know that the forces we are calling upon are amongst the yery 
best in the world, . 
They and their families are, of course, carrying an immense burden at this moment 
a n ~ ~ will be feelin? deep anxiety as will the British people, But we can take pride in 
theIr cOClrage, theIr sense of duty and the esteem with which they're held throughout 
the world. 
No country lightly commits forces to military action and the inevitable risks involved 
but we made it clear following the attacks upon the United States on 11 September 
that we would take part in action once it was clear who was responsible. 
There is no doubt in my mind, nor in the mind of anyone who has been through all the 
available evidence, including intelligence material, that these attacks were carried out 
by the al-Qaeda network masterminded by Osama bin Laden. Equally it is clear that 
his network is harboured and supported by the Taliban regime inside Afghanistan. 
It is now almost a month since the atrocity occurred, it is more than two weeks since 
an ultimatum was delivered to the Taliban to yield up the terrorists or face the 
consequences. It is clear beyond doubt that they will not do this. They were given the 
choice of siding with justice or siding with terror and they chose to side with terror. 
There are three parts all equally important to the operation of which we're engaged: 
military, diplomatic and humanitarian. The military action we are taking will be 
targeted against places we know to be involved in the operation of terror or against 
the military apparatus of the Taliban. This military plan has been put together mindful 
of our determination to do all we humanly can to avoid civilian casualties. 
I cannot disclose, obviously, how long this action will last but we will act with reason 
and resolve. We have set the objectives to eradicate Osama bin Laden's network of 
terror and· to take action against the Taliban regime that is sponsoring it. As to the 
precise British involvement I can confirm that last Wednesday the US Government 
made a specific request that a number of UK military assets be used in the operation 
which has now begun. And I gave authority for these assets to be deployed, They 
include the base at Diego Garcia, reconnaissance and flight s u p p o ~ ~ aircraft a ~ d d
missile firing submarines, Missile firing submarines are in use tOnIght. The aIr assets 
will be available for use in the coming days. 
The United States are obviously providing the bulk of the force required in leading 
this operation. But this is an international effort as well as UK. F r a ~ c e , , G e r m a n ~ ' . .
Australia and Canada have also committed themselves to take part In the operatIon. 
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On the diplomatic and political front in the time I've been P . "·1" I 
. . nme .v mIster cannot 
recall a sItuatIon that has commanded so quickly such a p rf 1 l' . . 
d . f . . owe u coa Ihon ot support an n o ~ ~ Just rom those countnes dIrectly involved in military action but from many 
others m a ~ l l parts of the w?rld. The coalition has, I believe, strengthened not 
weakened In the 26 d a ~ s s SInce t ~ e e atrocity occurred. And this is in no small measure 
due to the statesmanshIp of PresIdent Bush to whom I pay tribute tonight. 
T h ~ ~ w o ~ l d d understands that whilst, of course, there are dangers in acting the dangers 
of mactI.on are far, far greater. The threat of further such outrages, the threat to our 
economIes, the threat to the stability of the world. 
On the humanitarian front we are assembling a coalition of support for refuaees in and 
outside Afghanistan which is as vital as the military coalition. Even before 11 
September four million Afghans were on the move. There are two million refuaees in 
Pakistan and one and a half million in Iran. We have to act for humanitarian re:sons 
to alleviate the appalling suffering of the Afghan people and deliver stability so that 
people.irom that region stay in that region. Britain, of course, is heavily involved in 
that effort. 
So we are taking action therefore on all those three fronts: military, diplomatic and 
humanitarian. I also want to say very directly to the British people why this matters so 
much directly to Britain. First let us not forget that the attacks of the 11 September 
represented the worst terrorist outrage against British citizens in our history. The 
murder of British citizens, whether it happens overseas or not, is an attack upon 
Britain. But even if no British citizen had died it would be right to act. 
This atrocity was an attack on us all, on people of all faiths and people of none. We 
know the al-Qaeda network threaten Europe, including Britain, and, indeed, any 
nation throughout the world that does not share their fanatical views. So we have a 
direct interest in acting in our own self defence to protect British lives. It was also an 
attack not just on lives but on livelihoods. We can see since 11 September how 
economic confidence has suffered with all that means for British jobs and British 
industry. Our prosperity and standard of living, therefore, require us to deal with this 
terrorist threat. 
We act also because the al-Qaeda network and the Taliban regime are funded in large 
part on the drugs trade. 90 per cent of all the heroin sold on British streets originates 
from Afghanistan. Stopping that trade is, again, directly in our interests. 
I wish to say finally, as I've said many times before, that this is n.ot a war with I ~ l a m . .
It angers me, as it angers the vast majority of Muslims, t ~ ~ hear bm L a d ~ n n and hIS . 
associates described as Islamic terrorists. They are terronsts pure and SImple. Islam IS 
a peaceful and tolerant religion and the acts of these people are wholly contrary to the 
teachings of the Koran. 
These are difficult and testing times therefore for all of us. People are bound to be . 
concerned about what the terrorists may seek to do in response. I should say t h ~ r e e IS at 
present no specific credible threat to the UK that we know of an.d that we have I ~ ~ , 
place tried and tested contingency plans which are the best pOSSIble response to any 
further attempts at terror. 
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This, of course, is a moment of the utmost gravity for the world. None of the leaders 
involved in this action want war. None of our nations want it. We are a peaceful 
people. But we know that sometimes to safeguard peace we have to fight. Britain has 
learnt that lesson many times in our history. We only do it if the cause is just. This 
cause is just. The murder of almost seven thousand innocent people in America was 
an attack on our freedom, our way of life, an attack on civilised values the world over. 
We waited so that those responsible could be yielded up by those shielding them. That 
offer was refused, we have now no choice so we will act. And our determination in 




Metabolism and Tissue Distribution of Vitamin A 
Animal species lack the biochemical pathways necessary to s th' h . 
" " yn eSIze t e carotenOId 
structure, a precursor of vItamIn A. VItamIn A is a generic tenn f d' h 
. . . . . or compo un s \"1 t 
the bIOlogIcal actIvIty of retInal and was initially called fat solubl A " b 'b 
. h 11 . . . .. e , as It 1 S a SOl ed 
In t e sma IntestIne WIth hpids. Carotenoids are likewise absorbed d I' . 
". . an are sp It In 
the IntestInal mucosa Into two molecules of retInal which is then reduc d t t' I 
R . I d . . e 0 re InO . etInO :e uctase IS a zInc-dependent enzyme and there is evidence of reduced 
converSIon of B-carotene to retinol in zinc deficiency. Retinol is then re-esterified 
with u n s a ~ u r a t e d d !atty acids and transported in chylomicrons to the liver. At the liver, 
the ester lInkage IS hydrolysed and the molecule enters the liver cells as retinol where 
it is re-esterified and stored associated with lipid droplets. The esterification of' retinol 
is a n a l ~ g o u s s to that of o t h ~ r r cellular lipids, such as cholesterol, and is catalysed by 
~ a t t y y a c y ~ ~ c o ~ n z y m e e A retInol acyl transferase. Much retinol (19% of liver vitamin A) 
IS found In hIgh molecular weight lipoprotein complex in rat liver cytosol; this 
complex also contains the cytosol - retinol-binding protein, retinyl palmitate 
hydrolase as well as triolein, cholesterol oleate, and dipalmitoyl phosphatidylcholine 
hydroslase activities. The complex was isolated by gel filteration and 
ultracentrifugation, but it may represent an artifact generated during tissue 
homofenization. The principal liver cell involved in storage of retinol is the Ito or 
stellate cell which can be found in the space of Disse adjacent to the sinusoids. If 
retinol is required by the peripheral tissues, it is transported by a retinol-binding 
protein, which is synthesized in the liver and migrates with the serum globulins; this 
protein associates with prealbumin, presumably to fonn a larger molecule that is not 
filtered by the glomerulus. The retinol-binding protein concentration in plasma and 
plasma retinol is increased in chronic renal disease and estimation of retinol-binding 
protein in urine has recently been proposed as a means of detecting disturbed renal 
tubular function. Retinol-binding protein interacts with specific cell surface receptors 
at the retinol requiring peripheral tissues. Free retinol exerts a detergent-like action on 
membranes and is responsible for vitamin A toxicity effects. 
The synthesis and secretion of retinol-binding protein is regulated by vitamin 
A status, which is decreased in deficiency states, and by factors that alter liver protein 
synthesis. There is evidence that retinol is metabolized to retinoic acid in several 
. species; retinoic acid has all the biological properties of retinol except that it will not 
support vision and reproductive functions. However, recent evidence suggests that 
retinoic acid stimulates testosterone production by Leydig cells in the testis. There is 
some in vivo isomerization of all-trans retinoic acid to 13-cis-retinoic acid, which is 
further metabolized as to more polar derivatives such as 5,6-epoxy retinoic acid and 
4-hydrozy-and 4-oxo derivatives in various rat tissues, i ~ c l u ? i n g g liver. There is a 
retinoic acid 5,6-epoxidase in rat kidney microsomes whIch IS d e p e ~ d e n t t on A ~ p . ' '
NADPH and 02. It is stimulated by Fe2+ and has properties like mIcrosomal lIpId 
p r e o x i d a ~ e s . . If epoxidation is blocked, the function of retinoic a c i ~ ~ is n ~ t t i n h i b . i t ~ d , ,
suggesting that epoxidation is not a necessary m e t ~ b o l ~ c c step f ~ r r bIOlogIcal actl vlt1'. 
The reaction is probably a non-specific lipid ? e r O X I ~ a ~ I O n n reactIO.n. ~ h e e ~ - o s o o a n ~ ~ 5 : ~ ~
epoxy metabolites appear to have less biologIcal actI.vIty t ~ a n n retInOl.c. aCId. H o ~ , , C\. CI . 
there are multiple metabolites which are at least ~ r u : I a l l y y tIssue s p e c . I ~ l c c ~ n d d retInOIds 
induce retinoic acid metabolism in vitamin A-defICIent hamsters. OXIdatIOn of 
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retinoic acid ~ s s believed to b ~ ~ mediate? by a cytochrome P-type enzyme system. 
However, retmol-B-glucuromde, a major metabolite of retinoic acid in the small 
intestine that is also produced by incubating 5,6-epoxy retinoic acid with uridine 
diphospho 1 a-D-glucuronic acid in the presence of liver micorsomes, has increased 
biological activity and may be either an active metabolite or a tolerated modification. 
The suggestion has been made that glucuronidation ensures conservation of vitamin A 
in the body by enterohepatic circulation; retinol, retinoic acid and 13-cis-retinoic acid 
are likewise excreted in the bile as ~ - g l u c u r o n i d a t i o n n in the presence of uridine 
diphosphoglucuronic acid (UDPGA). As the 4-hydroxylation reaction may represent a 
catabolic pathway, this could account for the decrease in liver vitamin A in rats 
consuming ethanol. In human skin extracts, the major retinoids are all-trans-retinol 
and 3,4-dehydroretinol, the latter compound being found in dyskeratotic skin where 
its further metabolism may be defective. 
Liver stores of vitamin A are probably the best index of vitamin A status: 
plasma levels of vitamin A show little correlation with dietary intake and reflect the 
amoun!. of plasma retinol-binding protein. Plasma levels may decline when the liver 
stores are exhausted. If a dose of radioactively labelled retinol is given to a deficient 
rat, there is an increase in the excretion of labelled metabolites in urine is comparison 
with an animal of normal vitamin A status. This is because incoming retinol in such 
circumstances is preferentially utilized by the peripheral tissues rather than stored. 
The minimum liver concentration of retinol necessary to favor storage rather than 
immediate turnover and breakdown is 60 IU/g liver. When animals or humans are 
subjected to a variety of stressful stimuli, there is a decrease in serum vitamin A, 
although there is no change in the amount of the vitamin in the Ii ver or testis. There is 
evidence that the low serum vitamin A is due to increased renal loss in these 
circumstances. During stress there is an accumulation of vitamin A in the enlarged 
adrenal glands. The suggestion that vitamin A plays an essential role in steroid 
hormone dynamics is borne out by the fact that vitamin A accumulates preferentially 
in the adrenal glands when the vitamin is first administered to animals depleted of 
vitamin A. 
Interestingly, liver vitamin A stores are very low in alcoholics e ~ e n n with mild 
liver damage, even though plasma vitamin A levels are often normal: th.IS has s o m ~ ~
possible bearing on the increased risk of hepatic neoplasm in persons wIth alcoholIc 
cirrhosis. 
Both uptake and liver storage of vitamin A are e q ~ a l l y y e f f ~ c t i v e e when the 
vitamin is administered in an aqueous suspension or an OIly solutIOn, thus .. 
administration of vitamin A and E in solutions given for total parentaf nutnt.IOn (TPN) 
maintains blood levels and leads to storage. Illness, infections and prematunty affect 
both the storage and tissue requirements of vitamins A and E. 
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Cardiovascular diseases, especially myocardial infarction (heart attack) and t k kill I 12" s ro e, ~ t t ~ a s t t m ~ l h o n n people each year throughout the world. In the United States, 
cardIovascular dIseases are the primary cause in about half of all deaths. In 1995 
cardiovascular diseases killed about 455,000 men and 505,000 women. 
None of this is news, of course. What is news is that in the U.S. between 13,500 to 
50,000 of these deaths could easily be prevented by taking just 25 cents worth of 
vitamin supplements a day. 
For a mere quarter's worth of vitamins, you can significantly eliminate a major 
independent risk factor for heart attack or stroke. You can't even buy a candy bar for a 
quarter an y more. 
This is not a hyperbole. This is not snake oil. This is not some quack cure. This is 
hard science, incontrovertible evidence, based on the results of hundreds of studies 
going back more than 30 years. Although conservative organizations like the 
American Heart Association (AHA) still refuse to endorse the conclusions of these 
studies and to recommend that people take these vitamin supplements, the conclusions 
are strongly supported by numerous articles and editorials that have appeared in the 
two most prestigious American medical journals, the Journal of the American Medical 
Association and the New England Journal of Medicine, as well as many other 
journals. 
We are referring to the link between the amino acid homocysteine and cardiovascular 
disease and the fact that supplements of vitamins B6 and B 12, folic acid, and betaine 
(trimethylglycine, TMG) have been proven to sever that link. 
Homocysteine is an amino acid formed from the metabolism of another amino acid, 
methionine, which is commonly found in meats-especially red meat. High 
homocysteine levels are now widely recognized as an independent risk factor for 
cardiovascular disease. This means that high homocysteine levels along with cigarette 
smoking, obesity, high blood pressure, high-fat diet, diabetes, and a sedentary life 
style increase your risk of developing cardiovascular disease a n ~ ~ dying of a ~ e a r t t
attack or stroke. Taking supplemental B6, B 12, folic acid, and t n m ~ t h y l g l ~ c I . n e e . 
quickly and effectively restores homocysteine to safe levels, essentIally elImInatIng 
this very important risk, often within a few days (although the damage done by long-
term elevated homocysteine takes longer to resol\'e). 
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Homocysteine Increases Cardiovascular Risk 
More than 20 case-control and cross-sectional studies on more th J 000 b' 
h 'd d h H '" an -, su ~ e c t s save provI e w at arvard epIdemIOlogIst Meir J. Stampfer MD ~ ~ II - " k bl . 
. "f' d" , ,ca s remar a \ 
consIstent In Ings regardmg the relationship between h . I I . 
. . . . omocysteme e\e sand 
cardIovascular dIseases. SpecIfIcally patients wI'th stroke d th d' I 
. ' an 0 er car lOvascu ar 
dIseases tend to have hIgher blood levels of homocysteI'ne (h h " ) 
. . . yper omocvstememla 
than subjects wIthout dIsease. . 
S t ~ m p f e r r p o ~ n t s s ~ u t t that h o m o c y s t e i ~ e e l e v ~ l s s do not have to be elevated by very much 
to I n c ~ e a s e e nsk, SInce most of the patIents In these studies had levels that were within 
what ~ s s ~ e n e r a l l y y regarded to be the normal range.3 A meta-analysis found a positi\'e 
assocIatIon between hyperhomocysteinemia and thrombosis (formation of clots in 
bloo.d v e s s e l ~ ) ) in eight out of 10 studies involving 2,400 patients. In these eight 
studIes, the nsk of thrombosis was two to 13 times greater in people with 
hyperhomocysteinemia.9 
--
One ~ r o s s - ~ e c t i o n a l l study conducted by Dr. Jacob Selhub of Tufts University and his 
assocIates, Involved more than 1,000 elderly people from the long-running 
Framingham Heart StUdy. The investigators examined the relationship between the 
degree of carotid artery blockage (stenosis) and plasma homocysteine levels. After 
adjusting for other risk factors, they found that those individuals with the highest 
levels of homocysteine had twice the risk of a carotid stenosis than those with the 
lowest levels. Moreover, the authors reported that those patients who had the most 
carotid artery stenosis had the lowest intake of folic acid and vitamin B6.5 
The Physicians" Health Study, a Harvard-based study that tracked nearly 15,000 male 
physicians (aged 40-84 years) for up to five years, came to a similar conclusion. At 
the start of the study, none of the physicians had ever suffered a heart attack or stroke. 
During the course of the study, 271 of the men subsequently suffered a heart attack. 
When the researchers compared the homocysteine levels in these men with those of 
matched controls who had remained healthy, they found that the men whose 
homocysteine levels were in the highest five percent had about three times the risk of 
heart attack as those with the lowest levels. "Because high levels [of homocysteine] 
can often be easily treated with vitamin supplements, homocysteine may be an 
independent, modifiable risk factor," the authors concluded.4 
Homocysteine'S role as an independent risk factor for cardiO-vascular diseases was 
confirmed in a large multicenter European study that included researchers from nine 
different countries. The results showed a 2.2-fold greater incidence of cardiovascular 
disease in those whose homocysteine levels were in the top 20%. Although only a 
small number of the subjects in this study were taking vitamin supplements, the 
authors noted that those who were taking supplements appeared to have a 
"substantially lower risk of vascular disease, a proportion of which was attributable to 
lower plasma homocysteine levels. " 11 
Why Homocysteine Levels Rise 
High homocysteine in the blood can arise from three primary causes. The, first is a 
genetic defect that impairs homocysteine metabolism. Actually, s e v ~ r a l l different . 
genetic defects related to the formation of the various enzymes reqUired ~ o o metabolIze 
homocysteine have been identified. The most serious defects may result In premature 
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death, as in the cases McCully encountered early in h" " 
I ' IS mveStIgatIOns. More common are ess severe defects, whIch may produce mild or mod t I ' f 
. era e e evatIOns 0 
homocysteIne. These defects are quite common occum'ng I' h 30 C7. f h 
. , n per aps ie 0 t e 
populatIon, and may account, at least in part for the inhen'tabl'l't f d' I disease.3 'I Y 0 car IOvascu ar 
You can also elevate your homocysteine levels by consuffil'ng t h h' , 
. 00 muc met IOnme-
nch food. Recall that the converts methionine directly into homocysteine. 
~ l t h o u g h h the ,high fat content of c e r t ~ i n n meats is usually blamed for increasing the 
nsk of heart dIsease and stroke, the hIgh methionine content of meat may be equall \' 
culpable. -
P r o b a b ~ y y ~ h e e most i ~ p o r t a n t t contribution to elevated homocysteine levels for most 
people IS Inadequate lntake of folic acid, vitamins B6 and B12, and betaine. No matter 
what the cause of h ~ p e r h o m o c y s t e i n e m i a , , even when there is a genetic defect, it is 
a l m o s \ ~ l . l w a y s s possIble. to reduce levels to the healthy range by taking sufficient 
quantItIes of these nutntional supplements. 
Given the deadly consequences of elevated homocysteine, the ease with which 
homocysteine levels can be brought down and maintained within the safe range by 
taking vitamin supplements containing folic acid (folate), vitamin B6 (pyridoxine), 
vitamin B 12, and betaine is truly remarkable. 
Keeping Homocysteine Levels Low 
Study after study has demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that the risks 
associated with elevated homocysteine can be quickly and easily eliminated by taking 
adequate amounts of folic acid, vitamins B6 and B 12, and betaine. Selhub's 1993 
cross-sectional analysis of people from the Framingham study, for example, found 
that (1) homocysteine levels increased with age, (2) plasma homocysteine levels 
dropped as folate intake increased, and (3) 67% of the cases of 
hyperhomocysteinemia were related to inadequate plasma concentrations of one or 
more of the B vitamins.20 
In a German study, injections of folate and vitamin B6 reduced homocysteine 
concentrations in 175 elderly people, with maximum effect seen within five to 12 
days. Homocysteine levels returned to normal in 92% of the vitamin-treated group 
compared with only 20% of those treated with placebo.21 Another study compared 
130 Boston area patients hospitalized with their first heart attack with 118 matched 
controls who had never had a heart attack. The authors found that (1) homocysteine 
levels were 11 % higher in the heart attack patients, (2) dietary and plasma levels of 
vitamin B6 and folate were lower in the heart attack patients, and (3) as intake of 
folate and vitamin B6 increased, the risk of heart attack decreased, independently of 
other risk factors. 17 
While most studies have concentrated on using the B vitamins to normalize 
homocysteine metabolism, some people do not respond to this regimen, possibly 
because of a genetic defect. Studies have shown that by adding betaine to the standard 
B vitamin regimen, homocysteine can be reduced to safe levels in nearly everyone,22, 
23 
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How Much Do You Need? 
To sum up the homocysteine-cardiovascular disease-B-vitamin story, there is no 
doubt that: 
1. As homocysteine levels in the blood stream rise, the risk of 
cardiovascular disease also rises, and vice versa. 
2. Several mechanisms by which homocysteine appears to promote 
atherosclerosis have been identified. 
3. As intake of folic acid, betaine, vitamin B6, and vitamin B 12 
increases, homocysteine levels decline, and vice versa. 
4. On average, as intake of folic acid, betaine, vitamin B6, and vitamin 
B 12 increases, the risk of cardiovascular disease declines, and vice 
versa. 
--5. At the doses recommended for normalizing homocysteine 
metabolism, the B vitamins and betaine appear to be completely safe. 
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